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Chapter I 
Introduction 
How has the Vietnam War affected America's response to international conflicts? 
Have American Presidents been less likely to sanction a US military response to 
international conflicts in the post-Vietnam era? Has their ability to deploy US forces 
been weakened in any way by the Vietnam experience? This study seeks answers to 
these questions by examining how American Presidents responded to some of the 
major international conflicts of the post-Vietnam era, between 1982 and 1995. It 
looks at how they sought to lead America's responses to these conflicts and how far 
they were able to enact, and publicly 'sell', their chosen deployment decisions in the 
face of opposition from within the American public-political arena, especially from 
Congress. 
This focus is steered by one of the most prominent assumptions as to why the 
deployment of US force has been so controversial during the post-Vietnam era. 
Namely, that America's experience of the Vietnam War gave rise to a Vietnam 
Syndrome which has helped to sustain a palpable conflict- aversion within the 
Americans polity. 1 White House efforts to assuage the concerns of domestic 
1 There is a wealth of literary reference to the Vietnam Syndrome. See for example: Michael T. Klare 
(1982), Beyond the "Vietnam Syndrome ". US Interventionism in the 1980s. The Institute of Policy 
Studies; Martin Staniland, 'Africa, the American Intelligentsia, and the Shadow of Vietnam', Political 
Science Quarterly, Vol. 98, No. 4, Winter 1983-1984; Ole R. Holsti & James N. Rosenau (1984), 
American Leadership in World Affairs. Vietnam and the Breakdown of Consensus, George Allen & 
Unwin; Marilyn B. Young (199 1), The Vietnam Wars 1945-1990, Harper Perennial; George C. 
Herring, 'America and Vietnam: The Unending War', Foreign Affairs, Vol. 70, No. 5, Winter 199 1- 
1992; Arnold R. Isaacs (1997), Vietnam Shadows. The War, Its Ghosts and Its Legacy, The Johns 
Hopkins University Press; Charles E. Neu (ed. ) (2000), After Vietnam. Legacies of a Lost War, The 
Johns Hopkins University Press; Jon Roper (2000), The American Presidents. Heroic Leadership 
From Kennedy to Clinton, Edinburgh University Press; Richard Sobel (200 1), The Impact ofPublic 
Opinion on US Foreign Policy Since Vietnam, Oxford University Press, New York; Trevor B. 
McCrisken (2003), American Exceptionalism and the Legacy of Vietnam. US Foreign Policy Since 
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deployment-opponents otherwise have, some commentators contend, been hindered 
by the fact that many Americans have been less trustful of presidential solicitations on 
the use of military force since the Vietnam War, and are 'no longer automatically 
willing to accept arguments involving direct US military intervention'. 2 
Much has been written about the Vietnam Syndrome, its roots, its 
manifestations and its impact upon post-Vietnam US foreign policy. However, less 
attention has been paid to precisely how American Presidents have 'dealt' with the 
Syndrome as they have taken deployment decisions. This study seeks to shed light on 
this area. It examines presidential 'performance' as the White House responded to 
three of the major international conflicts of the post-Vietnam era: Lebanon (1982-84); 
Kuwait (1990-1991) and the fonner Yugoslav republic of Bosnia Herzegovina (1992- 
1995). It examines the decisions that Presidents Reagan, Bush and Clinton took in 
responding to these conflicts, the domestic deployment-opposition they faced as they 
decided to deploy US forces, and how far this opposition hindered their ability to 
enact their chosen policies. Finally, it seeks to illuminate how far the experience of 
the Vietnam War may have influenced these processes. This study asks important 
questions. Has the Vietnam experience really generated greater domestic challenges 
to Presidents wishing to deploy US forces during the post-Vietnam era? Or have 
Presidents continued to dictate and lead policy in this all-important policy area? If 
presidential foreign policymaking was decried as 'hnperial' in the aftennath of the 
1974, Palgrave Macmillan; Lloyd C. Gardner & Marilyn B. Young (eds. ) (2007), Iraq and the Lessons 
of Vietnam. Or How To Not Learn From the Past, The New Press: New York; London. See also, 
Joseph Nye Jr, 'Domestic Environments of U. S. Foreign Policymaking', in Arnold L. Horelick (ed. ) 
(19 86), US-Soviet Relations. The Next Phase, RAND/UCLA Center for the Study of Soviet Behaviour, 
Cornell University Press, 115. 
2 One can, of course, justifiably ask whether the American public has ever 'automatically' accepted 
sucharguments. Young (1991), p. 314; Peter J. Schraeder, 'From Ally to Orphan. Understanding US 
Policy towards Somalia after the Cold War', in James M. Scott (ed. ) (1998), After The End. Making US 
Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War Era, Duke University Press, pp. 346-347; Roper (2000), pp. 3& 
11; Sobel (2001), p. 4; Gardner & Young (2007), p. 8. 
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The Vietnam experience is also widely seen to have left an indelible mark on a 
US military establishment which watched American ground forces decline in both 
discipline and efficiency as the Vietnam campaign progressed. This startling 
degeneration prompted a longstanding Pentagon wariness over involving US troops in 
any foreign crisis which might re-invoke Vietnam's dysfunctions. The deployment- 
caution fomented by the Vietnam experience has evidenced itself with subsequent 
consistency as the military chiefs have counselled post-Vietnam Presidents on the use 
of military force. 5 
It was these various fragmentations and disenchantments - both within and 
out-with government - which, for Lloyd Gardner and Marilyn B. Young, came to be 
referred to as 'the Vietnam Syndrome'. Designated a 'national illness' by Gardner 
and Young, the Syndrome has persisted throughout the post-Vietnam years as 
America has remained fixated by, and frequently divided over, the Vietnam 
experience and what it counsels for the nation's foreign policy. 6 It is this ongoing 
Vietnam fixation which is popularly assumed to underpin the reluctance that many 
Americans feel when they are asked to support the deployment of US forces. 
Repeatedly throughout the post-Vietnam years, commentators have pointed to this 
reluctance as evidence of the nation's fear that the US military 'might once again 
suffer the massive military casualties of Vietnam'. 7 America's apparent deployment- 
aversion has thus become somewhat notorious, a subject of focus and study in its own 
right. Described by Lord David Owen as 'the exposed jugular of American foreign 
policy', the trepidation which America persistently seems to demonstrate when faced 
with the possibility of seeing US troops deployed remains, for many commentators, 
5 On the dysfunctionality of US forces in Vietnam see, for example, Michael Maclear (19 8 1), The Ten 
ThousandDayWar. Vietnam: 1945-1975, Avon Books, chapter 17, especially pp. 269-271 & 279-281. 
6 Gardner & Young (2007), p. 8. 
7 Ibid. 
7 
Vietnam experience, does the evidence of the post-Vietnam period suggest that this 
designation is now redundant? 3 
The Vietnam Syndrome -a brief introduction 
Whilst the roots and the various manifestations of the Vietnam Syndrome will be 
explored in greater depth in the next chapter, it is worth furnishing the reader with a 
brief overview of the concept - and its notional implications for presidential 
leadership on the use of military force - at this early stage. The Vietnam Syndrome 
refers to the fallout from America's involvement in the Vietnam War and the fact that 
America's response to that involvement went far beyond a sombre reflection of 
military defeat and the loss of nearly 60,000 American lives. The nature of America's 
escalating involvement in Vietnam, the various strategies employed in the pursuit of 
victory, and the dominant role played by the White House throughout this period, is 
broadly seen to have fractured America's 'political and cultural consensus' and 
unravelled the nation's traditional constitutional relationships. It left political and 
media critics decrying an 'Imperial Presidency' which had broken America's 
constitutionally mandated checks and balances and had grasped war-making authority 
from Congress. 4 
3 The label 'Imperial Presidency' derives from Arthur Schlesinger's thesis of the same name. See: 
Arthur Schlesinger Jr. (2005), The Imperial Presidency, Mariner Books; reprint edition. See also: 
Richard E. Neustadt (1990), Presidential Power and the Modern Presidents: The Politics ofLeadership 
From Roosevelt to Reagan, New York, Free Press; Norman A. Graebner, 'The President as 
Commander in Chief. A Study in Power', The Journal ofMilitary History, Vol. 57, No. 1, January 
1993; Fred 1. Greenstein (2004), The Presidential Difference: Leadership Stylefrom FDR to George W. 
Bush, Princeton University Press, second revised edition. 
4 Klare (1982), p. 1; Holsti & Roesnau (1984), p. 249. 
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the most vivid sign that the Vietnam Syndrome exists and that it is a potent factor in 
the making of US foreign policymaking. 8 
But precisely how have America's Vietnam-inspired deployment-aversions 
evidenced themselves throughout the post-Vietnam era? And just how much of an 
obstacle has the Vietnam Syndrome really been to American Presidents as they have 
taken deployment decisions throughout this period? In pursuing answers to these 
questions, the study proceeds by acknowledging that whatever 'role' the Vietnam 
Syndrome may have played in post-Vietnam US foreign policyinaking, it certainly 
has not actually proscribed force deployments. This acknowledgement can be 
justified by pointing to one glaring aspect of post-Vietnam US foreign policy - the 
sheer scale of US militarism during this period. Since America's withdrawal from 
Vietnam in 1973, American Presidents - both Republican and Democratic - have 
deployed US forces to conflicts in Lebanon, Grenada, Kuwait, Somalia, Haiti, Iraq, 
Macedonia and Kosovo, to name but a few. Indeed, at the time of writing, Jimmy 
Carter remains the only post-Vietnam President to have kept the United States out of 
war or major military interventions. 9 So much, sceptics might say, for the idea of a 
potent Vietnam Syndrome and a chastened post-Vietnam White House. 
However, whilst it is clear that the Vietnam Syndrome clearly has not actually 
stopped post-Vietnam Presidents from deploying US troops, it is equally clear that the 
passage of post-Vietnam US foreign policy has been replete with political, media and 
8 This designation comes from Lord David Owen, the fortner British Foreign Secretary who was the 
European Union's negotiator with the warring factions during the war in Bosnia Herzegovina (1992- 
1995). See David Owen (1995), Balkan Odyssey, New York: Harcourt Brace, p. 109. See also, Dana 
Allin (2002), NATO's Balkan Interventions, Adelphi Paper 347, The International Institute for Strategic 
Affairs, Oxford University Press, p. 30; Michael Howard (2001), The Invention of Peace: Reflections 
on War and International Order, Profile Books, p. 102. 
9 Bruce W. Jentleson, 'Who, Why, What and How: Debates Over Post-Cold War Military 
Intervention', in Robert J. Lieber (ed. ) (1997), Eagle Adrift. American Foreign Policy at the End of the 
Century, Longman Publishing, p. 40; Melvin Small (1996), Democracy & Diplomacy. The Impact of 
Domestic Politics on US Foreign Policy, 1789-1994, The Johns Hopkins University Press, pp. 13 5- 
136. 
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academic reference to the Syndrome and its influence upon White House use-of-force 
decision-making. Commentators such as Jon Roper, for example, have seen fit to 
declare that the Vietnam War has defined the parameters within which presidential 
leadership has been framed throughout the post-Vietnam years; in a similar vein, 
Brian Balogh contends that 'in foreign policy and military affairs, the lingering power 
of the "Vietnam syndrome" is well known'. ' 0 
It thus seems that the 'relationship' between the Vietnam Syndrome and 
presidential deployment decision-making requires attention and clarification. This 
study seeks to provide it. It aims to establish precisely what the Vietnam Syndrome 
has represented to US Presidents throughout the post-Vietnam years. Has it really 
made America more deployment-averse? Has it nourished the ability of the post- 
Vietnam Congress to 'significantly reverse presidential authority on the use of 
force'911 Or have Presidents continued to dictate and lead policy in this area, very 
much in keeping with their constitutionally mandated role as Commander-in-Chief of 
US forces? It is these questions which steer the focus of this study. 
Research assumptions 
In striving to answer these questions, this study aims to paint as complete a picture as 
possible of the various processes which have surrounded some of the major US troop 
deployments of the post-Vietnam era. It seeks to expose four key issues. Firstly, how 
and why post-Vietnam Presidents have chosen to deploy US forces to international 
10 Roper (2000), p. 3; Brian Balogh, 'The Domestic Legacy of the Vietnam War', in Neu (ed. ) (2000), 
p. 26. 
11 Joseph L. Nogee, 'Congress and the Presidency: The Dilemma of Policy-Making in a Democracy' in 
John Spanier & Joseph L. Nogee (eds. ) (19 8 1), Congress, the Presidency and American Foreign 
Policy, New York: Pergamon, p. 189. 
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crises. Secondly, how the Vietnam Syndrome has 'confronted' Presidents as they 
have deliberated this option. Thirdly, how Presidents and their administrations have 
responded when 'faced' with the Syndrome at such times. Fourthly, the extent to 
which Presidents have been able to assuage or deflect domestic opposition and enact 
their chosen deployment decisions throughout the post-Vietnam years. The focus of 
the study is thus divided between the major international conflicts which the White 
House faced between 1982 and 1995, the decisions that Presidents made in relation to 
these conflicts, and the public-political debates, commentaries and communications 
which accompanied these processes. 
If it is presidential decisions to deploy US forces, and the manner in which 
these decisions have taken, which have given rise to the domestic fears and criticisms 
so popularly associated with the Vietnam Syndrome throughout the post-Vietnam 
years, then the principal focus of this study seems to be obvious. The study focuses 
heavily upon the deliberations and the decisions of Presidents as they have taken 
deployment decisions throughout the post-Vietnam years. It also examines the 
interactions and dynamics between Presidents and their 'inner-circles' of civilian and 
military decision-makers, as they sought to conceptualise and execute effective 
deployment decisions during this period. Also relevant are the broader political 
interactions in Washington at such times; most notably those between the White 
House and Capitol Hill, as the White House has responded to Congress' efforts to 
impose its own will on Presidents' deployment decisions. By examining the 
interactions between the White House and Capitol Hill, it should be possible to see 
just how far the White House has been able to enact its chosen responses to foreign 
conflicts throughout the post-Vietnam period. If a President's chosen policy 
preferences can be highlighted, and if it is shown that those policies were enacted 
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even in the face of congressional opposition, then it suggests that Presidents have 
continued to enjoy political dominance in this policy area. 
Aside from examining post-Vietnam White House deployment decisions, it is 
assumed that a focus upon the debates that these decisions have prompted will also 
shed light on the relevant issues. The rationale for focussing upon Washington's 
deployment debates is based upon a quite simple assumption; namely, that since the 
Vietnam Syndrome is a manifestation of public-political America's post-Vietnam 
conflict-aversions, then it may be rendered 'discernible' if one scrutinises the 
opinions, criticism and demands which have emanated from Congress and the 
American media as the White House has taken deployment decisions during the post- 
Vietnam years. 
There is much to recommend the wisdom of focussing upon Washington's 
deployment debates as well as the policymaking processes they surround. This is 
because - very much in keeping with the 'democratic ideal' - public-political 
opposition and debate has represented an increasingly significant aspect of the politics 
of military intervention in the United States during the post-Vietnam era. 
12 If the 
need to take deployment decisions has become one of the dominant characteristics of 
the modem American presidency, an equally defining challenge of the office has been 
the need for the White House to publicly justify these decisions to an American 
public-political arena, sections of which - most notably the Congress - have 
frequently voiced opposition to the deployment of US troops. It is, of course, this 
domestic deployment-opposition which so many commentators designate as a 
vigorous manifestation of the Vietnam Syndrome. 
12 Jon Western (2005), Selling Intervention and War. The Presidency, the Media and the American 
Public, The Johns Hopkins University Press p. 4. 
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It is important to note that the controversy which typically accompanies 
presidential deployment decisions should probably not be attributed solely to 
America's Vietnam experience. For a start, it is clear that the use of military force 
was provoking debate and protest in America even before its very inception as an 
independent nation state. 13 It is also the case that Presidents' deployment decisions 
take place within the context of a liberal democratic political system in which 
competition, opposition and criticism are a given, even on issues which are infinitely 
less serious than those which may result in people being killed by official sanction of 
the US government. 14 Presidents certainly do not have to be contemplating something 
as grave as the deployment of US forces in order to find themselves on the receiving 
end of strident political and media criticism, and accusations that their policy 
decisions are not reflecting the will of the nation. However, given that such an 
adversarial partisan dynamic pervades the day-to-day routine of liberal democratic 
politicking in the United States, and given that any presidential decision to deploy US 
forces amounts to a conscious decision to send young Americans to fight, kill, and 
possibly die in a distant conflict-zone, it is little surprise that Washington's political 
battles are 'especially evident' when US Presidents are deliberating the deployment of 
US forces. 15 
This acknowledgement notwithstanding, there is little doubt that the Vietnam 
experience has greatly increased the intensity of these 'battles'; it has also provided 
an emotive and widely-recognised reference for those wishing to voice opposition to 
13 Ted Gottfried (2006), The Fightfor Peace. A History ofAntiwar Movements in America, Twenty- 
First Century Books. 
14 Gottfried (2006); Western (2005), p. 4; Robert C. DiPrizio (2002), Armed Humanitarians. US 
Interventionsftom Northern Iraq to Kosovo, Johns Hopkins University Press, p. 2; McKay (1997), pp. 
187 & 190. 
15 Western (2005), pp. 4-6; Andrew Moravcik, 'Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of 
International Politics', International Organisation, Vol. 5 1, No. 4, Autumn 1997. See also, Small 
(1996). 
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US military action. As Joseph Nye notes, the Vietnam War heralded not just the rise 
of a culture of 'antiestablishment politics' in the United States but also less deference 
to presidential leadership on key foreign policy issues, such as the use of military 
force. 16 And, as Brian Balogh contends, America's continuing fixation with the rights 
and wrongs of the Vietnam experience has generated what is tantamount to a Vietnam 
Syndrome lexicon. Balogh contends that Americans have discussed and debated the 
Vietnam experience so extensively that certain words and terms - invariably negative 
and often not explicitly referring to Vietnam itself - have become synonymous with 
it. 17 This Vietnam 'phraseology' has become a fixture in America's foreign policy 
debates and has allowed American deployment-opponents to continue pointing to a 
recent, widely-recognised and uniquely American war experience (an experience 
which was personal to at least hundreds of thousands of Americans, one matched in 
emotiveness perhaps only by the American Civil War itself) as an example of why US 
forces should be withheld from foreign conflicts. 
Given these considerations, it is hoped that a focus upon domestic-deployment 
during the post-Vietnam era - in particular an examination of the ways in which 
political and media deploy-ment-opponents have crafted their arguments as they have 
sought to publicly challenge White House deployment decisions - will expose the 
ways in which the Vietnam Syndrome has evidenced itself at times when the White 
House has deliberated the use of US forces during this period. 
16 Nye (1986), p. 115. 
17 Brian Balogh, 'The Domestic Legacy of the Vietnam War', in Neu (ed. ) (2000), especially pp. 27-28. 
Balogh asserts, for example, that the noun 'quagmire' is now widely recognisable as a reference to the 
intractable military stalemate that the United States found itself in Vietnam. This term has consistently 
been used by political and media deployment-opponents in their efforts to portray the dark fate 
awaiting US forces if the President chooses to deploy them to foreign conflict-zones. Balogh also 
contends that 'mired', 'bogged down', 'drawn into' and 'traumatised' are the verbs most used to 
describe the Vietnam experience, whilst phrases such as 'slippery slope' is an oft-cited term which 
refers to the way in which the United States appeared to be dragged into a full-scale war in Vietnam. 
See also Roland Paris, 'Kosovo and the Metaphor War', Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 117, No. 3, 
2002. 
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If the Vietnam experience has had a significant impact upon both the strength 
and the theme of deployment-opposition in the United States, then this study assumes 
that it must also have had an effect upon how Presidents have sought to publicly 'sell' 
their deployment decisions. Democratic convention and expectation dictates that 
Presidents simply cannot remain inactive in the face of emotive (and potentially 
damaging) public challenges to their policy decisions. 18 Since, as Siobhan McEvoy- 
Levy notes, an administration's 'survival and effectiveness' is dependent to a large 
degree upon the proficiency of its public diplomacy, it could be argued that the 
imperative for Presidents to communicate skilfully and persuasively is especially 
marked when it comes to their justifying of what is perhaps the most serious political 
decision of all - using military force. 
19 This imperative may be more marked still if 
Vietnam's clouds continue to loom large every time Presidents are known to be 
contemplating this action. If they are to sway Americans behind force deployments 
(and this includes trying to convince critical legislators and journalists that the 
deployment in question is both necessary and just), it seems reasonable to assume that 
Presidents must try to justify their deployment decisions not only with reasons, 
pledges and ideals which appeal as broadly as possible to Americans and 'American 
values'; they must surely also do so in a way which dispels any inhibitions that the 
Vietnam Syndrome might place upon Americans' willingness to rally behind these 
decisions. 
In short, the research approach of this study is based upon the assumption that 
if domestic deployment-opponents talk about Vietnam as they publicly argue against 
the proposed deployment of US forces, Presidents must also do so if they are to 
publicly 'sell' the deployment in question. If this is indeed the case, then the focus 
18 Small (1996), pp. xiii &xix; Slobhdn McEvoy-Levy (200 1), American Exceptionalism and US 
Foreign Policy. Public Diplomacy at the End of the Cold War, Palgrave Publ1shing, p. 2. 
19 McEvoy-Levy (2001), pp. 1,2 & 13. 
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upon Washington's oscillating deployment debates as well as the conflicts and the 
presidential decisions which prompt them, will expose precisely how the subject of 
Vietnam has featured in Washington's deployment debates. Importantly, it should 
also expose what the White House has said in its efforts to 'win' these debates. If the 
trauma of Vietnam has 'raised the bar' in terms of what post-Vietnam Presidents have 
had to do in order to generate domestic support for force deployments, exposing what 
they have said as well as what they have done at such times, will illuminate both how 
they have responded to this challenge and how effective they have been in meeting it. 
Methodology and resources 
In seeking to illuminate the events, responses, decisions and rhetoric surrounding 
presidential deployment decisions, this study draws upon public presidential 
communications, congressional debates, the public pronouncements of key political 
and military policymakers, author interviews with policy practitioners, extensive 
newspaper coverage and a range of secondary sources. 
These resources are used to scrutinise Washington's public-political debates 
across each of the three conflicts examined in this study. In each of the case studies, 
these resources help to paint a vivid picture of how key political, military and media 
actors crafted their arguments for or against deploying US forces. Given the study's 
particular focus upon the relationship between the White House and Capitol Hill at 
such times, they facilitate a particular understanding of the interactions and dynamics 
between the executive and legislative branches as they disputed the President's 
stewardship of each crisis. They expose how congressional and media actors publicly 
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articulated their support for, or opposition to, both the deployment in question and the 
President's performance; they also show how the Reagan, Bush and Clinton 
administrations sought to engage the opposition and criticism from these 
constituencies and garner domestic support for the President's deployment decisions. 
Newspaper coverage is used extensively throughout this study. In each case 
study, the use of newspaper articles provides an invaluable insight into how key actors 
sought to attain interpretive dominance of both the crisis itself and of how the White 
House should respond to it. These sources detail not just how actors from both the 
executive and the legislative branches used the media to 'speak to America'; they also 
show how the American media reported the foreign crisis at the centre of these 
debates, how it reported the executive-legislative 'battles' over policy, and how it 
rated the perfonnance of each branch in these 'battles'. Taken together, these sources 
provide a compelling snapshot of each crisis and of how public-political America 
responded to it. 
Aside from detailing how US forces deployments have been publicly justified, 
opposed and debated throughout the period in question, these resources are also 
employed to paint an informative picture of the 'private' policymaking sphere, as the 
Reagan, Bush and Clinton foreign policy teams deliberated effective responses to the 
conflicts in Lebanon, Kuwait and Bosnia Herzegovina respectively. They are used to 
illuminate, amongst other things, who amongst each President's 'inner-circle' of 
military and civilian policy advisors advocated deploying US forces, what concerns 
were raised over this option and what stipulations were applied to each deployment. 
These resources are also employed to expose the dynamics that have existed between 
important policy institutions such as the State and Defence Departments during the 
post-Vietnam years, on the issue of using military force. As this study shows, 
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differences in opinion on this issue between these departments have been both marked 
and consistent throughout this period. 
Perhaps most importantly, the research resources are used to provide a 
detailing of the 'perfon-nances' of Presidents Reagan, Bush and Clinton themselves as 
they sought to dictate and lead policy. In each case study, an intricate picture is 
painted not just of the role the President played as Commander-in-Chief but also of 
his thoughts and moods during the crisis in question, and his considerations in 
deciding to either deploy or withhold US forces. What is thus rendered is an 
instructive and personal picture of how successive Presidents have responded to 
international conflicts during the post-Vietnam era. 
The study's scrutiny of White House deployment decision-making is revealing 
for other reasons. This focus unveils the extent to which these decisions are often 
significantly influenced not just by the aspirations and biases evident in the Oval 
Office but also by factors external to the United States itself These factors can range 
from events occurring in the conflict in question (these events are well detailed in 
each case study), to the aspirations and decisions of external actors such as allied state 
governments, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the United Nations 
(UN). These various external factors may not only be decisive in steering the 
decisions that a President may take at any one time; they can also drive much of the 
domestic criticism arrayed against Presidents as they take these decisions. This study 
shows that American political and media critics have consistently accused Presidents 
of circumventing both America's constitutional prescriptions and its democratic 
conventions by acceding to the opinions and wishes of external, non-American, actors 
whilst ignoring those of the elected American legislature itself. 
19 
The narrative of this study is also enhanced by interviews with key policy 
practitioners, both civilian and military. These interviews add valuable detail and 
unique insight into the events, decisions and moods under scrutiny. They also add 
considerable corroborative weight to their interpretation. The thesis is thus richly 
informed by an impressive array of research resources. The dual-focus of the study 
also maximises the chances that these resources will effectively render the issues of 
interest. When employed in concert, a focus upon Washington's deployment debates 
and the conflicts and presidential decisions which prompt them, affords the best 
chance of illuminating not just the way in which the Vietnam Syndrome has 
evidenced itself throughout the post-Vietnam era, but also how far the Syndrome has 
hindered presidential deployment decision-making throughout this period. 
The case studies - some recurring characteristics 
The analytical approach adopted by this study reveals a unique insight into the key 
issues. Throughout the case studies, four key characteristics are both significant and 
recurring. Firstly, they show that whenever a foreign conflict has captured public- 
political attention in the United States, debates have quickly unfolded within political 
and media circles over the relevance of that conflict to the United States, and whether 
or not the deployment of US forces to that conflict is likely or necessary. This 
scrutiny demands not just political decisions but also public justifications for 
whatever decisions the President takes. 
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Secondly, for all the deployment- advocacy which is typically evident in 
Washington's deployment debates, it is often political and media deployment- 
opposition which attracts the biggest spotlight. This is in no small part due to the fact 
that throughout the post-Vietnam years, this opposition has consistently invoked 
various aspects of the Vietnam War in an effort to forward a strong and emotive 
argument as to why US forces should not be sent into the conflict in question. These 
poignant public challenges to, and prescriptions for, White House policy consistently 
seem to magnetize media attention. Because of this, Presidents who have decided to 
deploy US forces have consistently been forced to publicly deny comparisons 
between the Vietnam War and the current crisis, in their efforts to convince the 
American public-political arena that the deployment, and the President's stewarding 
of it, is both necessary and just. However, despite their esteemed status and their 
unique access to information and resources, Presidents' efforts to 'sell' their 
deployment decisions rarely - if ever - dispel deployment-opposition from within the 
American public-political arena. Indeed, Presidents persistently seem unable to 
garner broad public-political support behind their force deployments. 
20 Given these 
difficulties in persuading domestic critics, the White House has frequently appeared to 
exaggerate the rationales for deploying US forces, in order to make the case. In this 
sense, the Vietnam Syndrome may well have 'raised the bar' in terms of what 
Presidents have had to do in order to publicly 'sell' force deployments; however, 
rather than fostering more 'honest' presidential political communications and 
solicitations on this issue, it may have done exactly the opposite. 
Thirdly, the case studies show why cynics might well decry these White 
House public diplomatic efforts as merely ritualistic. This is because, despite its 
20 David McKay (1997), American Politics and Society, Blackwell Publishing, Fourth Edition pp. 187 
& 190. 
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apparently genuine efforts to 'win' these public debates throughout the post-Vietnam 
years, US force deployments have not been dependent upon presidential 
administrations being successful in doing so. Despite the 'democratic expectation' 
that the President's important political decisions will in some way reflect the national 
mood, this frequently does not happen when it comes to the use of US forces. Indeed 
the three case studies suggest that Presidents' deployment decisions have consistently 
disregarded the opposition of significant swathes of the American public-political 
arena, something which has invariably nourished political and media accusations that 
the White House is demonstrating a democratic unaccountability and hubris evocative 
of the Vietnam years. 
Despite such accusations, Presidents do not appear to be put off by a broadly 
unsupportive national mood; it seems that if the President has decided to deploy US 
forces, his deployment plans continue apace, regardless. Thus, despite the raft of 
allusion to the demise of the 'Imperial Presidency' in the decade after the Vietnam 
War, and despite what much of the literary allusion to the Vietnam Syndrome has 
often implied, the public-political backlash to the Vietnam War does not appear to 
have seriously altered the President's dominance of decisions relating to the use of US 
forces. He remains a figure who is central to any force deployment and he is 
generally imperious in deciding whether and how such actions proceed. Assisted by 
his civilian and military 'inner-circle', Presidents frequently deny any need to consult 
Congress on deployment decisions and are more than willing to take deployment 
decisions which Congress openly opposes .21 Executive 
branch unilateralism is a 
glaring characteristic in each case study. 
21 Andrew J. Bacevich (2005), The New American Militarism. How Americans are Seduced by War, 
Oxford University Press, New York, pp. 34-35; Chalmers Johnson (2004), The Sorrows ofEmpire. 
Militarism, Secrecy and the End of the Republic, Verso publishing, pp. 
60-6 1. This is discussed more 
in the next chapter. 
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Fourthly and finally, it is clear that whilst Presidents have paid considerable 
lip service to rejecting the Vietnam analogy throughout the post-Vietnam years (in 
order to try to dispel domestic deployment-sensitivities and rally support for the 
deployment of US forces), the Vietnam Syndrome has been manifestly evident in the 
ways in which they have chosen to deploy US forces. The events detailed in the three 
case studies demonstrate a consistent, near-obsessive, presidential preoccupation with 
mission-brevity and casualty- avoidance when the parameters for US troop 
deployments have been being designated by the Commander-in-Chief Presidents do, 
it seems, very much share the concerns and sensitivities of the most ardent 
deployment-opponents, even if they are committed to deploying US Forces. 
However, whilst the Vietnam Syndrome does seem to have loomed large over 
post-Vietnam deployment planning, its 'presence' has not always been viewed as 
baneful by the White House. The study of post-Vietnam presidential deployment 
decision-making is not simply a study of Presidents deciding to deploy US forces. 
For various reasons, Presidents have also chosen not to involve US forces in foreign 
crises during the post-Vietnam years and - in a stark rejoinder to the idea that the 
Vietnam experience imposed a blanket deployment-aversion upon the American 
polity - these decisions to withhold US forces have often come under 
just as much 
domestic criticism as have decisions to deploy. And whilst the White House has 
found the public invoking of the Vietnam Syndrome a hindrance to building broad 
public-political support for force deployments, it seems that it has also found that 
Syndrome a useful ally when it has been unwilling to sanction this action. This study 
shows that when the White House has faced criticism for refusing to use military 
force, the Vietnam Syndrome has been 'used' by presidential administrations to make 
what they clearly see as a persuasive public case for keeping US 
forces confined to 
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barracks. Chapter 6 vividly demonstrates this; it details both the Bush and the Clinton 
administrations publicly likening the war in Bosnia Herzegovina to that in Vietnam, 
as they sought to justify their controversial stance of remaining militarily disengaged 
from the Balkans conflict and its attendant humanitarian disaster. 
All in all, the events detailed in this study suggest that the Vietnam experience 
has undoubtedly heightened Americans' concerns over both the deployment of US 
forces and the way in which deployments are decided and executed from the White 
House. Despite this, there is much to suggest that the President's dominance of 
deployment decision-making has continued to mirror that which was so roundly 
criticised during the Vietnam years. Indeed, if the epithet of the 'Imperial Presidency' 
has continued to infuse commentary and analysis of US foreign policy throughout the 
post-Vietnam era, then it is surely the President's continuing dominance of this all- 
important policy area which upholds the validity of the designation. 
The study; structure and case study selection 
This study comprises six subsequent chapters. The next two chapters aim to provide 
the reader with an understanding of the dynamics, issues and arguments which 
dominate the three case studies in chapters 4-6. Given that the Vietnam Syndrome is 
a concept which denotes America's social-political concerns over 
deploying US 
forces, chapters 2 and 3 provide a more detailed consideration of the Vietnam 
Syndrome, its roots and influence, and of the domestic actors, institutions and 
challenges that Presidents typically face as they take deployment decisions. 
Chapter 2 
explores the context of the Vietnam Syndrome and its incorporation 
into the 
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American social-political consciousness. It details how the Syndrome has influenced 
both the composition and the use of the US military; it also charts the impact that it 
has had on the post-Vietnam presidency and Presidents' efforts to steer US foreign 
policy during this period. 
Chapter 3 seeks to craft a broader understanding of the domestic politics of 
military intervention in the United States. It examines the impact that Congress, the 
media and public opinion are popularly thought to have on the making of US foreign 
policy and how they have popularly been seen to influence White House decisions in 
this area. The chapter focuses specifically upon why, despite the notional influence 
that these domestic constituencies enjoy, the authoritative dynamics in this area have 
continued to be weighted so heavily in favour of the White House. It looks 
specifically at how the President is able to so routinely circumvent Congress as he 
takes deployment decisions. 
These chapters provide a broad, and necessary, background understanding in 
preparation for the case studies detailed in chapters 4-6. Each case study begins with 
a brief consideration of the President under focus and how America's Vietnam 
experience related to both his presidency and his deployment decisions. It then 
proceeds to provide an explanation of the conflict in question and its background, 
something which will be shown to be of considerable relevance to how the White 
House, and wider America, responded to it. Each case study then goes on to paint a 
comprehensive picture of how the White House reacted to the crisis in question and 
how this reaction was responded to from within the America public-political arena. 
Each study details the attitude of the President and his administration towards the 
confli4 how these attitudes were reflected in policy, and 
how the administration 
sought to publicly justify and promote that policy. How 
key political and media 
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actors responded to the White House's actions is detailed concurrently. Particular 
attention is paid to the executive-legislative wrangling over policy and to how 
successful Congress was in exercising its constitutionally-mandated empowerments in 
order to provide legislative input into the decision-making process. The American 
media's coverage of these processes is also given significant exposure - indeed, it is 
used extensively to illuminate the events and the debates surrounding each of the 
three conflicts. Each case study thus paints a vivid picture of the perceptions, debates 
and decisions which the conflict in question sparked, the 'role' played by the 
President in responding to the conflict, and the influence of the Vietnam Syndrome 
upon these processes. 
Chapter 7 concludes the study by drawing together the evidence presented in 
the preceding three chapters and making some observations about what the study tells 
us about the relationship between the President, the Vietnam Syndrome and the 
politics of military intervention in the United States. 
The value of the case studies 
The conflicts in Lebanon, Kuwait and Bosnia Herzegovina represent just three of the 
many post-Vietnam conflicts to which the White House has 
deployed US forces. Yet 
they stand out as being ideal examples to focus upon for one significant reason - they 
were headline news in the United States and generated 
debate and commentary to an 
extent which conflicts such as the 1994 Rwandan civil war, 
for example, simply did 
not. These three conflicts generated a profusion of newspaper commentary and 
analysis, congressional debate, and public statements 
from the presiding 
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administrations in the form of prepared statements, media interviews and 
congressional testimonies. They also generated a subsequent wealth of books, journal 
articles and policy papers. As has already been noted, this wealth of sources 
constitutes a valuable and comprehensive literature which facilitates a detailed 
examination both of post-Vietnam America's responses to, and debates over, military 
intervention and of presidential 'perfonnance' in this area. 
Another key benefit of choosing these conflicts is that they span both the Cold 
War and post-Cold War periods, thus affording an expansive view of post-Vietnam 
deployment decision-making. Indeed, the temporal 'positions' of these three conflicts 
are ideal for exposing aspects of continuity and change across both of these periods. 
Was the Vietnam Syndrome more or less pertinent to Presidents after the ending of 
the Cold War? Did the demise of the Soviet threat change the White House view - 
and indeed that of the broader American public-political arena - of when it is 
ap ropriate to use military force? Has there been a consistency in the challenges and 
. r, 
P 
criticisms that Presidents have faced as they have taken deployment decisions 
throughout the post-Vietnam years? A study which focuses upon US force 
deployments across both the Cold War and the post-Cold War periods can provide 
infonned, if not definitive, answers to these questions. 
Lastly, the selection of these case studies is vindicated by the fact that they are 
representative of the different types of conflict that post-Vietnam Presidents have 
been faced with. The case studies suggest that it is the President's perception of a 
conflict, and its significance to the United States, which is perhaps the most 
significant influence upon whether or not US forces will be deployed. They show 
why the White House was so willing to deploy US forces to Lebanon in 1982 and to 
the Persian Gulf in 1991 , 
but distinctly unwilling to deploy US forces to Bosnia 
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between 1992 and mid-1995. Chapter 4 demonstrates that strategic Cold War 
concerns and threats to Western oil supplies were significant spurs for President 
Reagan as he responded to Lebanon's conflict. Reagan's aspirations for a more 
assertive US military presence on the world stage - symbolically important to many 
'Reaganites' after America's post-Vietnam nadir - were also significant. The 
Lebanon deployment was also part of a limited 'peacekeeping' mission, one in which 
America's technologically advanced arsenal was rendered somewhat irrelevant. The 
question of whether or not US forces should be sent into a chaotic conflict-zone, with 
a limited 'interposition' mandate, created considerable disagreement in Washington 
and offered a vivid precursor to the 'peacekeeping' and 'humanitarian intervention' 
debates which would divide Washington in the decade following the end of the Cold 
War. 
Of the three conflicts examined in this study, America's engagement with the 
Persian Gulf crisis, detailed in chapter 5, is probably most representative of a 'classic' 
Westphalian imperative to intervene militarily. It shows, once again, that threats to 
oil supplies were instrumental in convincing President Bush of the need to enact a 
military response to Iraq's 1990 invasion of Kuwait. However, with the concurrent 
demise of the Soviet Union at this point, President Bush's willingness to use military 
force was also influenced by his desire to punish the external aggression of a nation 
state (in this case, Iraq) and thus demonstrate that the United States was willing to act 
to uphold and lead, the 'new world of freedom' that he himself had proclaimed. 22 
22 President Bush, 'Address to the American People from Camp David'. Maryland, 22 d November 
1989, cited in McEvoy-Levy (2001), p. 56. Bush's declaration came in anticipation of the December 
4peace' summit in Malta between Bush and President Gorbachev. * NB - unless stated otherwise (as 
above, for example), all presidential administration communications can be found (by date and 
statement title) in the 'public papers' sections of the presidential libraries. For the Bush Library, go to: 
http: //bushlibrary. tamu. edu/research/public_papers. php 
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Chapter 6 offers an insight into how the White House responded to the 
'decade of humanitarian emergencies' which dominated the 1990s, and which made 
the tenns 'ethnic cleansing' and 'genocide' dispiriting fixtures in the evolving 
discourses of post-Cold War intemational politics. 23 The chapter exposes the 
difficulties that these conflicts presented to the White House, creating pressures and 
dilemmas which shattered many of the use-of-force 'precedents' which had gone 
before. Should the lives of US troops be risked in order to save civilians from remote 
conflicts which had no immediately obvious national interest to the United States? 
This question dominated the presidential foreign policy agenda throughout the 1990s 
and saw the White House demonstrate a persistent unwillingness to demonstrate the 
kind of intervention-advocacy that, for example, President Bush had shown in 
response to the invasion of Kuwait. This new-found intervention-reluctance had 
intriguing implications for the White House's 'relationship' with the Vietnam 
Syndrome. 
The diversity of these conflicts, the fact that they span both the Cold War and 
post-Cold War periods, and the fact that they were presided over by different 
presidential administrations, provides a suitably diverse range of crises, contexts and 
personalities on which to construct an understanding of the 'relationship' between the 
Vietnam Syndrome and post-Vietnam presidential leadership on the use of the US 
military. If determining where and when to use military force has become one of the 
most vexing issues for modem Presidents, the focus and the time-span encompassed 
in this study renders an extensive detailing of these vexations and paints an intriguing 
picture of how the Vietnam Syndrome was relevant to Presidents, their 
administrations, and their deployment decisions from the early 1980s to the mid- 
23 Raimo Vdyrynen, 'More Questions Than Answers: Dilemmas of Humanitarian Intervention', Peace 
& Change, Vol. 24, No. 2, April 1999, p. 174. Also: Leslie H. Gelb, 'Quelling the Teacup Wars', 
Foreign Affairs, Vol. 73, No. 6, November/December 1994. 
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1990S. 24 It reveals the central role that Presidents have played in responding to 
international conflicts, the criticism and opposition which presidential dominance in 
this area has fomented within the American public-political arena, and how Presidents 
have engaged with this opposition as they have striven to enact effective - and 
broadly supported - force deployments. 
The debates and divergences exposed so vividly throughout the case studies 
fracture one of the great myths of American foreign policy; namely, that when it 
comes to decisions on deploying US forces, partisan politics 'stops at the water's 
edge' in Washington DC and the body politic rallies to support the President and, by 
extension, the US troops who are to be deployed. 25 In fact, this assumption is not 
accurate. The evidence in this study shows that whilst Washington typically does 
rally behind force deployments, America's conflict-aversions and the White House's 
guarded dominance of the deployment decision-making process does much to foment "I-- 
domestic opposition, criticism and division. 'Consensus' typically only emerges once 
things have clearly reached a 'point of no return', with the date at which US forces are 
to be fonnally deployed, fast approaching. It is generally at this point that the 
4 water's edge' is reached and the majority of political and media dissension 
dissipates, a shift engendered by the acknowledgement that domestic unrest over any 
military mission risks compromising both the commitment to the mission and the 
American military personnel being deployed. However despite this tardy, and 
frequently begrudged, final 'consensus', the decision-making pathway leading up to 
this point is typically contested and Presidents' deployment decisions are often 
challenged up until the very last moment. It is these challenges, and how Presidents 
have responded to them, which provide the focus for this study. 
24 DiPrizio (2002), p. 2. 
25 Westem (2005), p. ix. 
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Chapter 2 
The Vietnam War and After: The Vietnam Syndrome and 
the Battle for America's Foreign Policy 
The previous chapter introduced the concept of the Vietnam Syndrome. This chapter 
seeks to provide a more detailed understanding of its roots, its manifestations and 
what it has meant for presidential leadership on the use of military force during the 
post-Vietnarn era. 
The Vietnam War -a brief overview 
Even before US forces were withdrawn from Vietnam in March 1973, Americans 
were reflecting, with bewilderment and bitterness, on a military commitment which 
cost the United States an estimated $167 billion. ' This quite staggering expenditure 
would continue to affect the American economy well into the 1980s. 2 However, 
whilst this bill is startling, it does not even begin to hint at the true cost of the conflict 
from the American perspective. From an engagement which started during World 
' There are numerous excellent accounts of the Vietnam War and American involvement in it. See, for 
example: Maclear (198 1); Young (199 1); Isaacs (1997); Neu (2000); Christian G. Appy (2006), 
Vietnam: The Definitive Oral History Told From All Sides, Ebury Press. 
2 Herring (1992); Small (1996), p 127; Appy (2006), pp. 35 & 496; Amy Belasco, Lynn J. 
Cunningham, Hannah Fisher & Larry A. Niksch, Congressional Restrictions on US Military 
Operations in Vietnam, Laos, Somalia, and Kosovo: Funding and Non-Funding Approaches, 
Congressional Research Service Report (Order Code RL 33803), 16"' January, 2007, p. 2. 
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War Two, with Washington providing financial, logistical and intelligence support to 
Vietnamese nationalists fighting to free their country from both French and Japanese 
rule, the end of the War saw America's involvement in Vietnam escalate dramatically, 
as the fight against Hitler gave way to the Cold War fight against Communist 
expansion. 
America's growing involvement in Southeast Asia saw it cast aside its self- 
professed commitment to anti-colonialism. In an effort to secure French cooperation 
in the Cold War struggle, President Truman ordered American ships to transport 
13,000 French troops from the European theatre to Vietnam, in an effort to help the 
French regain their colony. 3 The American commitment escalated through the 1950s 
and 1960s as Washington sought to aid South Vietnam in its fight against the 
Communist North. It ultimately saw US forces sucked into leading a devastating war 
of attrition against North Vietnam and South Vietnamese insurgents - the Viet Cong - 
in which victory was ultimately unattainable at any cost that Washington was willing 
to pay. 
America's war-fighting strategy visited a terrible devastation upon Vietnam. 
The country saw almost two-thirds of its southern hamlets ruined, and over 12 million 
acres of forest destroyed by the chemical defoliants deployed by US forces. 4 The 
human toll of the war was enormous. An estimated 1.1 million North Vietnamese 
troops (both regular soldiers and Viet Cong guerrillas) died in the fighting, with 
around 600,000 wounded; the South Vietnamese military suffered 224,000 deaths and 
more than I million wounded. Around 2 million Vietnamese civilians were also 
killed, with a further 2 million widowed, orphaned and disabled. In the economic, 
moral and political crisis which engulfed Vietnam in the period following the US 
3 Appy (2006), pp. 36-39. 
4 ibid., p. 496; Young (199 1), pp. 190-191. 
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withdrawal from the country, a further one million Vietnamese emigrated from their 
homeland. 5 
Physically unscathed it may have been when compared to the carnage wrought 
upon Vietnam and its people, but the conflict left the United States facing a 
devastation all of its own. Whilst the fighting claimed the lives of over 58,000 
American service personnel, and wounded over 300,000 others, America's failure in 
Vietnam was not only costly in military terms; it also shattered the confidence of 
America's leadership, and fractured Americans' views of their country, its leaders, its 
place in the world. 6 Central to this dejection was an awareness of what the White 
House had done in its efforts to win the war; not only in terms of the war-fighting 
strategy it had sanctioned, but also in relation to the enon-nity of the deceit it had 
sustained in the pursuit of victory. Congress may well have formally sanctioned US 
involvement in Vietnam through its passing of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution in 1964; 
however, critics subsequently accused the White House of taking this involvement 
well beyond what the legislature had consented to. 
In prosecuting an 'undeclared and unexplained war' whose details were often 
hidden from the American public, successive American Presidents had supported a 
corrupt, oppressive and unrepresentative government in South Vietnam. They had 
also authorised covert Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) operations in the region and 
had sanctioned military strategies which relied upon the widespread use of napalm 
and white phosphorous, cluster bombs, 'free-fire zones', and had even flirted with the 
possibility of using tactical nuclear weapons. 
7 Evidence that US military support and 
5 Appy (2006), pp. 163-164 & 496; Isaacs (1997), pp. 190-191; Neu (2000), p. xvii. 
6 Michael Leigh (1976), Mobilizing Consent. Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy, 193 7- 
1947, Greenwood Press, p. 170; Appy(2006), p. 163; Hening(1992), pp. 116,117 & 104. 
7 M. J. Heale (200 1), The Sixties in America. History, Politics and Protest, BAAS Paperbacks, 
Edinburgh University Press, p. 78; Young (1991), pp. 129-131 & 190-191; Appy (2006), pp. 25-27. 
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operations had also extended illegally into both Laos and Cambodia during this period 
- in a manner, to an extent and for a duration that were not always fully revealed to 
Congress and the wider American public at the time - indicated to Americans that the 
nation's foreign policy was being steered by a secretive, executive elite whose actions 
did not always reflect the values it espoused. 8 
Americans' scepticism over the role of the White House in these events was 
further nourished by revelations over presidential actions in both escalating and 
sustaining American involvement in the war. In his efforts to attain congressional 
backing for expanding US military involvement in Vietnam, President Lyndon 
Johnson had been somewhat liberal with the truth when, on 4 th August 1964, he 
appeared on national television to relay details of two incidents off the coast of North 
Vietnam. Presenting them as a justification for escalating US involvement in the 
region, Johnson's interpretation of the 'Gulf of Tonkin incident' was that North 
Vietnamese patrol boats had launched torpedoes at two American warships, 
something he described as an act of 'open aggression on the high seas against the 
United States of America'. 9 In truth, the event bore little resemblance to the picture 
painted by the President, but the 'murky evidence' he provided to Congress on the 
issue was sufficient to see the passing of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, on August 7 th 
1964. Thus, whilst US involvement in military operations inside Vietnam had 
actually been underway since 1961 (albeit at a modest level), the ratification of this 
Resolution formally legitimised US military operations against North Vietnam and 
catalysed a massive escalation in the US military commitment. It is significant to 
note that the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution presented to Congress was not actually 
8 Small (1996), p. 129; Young (1991), pp. 234-238 & 281-284; Appy (2006), pp. 377-382. 
9 Appy (2006), pp. 112-113; Stephen E. Ambrose and Douglas G. Brinkley (1997), Rise to Globalism. 
American Foreign Policy Since 1938, Penguin, 8h revised edition, p. 200. 
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written in response to the incident in question but had actually been completed two 
months beforehand and then set aside, awaiting a suitable incident which would both 
justify its presentation to Congress and (Johnson hoped) guarantee its passage through 
both branches of the legislature. 10 
If President Johnson's behaviour might have forced Americans to question 
presidential integrity, there was worse to come from the man who succeeded him. 
Incredibly, Johnson's 'abdication' speech, on 31" March 1968, did not close the book 
on what would ultimately become a saga of executive branch deception over 
Vietnam. " Indeed, once in office, Johnson's successor Richard Nixon scripted a 
whole new chapter of his own. Subsequently described as the most deceitful of any 
twentieth century president, Nixon won the 1968 presidential election in no small part 
because of his stated commitment to bring an 'honorable end' to the war in Vietnam. 
However, his assumption of office saw him do little to accomplish this. As well as 
sanctioning ever more draconian measures to nullify escalating domestic opposition to 
the war, President Nixon proceeded to steer an increasingly punitive Vietnam policy, 
one which was largely shielded fTom the media, the public, and Congress. 12 Whilst 
his commitment to the strategy of Vietnamization - in which control of military 
ground operations was to be passed to the South Vietnamese government and military 
- was evidenced by the staged withdrawal of US troops from Vietnam (from 539,000 
in June 1969 to 21,500 by January of 1973), Nixon made no commitment to a 
complete US withdrawal; nor did he place any limitation on US combat operations in 
the region. 13 On the contrary, US ground forces briefly extended operations into 
10 Appy (2006), pp. 112 & 398; Heale (2001), p. 78; Ambrose & Brinkley (1997), p. 200; Western 
(2005), pp. 100- 10 1- 
11 Graham Evans & Jeffrey Newnham, (1998), Yhe Penguin Dictionary of International Relations, 
Penguin Publishing, p. 562. 
12 Appy (2006), p. 309; Small (1996), p. 128. 
13 Belasco, Cunningham, Fisher & Niksch, 16'h January, 2007, pp. 1-2. 
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eastern Cambodia in April of 1970, whilst the US Air Force continued bombing at 
extremely high levels across the region. 14 In fact, far from presiding over an 
honourable disengagement from Vietnam and an end to Vietnam's war, the hostilities 
continued for another six years under Nixon, killing a further one million Vietnamese 
and several hundred thousand Laotians and Cambodians. Forty percent of American 
service personnel who died in Vietnam did so during the Nixon presidency. 15 The 
subsequent Watergate scandal, where an unfolding litany of evidence showed that 
Nixon and his re-election committee had employed bribery, burglary and federal 
agencies in order to sabotage the Democrats' 1972 election campaign, further 
inflamed the smouldering climate of divisiveness, mistrust, and recrimination in 
Washington DC. 16 
Unsurprisingly, these events greatly damaged America's perception of the 
presidency and added a keenness to the nation's growing unease over both its foreign 
policy and the dominance of this policy by an apparently-untouchable White House 
elite. In fact, this unease was evident long before America's formal disengagement 
from Vietnam. Increasingly opposed to what some legislators were decrying as a 
'presidential war', Congress had, by early 1970, taken significant steps to curtail the 
expansiveness of Nixon's Vietnam policy. 17 In January 1971, legislators enacted the 
Cooper-Church Amendment, which prohibited the appropriation of funds to support 
14 Ibid., p. 2. 
15 Appy (2006), p. 309. 
16 Despite its association with the 1972 election campaign, Watergate actually had its roots in the 
Vietnam War, when a May 1969 New York Times report broke the news that US forces were engaged 
in 'secret' bombing missions over Cambodia. This revelation led Nixon to order FBI 'wiretaps' of 
those suspected of leaking this information; it led to the subsequent targeting of around two hundred 
journalists, celebrities and activists who had publicly opposed the war. He then authorised illegal CIA 
FBI and IRS wiretaps on individuals from this 'enemies list'. See: Small (1996), p. 129; Appy (2006), 
pp. 430-43 1. 
17 John L. S. Girling (1980), America and the Third World; Revolution and Intervention, Routledge & 
Kegan Paul, p. 6. 
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US ground operations inside Cambodia. 18 After the January 1973 cease-fire 
agreement, Congress also cut off funds for US combat operations 'in or over or from 
the shores of North Vietnam, South Vietnam, Laos or Cambodia'. It did, however, 
continue to authorise finance for the drawdown of US forces, until March of 1973.19 
Perhaps most significantly of all, Congress passed the War Powers Act, on 7h 
November 1973.20 Passed in both Houses, over the veto of President Nixon, this 
hugely symbolic measure was driven by broadly-held legislative concerns that an 
'Imperial Presidency' had now broken America's constitutionally mandated checks 
and balances and had grasped war-making authority from Congress. 21 The substance 
of the Act very much reflected these concerns. Section 3 stipulated that the President 
has, 'in every possible instance', to consult with Congress before introducing US 
Armed forces into hostilities or imminent hostilities. Section 4 (a) (1) of the Act 
stated that the President should formally report to Congress any introduction of US 
forces into hostilities or imminent hostilities. With the submission - or a requirement 
of a submission - of this report, the deployment in question would then have to be 
terminated within 60 to 90 days unless Congress formally endorsed the deployment in 
question or agreed to extend the deployment time-frame. 22 The enactment of the War 
Powers Act thus represented a clear statement of intent on the part of Congress to 
reassert its foreign policyrnaking authority vis-a-vis the White House, and to ensure 
18 Appy (2006), p. 494. 
19 Belasco, Cunningham, Fisher & Niksch, 16'h January, 2007, 'Summary'. 
20 See: Schlesinger (2005). Also, Richard Grimmett, War Powers Resolution: Presidential 
Compliance, Congressional Research Service Report (Order Code RL 33532), 16th January, 2007, pp. 
1-2; Michael Foley & John E. Owens (1996), Congress and the Presidency. Institutional Politics in a 
Separated System, Manchester University Press, p. 367. The tenets of the War Powers Act, and their 
broader significance, are given more consideration in the next chapter. 
21 Ibid; Richard F. Grimmett, The War Powers Resolution: After Airty-Three Years, Congressional 
Research Service Report (Order Code RL 32267), I't May, 2007, pp. 7-8; Girling (1980), p. 6. 
22 Grimmett, I" May, 2007, 'Summary'. 
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that future decisions relating to US military activity would be - as mandated by the 
American constitution -a joint possession of the two branches of government. 23 
Whilst the War Powers Act would ultimately do little to empower Congress to 
the extent that many had initially envisioned (the reasons for this are more fully 
discussed in the next chapter), its mere ratification signified a sea-change in how 
public-political America viewed the White House's dominance of military policy. 
With congressional investigative bodies such as the Church Commission and a 'newly 
emboldened media culture' monitoring, exposing, and publicly criticising America's 
military and intelligence behaviour like never before, an emerging 'No More 
Vietnams' mindset portended notable implications for the future of presidential 
leadership on the use of the US military. 
24 
And so it would prove. The resignation of President Nixon, in August 1974, 
may well have closed the book on the executive branch treachery of the Vietnam era. 
However, the scene was set for a convention of future opposition and challenge to 
presidential entreaties on the need to use military force, the vigour of which simply 
had not existed before Vietnam. 25 The Vietnam years may not have actually dispelled 
Americans' willingness to view the President as the nation's 'heroic leader', but they 
had significant implications for the way in which Americans would respond to 
subsequent White House solicitations on the need to deploy US forces. 26 
23 Jentleson, (1997), pp. 4-42; William C. Banks & Jeffrey D. Straussman, 'A New Imperial 
Presidency? Insights from US Involvement in Bosnia', Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 114, No. 2, 
Summer 1999, p. 167; Grimmett, 16th January, 2007, 'Summary'. 
24 John Lewis Gaddis (1982), Strategies of Containment, Oxford University Press, pp. 89-90,101 & 
152; Small (1996), p. 127; Klare (1982), p. 2; Neu (2000), pp. 5& 33; Western (2005), p. 102. 
25 Appy (2006), p. 430. 
26 Roper (2000), p. 9. 
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The post-Vietnam backlash 
America's exit from Vietnam paved the way for a new conflict back in the United 
States, as attempts to define responsibility and apportion blame for the endeavour 
unfolded in Washington. 27 The search for answers for the Vietnam debacle saw the 
White House blame the American media for undermining the war effort; it accused it 
of relinquishing its initial support for the war, of deliberately ignoring the progress 
made by US forces in Vietnam, and of increasingly throwing its support behind the 
domestic antiwar movement. 28 Congress was also broadly criticised. Opponents of 
the war pointed to the way in which it had initially given the White House a 'green 
light' to wage unchecked warfare in Vietnam and had persistently surrendered its 
constitutionally-mandated powers of oversight over presidential foreign 
policyrnaking. Vietnam 'hawks', on the other hand, castigated the way in which an 
increasingly 'radicalized' Capitol Hill had backtracked on its initial commitment to 
the mission and then began to cut America's commitment to South Vietnam. 29 
However it was executive stewardship of the Vietnam campaign which invited 
the most damning indictments. Those who had opposed the war pointed accusatory 
fingers at the White House for both sanctioning and sustaining the hostilities and for 
trying to stamp out domestic opposition to them. Proponents of the Vietnam 
endeavour - or at least those who had opposed the withdrawal of US forces from the 
conflict - pointed to the executive incompetence which had invited such misery and 
27 Roper (2000), pp. II- 12. 
28 Small (1996), p. 127. 
29 Appy (2006), pp. 400-401. 
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humiliation upon the United States, asserting that the war was not lost on the 
battlefield but in the corridors of power in Washington. 30 
This view - that 'politics lost the war' - was articulated with particular 
stridency by much of the US military establishment. It had largely forewarned 
against involving American forces in a land war in Vietnam and had been shocked to 
see the degeneration of the US fighting machine, as indiscipline, disillusionment and 
drug abuse increasingly evidenced themselves amongst frontline American troops. 31 
Stung by what young American soldiers had been exposed to in Vietnam, and angered 
by the White House's ultimate lack of commitment to a mission that these soldiers 
had died for in their tens-of-thousands, critics within the military - and also in 
conservative political and media circles - blamed the civilian leadership in 
Washington for forcing US forces to fight 'with one hand tied behind their backs'. 
This perception inspired many within the military to vow that they would never place 
US forces in such a position again. 32 In Peter Davis's Oscar-winning film Hearts and 
Minds (1975), General William Westmoreland (Commander of US Forces in Vietnam 
between 1964 and 1968) candidly reflected this view when he criticised Washington's 
civilian policymakers for stopping US forces from pushing for decisive victory in the 
aftennath of the 1968 Tet Offensive: 
The enemy was on the ropes after the Tet offensive was over. And it's like two 
boxers in the ring. One boxer has the other one on the ropes but the man who's about 
33 
to be the victor has his second throw the towel in. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid, pp. 172-173 & 394-395. See also, Maclear (198 1), pp. 269-271 & 279-28 1. 
32 Ambrose & Brinkley (1997), p. 205. 
33 Hearts and Minds, Peter Davis (Dir. ) 1975. 
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Whether right or wrong, Westmoreland's interpretation encapsulates what would 
come to form one of the dominant conservative reflections on the Vietnam failure; 
namely, that a lack of commitment from the civilian policymakers had plucked defeat 
from the jaws of an American victory. 34 Not only would this view come to colour the 
foreign policy perspectives of many Washington conservatives in subsequent decades; 
it would also steer the US military establishment's subsequent thinking on when and 
how to use military force. Adamant that American soldiers would never again be 
compromised by the fickle priorities of the civilian leadership in the White House, 
these attitudes would resonate in the Pentagon throughout the post-Vietnam years and 
would have a significant influence on the future makeup, use, and stewardship of the 
US military. 
The Vietnam Syndrome 
Given these various contentions, it is little wonder that Washington DC found itself 
wracked by 'rancorous foreign policy debates' throughout the 1970s and 1980s. 35 
However, the divisiveness of these debates was not simply a product of Washington's 
efforts to apportion blame for the Vietnam failure; they also reflected legitimate Cold 
War concerns that America's post-Vietnam disunity had grave implications. At a 
time when Western confidence in American power, and a concerted will in 
Washington to exercise it, represented 'the cornerstone of security for the free 
nations' in the fight against Communism, America's post-Vietnam disunity and war- 
34 Johnson (2004), pp. 60-61. 
35 Mare (1982), pp. 2&5; Balogh (2000), p. 30. 
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weariness raised serious questions over its ability to continue offering a credible 
deterrent threat to Moscow. 
Given these many concerns, Washington's foreign policy deliberations in the 
immediate post-Vietnam period were heavily steered by two significant questions: 
firstly, how might the Vietnam experience inform future use-of-force policy9 
Secondly, how might Americans be persuaded back towards the foreign policy 
confidence they had felt in the years between the ending of the Second World War 
and the Vietnam debacle? These questions generated responses that were split 
roughly along the fissures of two established American ideologies - those of 
'conservatives' and 'liberals'. 36 On the one hand, many American 'liberals', 
reflecting in no small part a wider national mood, advocated the pragmatism of a less 
interventionist post-Vietnam US foreign policy. Decrying as absurd the conservative 
assertion that US forces were somehow 'stopped' from winning in Vietnam, they 
pointed to the massive amount of armaments and chemicals dropped by US forces, 
and the estimated 2.5 million people who had been killed by an American-prosecuted 
war, as evidence that Vietnam certainly had not been 'lost' because civilian 
policyrnakers forced the US military to fight with 'one hand tied behind its back'. 37 
Indeed, in a marked departure from the classic Wilsonian liberal tradition which 
depicted American engagement as being central to a more secure and democratic 
international order, many post-Vietnam liberals now argued that Vietnam 
demonstrated that the US military could not, and should not, be used to reshape the 
world in America's own image. 38 In the words of Senator Edward Kennedy, it was 
36 Enrico Augelli & Craig Murphy (1988), America's Questfor Supremacy and the Third World. A 
GramscianAnalysis, The Center for International Affairs, Harvard University. Pinter Publishers, 
London, p. 70. 
37 John Pilger (1992), Distant Voices. London, Vintage, p. 105 
38 Western (2005), p. 101; Herring (1992), pp. 104 & 117; Balogh (2000), p. 30; Augelli & Murphy 
(1988), pp. 70-71; Robert W. Tucker, 'The Triumph of Wilsonianism', 
World Policy Journal, 10/4, 
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time for the United States to 'throw off the cumbersome mantle of world 
policeman'. 
39 
This argument resonated with considerable swathes of conflict-weary 
Americans, who thought that this stance would not only save American lives but 
might also facilitate alternative, non-military solutions to the Cold War standoff. For 
example, many leading business leaders and financiers sympathetic to this viewpoint 
argued that Washington should target the Soviet Union's economic backwardness. 
They pointed out that America's considerable advantage in this area could be even 
further increased through greater economic co-operation with Japan and Western 
Europe, and through the 'co-optation of Third World elites through token concessions 
on North-South trade issues. ' 
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These liberal efforts to pedestal the merits of multilateral mechanisms for 
prevailing over Moscow, and the privileging of NATO as the vehicle through which 
any US militarism should now be conducted, would not last long. Global events, 
most notably in the Middle East, soon generated a momentum of support for a more 
assertive and unilateral American military presence on the world stage. 41 However, 
whilst this shift in opinion would eventually move many Americans towards a 
position of greater support for a more assertive national foreign policy, it was a shift 
that would take several years and one which would continue to clash with the unease 
that many Americans - both within and out-with government - now felt about the 
possibility of seeing US forces deployed to foreign conflict-zones. As Marilyn B. 
1993-95, pp. 83-99; Michael Cox, Wilsonianism Resurgent? The Clinton Administration and the 
Promotion of Democracy', in Michael Cox, G. John Ikenberry & Takashi Inoguchi, (eds. ) (2000), 
American Democracy Promotion. Impulses, Strategies, and Impacts, Oxford University Press, p. 235; 
Alan Dobson & Steve Marsh (2006), US Foreign Policy Since 1945, Routledge, second edition, pp. 
210-211. 
39 Klare (1982), pp. 2-3. 
40 Ibid, pp. 5-6. 
41 Klare (1982), pp. 24-25. 
43 
Young observes, a 'No More Vietnams' mindset quickly evidenced itself in the 
United States in the immediate post-Vietnam period and such was its palpability, that 
it was soon given a 'special designation' in political, media and academic circles, one 
which would become a domineering fixture in the lexicon of debate and commentary 
on post-Vietnam American foreign policymaking - the Vietnam Syndrome. 
42 
If the Vietnam War divided Americans, the Syndrome it spawned was 
similarly divisive and it would also roughly divide Americans along traditionally 
ideological lines. For the many who now placed themselves under the 'liberal' 
banner, the Syndrome represented something positive, something which, as long as it 
remained both palpable and a discernible influence on Americans, might stop any 
repeat of Vietnam's mistakes. As Michael Klare observed in 1982: 
The memories of US paralysis and despair in Vietnam remain potent and thanks to 
the efforts of many Vietnam War veterans and former anti-war activists, very much in 
the public eye. So long as these memories remain alive, and the public remains 
sceptical about official explanations for government conduct, the Vietnam Syndrome 
will continue to discourage indiscriminate military interventions abroad. 
43 
Individuals such as Klare clearly hoped that the Vietnam Syndrome had a degree of 
permanence about it so that it might continue to imbue Washington's policyrnakers 
with wisdom and caution as they deliberated the future path, and vigour, of 
US 
foreign policy. Unsurprisingly, not everyone concurred with this view. 
42 Young (199 1), p. 314. 
43 Klare (1982), p. 14. 
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The conservative backlash and the 'assault' on the Vietnam Syndrome 
The Vietnam experience certainly did not imbue every American with a wish to see a 
more cautious national foreign policy. Given that they viewed prevarication and 
timidity as having 'lost' Vietnam in the first place, many American conservatives 
stridently rejected this liberal prescription. Indeed, whilst it would be 1981 before the 
United States saw a conservative presiding in the White House, America's right-wing 
was highly vocal in the aftermath of Vietnam and argued consistently that the nation's 
loss of face in Vietnam should spur the White House to reassert America's military 
profile on the world stage. America should, it argued, continue to crusade against 
'alternative ideological systems', 'be willing to use its power and defeat its enemies' 
and 'not back away from conflict as it did in Vietnam'. 44 
This willingness to continue flexing America's military muscles was also 
allied to a clear view of precisely how these muscles should be flexed. Echoing the 
conclusion that much of the military establishment had drawn from the Vietnam 
experience, critics lambasted the incrementalist approaches of successive Democratic 
administrations in deploying US forces in both Korea and Vietnam. They argued that 
the Second World War showed that America's military power was most effectively 
unleashed if the White House sanctioned an 'overwhelming force' approach to any 
military endeavour. Only this approach, critics argued, would ensure US victory in 
the field and an end to any more 'Vietnams I. 
45 
44 Augelli & Murphy (1988), pp. 70-71; Klare (1982), pp. 4-5; Johnson (2004), p. 60. 
45 As this study shows, however, this 'overwhelming force' mantra has been, at times, neglected by 
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Predictably, advocates of this perspective were no less vociferous in how they 
viewed the Vietnam Syndrome itself If the Syndrome made the deployment of US 
forces 'less viable' in the post-Vietnam period (and media, political and elite 
commentators were asserting just that at this point), then conservatives regarded it as 
nothing less than a dangerous impediment to America's Cold War mission and global 
role. 46 They thus took the view through the 1970s and 1980s that even public 
reference to the Vietnam Syndrome was troubling evidence that this national 
affliction was still prevalent. As long as it remained in the collective conscience of 
Americans, they feared, it would continue to invoke the Vietnam experience and thus 
continue to sway Americans against what remained the cornerstone of America's 
ability to prevail over the Soviet Union -a bold willingness to project military power. 
Thus, amidst all of the other debates in Washington, the immediate post- 
Vietnam period saw Washington conservatives launch 'a vigorous and unceasing 
campaign to "cure" America of the Vietnam Syndrome', as part of their efforts to 
revive military intervention as a key foreign policy option which might be broadly 
supported by Americans. These 'anti-Syndrome forces' would have a significant 
impact on presidential foreign policymaking until at least the end of the Cold War. 
47 
46 Richard E. Feinberg (1983), The Intemperate Zone. The Third World Challenge to US 
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The White House and the Vietnam Syndrome 
Even as America's Vietnam debates continued apace in political, media and academic 
circles, it was clear that one thing certainly had not changed for the post-Vietnam 
White House. The Cold War was still very much on and there was still a pressing 
need to maintain Americans' readiness for military action against any perceived 
Communist threat. Thus, perhaps inevitably, the White House also weighed into 
America's debates over the Vietnam Syndrome. 
The White House's engagement with the Vietnam Syndrome would become a 
significant characteristic of the post-Vietnam presidency, until at least the end of the 
Cold War. It would see every President in office in the two decades following 
Vietnam take it upon himself to publicly renounce the Syndrome at some point. The 
White House 'assault' on the Vietnam Syndrome really gathered momentum in 1981, 
with the election of Ronald Reagan. However, if Reagan would come to represent the 
embodiment of White House anti-Syndrome conservatism, it was perhaps his 
predecessor, the Democrat Jimmy Carter, who established a benchmark and set the 
parameters for the Reagan presidency. The next section of this chapter details, in 
brief, the key foreign policy events of the Carter presidency and America's response 
to how he dealt with them. This response manifested itself in gradually-increasing 
support for a more vigorous foreign policy stance from the White House and, 
ultimately, the election of a Commander-in-Chief whose mission it would 
be to 
eradicate the Vietnam Syndrome once and for all. 
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The Carter foreign policy and the Vietnam Syndrome 
Jimmy Carter was US President from 1977 until 1981, when Washington's debates 
over the Vietnam Syndrome were at their height. 48 Carter's foreign policy very much 
reflected the 'liberal' consensus on Vietnam. Consequently, for most of his 
presidency, he found himself criticised by conservatives as being a hostage to the 
worst excesses of the Vietnam Syndrome, as he vetoed direct US involvement in 
conflicts in Zaire, Angola, Iran and Nicaragua. Carter's non-interventionism would 
gradually act as a catalyst to rally elite and corporate support behind conservatives' 
calls for a more forceful US foreign policy. Whilst he did eventually yield to these 
calls, he did so too late, and with insufficient conviction, to win a second tenn in 
office. Carter's 'perfonnance' as President would pave the way for 12 years of 
conservative Republican presidential leadership. 
49 
Accusations of Carter's foreign policy timidity emerged in the aftermath of 
Portugal's military defeat and hurried exit from Angola, in November of 1975. For 
many in Washington, there were many reasons why the United States should involve 
itself in Angola after its wars of independence (1961-1975) against the Portuguese. 
Not the least of these was the fact that one of the principal protagonists in this 
unstable, war-torn environment - the Marxist Movimento Popular de Libertaqdo 
de 
Angola (MPLA) - was receiving signficant 
backing from both Moscow and Havana. 
In the aftermath of Portugal's rout, the MPLA 'assumed hegemony' over 
Angola and 
held the capital, Luanda. Wary of this situation, the concerns of many Western 
Cold 
War warriors were then bolstered when MPLA numbers were supplemented 
by 
Cuban military reinforcements; by February of 1976, around 
12,000 Cuban troops had 
48 Roper (2000), p. 13 1. 
49 Klare (1982), pp. 2-4; Roper (2000), P. 128. 
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been deployed to Angola. 50 However, despite fears that Moscow was now able to 
control important sea-lanes off the South African coast, and that it might use its 
military foothold in Angola as a staging post for possible intervention in Zimbabwe, 
Namibia and South Africa, Carter chose (albeit under constraints from a concerned 
Congress) to remain largely disengaged from Angola. It was a decision which invited 
significant criticism from many quarters in Washington. 51 
However, it was Carter's handling of the Iranian Revolution of 1978-1979 
which shifted much of Washington's policyrnaking elite over to the position espoused 
by an ascendant right-wing. 52 Carter ignored the wishes of some of his key 
administration figures by refusing to use the US military to protect the Shah during 
the Revolution and maintain stability within Iran. Critics quickly seized upon this 
decision as an example of Carter's foreign policy timidity and of his lack of strategic 
judgement. It was, they asserted, a critical mistake which risked undermining one of 
America's key Middle Eastern allies. These concerns appeared to be realised when 
Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini seized power in Tehran, on I 1th February 1979 . 
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Accused by domestic opponents of 'abandoning the Shah to his enemies', domestic 
criticism of Carter escalated still further after the US Embassy in Tehran was stormed 
by Iranian 'students', on 4 th November. Carter ordered a Special Forces mission to 
rescue the 52 American hostages held by the students. However this operation failed, 
further fuelling America's 'hysterical response' to the crisis and leaving the President 
facing accusations that he had 'lost Iran'. 54 
50 Keith Somerville, 'The USSR and Southern Africa Since 1976', The Journal ofModern African 
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Carter's handling of the Iranian crisis seemed to galvanise a growing 
consensus amongst Americans that the nation's post-Vietnam diffidence had gone far 
enough. In admonishing the Carter administration's poor showing on foreign policy, 
Newsweek castigated it for 'the interventions it will not contemplate, bases it will not 
seek, weapons it will not build'. Business Week lamented the 'perception of 
paralysis' in the Carter White House and warned that the Vietnam experience was 
continuing to restrain the Carter administration from protecting America and 
American interests: 'The policies set in motion during the Vietnam War are now 
threatening the way of life built since World War 11', it warned. 55 
Commentaries such as these may sometimes have been written by Republican- 
leaning observers who had little intention of offering an impartial appraisal of the 
Carter presidency. However, it was opinions of this nature - always reminding 
Americans of the continuing need to address the Soviet threat - which captured much 
public-political attention in America during the latter period of the Carter presidency. 
Indeed, 'militant globalist, groups in Washington such as the Committee on the 
Present Danger, headed by the hawkish political strategist Paul Nitze, were being 
quoted in the media 'as regularly as the White House itself during this period. 
Further criticism from hardliners such as Nitze (ironically, a former political ally of 
Carter's) would be levelled at Carter when he signed the second Strategic Arms 
Limitation Treaty (SALT 11) with the Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev, in June 1979.56 
Mage Publishing; Babak Ganji (2006), 7he Politics of Conftontation: ne Foreign Policy of the USA 
and Revolutionary Iran, Taurus Academic Studies, New York. 
55 George F. Will, 'No More 'No More Vietnams", Newsweek, 19 Ib March, 1979; Business Week, 'The 
Decline of US Power', 12 th March, 1979; See also, Klare (1982), pp. 4&8. 
56 lbid, p. 7; Wright (1997), p. 78. The Committee on the Present Danger remains a bipartisan 
organisation 'concerned about strategic drift in US security policy'. See the organisation's declaration 
on its own website (accessed 14th January 2008) at: 
http: //www. committeeonthepresentdanger. org/AboutUs/History/tabid/382/Default. aspx. On Nitze's 
criticisms, see Fred Kaplan, 'The Man Who Brought us the Cold 
War', Slate, 21" October, 2004. 
Available at: http: //www. slate. com/ld/2108510 
50 
With a growing momentum of elite disgruntlement with, and negative media 
coverage of, Carter's foreign policy, it seemed that America was shifting slowly to the 
right. And by mid-1979, it seemed that Carter was responding to that shift. Amidst 
growing concerns in Washington that ongoing Middle-East turbulence could spark a 
domestic energy crisis, and opinion polls appearing to confirm a bolder public mood, 
Carter demonstrated a willingness to adopt some of the 'Cold-War militarist policies' 
being advocated by the increasingly-vocal right. 57 He announced plans for a Rapid 
Deployment Force (RDF) tasked with counter-insurgency warfare, and a significant 
expansion of America's naval presence in the Persian Gulf. 
This vigour was timely, to say the least. In December of 1979, the Soviet 
Union invaded Afghanistan, leaving Carter with the responsibility of offering an 
appropriately strong response to Moscow's incursion. 58 If this response was viewed 
domestically as a measure of how far this seemingly conflict-averse Democratic 
administration had now shrugged off the Vietnam Syndrome, Carter's announcement 
- that he was prepared to use military force to protect 
American Persian Gulf oil 
supplies, and that he would consult Congress on authorizing registration of the draft - 
was broadly viewed as evidence that it had indeed shrugged off Vietnam's chains. In 
fact, one Carter official publicly declared just that, stating that the President's strident 
response had 'put and end to the Vietnam Syndrome'. 
'9 The announcement of the 
Carter Doctrine - which stated that any effort to wrest control of 
the Persian Gulf 
region would be treated as a direct attack on America' 
interests - appeared to reiterate 
this strident new position. 
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However, if President Carter had finally shrugged off the Vietnam Syndrome 
and come round to a more interventionist position, then it was too little too late for his 
presidency. In November 1980, Americans rejected Carter and voted the hawkish 
Republican Ronald Reagan into office as the 40th President of the United States. For 
the time-being at least, it seemed that the conservative anti-Vietnam Syndrome forces 
in Washington were winning the post-Vietnam battle, both for America's votes and 
for its foreign policy. 
Ronald Reagan enters the White House; the presidential 'assault' on the 
Vietnam Syndrome begins in earnest 
Carter's election defeat might be viewed as an instructive benchmark as to what 
Americans expected of their country as it entered the 1980s. The Vietnam Syndrome 
still assumed a fixture-like presence in the American collective consciousness at this 
point. However, Reagan's election victory suggested that many Americans were 
dissatisfied at seeing the White House demonstrate too much of the timidity the 
Syndrome represented. A Republican hardliner, there certainly seemed little chance 
that the new President - and the 'rugged Reaganauts' who peopled his foreign policy 
team - would succumb to this timidity. 
61 As one Reagan official explained: 
When we came into office, one of our primary missions was to get Americans out of 
the 'Vietnam Syndrome', and get them accustomed again to the idea that projecting 
power overseas can help the cause of peace. 
62 
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Reagan's public rhetoric vividly reflected this 'mission'. Expansively revisionist, he 
publicly recast the Vietnam War as a 'noble cause', describing it as having been a 
'sanctified noble crusade'. He also pointed to a changing national mood as 
unmistakeable evidence that the Vietnam Syndrome had been 'swept away'. 63 
However, Reagan's efforts to exorcise Vietnam's demons found forrn in more than 
just buoyant public diplomacy. He also sought to implement a bold foreign policy. in 
doing so however, he ensured that - contrary to his wishes - the Vietnam Syndrome 
remained very much at the forefront of America's thinking. 
For all his self-declared ability to engage with the national mood, Reagan may 
well have over-estimated the extent to which America's electoral endorsement of him 
signified its willingness to embrace a more interventionist position. Americans may 
well have rejected a 'wimpish' Carter; however, this did not mean that they were 
ready to offer blind support for Reagan's bullish plans for winning the Cold War. For 
example, his commitment to aid the El Salvadoran government in its domestic fight 
against Marxist guerrillas - Reagan provided military advisors and financial 
assistance to the junta - proved hugely unpopular with Americans; it generated 
considerable unrest on Capitol Hill, strident media criticism and, on 3 rd May 1981 
Oust 4 months into his office), Washington's largest anti-war march since Vietnam. 
Despite his mission to eradicate any mention of Vietnam from the national vernacular, 
the subject quickly came to dominate America's debates over El Salvador. Critics 
made ready physical comparisons between Vietnam and El Salvador's own heavily- 
jungled terrain and between Reagan's 'assistance' to San Salvador and that which had 
drawn the US into Vietnam in the first place. Media critics openly questioned 
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September, 1983; Ted Gest, 'Foreign Policy: The Main Area', US News & World Report, November 3, 
1980, p. 62; Gardner & Young (2007), pp. 8-9; Kenneth Janda, Jeffrey Berry & Jerry Goldman (2008), 
The Challenge ofDemocracy. Government in America, Houghton Mifflin: Boston, New York, 9th 
edition, p. 632. 
53 
whether the United States might ultimately find itself 'being sucked into a repetition 
of the Vietnam War in its own back yard'. 64 Reagan protested such suggestions and 
publicly criticised his detractors of still suffering from the Vietnam Syndrome. 65 
Whilst he was not shy of taking on his critics, Reagan was thus left in no 
doubt that his much-promoted 'peace through strength' foreign policy vision faced 
considerable domestic opposition. Not only was his foreign policy approach decried 
by his opponents as a reincarnation of the 'Imperial Presidency' so denounced during 
the Vietnam years; his emboldening influence on the national mood simply had not 
eradicated the conflict-shy, casualty-averse sensitivities which still seemed to grip 
significant sections of the American polity. 
It was this continuing domestic deployment- aversion which played a large part 
in steering what has become one of the central missions, and the most glaring 
characteristics, of post-Vietnam American foreign policymaking. In his efforts to 
ease Americans towards a position where they would be more likely to support the 
projection of US military power across the globe, Reagan did more than just try to 
persuade Americans that the Vietnam Syndrome was behind them. He also turned his 
attention towards the Pentagon in order to promote what subsequently become known 
as the Revolution in Military Affairs. 66 
64 4 Why the Talk of Another Vietnam? ' US News & World Report, 9 th March, 19 8 1, p. 9; Hedrick 
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The post-Vietnam quest to fail-safe US military operations 
Spurred by its failure to make its military Superiority count in Vietnam, but mindful 
that America's Vietnam casualty-count continued to sway many Americans against 
supporting force deployments, the development of new conventional military 
technologies became a driving concern for America's political-military establishment 
in the decade after Vietnam. The imperative to develop these technologies was driven 
by rather obvious rationales. Firstly, unlike the vast numbers of nuclear weapons held 
by Washington and Moscow, they could be readily used. 67 Secondly, and just as 
importantly, they also suggested the possibility of reducing dependence on that most 
vulnerable, and politically precious, military resource - troops. 
68 Faced with the 
panacean possibility of risk-free military operations in the future, the Revolution in 
Military Affairs (RMA) thus appeared to represent an irresistible opportunity for 
Washington's foreign policymaking establishment, both in its efforts to establish an 
American-policed world order and also, importantly, in its efforts to re-inspire 
Americans' support for this endeavour. 69 
Unsurprisingly, Reagan was a willing RMA sponsor. Shortly after taking 
office, he sanctioned an extra $33 billion to the Pentagon's annual spending budget. 
It was a commitment which would help the United States to develop an unassailable 
technological advantage over the Soviet Union through the 1980s. 70 Whilst Reagan's 
'Star Wars' programme grabbed much public attention, the RMA would ultimately 
see fruition in the emergence of cruise missiles, satellite positioning systems, 
67 Ignatieff (2001), p. 164. 
68 Hirst (200 1), pp. 88-9 1. 
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55 
remotely piloted vehicles and 'stealth' technologies. 71 However, if the realization of 
these weapons reflected a broadly-held confidence in Washington that technology 
could facilitate military operations absent the various hanns and debilitations which 
had been so prevalent during the Vietnam War, the Vietnam Syndrome continued to 
preclude consensus, even on this issue. Scepticism over the efficacy of the RMA 
quickly evidenced itself. Surprisingly, perhaps, it emanated from a quarter of 
American government which was indispensable to the conceptualising and execution 
of American foreign policy - the US military itself. 
With the post-Vietnam hangover still palpable within the Pentagon, much of 
the US military hierarchy viewed the RMA with a discerning scepticism. 
Institutionally conservative, it embraced the new technologies on the condition that 
they entailed no loss of personnel, structures and traditions. The most guarded 
response of all the military branches came from the Army, which struggled to see past 
the possibility that its divisions of tanks, artillery pieces and troops faced redundancy, 
along with the 'warrior ethos' which was so central to its culture. Notwithstanding 
these concerns, enthusiastic solicitations that new weapons technologies could dispel 
the fog and friction of war sounded suspiciously like what many senior soldiers had 
heard from their civilian masters in the build-up to, and during, the Vietnam War 
itself Many military sceptics wondered whether these new technologies really would 
eradicate the compromises and mistakes which had proven so costly in Vietnam. 72 
These scepticisms were nourished by America's very first major post-Vietnam 
military operation, when President Reagan deployed US Marines to the conflict in 
Lebanon, in August of 1982 (see chapter 4). Despite their ostensibly neutral presence 
in this conflict, US troops soon found themselves drawn into Beirut's fighting and 241 
71 Ignatieff (200 1), pp. 162 & 167; Hirst (200 1), p. 9 1. 
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American Marines were killed in a targeted bombing in the city, on October 23d 
1982.73 A serious blow to both his Lebanon policy and his efforts to help Americans 
put the Vietnam experience behind them, Reagan found to his cost that the Pentagon's 
emerging monopoly on weapons technologies had not altered two longstanding 
axioms of warfare: firstly, that clarity of aim, astute strategising and skilled leadership 
are minimum requirements for victory in the field; secondly, that military success is 
typically dependent upon a military resource which has remained largely unchanged 
for generations - well-trained infantry who are able to win the battle on the ground. If 
the Marines in Lebanon more than met the latter requirement, ill-defined deployment 
goals, stumbling mission parameters and Reagan's ultimate lack of commitment to the 
mission compromised an endeavour which the Pentagon had vigorously opposed from 
the start. 
Reagan may well have thought that a nation-lifting victory would cast away 
the shadows of the Vietnam Syndrome. However, the tragic finale to the Lebanon 
deployment saw Americans once again watch their soldiers withdrawn from theatre, 
bloodied and defeated by a supposedly inferior enemy. 74 A much-vaunted success in 
overthrowing the 'virulently anti-American' Marxist government in Grenada, just a 
few days later, did little to convince America ýs many conflict-doubters that the use of 
military force - even with America's superior military means - was likely to bring 
success at acceptable costs. 75 The military chiefs quickly came to view the Lebanon 
73 Caspar Weinberger (1990), Fightingfor Peace: Seven Critical Years in the Pentagon, New York: 
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experience as something of a 'mini-Vietnam lesson'; in the coming years, they would 
continue to make sure that this experience was not forgotten as they counselled 
civilian policyrnakers on the use of US forces. 76 
Deten-nined that the Lebanon setback would not be repeated, President 
Reagan's Secretary of Defence, Caspar Weinberger, attempted to enshrine the 
military's intervention-concerns when he announced the Weinberger Doctrine, in 
1984. Drawing upon one of the key conservative 'lessons' of Vietnam - that US 
military interventions must be executed in a manner, and on a scale, 'sufficient to 
win' - the Weinberger Doctrine was a policy statement detailing six prerequisites that 
should be met before US forces should be deployed. 77 It stated that: any proposed US 
intervention should be 'vital' to America's interests; that deployment should be 
willingly undertaken; that intervention should be aimed at attaining unambiguous 
military and political objectives; that force of arms was clearly the answer to 
achieving these objectives; that domestic (particularly congressional) support for 
intervention was attained; and that combat should be a last resort. 78 However whilst 
Weinberger's efforts to 'straight-jacket' America's military interventions would be 
further honed within the next decade, these 'intervention rules' would ultimately do 
little to guide presidential deployment decisions - they were often too rigid, too 
inapplicable or were simply a hindrance to the wishes of a particular Commander-in- 
Chief Whatever the value or usage of these 'rules', deficiencies and mistakes would 
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continue to evidence themselves in executive branch deployment decision-making in 
succeeding years. 79 
There can be little argument that President Reagan - the undisputed champion 
of the anti-Syndrome forces during the late 1970s and 1980s - was largely 
unsuccessful in his task to rid America of the Vietnam Syndrome. Spurred by 
Reagan's interest in El Salvador and also by the ill-fated Lebanon mission, Martin 
Staniland observes that America continued its 'obsessive' preoccupation with 
Vietnam throughout his first ten-n in office. Its responses to the various international 
conflicts of this period were, he notes, characterised by an immediate buzzing of 
Vietnam 'radars' in Washington and a near-paranoid search for 'Vietnamness' on the 
part of much of the political and media establishment, so that disengagement from the 
conflict in question might be justified. 80 Elite commentators would continue to note 
the 'surprising persistence' of the Vietnam Syndrome throughout the 1980s, whilst 
political journalists acknowledged the Syndrome as 'an identifiable political force' in 
Washington DC politics. 
81 
This changed little through the passage of Reagan's second tenn in office. He 
and his administration were all too aware of their failure to rid America of the 
Vietnam Syndrome. 'Our failure in Vietnam still casts a shadow over U. S. 
intervention anywhere', an administration report warned at the end of Reagan's 
second term, a clear admission that - despite its best efforts - the Vietnam experience 
continued to infuse America's collective consciousness. 
82 It would be left to 
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Reagan's successor to pick up the torch and to try, once more, to eradicate the 
Vietnam Syndrome. 
The post-Cold War era; a fragmenting world order and a rejuvenated Vietnam 
Syndrome 
The White House 'assault' on the Vietnam Syndrome certainly did not end with 
Reagan's exit from office. He was succeeded in the Oval Office by the man who had 
been his vice-President; George H. W. Bush. Bush carried his predecessor's anti- 
Syndrome verve into office with him when he won the presidency in 1989.83 
However, for all his own efforts to move Americans beyond the Vietnam Syndrome 
during the uncertainties of the immediate post-Cold War period, the Syndrome 
persisted, much as it had done throughout the Reagan years. 
Despite the fact that many Americans continued to demonstrate a 'grave 
reluctance to send American troops abroad', Bush mirrored his predecessor in 
deploying US forces to the Middle East, this time in response to Iraq's 1990 invasion 
of Kuwait. Unlike the limited Lebanon deployment, however, Bush's deployment 
was massive and on a scale which had not been seen since the Vietnam War. 84 Like 
his predecessor, President Bush found himself having to 'fight' the Vietnam 
Syndrome as he sought to rally domestic support behind the Persian Gulf deployment. 
Amidst political and media accusations that he was sending US troops into a desert 
quagmire, and that he was acting with all the unaccountability demonstrated by the 
Vietnam Presidents, Bush arguably found it easier to amass a strong international 
83 Gardner & Young (2007), pp. 8-9. 
84 Young (1991), p. 314. 
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military coalition to stand against Iraq's aggression, than he did to win the domestic 
battle at home (see chapter 5). 
Despite his efforts to dispel Vietnam's shadows during this time, it is clear that 
the Bush White House was extremely mindful of the Vietnam Syndrome. Whilst 
America's Vietnam concerns were not sufficient to stop him from deploying US 
forces into combat against Iraqi forces, Bush's stipulations for the deployment had the 
Vietnam Syndrome etched all over it - Operation Desert Storm was planned with a 
near-obsession with mission-brevity, casualty-avoidance and the need for 
international legitimacy. Whilst the success of this US-led operation in 'liberating 
Kuwait' may well have dispelled Vietnam's shadows from the American 
consciousness, Bush's triumphant declaration in the aftermath of victory in the 
Persian Gulf - that America had 'kicked the Vietnam Syndrome once and for all' - 
ultimately proved (as had similar declarations from his predecessor) to be a premature 
affirmation of the Syndrome's demise. 85 Ironically, within just a year or so, Bush 
himself would breathe new life into it. 
Its public renunciation by President Bush in early 1991 had little effect in 
eradicating the Vietnam Syndrome. In fact, the Syndrome continued to evidence 
itself over the next decade as an unfolding succession of ethnic conflicts (in Somalia, 
Bosnia Herzegovina and Rwanda) sparked a whole new series of use-of-force debates 
- and deployment concerns - in the United States. 
Whilst many Americans remained 
stubbornly resistant to seeing US forces deployed to foreign conflicts, the end of the 
Cold War saw many others reflect a growing international consensus that 'human 
rights protection and democracy promotion' were the 'new imperatives in world 
politics'. For the many Americans who appeared to be sympathetic to this view, 
85 E. J. Dionne, 'Kicking the "Vietnam Syndrome"; Victory Sweeps Away U. S. Doomed-to-Failure 
Feeling', The Washington Post, 4h March, 199 1. 
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'humanitarian' military intervention was now an acceptable - and, to the world's sole 
remaining superpower - an achievable vehicle for upholding 'universal civic 
values'. 86 Dissatisfied at seeing the White House remain inactive in the face of the 
civilian disasters spawned by such conflicts, and absent the threat of military 
retaliation from Moscow, 'liberals' and 'hardliners' often made unlikely bedfellows in 
demanding US military intervention - if not to actually curb the hostilities, then at 
least to alleviate the humanitarian crises they spawned. 87 
These arguments were often compelling but the White House perspective was 
frequently at odds with liberal interventionist demands. Wary of sending US troops 
into open-ended operations in the middle of heated battle-zones, administration 
deliberations over how to act towards these crises consistently appeared to have 
Vietnam's shadows hovering over them. Absent any Cold War imperatives, or any 
glaring resource or strategic significance, Presidents - backed vigorously by the 
Pentagon - typically viewed these conflicts as being both devoid of American 
'interests' and as chaotic killing fields which promised little political capital for any 
would-be interventionist President. 88 
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The Weinberger-Powell Doctrine and the decade of humanitarian emergencies 
Central to this White House deployment-reluctance was the fact that possible 
engagement with the ethnic conflicts of the post-Cold War period little satisfied the 
'overwhelming force' mindset which had, albeit inconsistently, largely embedded 
itself in the collective consciousness of Washington's political-military establishment 
since Lebanon. Successful US interventions in Grenada (1983) and Kuwait (1991) 
had affirmed for much of this establishment that political ends could be successfully 
achieved through force but only if used overwhelmingly and if operations were largely 
US-controlled. However, it was clear that if the US was to respond to the wave of 
conflicts which emerged in the post-Gulf War period, then these conditions were 
unlikely to be met. Possible Western involvement in these crises was always 
predicated upon the assumption that that involvement would be: a) multilateral; b) 
subject to restricted rules of engagement, and c) under co-operative military 
command, most probably through the United Nations (UN). 
For many in Washington, these conditions held little appeal. Firstly, the 
possibility of seeing US troops involved in multilateral peacekeeping and 
humanitarian operations sparked longstanding concerns that external actors should not 
usurp the President's constitutionally-enshrined role as Commander-in-Chief of US 
forces. Secondly, this feeling was especially marked if that 'external actor' was the 
United Nations; a near-institutional aversion - especially amongst conservatives - to 
seeing US forces operating under the UN was palpable in Washington throughout 
much of the 1990s. Thirdly, the Lebanon experience had galvanised the perception 
amongst many political, military and media figures in Washington that US forces 
faced fruitless risks in assuming non-aggressive interpositional roles bound by 
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restrictive 'political' rules-of-engagement. Fourthly, inter-operability problems with 
technologically inferior military allies appeared to presage that in such operations, US 
forces not only risked being compromised in the field but that they would also have to 
shoulder the bulk of the burden in any operation, in order to secure mission integrity, 
safety and effectiveness. 
Given these considerations, it is perhaps unsurprising that many in 
Washington - on both sides of the political divide - were unsupportive of US military 
involvement in these crises. 'From the political perspective', one former State 
Department official has subsequently admitted, these considerations and concerns 
'had a big impact' on White House deployment decisions during the 1990s and they 
may go a long way towards explaining America's reluctant involvement in the 
conflicts of this period. 
89 
One aspect of the White House's efforts to grapple with these new 
intervention dilemmas was to further sharpen its intervention guidelines. The 
Weinberger Doctrine had been constructed to offer prudent intervention guidelines to 
the Cold War White House but General Colin Powell, Chainnan of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, refined Weinberger's 'rules' in 1992. Powell specified that force deployments 
should only be sanctioned with the absolute commitment of the White House and 
should employ overwhelming force, a stipulation which reflected Powell's disdain 
for 
the idea that US forces might be used incrementally or, even worse, as a symbol of 
'American power 
Against the backdrop of the liberal interventionist mood which appeared to be 
taking hold of some sections of post-Cold War America, the Weinberger-Powell 
89 Author interview with former State Department official Dr 
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Doctrine (WP Doctrine) was quickly lambasted by some critics as representing a 'no- 
can-do' attitude on the part of a military establishment which, since Vietnam, had 
demonstrated a consistent reluctance to engage in anything less than a full-scale war. 
There may well have been some legitimacy in this accusation; Powell's mindset did 
indeed have the Vietnam experience stamped all over it. However, the WP Doctrine 
was also informed by the Lebanon experience and vividly reflected the military's 
belief that if civilian policyrnakers really did see fit to deploy, then they should 
honour this commitment by bringing the full weight of American military power to 
bear so that debacles of the type witnessed in Beirut could be avoided. 90 
Whatever the wisdom of, of the rationales for, these 'intervention rules', the 
WP Doctrine inspired little more presidential fidelity to their prescriptions than had 
the Weinberger Doctrine. General Powell's concerns may well have made sound 
military sense but these concerns were not always compatible with those of his 
Commander-in-Chief, who was clearly subject to a far broader array of public- 
political pressures than any military practitioner. The passage of the 1990s 
consistently proved this. With Western media coverage keeping ongoing crises in 
Somalia and Bosnia very much in the public limelight, and with American inaction on 
these crises often appearing negligent when compared to the actions taken by other 
national governments, the White House came to realise that - despite the reservations 
of senior political and military policymakers - military non-engagement was not 
always a feasible political option. 
However, President Bush's decision to deploy US forces to Somalia in 
December of 1992 proved once more - as had been the case for President 
Reagan 
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with the Lebanese War twenty years earlier - that military operations held grave risks, 
even for the world's most advanced military power. As in Lebanon, it would be the 
dubiety of civilian policyrnakers' decisions and commitment, rather than the 
deficiencies of the US military or its arsenal, which would bring America's mission to 
a bloody end. Initially deployed to safeguard humanitarian aid deliveries, Bush's 
successor Bill Clinton (apparently joining his predecessor in ignoring the prerequisites 
enshrined in the WP Doctrine) escalated America's role in Somalia. It was a decision 
which ultimately resulted in the now-infamous Mogadishu fire-fight, in October of 
1993. The confrontation ended with 18 US troops being killed, with a further 84 
wounded. 91 The incident set Vietnam 'radars' buzzing with renewed vigour in 
Washington; it did not take political and media critics long to start referring to 
Somalia as 'Vietmalia'. President Clinton promptly withdrew US forces. 92 
The ignominious ending to America's involvement in Somalia, and the 
predictably sensational response to it from within the American public-political arena, 
ultimately spurred the Clinton administration to rein in its brief support for US 
involvement in multilateral humanitarian operations. Clinton's review of such 
operations was enshrined in Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD-25), a directive 
which Trevor McCrisken describes as 'a further codification of the Vietnam 
13 Syndrome .9 For much of 
the drawing up of this directive, Clinton officials had 
articulated considerable support for US involvement in multilateral humanitarian 
operations - early on in the review process, proposals were even 
forwarded for the 
creation of a standing UN 'peacekeeping) anny. However 
in the light of the 
Mogadishu fracas, and administration concerns that Congress and the American 
91 See the PBS website, 'Ambush in Mogadishu'. Accessed 3 
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public would now vigorously oppose any such missions in the future, PDD-25 was 
drastically re-evaluated and its unveiling detailed a considerable retreat from its early 
liberal-interventionist ethos. 94 Once more, America's post-Vietnam military casualty- 
aversions appeared to be influencing the path and the vigour of US foreign policy. 
An irrelevant military advantage? 
The doomed Somalia mission very much re-invigorated the Vietnam Syndrome. 
Indeed, after Mogadishu, it seemed that the Clinton administration was suffering from 
the Syndrome as badly as its most deployment- averse critics (see chapter 6). The 
Mogadishu setback re-ignited Washington's debates over the abilities and 
responsibilities of the world's sole remaining superpower. There were numerous 
viewpoints. For some, the US failure in Somalia proved that an RMA-obsessed 
Pentagon had 'failed to develop concepts relevant to the new realities' of the post- 
Cold War world. Others speculated that Washington had learnt nothing at all from 
'I'k the Vietnam experience: the US may now have an abundance of aircraft carriers, 
stealth aircraft and satellite-guided missiles at its disposal, critics argued; however 
Mogadishu, and ongoing White House timidity over US involvement in Bosnia, 
demonstrated that this futuristic arsenal, and its modus operandi, was a 'poor fit' with 
the low intensity conflicts which now appeared to be the dominant threat to 
international peace. Nor had America's supposed 'military advantage' increased its 
proficiency, or confidence, in what remained the most crucial arena of warfare - 
94 Sarah B. Sewall, 'Multilateral Peace Operations' in Stewart Patrick & Shepard Fonnan 
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fighting on the ground. 95 Other commentators argued that the Mogadishu debacle did 
not prove that America's military was actually ineffectual in (small war settings'; it 
merely showed that US forces had to be utilised with greater proficiency. 96 As far as 
America's military chiefs were concerned, all of these perspectives missed the point: 
US forces were sufficiently able to accomplish any task set for them, they argued; 
however, there were clear intervention guidelines enshrined in the WP Doctrine and 
these guidelines emphasised full and decisive applications of military force, not 
cautious 'gesture' deployments constrained by the political motivations of civilian 
policymakers. However, other Americans utterly opposed any US involvement in 
these conflicts whatsoever, regardless the reasons for, and vigour of, the deployment. 
After Somalia, these divergent perspectives were stridently touted as 'hawks' 
and 'doves' contested the pros and cons of military engagement with the Bosnian 
War, which had sprung to international prominence in 1992. They perhaps 
manifested themselves most prominently in a notorious altercation between a hawkish 
Madeleine Albright - who was then President Clinton's Ambassador to the United 
Nations - and General Colin Powell, then Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff. 
Citing both fuzzy policy objectives and a lack of mission clarity from the Clinton 
administration, Powell vigorously opposed placing US forces in the firing-line 
between Bosnia's three warring factions, a stance which prompted Albright to 
challenge him: 'What's the point in having this superb military you're always talking 
about if we can't use iff Powell (who later admitted that he thought he would 
'have 
an aneurysm' over this question) reacted with fury, affronted that Albright seemed to 
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view American troops as 'toy soldiers' who could be readily used in 'some sort of 
global board game'. 
97 
Thus, whilst they were referred to as 'teacup wars' by some analysts, the post- 
Cold War ethnic conflicts nonetheless posed challenging questions, and difficult 
political problems, for the White House. 98 They also guaranteed the longevity of the 
Vietnam Syndrome by ensuring that deployment opponents would continue pointing 
to the Vietnam experience as an example of why US forces should remain confined to 
barracks. However, whilst there was certainly nothing new in the fact that 
Washington's debates over US involvement in Bosnia were dominated by references 
to the Vietnam War, these debates were to see a dramatically novel twist in which - in 
an astonishing departure from the post-Vietnam 'norm' - the process of publicly 
alluding to Vietnam as a way of stymieing support for the deployment of US forces 
was led and sustained by the White House itseýf 
This was a marked change in the White House's 'relationship' with the 
Vietnam Syndrome. White House deployment planning throughout the post-Vietnam 
years had consistently demonstrated that the key fears and concerns associated with 
the Vietnam Syndrome - open-ended military commitment, the incurring of 
casualties, no specified end to the military operation in question - did appear to affect 
executive branch policymakers as they deliberated how to respond to 
foreign 
conflicts. However, throughout this period, they had done everything they could not 
to articulate their Vietnam concerns to the American public-political arena; 
indeed, 
successive presidential administrations - from Carter to Bush - 
had attempted to 
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publicly renounce the Vietnam Syndrome in an effort to move America beyond the 
foreign policy timidity it was popularly thought to impose. 
However, the vigour of this presidential 'assault' on the Vietnam Syndrome 
was to be dramatically checked as the conflict in Bosnia Herzegovina began making 
front-page news in the United States. Adamant that US troops should not be sent into 
Bosnia's intense hostilities, but coming under considerable public-political pressure to 
'do something' about the crisis, President Bush searched for ways of publicly 
justifying the withholding of US forces from Bosnia. In a vigorous overturning of 
convention, he did so by publicly invoking the Vietnam Syndrome. Having told 
Americans, in the aftermath of the Persian Gulf victory, that America had 'kicked' the 
Vietnam Syndrome, he now reinvigorated it, clearly thinking that by doing so, he 
might diminish Americans' willingness to support US military involvement in the 
Balkans. Bush told Americans that he would not send US troops to Bosnia because 
the Vietnam Syndrome still counselled against incautious interventions: 4 ... never get 
bogged down in a guerrilla war where you don't know what the hell you're doing'. 
99 
As chapter 6 vividly demonstrates, the succeeding Clinton administration continued in 
this vein for a considerable period of Bosnia's war. 
99 Michael Putzel, 'Treading Cautiously: Warnings of Military Folly% The 
Boston Globe, 7 th August, 
1992; Sandy Grady, 'Bush Wary of Balkan Snakepit Pressured By 
World Opinion, President Seeks 
Low-Risk Military Option For Defending Bosnia', The Charlotte Observer, 
8h August, 1992. 
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An enduring Vietnam Syndrome 
By mid-1995, with the White House - now under Bill Clinton's stewardship - still 
obstinately refusing to send US troops into Bosnia's hostilities, it thus seemed that the 
White House 'relationship' with the Vietnam Syndrome had come full circle. During 
the Reagan years, the dispelling of the Syndrome was seen as imperative in upholding 
Americans' tacit acceptance that force deployments were a distinct possibility in the 
fight against Communism. Now, absent the Soviet threat, and with a marked decline 
in presidential deployment- advocacy (at least where messy, localised ethnic conflicts 
were concerned), the White House was more than willing to re-sensitise Americans' 
deployment- aversions by publicly re-invoking the Vietnam Syndrome. 
However, the Syndrome was not something to toy with; this new White House 
public diplomatic strategy had significant consequences. It became clear during the 
mid-1990s that whilst the ending of the Cold War had greatly changed the dynamics 
and imperatives of international politics, two elements of foreign policy-making had 
not changed: firstly, Presidents were still being confronted with situations which 
might require the deployment of US forces; secondly, the President would still have to 
publicly confront the Vietnam Syndrome in order to gamer broad domestic support 
for such an action. These imperatives became vividly evident to President Clinton as 
- after nearly three years of refusing to 
do so - he committed himself to sending US 
troops into Bosnia as part of NATO's mission to oversee that country's fragile peace. 
Once Clinton had sanctioned this change of stance, he found that the White House's 
prolonged 'use' of the Vietnam Syndrome had created a considerable problem. 
Quite simply, the Clinton administration discovered that it could not garner 
broad public-POlitical support for sending 25,000 US peacekeeping troops 
into Bosnia 
71 
because - it seemed - many Americans were now concerned about the 'Vietnamness' 
of Bosnia and convinced that sending US troops there risked 'miring' the United 
States in 'another Vietnam'. Given that the White House itself had been emphasising 
just this message for the previous three years, it is hardly surprising that many 
Americans (especially in Congress) now appeared to take this view and that the 
Clinton administration could not persuade them otherwise. 
Thus, despite the frequent and (during the Reagan and early Bush years, at 
least) persistent White House efforts to publicly disavow the Vietnam Syndrome, it 
was still very much alive and kicking throughout the 1990s. And, if the existence of 
the Syndrome is confirmed by its mere mention - as right-wing conservatives in 
Washington had worried throughout the 1970s and 1980s - then it remained a 
palpable influence on American foreign policymaking at the onset of the new 
millennium itself, a longevity apparently confirmed by Louis Galambos' observation 
that the Vietnam War 'still lingers in [America's] national politics and foreign policy 
decisions. ' 100 
Conclusion 
The Vietnam War had profound and varied impacts upon the United States. The 
overview provided by this chapter has vividly illustrated them. It 
has shown not just 
why the Vietnam Syndrome arose but also how and why 
it has continued to be so 
influential on America's thinking on the use of military force. This chapter 
has also 
shown that, despite what much of the literary reference to the 
Vietnam Syndrome has 
100 Louis Galambos, 'Introduction' in Neu (2000), pp. xii-xiii. 
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implied, the post-Vietnam American polity has not been uniformly opposed to 
supporting force deployments. Despite the trauma of the Vietnam experience, many 
Americans have continued to hold the Wilsonian belief that a powerful US military 
can act as a force for good in the world. Indeed, whilst this viewpoint was espoused 
stridently by conservatives in the post-Vietnam period, it was espoused with equal 
vigour by many liberals in the post-Cold War period as they petitioned the White 
House to deploy US forces to humanitarian crises. Despite intervention-advocacy 
evidencing itself throughout the post-Vietnam years, however (not least within the 
White House itself), the Vietnam Syndrome has nevertheless maintained a fixture-like 
presence on the American foreign policymaking landscape, despite the efforts of 
successive Presidents to move America beyond it. 
The longevity of the Vietnam Syndrome has been fuelled by several factors. 
Not the least of these is that despite the wealth of thought, money and technological 
expertise which has been expended on trying to fail-safe US military operations (thus 
notionally eradicating US military setbacks and the deployment-aversions that such 
setbacks inevitably foment within the American public-political arena), the RMA has 
not changed the fact that conflict-zones continue to harbour the dangers which killed 
so many American soldiers in Vietnam. As this study shows, successive Presidents 
have sought to mitigate against incurring military casualties and operational open- 
endedness as they have envisioned deployment strategies throughout the post- 
Vietnam years. At times, their concerns over securing these prerequisites have been 
so pronounced that - rather than take the risk - they have 
decided not to deploy US 
forces at all. 
However, there are times when (for a variety of reasons) deployment is the 
chosen option for the White House and this option 
has consistently met with the 
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opposition of broad swathes of Public-political America. This domestic opposition 
has undoubtedly been nourished by some of the US military's experiences during the 
post-Vietnam years. The US mission in Somalia is just one instance which shows that 
military operations can quickly go awry. Regardless the technology employed and 
the soundness of the planning process, it seems that any deployment into a conflict- 
zone brings with it the chance of setbacks, even for the world's foremost military 
power. When these setbacks have occurred, the Vietnam Syndrome has been 
reinvigorated. 
The persistent 'presence' of the Vietnam Syndrome has undoubtedly made it 
much harder for Presidents to win broad domestic backing for force deployments. At 
times when it has taken the decision to deploy, the White House has invariably had to 
try to stop 'Vietnam radars' from buzzing, in its efforts to generate this backing. 
However, whilst Presidents and their administrations have typically taken pains to try 
to convince the American public-political arena that deploying US troops will not 
mire the United States in 'another Vietnam', it is also true that throughout the post- 
Vietnam era, deployments have proceeded apace anyway, regardless the White 
House's success in quelling Vietnam fears and rallying broad domestic support for the 
deployment in question. Indeed, the ability (and indeed the willingness) of Presidents 
to circumvent domestic opinion on the issue of using US forces flies in the 
face of 
much of what has been written about the Vietnam Syndrome. Not only 
does it 
contradict the notion of a more constrained post-Vietnam 
foreign policy presidency; it 
also challenges the supposition that an empowered post-Vietnam 
Congress has been 
able to act as a greater check on the White House's deployment authority, through 
the 
ratification of the War Powers Act and the enhancement of the 
legislature's oversight 
powers. The principal reasons for the White House's willingness, and ability, 
to so 
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routinely circumvent Congress - and indeed the broader domestic arena - on this 
issue is explored in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 3 
US Presidents and the Domestic Politics of Military 
Intervention in the United States 
One of the glaring characteristics of US force deployments is the dominance of the 
President in dictating if and how US forces are to be deployed. This chapter considers 
why, despite the apparent obstacle represented by the Vietnam Syndrome, the 
President has continued to hold most of the cards on this issue and why he has been so 
able to circumvent the wishes of other domestic actors - principally the Congress - in 
this area. 
For all that Presidents are perennially keen to curry favour as far as possible 
with the legislative branch and the broader American public-political arena - 
Congress, the media and wider public opinion are not just vital and tangible aspects of 
America's liberal democratic political processes but also the key to the President's re- 
election - this does not mean that White House deployment decisions always coincide 
with the wishes of these constituencies. Indeed, these decisions frequently pre-empt a 
coherent public-political stance on any given foreign crisis. On the rare occasions 
when a discernible and consistent stance does seem to be evident within the public- 
political arena, Presidents - advised by their 'inner-circle' of 'expert' political and 
military policyrnakers - are frequently prepared to take 
decisions which clearly 
contravene these stances. Domestic challenges to, or dissent over, White House 
deployment decisions typically do not alter the decisions in question and the President 
consistently appears to act imperiously when it comes to 
decisions on the use of US 
forces. This convention is one of the most glaring characteristics exposed by this 
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study. Both the reasons and the mechanisms for this presidential dominance are 
considered in this chapter. 
Domestic influences on presidential deployment decision-making: 
A brief literary overview 
There exists a vast and mature literature suggesting that the use of US military forces 
is influenced by domestic actors operating out-with the executive branch of 
government in the United States. Writing in 1927, Harold Lasswell noted that with 
increasing public awareness of the political process, government management of 
public opinion was now 'an inescapable corollary of .. modem war'. 
' More recently, 
Michael Leigh has observed that the imperatives of the domestic social-political scene 
are often 'more salient' to those taking deployment decisions than the international 
crisis to which they are responding. 2 J. M. Rabbie contends that a rounded 
understanding of international conflict can often be best understood by examining 'the 
3 internal or domestic conflicts of interests' of the nations concerned . Joe Hagan 
observes that it is the 'domestic pattems' of major powers, as well as international 
4systemic structures', which steer the path of international PolitiCS. 
4 Melvin Small 
offers a concurring view, noting that 'domestic components lurk behind virtually 
every case of American international interaction'. 5 Rejecting any notion of executive 
monopoly of these processes, J. G. Clifford points out that there is no 'single 'maker" 
1 Harold Lasswell (1971), Propaganda Technique in World War One, Cambridge, Massachusetts, p. 
15. 
2 Leigh (1976), p. xiii. 
3 j. M. Rabbie, 'Group Processes as stimulants of aggression', in Jo Groebel & Robert A. Hinde (eds. ) 
(199 1), Aggression and war: their biological and social bases, Cambridge University Press, p. 143. 
4 Joe D. Hagan, 'Domestic Policy Explanations in the Analysis of Foreign Policy', in Laura Neack, 
Jeanne A. K. Hey & Patrick J. Haney (eds. ) (1995), Foreign Policy Analysis. Continuity and Change in 
its Second Generation, Prentice Hall, p. 118. 
5 Small (1996), pp. xiii &xix. 
77 
of America's foreign policy; Clifford contends that Policy outcomes flow not solely 
from presidential ponderings but also from the opinions of his 'inner-circle' of key 
political and military policy advisors, and from the complex interplay between this 
ýprivate' elite body and an array of actors within the American public-politIcal arena, 
all of whom are as keen as the White House to attain interpretive dominance of the 
ctisis in question. 6 
The sheer weight of such commentary appears to suggest strongly that the 
triadic influence of the Congress, the media and public opinion does indeed have the 
potential to influence presidential deployment decisions. Indeed, the import of the 
Vietnam Syndrome largely rests upon this supposition since it assumes that the 
Vietnam-inspired conflict- aversions residing within the American public-political 
arena are able to place obstacles in the way of the President's ability and willingness 
to deploy US forces. But how might these domestic concerns impact upon the 
President's deployment decisions? And which constituency has the greatest potential 
to offer the greatest impact upon these decisions? 
Since the principal focus of this study falls upon the dynamics and interactions 
between the White House and Capitol Hill at times when the President is deliberating 
the deployment of US forces, it is to Capitol Hill that this chapter first turns its 
attention. The apparent demise in executive credibility after the Vietnam War 
prompted some commentators to depict a reinvigorated post-Vietnam Congress which 
- its military authority having apparently been bolstered by the enactment of the 1973 
War Powers Act - 'significantly reversed Presidential authority on the use of force'. 
7 
The question of whether Congress - and indeed the broader congressional-media- 
6 J. Garry Clifford, 'Bureaucratic Politics', in Michael J. Hogan & Thomas G. Paterson (eds. ) (2004), 
Explaining the History ofAmerican Foreign Relations, Cambridge University Press, second edition, p. 
93. 
7 Nogee (198 1), p. 189. 
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public opinion triad - actually has managed to impose itself upon presidential 
deployment decision-making is given greater consideration below. 
Executive-legislative relations with respect to the use of military force: 
A brief constitutional background 
Arguably the most significant confrontations which emerge over the deployment of 
US forces are those which take place between the White House and Congress. As 
was noted in the previous chapter, congressional foreign policy authority was 
bolstered after the Vietnam War, in no small part because of the enactment of the War 
Powers Act of 1973. As chapters 4-6 vividly demonstrate, at times when the 
deployment of US forces is seen to be a possibility in the United States, much of the 
opposition arrayed against the White House emanates from Capitol Hill, and much of 
this opposition typically centres upon who - between the legislative and executive 
branches of government - should have a say in the deployment in question. Indeed, 
this issue frequently appears to provoke as much contestation as the question of 
whether and why US forces should be deployed in the first place. 8 
However, it is important to note at this point that whilst much of the post- 
Vietnam commentary on, and construal of, legislative-executive use-of-force 
confrontation risks giving the impression that this dissention is purely a post-Vietnam 
phenomenon, this is most certainly not the case. Such confrontation would doubtless 
evidence itself even if the United States had not been involved in the Vietnam War. 
indeed, a quick perusal of the American constitution reveals that inter-branch 
8 Jentleson (1997), pp. 39-70. 
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wrangling over the use of US military forces was willingly sanctioned by those who 
prescribed the guiding edicts for the newly independent United States. 
Arg., xiably the most significant characteristic of the war-making statutes written 
into the constitution is that any American commitment to war should be agreed upon 
by both the legislative and executive branches of government. 9 From the perspective 
of those who fonnulated the constitution, there were very good reasons for this. 
Contemptuous of what they decried as the 'undemocratic, executive-dominated' 
system of British governance, and mindful that they had not fought against British 
rule merely to install an 'elective despotism' of their own, the constitution's framers 
sought to provide the United States with a system of governance which would avoid 
concentrating decision-making power with any one institution, or person, in 
government. 10 Pronouncing the President Commander-in-Chief of United States' 
armed forces ensured that the nation's military chiefs would be answerable to an 
elected civilian leader. However, this ostensible check on military hubris was also 
imposed upon the President himself, with Congress being endowed not only with the 
power to fonnally declare war, but also with appropriative power over the nation's 
military spending. " Concerns over whether such an arrangement was suitable for 
responding decisively to immediate or unforeseen military threats were addressed by 
formally endowing the Commander-in-Chief with the authority to take autonomous 
action against 'foreign attacks'. These emergency provisions aside, however, the 
constitution's framers were of a clear mind; namely, that both Congress and the 
President would steer America's military engagements. 12 
9 Jentleson (1997), pp. 41-42; Banks & Straussman (1999), p. 167. 
10 Foley & Owens (1996), p. 2; McKay (1997), pp. 52-53. 
11 John Dumbrell (1997), The Making of U. S. Foreign Policy, Manchester University Press, second 
edition, p. 55. 
12 H. Bailey and J. Shafritz (eds. ) (198 8), The American Presidency, Chicago, Dorsey, p. 2 1; McKay 
(1997), p51; Jentleson (1997), p. 42; Foley & Owens (1996), p. 3 67. 
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It should thus come as little surprise that inter-branch competitiveness over 
America's military activities has emerged to become one of the hallmarks of 
American political history. As Bruce Jentleson observes, the popular depiction of 
American foreign policymaking being tantamount to 'an invitation to struggle' 
between the President and Congress could be dismissed by now as cliched, if it didn't 
continue to so graphically characterise inter-branch wrangling over US force 
deployments. 13 However, the extent to which the relationship on this issue has been 
one of executive-legislative equivalence during the post-Vietnam period is highly 
questionable. 
The executive-legislative 'struggle' for America's foreign policy: the 
congressional role in deployment decision-making 
Congress and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan 
There have certainly been notable instances in which the post-Vietnam Congress has 
assumed the significant foreign policy role envisioned for it by the constitution's 
framers. This section examines just such an episode. On Christmas Eve of 1979, the 
Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan with the aim of preventing an Islamic government 
seizing power from the quasi-Communist Peoples' Democratic Party, headed by Nur 
Muhammad Taraki. 14 Drawing attention to the presence of Soviet forces just 300 
miles from the Persian Gulf coast, President Jimmy Carter responded by ordering a 
build-up of US forces in the Indian Ocean and by publicly announcing that any threat 
13 Jentleson (1997) p. 4 1. 
14 See Sandy Gall (1988), Afghanistan: Agony ofa Nation, Random House, pp. 3-7. 
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to Middle Eastern oil supplies would be deemed 'an assault on the vital interests of 
the United States' which would be 'repelled by any means necessary, including 
military force'. 15 Less conspicuously, Carter also initiated a modest, covert CIA-run 
weapons-supply programme aimed at providing Afghan guerrillas (the Mujahedin) 
with the means to fight Soviet forces. However, Washington's assistance proved 
ineffective in bringing anything approaching parity to the conflict, especially given 
the Soviets' unchallenged air superiority over the Afghan resistance forces. 
The ineffectiveness of this programme, and the succeeding Reagan 
administration's prolonged unwillingness to increase American assistance to the 
Afghans, provoked rumblings of discontent from many in Washington DC. This 
mood was sustained in no small part by the lobbying efforts of Congressman Charlie 
Wilson, who had personally visited Afghanistan and had spoken with Mujahedin 
commanders in the field. A Vietnam veteran himself, Wilson returned home to 
Washington from Afghanistan with a clear idea of what America's assistance 
programme would have to provide if the Afghan resistance was to prevail over the 
Soviets: shoulder-held surface-to-air missile launchers, called Stingers. Providing the 
Mujahedin with these easy-to-use weapons would, Wilson felt, play havoc with a 
Soviet military strategy whose success rested largely upon its unchallenged aerial 
dominance. 
In concert with Wilson's informed advice, both the House and Senate Defence 
Appropriations subcommittees met and agreed to substantially increase funds that the 
CIA could draw upon, for the purchase and supply of Stingers to the Mujahedin. 
These committees twice subsequently sanctioned add-on funds for the programme. 
However, still resistant to any escalation of the programme, the Reagan 
' Klare (1982), p. 75. 
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administration argued that these weapons would be too sophisticated for the Afghan 
fighters and the Pentagon continued to refuse to spend the appropriated money. 
Despite the 'many bureaucratic hurdles' the Reagan administration put in the 
way of the programme, the Stinger programme funds were finally activated, the 
administration responding to legislators' threats that Congress would withdraw 
funding and support from some of President Reagan's flagship domestic policies. 
And, despite the President's scepticism, the Stinger supply programme proved hugely 
successful. The ability of these missile launchers to shoot down Soviet aircraft was 
decisive in changing the balance of the conflict. Indeed, their introduction was widely 
seen as being pivotal in forcing the Soviets to withdraw from Afghanistan in defeat 
(in February 1989), unwilling to sustain the human and economic costs of a war in 
which the playing field was now considerably levelled. This shift was catalysed 
almost exclusively by prolonged congressional pressure on a reluctant executive in 
Washington DC, and it catalysed a change not just in the Soviet-Afghan conflict, but 
possibly also the wider the East-West struggle. 16 
The congressional role in shaping American policy towards the Afghanistan 
War is just one example of how Congress can steer America's foreign policy. 
Congress' actions during this period were very much in keeping with the 
constitutional prescription that the legislature should play a decisive role in American 
foreign policyrnaking - doubtless this episode would meet the approval of the 
constitution's framers. However, whilst these events provide a vivid example of the 
potential that Congress has to make its mark on the making of American foreign 
policy, it seems that Capitol Hill's ability to make such an impact on what is probably 
16 Murtha (2006), p. 55-59. 
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the gravest foreign policy area of all - namely, the decision to actually deploy US 
forces into combat - is somewhat less pronounced. 
Ignoring the old goats: the rise of the presidential 'inner-circle' and the 
continuing marginalisation of Congress in post-Vietnam deployment decision- 
making 
There are many reasons why Congress' foreign policy authority appears to dissipate 
markedly on the issue of deploying US forces, despite the fact that this diminution 
appears to stand at odds with its constitutionally-mandated empowerments. Congress 
enjoys two notable prerogatives with regard to military deployments. Firstly, it 
controls the funding for such operations. Secondly, only it has the right to fonnally 
declare war, an authority over US military operations which Congress sought to 
bolster by the enactment of the 1973 War Powers Act, at the end of the Vietnam War. 
In reality, however, this apparent strengthening of Congress' existing pre-Vietnam 
authority has done little to swing deployment authority away from the post-Vietnam 
White House. 
There are several reasons for this. For a start, the institutional idiosyncrasies 
of American federalism and joint-control governance have frequently been derided as 
being ill-suited to decisive use-of-force decision-making. William Banks, Jeffrey 
Straussman and David MacKay all depict inevitable congressional decision-making 
lethargy, given Congress' lack of consistently shared policy objectives and mutually 
acceptable co-operative frameworks for engaging with crisis decision-making. 
17 
Congress, James Lindsay observes, is a they not an it, and the disparateness of its 
17 McKay (1997), pp. 187 & 190-191; Banks & Straussman (1999), p. 198. 
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hundreds of members is simply ill-suited to the unified assertiveness which effective 
deployment decision-making typically appears to demand. 18 
By contrast, executive branch offices such as the National Security Council 
(NSQ, the State Department and the Department of Defence are specifically tasked 
with assessing and coordinating foreign policy and - most importantly - they also 
have intimate contact with the White House. Whilst the ability of each individual 
institution to command the President's ear is typically dependent upon a mixture of 
presidential preference and how effectively each institution asserts itself, it is 
executive branch practitioners - most notably those civilian and military policy 
advisors who comprise the President's 'inner-circle' - who are always 'the central 
core of the policy-making process' when it comes to interpreting a foreign crisis and 
earmarking the most appropriate response to it. ' 9 
The increasing prominence of the President's 'inner-circle' has been one of 
the most significant characteristics of US crisis foreign policy decision-making in 
recent decades. Indeed, it is one of the ironies of post-Vietnam US foreign 
policymaking that the 'experts' and elites who were so heavily implicated in the 
Vietnam failure have, since Vietnam, actually become more firmly entrenched in 
executive branch foreign policy making. They work closely with the President and 
they enjoy a decision-making influence that elected legislators simply do not. 
20 The 
rise and rise of the presidential 'inner-circle' thus cannot be ignored when one is 
examining executive-legislative relations on the issue of deployment decision- 
making. Truly dominating this process, this presidential clique has persistently 
18 James. M. Lindsay, 'Cowards, Beliefs and Structures. Congress and the Use of Force', in H. W. 
Brands, (ed. ), (2000), The Use ofForce After the Cold War, Texas A&M University Press, College 
Station, p. 15 1. 
19 Dobson & Marsh (2006), pp. 12-13. 
20 Balogh (2000), p. 39; Deborah Stone (2002), Policy Paradox. The Art ofPolitical Decision 
Making, 
W. W. Norton Publishing, third (revised) edition, pp. 7& 376. 
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endorsed the value, even the necessity, of an executive-legislative partition when the 
issues are at their gravest, and has taken a consistently dim view of congressional 
'intrusion' into crisis foreign policyinaking. 21 
There are some telling examples of the attitudes which underpin this 
dismissive executive branch attitude towards the legislature. At the Texas State 
Republican Convention in Dallas in June 1992, President George H. W. Bush was 
asked why he was not able to bring the same assuredness to his domestic politics that 
he did to his foreign policymaking. His response - 'that I don't have to get the 
permission of some old goat in the United States Congress to kick Saddam Hussein 
out of Kuwait. That's the reason' - is not only instructive in shedding light upon how 
this President viewed the value of congressional involvement in deployment decision- 
making; it also illuminates how he viewed his own deployment empowerments, as 
President, vis-a-vis Congress. 22 Interestingly, this dismissive view of Congress' value 
to foreign policy decision-making is by no means new; writing nearly two hundred 
years earlier, Thomas Jefferson espoused similar sentiments, noting that it was the 
'tyranny of the legislature' that policy-makers had the most to fear from as they took, 
and tried to implement, political decisions. 23 
The views reflect an established debate over how far 'democratic values' or 
ýelite expertise' should steer political decision-making in liberal democracies such as 
the United States. This debate raises some compelling and controversial questions. 
For example, should decisions on the use of military force be driven by whatever the 
broader public-political mood appears to want, in keeping with the 'democratic 
ideal'9 Or are these decisions simply too important to be left hostage to a fickle and 
21 Record (2002), p. 28. 
22 Bush's remarks recorded in the Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, 
June 29, h 1992. 
Cited in Grimmett, I s'May, 2007, p. 27 (footnote 62). 
23 Quoted in Alexis de Tocqueville (2000), Democracy in America, Abridged edition, Hacket 
Publishing Company, p. 117 (2.272) 
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uninformed public mood? Should they not instead be presided over by 'experts' 
whose knowledge and experience makes them best placed to steer the nation's foreign 
policy9 Furthermore, if these individuals 'know best', should their opinions and 
decisions not prevail, even if they are greatly at odds with the national mood and the 
opinions of the elected legislature? Writing in the early 1950s, George Kennan 
articulated the classic 'expert-centric' perspective. Warning of the dangers of 
'diplomacy by dilettantism', he championed the 'principle of professionalism' and 
declared that America's foreign policy should be placed in the hands of 'a corps of 
professional officers'. Trying seriously to incorporate the mood of Congress and the 
media into the decision-making process would, Kennan believed, compromise the 
expertise of the 'professionals' and risk seeing US foreign policy 'led astray into areas 
of emotionalism and subjectivity. 124 
Kennan's views clearly show little sympathy to what many people would feel 
is the 'democratic ideal'; the very ideals, indeed, that many Americans view as being 
quintessentially American. Despite its apparent contravention of 'American values', 
however, this study shows clearly that Kennan's 'undemocratic' counsel for 
deployment decision-making in Washington DC has been well-realised throughout 
the post-Vietnam years and that this has had considerable implications for 
congressional involvement in force deployment decisions. Despite America's status 
as a liberal democracy, and despite the fact that it sits uneasily with the constitutional 
remit for legislative-executive co-operation on this issue, post-Vietnam Presidents 
have almost reflexively assumed command at times when the deployment of US 
forces may be required. At such times, Congress' empowerments in this area 
have 
24 George F. Kennan (1984), American Diplomacy, The University of Chicago Press; expanded 5h 
edition, pp. 93-94. Another significant figure in US 
foreign policyrnaking who has advocated the 
'expert-centric' approach is Henry Kissinger. See, Kissinger (2001). 
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often been rendered largely irrelevant in the face of the President's open willingness 
to ignore Congress' 'old goats' if he sees fit to do so. 
Congress' power of the purse and congressional war powers 
The frequent subordination of Congress in American deployment decision-making 
can be further examined by looking more closely at how Congress' two major 
empowerments in this area - control over funding for US military operations and the 
legislative authority enshrined in the 1973 War Powers Act - are persistently rendered 
impotent in the face of presidential assertiveness. The popular idea of Congress 
having the 'power of the purse' over any use of the US military carries with it such an 
authoritative air since it implies that there is just one 'purse' to which Congress holds 
the key. In fact, this is not the case and Presidents have frequently found little 
difficulty in circumventing congressional fiscal obstinacy by sourcing alternative 
C purses' to fund military operations. 25 For example, congressional threats to block 
funding for the deployment of US forces to Bosnia in 1995 (see chapter 6) saw 
President Clinton's Defence Secretary William Perry assert that he would simply 
draw the funds from 'other defence accounts', in order to pay the estimated $1.5 
billion cost of the operation. 26 However, as will be demonstrated in the case studies, 
it is also true that Congress is typically unwilling to undennine the President by 
withholding funds for endeavours which are often very serious in nature, and where 
American credibility is at stake. The reasons for this apparent legislative willingness 
to defer are discussed later in this chapter. 
25 Dobson & Marsh (2006), p. 9. 
26 'Read Our Lips': Congress Must Say No To Troops in Bosnia, Now', Decision Brief (No. 95-D 86) 
from the Center For Security Policy, I" November 1995. 
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On the second issue, that of congressional empowerment over war-making, it 
may well be the case that Congress is constitutionally mandated to sound the tocsin of 
war. However, it is also the case that America's numerous engagements with 
international conflict in the previous few decades have not actually seen the United 
States involved in hostilities which have carried the fonnal designation of 'war'. In 
fact, from the time of President Washington to the present day, Congress has enacted 
just II fon-nal declarations of war against foreign nations, in 5 different wars; the last 
of these declarations was on 5 th June 1942, against Rumania. 27 Indeed, despite its 
considerable involvement in international conflict in the post-World War Two period, 
it appears that the United States does not involve its forces in 'war' anymore; this 
designation has been absent even from engagements which have involved the 
commitment of several hundred thousand US troops and where US forces have been 
involved in offensive 'war-fighting' operations. In domestic political terms, this 
apparent demise of formal 'war' declarations has inevitably unden-nined legislative 
branch deployment authority, given that much of this authority pertains to US military 
involvement in crises which carry just this designation. 
28 Presidents might feasibly 
have pushed Congress to formally designate some of America's post-World War Two 
military operations as 'war'; however, as will be discussed, there are very good 
reasons for why they have not done so. 
The 1973 War Powers Act sought to redress the 'war anomaly' by notionally 
forcing the White House to engage in executive-legislative deployment co-operation, 
regardless of whether or not US military operations actually 
fell under the 
designation of 'war'. However, this Vietnam-inspired attempt to address Congress' 
27 Jennifer K. Elsea & Richard F. Grimmett, Declarations of War and Authorizationsfor the Use of 
Military Force: Historical Background and Legal Implications, Congressional Research Service 
Report (Order Code RL 31133), 8th March, 2007, p. 29. 
28 Ibid., p. 27. 
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deployment marginalisation has been largely unsuccessful. Presidents have 
responded to this legislative challenge with vigour and have continued to do whatever 
they deem necessary to uphold their dominance of this crucial policy area. It may 
well flout America's democratic ideals (and, indeed, the American constitution), but it 
has been very much the case throughout the post-Vietnam years that what the 
President says goes, vis-a-vis foreign conflicts. As will be shown in chapters 4,5 and 
6. the Vietnam Syndrome may well have increased the vigour with which the White 
House has had to publicly 'make the case' for deploying US forces but the consistent 
strength of domestic deployment-opposition has certainly not stopped Presidents from 
deploying, even if Congress has appeared to oppose the deployment in question. At 
such times, Presidents have often exercised considerable rhetorical guile. Not only 
have they articulated what have often appeared to be quite exaggerated rationales for 
deploying US forces, in an effort to sway domestic opinion, they have also used their 
interpretive dominance of the issues in order to stop the enactment of War Powers 
resolutions which would allow Congress a say in the deployment decision-making 
process. 
Dancing on a dime: haggling over the War Powers Resolutions 
Congress continuing marginalisation in this policy area can largely be located 
in the 
fact that successive Presidents have continued to act very much as 'Imperial 
Presidents' when foreign crises have captured America's attention. A more expansive 
view of their constitutional rights since the end of the Second 
World War has seen 
Presidents increasingly move to use military force without prior congressional 
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approval. The apparent stiffening of Congress' powers in this area through the War 
Powers Act has done very little to change this convention. 29 Indeed, every single 
President who has faced a possible invoking of the War Powers Act by Congress has 
dismissed the Act as an unconstitutional infringement on the authority of the 
Commander-in-Chief This stance was given considerable backing when, on 23 rd 
June 1983, the US Supreme Court declared legislative vetoes unconstitutional (INS v. 
Chadha). 30 With the legality of the War Powers Act still un-clarified by the Supreme 
Court, Presidents have continued to state that whilst they welcome congressional 
authorisation for force deployments, the President is notformally required to seek this 
authorisation and that Congress' War Powers empowennents are in fact an 
unconstitutional infringement upon the Commander-in-Chief s powers. 31 As the case 
studies in the next three chapters demonstrate, Presidents Reagan, Bush and Clinton 
all responded to congressional efforts to assert policy influence through the War 
Powers Resolutions by confidently rejecting the ability of these statutes to supersede 
the President's own constitutional empowerments on the use of US military forces. 
However, executive branch vigour in blocking the enactment of the War 
Powers resolutions does not stop there. Presidents deploying US forces have also 
been able to stop their deployments coming under congressional War Powers 
oversight by simply denying the applicability of the War Powers resolutions to the 
deployment and the crisis in question. Bizarrely, perhaps, much of the executive- 
legislative jousting which has accompanied presidential deployment decisions has 
revolved around Section 2 of the War Powers Act, which stipulates that: 
29 Ibid., p. 29. 
30 Grimmett, I't May, 2007, pp. 8-9. This judicial decision is available to view at the 
Cornell 
University Law School website. Available at: 
http: //www. law. comell. edu/supct/html/historics/USSC - 
CR 
- 
0462_0919_ZS. html 
31 Jentleson (1997), p. 42; Grinimett, 16'h January, 2007, p. 2. 
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... 
The collective judgement of both the Congress and the President will apply to the 
introduction of United States Armed Forces into hostilities, or into situations where 
imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances (italics 
31 added) . 
In response to Congress' demands that US force deployments should come under War 
Powers authority, Presidents have simply denied that key words contained in this 
section actually apply to the crisis in question; specifically, 'hostilities' and 'Imminent 
involvement in hostilities'. As the next chapter demonstrates, for example, President 
Reagan successfully delayed a congressional deployment time-limit on the 1983 US 
Marine deployment to Lebanon by repeatedly stressing that 'there is no expectation 
that US forces will become involved in hostilities. ' 33 Reagan's justifying logic was 
clear; if the President states that American troops are not involved in 'hostilities', then 
that is indeed the case and there is thus no basis for enacting War Powers resolutions 
which would allow Congress a collaborative over-viewing role in the deployment. 
Indeed, debates over the wording of the War Powers Act can reach ridiculous 
proportions, especially given the gravity of the events against which these debates 
typically take place. Even as US Marines were taking their first casualties in Beirut, 
Reagan was still resisting congressional involvement in the deployment by arguing 
that the crisis the Marines were involved in did not actually constitute 'hostilities'. 
34 
The obstacles that Congress faces in trying to bring War Powers resolutions to 
bear on US force deployments extends even beyond this. As Louis Fisher and 
David 
Gray Adler point out, even where Presidents do see fit to report to Congress under the 
provisions of the Act, the sixty-to-ninety day deployment 'clock' enacted 
by the 
32 Grimmett, 0 May, 2007. Appendix C, p. 80. 
33 George C. Wilson, 'Skirmishing Starts on How Long Marines Can Stay in Beirut', The 
Washington 
Post, I't October, 1982. 
34 Ibid. 
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invoking of the Resolution only begins 'ticking' if the President reports the mission 
under a specific subsection of the Reporting section of the Act: Section 4 (a) (1). 
35 
Unsurprisingly, Fisher and Gray observe that Presidents typically do not tend to report 
force deployments under 4 (a) (1); they often choose instead to declare simply that 
they are reporting the deployment in question to Congress 'consistent with the War 
Powers Resolutions'. The glaring omission of this (more 'informal') type of 
announcement for congressional dissenters is that the deployment time-clock - which 
is set ticking only by the President specifically invoking Section 4 (a) (1) - remains 
inoperative so that there remains, despite the President's ostensible succumbing to 
War Powers authority, no formal grounds for congressional involvement in 
overseeing and time-limiting the deployment in question. Any such agreement is 
frequently only reached at the President's discretion. 36 Once again, these measured 
White House obfuscations are frequently accompanied by the President telling 
Congress that he is not obligated to cite Section 4 (a) (1) anyway, since he is acting 
gpursuant to the President's constitutional authority with respect to the conduct of 
foreign relations and as commander-in-chief of the anned forces. ' 
37 
It is precisely because of these various factors that the enactment of the War 
Powers Act has in fact emerged as something of a hollow victory for Congress. 
Initially regarded by some as 'the salvation of the American political system', the 
Act's effectiveness in reining in executive authority on the use of force has in 
fact 
been negligible. This is not only because Presidents have increasingly neglected to 
formally designate US military operations as 'war'; it is also due to the fact that every 
single President who has faced the enactment of War 
Powers resolutions has managed 
35 Louis Fisher & David Gray Adler, 'The War Powers Resolution: Time To Say Goodbye', 
Political 
Science Quarterly, Vol. 113, No. 1, Spring 1998, p. 11; Grimmett, I" May, 2007, p. 
24. 
36 Ibid. 
37 President Reagan cited in George C. Wilson, 'Reagan Assures 
Congress Marines Will Avoid 
Combat', The Washington Post, 26ýh August, 1982; Grimmett, I" May, 
2007, p. 15. 
93 
to both circumvent a formal enactment and publicly dismiss the resolutions 
themselves as an unconstitutional infringement on his authority as Commander-in- 
Chief. 38 
These factors have clearly had a profound impact upon Congress' ability to 
exercise any authority upon force deployments. The Vietnam War may have 
produced both the Vietnam Syndrome (a significant impediment to the White House's 
111'k ability to rally America behind US force deployments) and the War Powers Act (an 
apparently decisive piece of legislation compelling the White House to involve 
Congress in these deployments) but these notional obstacles have done little to stop 
Presidents from assuming control when a crisis arises which may result in US troops 
being deployed. Indeed if Arthur Schlesinger's classic depiction of an 'Imperial 
Presidency' has been so oft-repeated within the discourses on American foreign 
policy, then it is undoubtedly the ability of the White House to so routinely 
circumvent Congress at such times which plays a significant part in sustaining this 
characterisation. 
The importance of presidential status 
Aside from the frequent willingness - and ability - of Presidents to deflect 
congressional 'intrusion) into deployment decision-making, there 
is another 
significant factor which frequently consigns Congress to a 
'junior role' in this area - 
the status of the presidency itself. Fulfilling a role which 
far exceeds the mere 
execution of policy, the American President 
is the sole leader of a nation which, since 
38 Jentleson (1997), p. 42; Grimmett, 16th January, 2007, p. 
2. 
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its very inception, has viewed itself as 'exceptional' . 
39 The President is thus broadly 
expected to act, and to be treated, as someone who embodies the 'history and 
greatness' of America and nowhere is this expectation more tangible than in the field 
of foreign policyrnaking, a policy area whose importance to the United States rose 
inexorably through the course of the twentieth century. 40 
Surprisingly, perhaps, given the popular assumption that the White House was 
badly damaged by the Vietnam experience, this veneration has continued throughout 
the post-Vietnam era. Americans have frequently demonstrated a reluctance to 
undermine the President at times of crisis. This has gone some way to preserving the 
latitude that the President has continued to enjoy (and assume), at times when the 
smoke from foreign battlefields has attracted America's attention in the post-Vietnam 
era. The fact remains that events such as the Vietnam War and the Watergate and 
Iran-Contra scandals have done little to diminish the view held by many on Capitol 
Hill and beyond, that the Commander-in-Chief of America's armed forces should 
enjoy discretionary authority to execute successful deployment initiatives. 
41 The need 
to have an authoritative focal point for explaining foreign crises, to formulate 
responses to them, and to rally Americans to support these responses has thus seen 
Congress consistently cede ground to the White House. Despite the partisanship 
which so typically fuels much of the inter-branch haggling over force deployments, 
and despite the fact that there is considerable potential for the President's political 
opponents to undermine him on an issue which has such potential to go awry, there 
appears to remain a broadly-held acceptance that the US military does have a role to 
39 On American exceptionalism, see: Madsen (199 8); Roper (2000); McEvoy-Levy (200 1); McCrisken 
(2003). 
40 Foley & Owens (1996), p. 368; Dumbrell (1997), p. 56. 
41 Alexander Hamilton (Federalist No. 75), cited in Jentleson, (1997), p. 42; McKay (1997), pp. 187 & 
190; Lindsay (2000), p. 152. 
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play in world affairs and that the President is the natural locus of authority in 
conceptualising and steering this role. 42 
Indeed, whilst all three of the case studies bear out this observation, the events 
detailed in chapter 6 (which charts the response of the Clinton administration to the 
conflict in Bosnia Herzegovina) are especially marked. As Ryan Hendrickson notes, 
the onset of the 104 th Congress in 1995 was perhaps the likeliest moment in recent 
decades at which a congressional challenge to White House deployment authority 
might have evidenced itself With a Republican majority in both Houses, with 
President Clinton viewed as weak and unpopular by many high-ranking 
representatives and with a swathe of opinion in Republican circles weighted against 
US participation in United Nations peacekeeping projects, Hendrickson speculates 
that Clinton's designs for involving the United States in the UN 'peacekeeping' 
mission inside war-torn Bosnia Herzegovina may well have led to the 'break' of the 
4war powers practice of deference to the commander in chief . However, a feisty 
Republican-dominated Congress found that it could ultimately do little to prevent 
President Clinton from deploying 25,000 American troops to Bosnia at the end of 
1995.43 
The observations of Congressman John Murtha (Dem, PA) are instructive in 
illustrating the mindset which has frequently seen legislators defer to the White House 
in this way. Referring to President Reagan's controversial deployment of US Marines 
to the Lebanese conflict in 1982, Murtha notes that whilst he had 'argued in private' 
for the withdrawal of US Marines from Lebanon in 1983, he actually voted with the 
majority of other legislators in supporting President Reagan's wish to keep the 
Marines there. Murtha's stated reasons for this are illuminating. Firstly, he knew that 
42 McKay (1997), pp. 187 & 190-191. 
43 Ryan Hendrickson, 'War Powers, Bosnia and the 104"' Congress', Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 
113, No. 2, Summer 1998, pp. 241-242. 
96 
Congress was unlikely to manage to change Reagan's preferred policy option; even if 
there did exist a concerted congressional will to challenge either the deployment or its 
terms, a two-thirds majority in both Houses would have been required in order to 
prevail over the President's veto which would inevitably have been enacted in 
response to any such challenge. Secondly, Murtha asserts that he 'instinctively' 
supported the President on major foreign policy issues anyway, and he thought that it 
would look bad if Congress did not back the President and, by extension, the 
American troops in Lebanon. Cold War concerns about the implications of a failed 
American policy in Lebanon also featured in his thinking. Thirdly, Murtha noted that 
since he had been personally sent to Lebanon as an emissary of the House Speaker 
Thomas 'Tip' 0 Neill (Dem. MA), and since O'Neill had received a personal 
assurance from President Reagan himself over the safety of the military mission in 
Lebanon, O'Neill told Murtha that Murtha 'would embarrass him' if he voted against 
the President's deployment. 44 
Murtha's candid recollections of this episode illuminate the extent to which the 
President is often able to win support for force deployments merely by virtue of his 
office, what it stands for, and what it is charged with doing. Those in government, 
even if they are politically opposed to the President, are consistently willing to defer 
to him due to their national affiliations and their personal esteem for the office and 
what it represents. Legislators are patriotic American citizens themselves and they 
understandably have no wish to see the United States embarrassed, or to see US 
military operations compromised. Indeed, whilst the post-Vietnam era has seen 
legislators persistently criticise Presidents for acting 'undemocratically' in the taking 
of deployment decisions, it is not uncommon to see legislators themselves acting in 
44 Murtha (2006), p. 43. 
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just such an 'undemocratic' manner as they have sought to 'do what is right for the 
nation' and to support the President at times of crisis. For example, Senator Dianne 
Feinstein (Dem. CA) can be seen to have done just that when, in late 1995, she stated 
publicly that she was 'pleased to give one hundred percent support' to President 
Clinton's deployment of US troops to Bosnia, despite her admission that 'my calls all 
run by the thousands to the contrary'. 45 
Murtha's second point - that he wanted to back the President and the US troops in 
theatre - is also significant and can be traced in no small part to the Vietnam 
experience. One of the widely-drawn conclusions from the Vietnam years was that 
dwindling congressional support was a key factor in unden-nining the US mission in 
Vietnam. The eroding of support 'back home' has often been cited as something 
which also contributed to the decline in moral of frontline American troops. 
Consequently, whilst the post-Vietnam Congress has consistently taken seriously its 
role as a 'check' on executive military decision-making (how effectively it has 
actually fulfilled this role is a different matter), legislators have also been extremely 
wary of taking their deployment-opposition too far. Even where Congress appears to 
have vigorously opposed the deployment of US forces and has castigated the 
President for sanctioning this action, it has been extremely careful to rein in its 
opposition once the deployment is imminent. Having endured criticisms during the 
1970s that its dwindling support undennined the efforts of young US troops in 
Vietnam, being seen to be 'right behind' deployed US troops has subsequently 
become something of a byword of congressional protocol in the post-Vietnam years. 
45 Dianne Feinstein, 'The Senate Debates Sending Troops to Bosnia', Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee, I't December 1995. NB - unless stated otherwise, the comments of congressional 
representatives cited in this study can be found (by date/legislator's name & statement title) at the 
Library of Congress' Thomas search facility: http: //thomas. loc. gov/home/rI 04query. html 
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Congressional support for US forces deployments may not thus be attributed solely to 
legislators' respect for the man ordering the deployment. 
This is not to suggest, by any measure, that Congress is timorous in its 
dealings with the White House on the issue of deploying US forces. As one former 
senior State Department official has observed, whilst Congress is generally willing to 
support White House force deployments, it is also generally accepted that the 
President will be 'pilloried without mercy' if the mission goes awry and will have to 
face all of the political fallout which that criticism will bring with it. 
46 Indeed, as the 
next chapter shows, Congress is able to exert considerable pressure upon the White 
House if a deployment is prolonged and is starting to suffer setbacks. Congressional 
disgruntlement, whether with the mission itself or with the President's stewardship of 
it, will inevitably attract considerable media attention and can contribute to the build- 
up of pressures which may lead the White House to conclude that scaling down the 
operation, or even aborting it, is the only expedient option. 47 However, this influence 
certainly does not appear to extend to an ability to force the President to change his 
mind about deploying in thefirst instance. 
The various factors discussed in the preceding sections have combined to 
ensure that the White House's deployment authority has not only been consistent - 
they have also, as John Dumbrell points out, fin-nly entrenched the President as the 
4 prime mover' in Washington's inter-branch wrangling in this area. 
48 
" Author interview with former State Department official, Dr William Schneider Jr. Washington DC, 
I Oth May, 2006. 
" Sobel (2001), pp. 42-47. 
48 Dumbrell (1997), p. 60; Banks & Straussman (1999), p. 198. 
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The media-public opinion dyad and its role in presidential deployment decision- 
making 
Of course, the terms of Washington's deployment debates are not solely raised by, 
and confined to, the aspirations and opinions of politicians. Domestic constituencies 
other than Congress have also been depicted as having the ability to influence the 
making of US foreign policy. The American media - the 'fourth institution' - has 
often been seen as having just this ability. It has increasingly been characterised as 
being 'at the centre of a struggle to define and influence public opinion' and a 'major 
force' in the making of American foreign policy, one unencumbered by the partisan 
motivations and political cowardice which so many Americans ascribe to Congress. 49 
Joseph Pika and John Anthony Maltese observe that public scrutiny and 
evaluation of presidential performance is an ongoing fact of American politics, with 
journalists, polling organisations and academics 'constantly engaged in contemporary 
evaluation of presidential performance'. However, it seems that this attentiveness is 
not one-way. Presidents and their staff demonstrate a consistent interest in how they 
are being evaluated and in how they are doing in the opinion polls, doubtless mindful 
of the fact that popular Presidents appear to attain greater congressional and public 
support for their policies. Presidents thus have, it seems, a considerable interest in 
trying to pander to the wider public mood as much as possible, attain 'good press', 
49 Lindsay (2000), p. 150. Also: L. Broadbent, J. Elridge, G. Kimmett, G. Philo, M. Spaven & K. 
Williams (1985), War and Peace News, Glasgow University Media Group, Open University Press, p. 
178; Simon Serfaty, 'The Media and Foreign Policy', in Simon Serfaty (ed. ) (1990), 7he Media and 
Foreign Policy, MacMillan, p. 1. See also, Walter Lippmann (1922), Public Opinion, Free Press 
Publishing (1997 edition); Leigh (1976); George C. Edwards & B. Dan Wood, (1999), 'Who 
Influences Whom? The President, Congress, and the Media', The American Political Science Review, 
Vol. 93, No. 2, June 1999; Jonathan Mermin (1999), Debating War and Peace. Media Coverage of 
U. S. Intervention in the Post- Vietnam Era, Princeton University Press; Western (2005). 
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and thus maximise their ratings . 
50 That the President seeks such approval is certainly 
bome out by the evidence provided in this study. 
This view of an influential media as a facilitator of wider public involvement 
in the political process also presupposes that public awareness of, and opinion on, US 
foreign policy also constitutes something of significance to the making of that policy. 
If the public read the papers, they are infonned and - notionally, at least - are thus in 
a position to let their political leaders know whether they support certain course of 
action or not. Indeed, newspapers themselves often provide the platform for public 
opinion and dissention, through the publication of letters, editorials and opinion 
pieces and by the conducting of interviews and opinion polls. 
Given that the Vietnam Syndrome frequently finds form in both journalistic 
commentary upon proposed US force deployments and in journalists' charting of 
congressional, elite and wider public opposition to deployments, the media can 
certainly be seen as one of the key channels through which the Vietnam Syndrome 
manifests itself in the American public-political arena. Given its potential to give an 
emotive voice to deployment-opponents' Vietnam-infused arguments against sending 
US troop to foreign theatres of conflict, this next section considers how far it is 
feasible to depict both the American media and domestic public opinion as having a 
significant influence on White House deployment decision-making, in the face of 
what has already been acknowledged as the White House's domineering role in this 
area. 
The media and the domestic politics of military intervention 
50 Joseph Pika & John Anthony Maltese (2003), The Politics of the Presidency, CQ Press, p. 13 1. 
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There are numerous adherents to the idea of a media-driven, or at least a media- 
influenced, American foreign policy. Barilleaux has speculated that the television 
media has considerable ability to influence the broader public view of American 
Presidents. 51 Rogers and Dearing find that the media appears to have a strong 
influence upon key policy decision-makers themselves, whilst Wood and Peake have 
drawn the conclusion that it is the media which influences the President's foreign 
policy agenda, and not vice-versa. 52 In their consideration of the domestic backdrop 
to decision-making, Edwards and Wood see Congress as exerting very little influence 
on the policymaking agenda; in contrast, they depict the media as having a 
6particularly important role' in setting the presidential policy agenda. 53 As James F. 
Hoge notes, administrations have to be proactive if they want to maintain interpretive 
dominance of both a foreign crisis and of what the United States should do about it: 
If policyrnakers want to set the agenda and not leave it to the media, they must have 
an agenda. The existence of policy that can command public support against 
emotional swings stirred up by television imagery is key. In the absence of 
persuasive government strategy, the media will be catalytic. 
54 
Hoge's observation goes to the heart of the task facing modem Presidents as they 
respond to foreign crises. The status and resources of his office certainly give the 
President every chance to dictate and lead policy. However if he prevaricates, 
sanctions a policy which fails, or is perceived not to be leading policy effectively or 
51 Ryan Barilleaux (1998), The Post-Modern Presidency: The Office after Reagan, New York: Praeger. 
52 Everett M. Rogers & James W. Dearing, 'Agenda-Setting Research: Where Has It Been, Where Is It 
Going? ' in Doris A. Graber (1994) (ed. ), Media Power in Politics, CQ Press, Washington DC; B. Dan 
Wood & Jeffrey S. Peake, 'The Dynamics of Foreign Policy Agenda Setting', American Political 
Science Review, Vol. 92, March 1998. 
53 Edwards & Wood (1999), p. 342. 
54 James F. Hoge Jr., 'Media Pervasiveness', Foreign Affairs, Vol. 73, No. 4, July/August 1994, p. 138. 
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'popularly', then the media is likely to criticise him and demand alternative strategies 
and stances. Whether or not this criticism actually affects the President's initial 
decision to deploy US forces is, of course, a different matter but there is little doubt 
that such criticism can foment and sustain a public-political climate which can exert 
pressures upon any Commander-in-Chief who is forced to take decisions in this area. 
There has been significant debate over the possibility that critical media 
coverage can actually affect this all-important 'initial decision' to deploy or not. In 
the post-Cold War period in particular, much reference has been made to the so-called 
'CNN effect', the notional ability of the media - through relaying images and reports 
of bloody conflicts and their accompanying humanitarian tragedies back to the United 
States - to mobilise public-political support for US military interventions. Whilst 
some commentators maintain that such active media activity can persuade foreign 
policymakers 'to act in ways they otherwise would not', it is certain that, at the very 
least, a 'CNN effect' can place administrations under considerable pressure to engage 
with a crisis, in order to address the sufferings (perhaps most notably, the killing, 
starvation and forced migration of civilians as a result of conflict) which are making 
headline news and capturing public-political attention. 
55 These pressures can become 
both politically damaging and demoralising to an administration if it is not able to 
effectively respond to them. As chapter 6 shows, this happened as the Clinton White 
House struggled to respond to the Bosnian War in a way which met broad domestic 
demands that the United States 'do something' about the crisis. In failing to do so, 
and being unable (or unwilling) to conjure effective policies which would 
deflect 
America 9s attention away from the crisis, the American media were able to build a 
momentum of critical commentary on how the White House was 
failing Bosnia's 
55 DiPrizio (2002), p. 157. 
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civilians and effectively allowing ethnic cleansing to go unpunished. Exasperated at 
the relentless criticism, Clinton rounded on the American media, accusing it of trying 
to pressure him to take actions he did not want to take. More than once, he protested 
to aides that the media 'keep trying to force me into a war'. 'We have a war by 
56 CNN he complained. 
Whilst advocates of the CNN effect contend that the media may have the 
potential to pressure the White House into actually sanctioning force deployments, it 
is also the case that the American media is also frequently at the forefront of 
opposition to any deployment of US forces. Prominent American editors and 
journalists have opposed presidential deployment decisions throughout the post- 
Vietnam years and they have understandably used their unique platform to make their 
opposition known. They have often been amongst the most vigorous in drawing 
analogies between the Vietnam experience and the current crisis in order to forward a 
more convincing case. Always drawn to dramatic political stories and comments, 
America's newspapers - whether apparently opposed to White House policy or not - 
have also been more than willing to cite and quote political and military deployment- 
opponents who have made just the same comparisons. Indeed, as far as the 
manifesting of the Vietnam Syndrome is concerned, it is often in the newspapers, and 
in televised interviews and discussions, where reference to Vietnam and the grisly 
consequences of deploying US forces is most palpable. 
At times when the White House is deliberating the pros and cons of deploying 
US forces, the American media thus vividly reflects and voices both sides of the 
argument. Such is their national platform, and their purported 'closeness' to the 
56 Elizabeth Drew (1995), On the Edge. The Clinton Presidency, Touchstone, Simon & Schuster, pp. 
123-126; Dick Morris (1997) Behind the Oval Office. Winning the Presidency in the Nineties, Random 
House, New York, p. 245; Halberstam (2002), p. 317. 
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national mood, that media coverage and commentary is a significant feature of, and 
influence on, America's deployment debates. Presidents simply must acknowledge 
the media, and its communications, as they take deployment decisions. 
Public opinion 
Inextricably tied to media influence and a so-called 'CNN effect' is public opinion 
itself. Popular wisdom depicts a situation in which the public mood is variously 
reflected, shaped, articulated and addressed by both the media and Congress on 
foreign policy issues. Furthermore, in keeping with the 'democratic ideal', elected 
liberal democratic governments are supposed to be responsive to the public mood and 
to enact policy outcomes which at least partially reflect its wishes and moods. The 
significance of public opinion to the making of US foreign policyrnaking may have 
become greater since the Vietnam years. Joseph Nye is just one commentator who 
suggests that the American public has been less receptive to presidential deployment 
solicitations in the succeeding years, and that the United States has seen a significant 
57 
rise in 'anti-establishment politics' during this period . 
The increasing spread, availability and use of media and communications 
technology is seen to have greatly enhanced the public's engagement with the 
political process. Some might argue that increasingly communications- empowered 
citizens, public groups and non-goverranental organisations (NGOs) are 
in a stronger 
position than ever to oppose, and even change, stated White House 
foreign policy 
57 Nye (1986), p. 115. 
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goals and actions. This increasing public activism has been depicted as having been 
especially marked in the post-Cold War era when - absent the Soviet threat - 
domestic and foreign policy issues have becoming increasingly inter-linked. Opinion 
polls suggested that Americans' interests in foreign policy issues were those which 
had a clear domestic dimension as well - jobs, drug trafficking and illegal 
immigration ranked consistently highly, at least before the terrorist attacks of II th 
September 2001.58 
This may be so but there are considerable difficulties in trying to designate the 
extent to which American public opinion might actually impede a President's 
willingness to deploy US forces. A key reason for this is that there is a predictable 
lack of consensus amongst Americans on the acceptability of using military force. 
There does indeed appear to be a considerable swathe of America which consistently 
responds with trepidation and resistance to any suggestion that US troops will be 
deployed to foreign conflict-zones. Indeed, there would surely be little to sustain the 
considerable political and media reference to the Vietnam Syndrome if those concerns 
were not significant and palpable within the American population. However, to 
suggest that any President wishing to use military force inevitably finds himself 
facing a national storm of public opposition is simply fatuous. There is, in fact, little 
to suggest that post-Vietnam America has remained broadly tethered to a timid anti- 
militarist mindset. Since the end of the Second World War, significant numbers of 
Americans have continued to believe that their country should play a leading role in 
world affairs and, significantly, that it should use its military power to 
do so if 
58 Andrew Kohut, 'Post-Cold War Attitudes towards the Use of Force I, in H. W. Brands, 
(ed. ), (2000), 
The Use qfforce, 4fter the Cold War, Texas A&M 
University Press, College Station, pp. 171-172. 
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necessary. 59 The Vietnam experience has not eradicated that view. Whilst the 
numerous military interventions of the post-Vietnam years betray the extent to which 
successive generations of Washington policymakers have demonstrated a willingness 
to use military force, it is fair to conclude that all of these deployments have been 
supported by at least some sections of the American public-political arena. 60 The 
'obstacle' of an unsupportive public may thus not always present itself to the White 
House as it prepares to send US forces overseas. 
It is in fact fair to say that deployment-advocacy has been a significant feature 
of the politics of military intervention in the United States. As was discussed in the 
previous chapter, public support amongst Americans for US military action evidenced 
itself throughout both the Cold War and the post-Cold War periods. During the 
1990s, with the Western media relaying harrowing pictures of humanitarian disasters 
from conflict-zones around the world, Jens Stilhoff S6rensen notes that significant 
sections of America mirrored other Western publics in urging their government to use 
military force in order to enforce and uphold 'universal civic values' in foreign 
conflicts where civilians were being targeted by the protagonists. 
61 
Richard Sobel, whilst acknowledging that the American public has been 
inconsistent in its views on, and support of, military intervention, contends that public 
opinion may have the ability to exact a considerable influence on US military 
interventions. He contends that whilst it may not actually 'set' policy, the public can 
certainly 'set the parameters within which the political leadership may act' and have a 
major impact upon the constancy and duration of any force deployment. 
62 It has been 
observed, for example, that the impact of public opinion can be especially significant 
59 James. M. Lindsay, 'Cowards, Beliefs and Structures. Congress and the Use of Force', in H. W. 
Brands, (ed. ) (2000), p. 15 1. 
60 Bacevich (2005), p. 34. 
61 Stilhoff S6rensen (2002), p. 2. 
62 Sobel (2001), pp. 42-47; quote at p. 45. 
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at certain points of the presidential election cycle. Presidents may be especially 
mindful of their domestic ratings during their first ten-n in office, concerned that any 
reckless overseas adventurism may have a detrimental impact upon their re-election 
chances. This implies, of course, that second-ten-n Presidents - since they do not need 
to worry about re-election - may conceivably be bolder in responding to foreign 
conflicts, perhaps more likely to sanction the deployment of US forces. If this were 
true, it would assign a considerable significance to domestic opinion and its ability to 
influence - even constrain -a President's foreign policy. 
Regardless the point in the electoral cycle, Melvin Small observes that 
Presidents do typically invest considerable time and effort in publicly justifying, 
defending and commending their deployment decisions to the American public- 
political arena. Their consistent willingness to do so, Small contends, is undeniable 
evidence that they are very much aware of the 'prying free press, the requirement to 
stand for re-election, and the need to obtain popular endorsement for foreign 
policies'. 
63 
The memoirs of James Baker, George H. W. Bush's Secretary of State, offer 
just one example in support of this contention. Describing the Bush administration's 
response to Iraq's 1990 invasion of Kuwait, Baker paints a picture of a Bush 
administration which was extremely frustrated over its inability to win public support 
for the deployment of US forces to the Persian Gulf This failure was not down to any 
lack of effort on the administration's part. On the contrary, Baker notes that it was 
well aware that it was suffering domestically because of its 
failure to adequately 
justify this response to the American public and that it stepped up its efforts to make 
the case. However, Baker acknowledges that whilst the administration employed 
63 Small (1996), pp. xiii &xix. 
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'words carefully chosen for their impact', it was unable to rally America behind 
Presidents Bush's actions. 64 Baker's candid recollections suggest that the White 
House does indeed take the winning of public support for military interventions very 
seriously indeed. 
The media and public opinion: influential ... but not decisive 
It seems clear that Presidents are very mindful of media commentary and of public 
opinion. It also seems that they are prepared to go to considerable lengths in order to 
'win' the battle to garner favourable 'press' and to convince Americans over their 
deployment decisions. However, it is also the case that they are quite prepared to 
proceed with their deployment plans even if they are not successful in winning this 
public diplomatic 'battle'. As was the case with Congress, it seems that whilst the 
media and public opinion are undoubtedly considerable factors in these processes, it is 
doubtful whether these domestic constituencies really do play a substantial role in 
influencing whether or not the President will actually decide to deploy US forces. 
Despite the Vietnam Syndrome, the President's deployment decisions are not tethered 
to the 'domestic mood' and what it seems to opine, vis-a-vis a given crisis. 
Robert DiPrizio is just one commentator who takes this view. Rejecting the 
idea that a CNN effect stimulates the White House to take deployment decisions 
which it would not have otherwise, his analyses of Washington's responses to the 
recent conflicts in Northern Iraq, Somalia, Rwanda, Haiti, 
Bosnia and Kosovo have 
led him to conclude that the significant actions taken by the White House 
in relation 
64 James A. Baker (1995), The Politics ofDiplomacy: Revolution, War and Peace 1989-1992, 
New 
York, Putnam, p. 334-337. 
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to these conflicts largely pre-empted supposedly critical periods of media coverage, 
and were not a response to it. 65 He contends that the most likely effect of media 
pressure is the 'speeding up of the decision-making process'. 66 Jonathan Mermin also 
articulates scepticism over the media's ability to impact significantly upon the 
deployment of US forces. He asserts that the American media typically 'does not 
offer critical analysis of White House decisions unless actors inside the goverment 
(most often in Congress) have done so first. ' Rather than bringing an independent 
and critical presence to deployment debates, Mermin contends that American 
journalists consistently surrender their status as critical constructors of opinion and 
agenda, instead settling for letting 'actors inside the govenunent set the tenns and 
boundaries of foreign policy debate'. 67 Given, as has already been noted, the 
executive branch's assumption of its dominance in this policy area, any such passivity 
from the media is likely to render it impotent in even influencing the tenns of 
interpretation and debate, let alone actual White House decision-making itself 
Indeed, the fact that prolonged, often visceral, television and newspaper coverage of 
both the Bosnian and Rwandan conflicts were insufficient to prompt Presidents Bush 
and Clinton to sanction a decisive US military response to these conflicts, goes a long 
way towards negating the idea that an affective CNN effect prompts unwilling 
Presidents to order force deployments. 
Any notion that public opinion can act as a tangible influence on presidential 
deployment decisions, also appears to rest upon thin ice. Again, the executive 
branch's assumption of dominance in this area appears to preclude any contrary 
outcome. For a start, the public mood is perennially fickle, a 
fact which has doubtless 
65 DiPrizio (2002), p. 157-159. 
66 Ibid., p. 157. 
67 Mermin (1999), pp. 4-5,7 & 143. See also, Murray Edelman 
(1988), Constructing the Political 
Spectacle, The University of Chicago Press, p. 90. 
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sustained the view, oft-articulated by elite policymakers, that the public is uninformed 
and too temperamental to provide any feasible partnership on foreign policy (George 
Kennan's views, noted earlier, certainly fall into this category). 68 Also, as Jeffrey 
Record points out, whilst much has been made of the post-Vietnam White House's 
awareness of the Vietnam Syndrome and a casualty-sensitive American public, when 
it comes to the crunch of decision-making, the studies and the polls frequently appear 
to make 'no impression' on the White House; US forces are deployed if the President 
seesfit and once he is committed to this course of action, it is difficult to imagine how 
domestic opposition might actually prompt the President to halt his deployment 
plans. 
69 
Kenneth Boulding concurs. He depicts the President and his 'inner-circle' as 
holding all of the cards on this issue and contends that it is the preconceptions and 
wishes of key decision-makers which, in terms of significance to the key decisions, 
far outweigh those of 'the masses'. 70 Jonathan Mennin suggests that whilst a growing 
media omnipresence purportedly strengthens the intimacy of the people-politics- 
governance relationship, and certainly does place policymakers and policymaking 
under more public scrutiny than ever before, it remains the case that most of public- 
political challenges to White House deployment decision-making are merely reactive 
to actions already proposed or taken by key policymakers. 
The authoritativeness typically displayed by Presidents in this area also has 
significant implications for the suggestion that the timing of the presidential election 
68 See Steven Kull & I. M. Destler (1999), Misreading the Public. The Myth of a New Isolationism, 
Brookings Institution Press; also, Steven Kull, 'Public Attitudes Towards Multilaterallsm', 
in S. Patrick 
& S. Forman (eds. ) (2002), Multilateralism & US Foreign Policy. Ambivalent Engagement, Lynne 
Rienner Publications. Quote on p. 115; Kennan (19 5 1), p. 94. 
69 Record (2002), p. 143-144. 
70 Kenneth E. Boulding, 'National Images and International Systems'. The Journal of 
Conflict 
Resolution, Vol. 3, No. 2, June 1959. Also, Boulding (1956), The Image: 
Knowledge in Life and 
Society. University of Michigan Press; Edelman (1988), pp. 97 
& 106; C. B. MacPherson, 'Participatory 
Democracy', in David Held et al. (1985), States and Societies. Open 
University, Blackwell Publishing, 
p. 576. 
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cycle may play a crucial factor in a President's deployment-advocacy. Even a first- 
term President may feel little constrained by a negative public mood - he may, for 
example, feel that so early into his time in office, he has plenty of time to turn around 
any negative opinion which the deployment in question may foment. 71 More broadly 
speaking, since Presidents invariably view themselves as enjoying the monopoly of 
authority in this area anyway, their own views are overwhelmingly likely to eclipse 
the views of journalists and the wider public as they deliberate force deployments. 
For example, a President may feel that deploying US forces to a foreign crisis is the 
only morally responsible thing to do for the President of the United States and the 
self-styled leader of the 'free world'. If the President does indeed feel this, it may not 
matter whether the American media or public actually share the President's 
willingness to deploy; it may also not matter whether that President is in his first or 
second tenn. Furthermore, given that Congress invariably rallies to support US force 
deployments anyway, a President may feel that this congressional shift may ultimately 
take an unsupportive American public with it. 
As is the case with Congress, the public mood is nearly always at the forefront 
of White House force deployment considerations. However, this does not inevitably 
endow this mood with any definite input into the key deployment decisions 
themselves. It is safe to assume that Presidents genuinely want to make popular and 
sound decisions on the use of US forces. It should be remembered that the President 
is as much a concerned American citizen as his loftiest opponent on this 
issue. Whilst 
the responsibilities of his office will doubtless give him a 
distinct perspective on any 
given foreign conflict and its significance to the 
United States, the President is likely 
to be at least as concerned as domestic 
deployment-opponents about the 
71 Of course, if a US military operation is a success and 
is relatively bloodless (at least to US service 
personnel), the President may see his domestic standing 
boosted considerably. 
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consequences of deploying of US troops to that conflict because it is he who bears the 
moral and political responsibility for any such deployment. 
It is these presidential responsibilities which make the difference. Presidents 
clearly want to make popular decisions. However, they demonstrate an 
understandable disinclination to compromise national security, their own instincts, or 
the opinions of their favoured policy aides, just to avoid a dip in the opinion polls or 
the wrath of Congress - especially when there is every chance that they will 
ultimately manage to garner a broad swathe of public-political support behind a force 
deployment, regardless the initial unpopularity of the deployment announcement. 
Charged with the responsibility of both steering and protecting the United States, and 
well aware of his status as the sole 'gatekeeper' to any use of US military forces, it is 
little surprise that it is what the President personally thinks is the 'right' thing to do, 
which is typically the crucial factor in deciding whether or not US forces are 
deployed. It is also unsurprising that if a President sees the need to take this decision, 
he will do so, regardless the domestic mood. 
The Vietnam experience may well have changed America's views on the use 
of military force. The Vietnam Syndrome may well have placed extras pressures on 
any President wishing to sanction this course of action. However, the responsibilities 
of leading the United States have changed little since the Vietnam years and when it 
comes to taking deployment decisions, Presidents still look to 'do the right thing9. 
This sometimes means sanctioning the military option, regardless the apparent 
domestic unpopularity of this recourse. 72 
72 Chaim Kauffman, 'See no Evil. Why America Doesn't Stop Genocide', Foreign Affairs, Vol. 8 1, 
No. 4, July/August 2002, p. 144; Power (2002), p. 294; Sobel (2001), p. 185; Halberstam (2001), p. 
358. 
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Conclusion 
The Congress, the American media and public opinion have been Popularly viewed as 
having the ability to effectively influence White House foreign policy decision- 
making. These factors have often been depicted as catalysts to the participative 
democratic process by both mirroring and broadcasting America's concerns over US 
force deployments. As national vehicles for the expression of the Vietnam Syndrome, 
it is notionally feasible to bestow a constitutionally-empowered Congress and - 
perhaps to a lesser degree - the media and public opinion with the ability to 
significantly influence the way in which the White House will respond to a foreign 
war. This chapter has drawn attention to many reasons why the influence of these 
three constituencies is far more limited that it might initially appear and how it is in 
fact the White House which has continued to dominate post-Vietnam deployment 
decision-making. 
This is certainly not to depict a marginal role for all of the domestic actors 
considered in this chapter. He may well be 'chief among many' on the issue of 
deploying US forces, and he may command broad respect by virtue of his office, but 
Presidents are unwise to ignore or dismiss Americans' concerns on this issue. 73 Any 
President knows that he risks floundering if he fails to guard against 'a relentless 
combination of global events, CNN film crews and syndicated journalists'. In short, 
any lazy reliance upon the powers inherent in their office is, successive Presidents 
74 have understood, very risky indeed . 
However, in deciding the 'best' response to any given foreign conflict, 
Presidents (assisted by their civilian and military advisors) have to consider an array 
73 Clifford in Hogan & Paterson (2004), p. 93; Nye (1986), p. 114. 
74 Clarke (1993), p. 54. 
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of issues and concerns which legislators and journalists simply do not. The President 
is personally responsible for defending and upholding various national interests and if 
he deems a foreign crisis sufficiently grave to merit US military involvement, then he 
will likely view congressional, media and public criticism as something to be 
assuaged or endured, but not as something which might alter his chosen policy 
decisions. At the same time, however, it is unsurprising to note that the post-Vietnam 
White House has shared with the wider American polity the post-Vietnam obsession 
with avoiding military casualties and intractable military commitments. This has been 
vividly evident in White House deployment planning. For all that they frequently 
take deployment decisions which appear to depart from the domestic mood, 
Presidents' aspirations for their force deployments - that they are as quick, bloodless 
and successful as possible - vividly reflect those of the vast majority of Americans. 
America's concerns about the United States becoming involved in 'another Vietnam' 
are thus never enough to stop a willing President from deploying US forces if he sees 
fit to do so. However, if a President does see fit to use military force, these Vietnam- 
fears will likely dominate the prerequisites and parameters he sets for the deployment. 
These assertions are vividly reflected in the next three chapters, which detail 
how the White House responded to conflicts in Lebanon, Kuwait and Bosnia 
Herzegovina. In all three of the crises examined in these chapters, presidential 
administrations grappled with the events and complications of the conflict in question, 
frequently disagreeing as to what the most prudent course of action was. In these 
'inner-circle' wrangles, presidential preference persistently decided the course of 
action. Amidst these policy deliberations, the American public-political arena was 
rife with criticism and deployment-opposition, with reference to the Vietnam 
experience dominating the debates. Indeed, in all three instances, the Vietnam 
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Syndrome had a considerable influence upon both the deployment decisions and on 
the attendant debates and commentary. 
What is clear is that when Presidents have taken the decision to commit US 
forces, these decisions have been decisive and final. Congressional efforts to either 
influence the decision-making process or to actually derail the President's deployment 
plans have been largely unsuccessful. Despite the Vietnam and Watergate 
experiences, the President's imperiousness on the issue of deploying US military 
forces has remained largely unchanged in the post-Vietnam era. 
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Chapter 4 
Waging War on the Vietnam Syndrome: 
The Reagan Administration and the Lebanese Conflict, 1982-1984 
The first of the three case studies focuses upon a President who, perhaps more than 
any other, committed himself to dispelling the Vietnam Syndrome - Ronald Reagan. 
This case study illuminates not just the difficulties that President Reagan had in 
achieving this mission; it also shows that during the Cold War, White House efforts to 
dispel Vietnam's shadows were not just confined to episodes when it was trying to 
win domestic support for force deployments. The Cold War standoff defined the 
Reagan presidency and if he could justifiably be credited with pushing the United 
States to ultimate victory over the Soviet Union - the so-called 'Reagan victory' 
thesis - then this 'victory' might well be seen to have its roots in Reagan's efforts to 
drag America out of its post-Vietnam nadir. 1 Convinced that the United States had 
been greatly weakened by the Vietnam experience, Reagan sought to rejuvenate the 
nation and disperse Vietnam's shadows as soon as he took office. 
1 Dumbrell (1997), pp. 36-37. 
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President Reagan, Vietnam and the use of military force 
Reagan assumed office in January 1981, on a self-professed mission to change 
America's fortunes. During the 1980 presidential campaign, he had repeatedly 
criticised both Presidents Ford and Carter for being weak in their foreign 
policymaking and he won office on the promise of change. Placing a bold foreign 
policy at the very heart of his presidential vision, Reagan's 'peace from strength' 
mantra was based upon the conviction that only a significantly bolstered American 
military would deter any Soviet aggression towards the United States, thus reducing 
the likelihood of military confrontation between the two superpowers. 2 
One of Reagan's first goals as President was to re-strengthen the relationship 
between the White House and the Pentagon and to overturn the Pentagon's post- 
Vietnam hesitance in supporting a bolder projection of US power on the world stage. 
At their very first meeting, Reagan's Defence Secretary Caspar Weinberger told the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff that their first task was to 'close the window of vulnerability' to 
the Soviet threat; Reagan sanctioned an extra $33 billion to the Pentagon's annual 
spending budget in order to help it in this task. 3 
If Reagan was more than willing to provide the financial means for his 
national rejuvenation project, he was also willing to do what was required to get 
Americans to support that project. As far as Reagan was concerned, eradicating the 
Vietnam Syndrome would go a long way towards achieving this. He felt that the 
nation's confidence had been effectively deadened by the Vietnam experience and 
that America's position as leader of the free world would continue to be threatened as 
2 Ted Gest, 'Foreign Policy: The Main Area', US News & World Report, 3 rd November, 1980, p. 62; 
Janda, Berry & Goldman (2008), p. 632. 
3 Hedrick Smith, 'The National Mood', New York Times, 29th May, 198 1; Herspring (2005), pp. 268- 
269; Neu (2000), p. 21. 
118 
long as Americans were tied to fears that their country might become embroiled in 
another Vietnam'. 4 With his administration peopled by individuals who, like 
himself, had 'an obsession' with shaking off the Vietnam Syndrome, the Reagan 
White House was thus committed to dispelling Americans' fears. 5 The United States, 
Reagan declared more that once, had lived with the Vietnam Syndrome for too long. 6 
Reagan's charisma and strident rhetoric certainly had confidence-boo sting 
appeal for many Americans, and provided a welcome contrast to the mood of the late 
Carter presidency when significant numbers of Americans thought that their country 
was 4on the wrong track'; the new President's 'politics of hope' seemed, to many 
Americans, to cut through the post-Vietnam gloom. 7 Reagan himself certainly 
thought so. In a speech to West Point graduates in May of 198 1, just four months into 
his presidency, he pointed to both the American public's 'spiritual revival' and a 
'bipartisan patriotic mood in Congress' as proof that the Vietnam Syndrome had been 
ý swcpt away'. 8 
However, Reagan soon found that his optimistic appraisal of the national 
mindset was not entirely accurate. Not every American shared his bullish 
perspective; on the contrary, his self-proclaimed willingness to reassert America's 
military supremacy on the world stage created concerns in many domestic quarters. 
Indeed, these apprehensions had evidenced themselves even before Reagan took 
office. During his presidential race against Jimmy Carter, the US News and World 
Report had concernedly drawn attention to the fact that Reagan had 'publicly raised 
4 McKrisken (2003), p. 105. 
5 Halliday (1984), p. 220. 
6 James Reston Jr. (1984), Sherman's March and Vietnam, New York pp. 263-264; Neu (2000), p. 21. 
7 Hedrick Smith, 'The National Mood', New York Times, 290' May, 19 8 1; Robert Dallek (19 84), 
Ronald Reagan. The Politics ofSymbolism, Harvard University Press; Cambridge, Massachusetts, pp. 
56-57. 
8 Howard Raines, 'Reagan Vows US Will Press Efforts To Build Defenses'. New York Times, 28th May 
198 1; Hedrick Smith, 'The National Mood', New York Times, 29 th May, 1981. 
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the possibility of military action at least nine times in the last 12 years in response to 
crises', including suggesting a blockade of Cuba as a response to the Soviet invasion 
of Afghanistan. 9 
Thus, once in office, and despite opinion polls depicting a more buoyant 
national mood, there were significant concerns over where the new administration's 
foreign policy aspirations might lead the United States. The Cold War definitely grew 
colder in the first few years of the Reagan presidency and many Americans felt this 
chill keenly, their anxieties nourished in no small part by the administration's frequent 
reference to the use of military force. In May 1981, for example, Reagan's Defence 
Secretary Caspar Weinberger stated that the United States must be prepared to engage 
in wars 'of any size and shape and in any region where we have vital interests. " 0 His 
Secretary of State Alexander Haig, a noted Vietnam 'hawk', had notoriously 
complained of America's opposition to anything military in the post-Vietnam years. II 
Reagan's continuing, almost obsessive, interest in South and Central America also 
gave many Americans a troubling sense of dýja vu. With the New York Times 
criticising his 'macho' stance on foreign policy issues, some wondered whether US 
soldiers might once again find themselves fighting jungle warfare in a foreign conflict 
which appeared to have little relevance to the American people. 12 
America's wavering attitude towards US force deployments was thus still very 
much to the fore, despite the generally upbeat national mood. Scepticism over the 
Reagan foreign policy was little helped by those actions which Reagan did see fit to 
sanction. The Reagan administration frequently failed, in Joseph Nye's words, to 
9 Ted Gest, 'Foreign Policy: The Main Area', US News & World Report, 3d November, 1980, p. 62. 
10 Weinberger quoted in New York Times, 6th May 198 1, cited in Klare (1982), p. 11. 
11 Dallek (1984), p. 136. 
12 Howard Raines, 'Reagan Vows US Will Press Efforts To Build Defenses', New York Times, 28 th 
May 19 8 1; 'Why the Talk of Another Vietnam? ' US News & World Report, 9t" March, 19 8 1, p. 9; 
Hedrick Smith, 'The National Mood', New York Times, 29th May, 198 1; Small (1996), p. 14 1; Janda, 
Berry & Goldman (2008), p. 632. 
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'develop a capacity for strategic formulation' in their foreign policy endeavours. 13 
Other commentators offer a more robust interpretation; John Dumbrell, for example, 
notes that the Reagan administration's foreign policy ventures were ýoften 
ramshackle'. 14 This case study very much confirms these interpretations. Reagan's 
zealous exceptionalist vision for his presidency certainly did not always manifest 
itself in a studied, well-defined approach to using military force. Indeed, concerns 
over these perceived flaws were being espoused from within the Department of 
Defence early on in his presidency and would be justified by the way in which 
Reagan responded to his very first major foreign policy crisis, Israel's invasion of 
Lebanon, on 6 
th June, 1982.15 
In response to the invasion and the degenerating situation inside his country, 
Lebanese President Bashir Gemayel requested international assistance. This request 
prompted President Reagan to deploy US Marines to Lebanon, as part of a UN- 
mandated multinational force (MNF) which also included French and Italian troops. 16 
In ordering this deployment, however, it was clear that despite his 'anti-Syndrome' 
mind-set, Reagan was certainly not above America's post-Vietnam conflict- 
sensitivities. Indeed, for all bullishness, he was very much aware of the impact that 
military recklessness might have in aggravating these fears. The deployment that he 
stipulated very much reflected this. Modest in both size and scope, it little reflected 
the conservative 'overwhelming force' doctrine he had repeatedly advocated. 17 
Regardless the deployment's minimalism, however, the Vietnam Syndrome was very 
evident in how the American public-political arena responded to it. The MNF 
13 Nye (1986), p. 125. 
14 Dumbrell (1997), p. 37. 
15 Herspring (2005), p. 295; Kelly (1996), pp. 2&4. 
16 Weinberger (1990), p. 104; George Schultz (1993), Turmoil and Triumph, New York: Simon & 
Schuster, pp. 108-109. 
17 Neu (2000), p. 4. 
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mission - to oversee the evacuation of militants representing the Palestinian 
Liberation Organisation (PLO) from Beirut - was widely condemned by American 
political and media critics as a vaguely defined and open-ended commitment. Indeed, 
these criticisms were evident even within Reagan's own 'inner-circle' of key foreign 
policy advisors; the MNF deployment caused substantial rifts between the State and 
Defence Departments as practitioners from each institution differed over the wisdom 
of sending US troops into an urban war-zone with a vaguely-defined mandate. 
These tensions escalated further when, with the MNF having successfully 
supervised the PLO withdrawal and then having been withdrawn from Lebanon, 
President Reagan (along with his French and Italian counterparts) agreed to re-deploy 
the NINF back into Lebanon at the request of the Lebanese govenunent, in order to 
assist Lebanese goverranent forces in regaining control as hostilities continued to grip 
the country. 
America's fears and criticisms over seeing American troops operating inside 
Lebanon were soon vividly realised. US forces were in Lebanon for well over a year 
and ultimately found themselves sucked into a hostile and complicated conflict which 
would severely dent Reagan's efforts to put the Vietnam experience behind America. 
The experience also galvanised a scepticism within much of Washington's political- 
military establishment over American involvement in peacekeeping operations, a 
prejudice which would linger well into the post-Cold War era. 18 
" Author interview with General George Joulwan, US Anny (retired). Arlington, Virginia, May 11 th 
2006. 
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Conflict in Lebanon - an overview 
The background to Lebanon's complicated conflict was essentially down to two key 
factors: firstly, Lebanon was home to a complex array of religious and political 
antagonisms; secondly, the threat that some of the factions within Lebanon posed to 
Israel invited sporadic retaliatory strikes and incursions from Israeli forces. Since at 
least the time of the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, Lebanon had become a surrogate 
homeland to around 400,000 Palestinians who had fled in the aftermath of the 
conflict. These figures increased in 1970, when large numbers of PLO fighters were 
ejected from Jordan at the behest of King Hussain. Residing in huge refugee camps in 
and around Beirut, Palestinians controlled the economics, policing and politics of the 
camp areas, which stretched into both the Beqaa Valley and Southern Lebanon. 
Palestinians thus had what was, for some commentators, almost a 'state within a state' 
inside Lebanon. In the words of one Reagan official, the PLO had 'hijacked' the 
country. 19 
Palestinian militias were soon protagonists in spiralling violence inside 
Lebanon, fighting not only with Lebanese government forces over control of areas of 
20 
Lebanon itself but also mounting frequent attacks against targets inside Israel . In 
1976, amidst escalating hostilities between Lebanese Muslim and Christian groups 
and Palestinians, around 30,000 Syrian troops were deployed into Lebanon as a 
'deterrent' force, under a mandate from the Arab League. However, Damascus had 
its own intentions for Lebanon. It viewed the country very much as a sphere of 
" Author interview with former State Department official Dr William Schneider Jr. Washington DC, 
1 Oth May, 2006; John H. Kelly (1996), 'Lebanon 1982-1984' in J. R. Azrael & E. A. Payin (eds. ) 
(1996), US and Russian Polic making with Respect to the Use ofForce. Rand Institution Publications, Y 
chapter 6, p. 2. 
2' Kelly (1996), p. 2. 
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Syrian influence (Lebanon and Syria had been one Political entity during the Ottoman 
Empire) and it firmly rejected Lebanon's Christian political base. Syria's presence 
merely poured oil onto Lebanon's flames; Syrian forces would subsequently engage 
in hostilities not only against Lebanese Christian factions, but also against Palestinian 
forces as well. To further add to the muddled composition of this conflict, both 
Syrian and Palestinian forces would use locations in Southern Lebanon as a base for 
military strikes against their sworn enemy, Israel. 21 
American involvement in Lebanon 
Washington's response to Israel's June 1982 invasion was not the first time that US 
forces had seen action inside Lebanon. On 15 
th jUly 1958, as Gamal Abdel Nasser's 
pan-Arab nationalism sparked anti-Western uprisings across the Middle Eastern 
region, President Eisenhower ordered US troops into Lebanon at the behest of its pro- 
Western President, Camille Chamoun. Lebanon had been beset by considerable 
tensions and riots for around two months or so when, on 14 
th july 1958, pro-Nasser 
forces overthrew the pro-Western Hashemite monarchy in Iraq. Greatly concerned, 
the Eisenhower administration agreed that deploying US troops into Lebanon offered 
the best chance of achieving three key goals: firstly, it would help to maintain the 
stability of Chamoun's govennnent in Beirut; secondly, the impact of moving US 
forces into Lebanon might serve to slow the spreading influence of Nasser's pan- 
Arabism which, it was feared, might engulf the entire Middle East; thirdly, the 
21 Kelly (1996), p. 2; Ambrose & Brinkley (1997), pp. 291-293; Ronald Reagan (1990), An American 
Life, Pocket Books, pp. 409-4 10; William L. Chaze, Dennis Mullin, Joseph P. Shapiro & Douglas 
Watson, 'In Lebanon To StayT US News & World Report, 26thSeptember, 1983, p. 26; 'Israel and the 
PLO: 7 Years of Strife', New York Times, 8thJune, 1982. 
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deployment of US forces would send a message that Washington was prepared to take 
military action even if that meant confronting the Soviet Union, which had backed 
Nasser. Despite domestic concerns over the deployment, the US mission in Lebanon 
was both short and successful. With just one US combat death, the mission was 
described by some observers as 'Eisenhower's finest hour'. 22 
Twenty four years on, Eisenhower's Lebanon mission was still viewed as a 
model intervention by many in Washington and may well have boosted a readiness to 
deploy US forces back into that country. However, Reagan's interest in the crisis was 
undoubtedly rooted in more contemporary concerns. He was supportive of an 
aspiration in Washington that Lebanon might be amenable to an American assistance 
programme that Fred Lawson has termed 'Jordanization'. The notional aim of this 
programme was to repeat in Lebanon what Washington had done in Jordan during the 
1950s; namely, to help develop a stable regime which was able to handle 'both its 
Palestinian population and its own radical and dissident factions', and which was 
willing to work with Washington in pursuing America's own aims in the region. 23 
Predictably, Israel's plight was also central to Reagan's interest in the 
Lebanese crisis. Israel was viewed from Washington as an island of America-friendly 
democracy in the region. The Carter administration had overseen the negotiating of 
the Camp David Accords in 1978, where Israel and Egypt had signed a peace treaty 
which formally ended their thirty-year war. Reagan had openly expressed his desire 
to build upon Carter's achievement, declaring that he wanted to create 'more Egypts' 
in the Middle East in order to dissipate the hostility which Israel constantly felt from 
22 Western (2005), pp. 62,66,72,89-90. 
23 George C. Wilson & John M. Gosko, 'US Planning to Rebuild Armed Forces of Lebanon', The 
Washington Post, 28h October, 1982; Fred Lawson, 'The Reagan Administration in the Middle East', 
MERIP Reports, No. 128, 'The Deadly Connection: Reagan and the Middle East', November- 
December 1984, p. 32. 
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24 its environs. Reagan also saw considerable Cold War value in negotiating a broader 
Middle East Peace; as his first Secretary of State Alexander Haig put it, America 
could only benefit if it could 'persuade the Arabs that they have more to fear from 
Moscow than they do fTom Jerusalem. 25 
Cold War concerns also came into play where Syria's role in Lebanon was 
concerned. Notwithstanding its open hostility towards Israel, Syria was viewed from 
Washington as a virtual 'Soviet satellite' in the Middle East. On a formal diplomatic 
level, Moscow and Damascus had signed a twenty-year friendship treaty, in which 
Moscow pledged itself to aid Syria if required. 26 There was also thought to be around 
5,000 Russian 'military advisors' operating inside Syria and Moscow continued to 
provide Damascus with both money and arms. Indeed, Moscow's sponsorship of 
Syria was the reason that Syria was able to offer itself as a credible military force at 
all during this period. Having suffered considerable losses (in aircraft and other 
military materiel) when Israeli forces invaded Southern Lebanon in 1978, Syrian 
forces only managed to sustain the levels of military activity they subsequently did - 
both inside Lebanon and in striking against Israel itself - because Moscow had re- 
supplied Damascus with 'high-end' military equipment. Fearful that a Soviet-backed 
Syria might fill any power vacuum created by Lebanon's conflict, Syria's presence in 
Lebanon was thus a notable concern in Washington. 27 
24 Reagan (1990), p. 424. 
25 Haig cited in Newsweek, 4th May, 198 1, p. 22; Dallek (1984), pp. 171-172. 
26 'Lebanon Crisis a New Test for Reagan', US News & World Report, 25 th May, 198 1, p. 11; Reagan 
(1990), p. 409. 
27 Author interview with former State Department official Dr William Schneider Jr. Washington DC, 
I Oth May, 2006 
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A critical escalation 
Under considerable American pressure, Israel withdrew the Israeli Defence Force 
(IDF) from Southern Lebanon, in June 1978. It was replaced by the United Nations 
Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). With a mandate to 'restore international peace 
and security and assist the Lebanese Government in restoring its effective authority in 
the area', UNIFIL occupied Southern Lebanon's 'buffer zone' between the Israel- 
Lebanon border and the Litani river 28 However, UNIFIL's mandate proved to be 
well beyond its capabilities. Despite President Reagan's efforts to bring American 
diplomatic authority to bear on the conflict (in April 1981, he persuaded the fon-ner 
Under-Secretary of State Philip Habib to come out of retirement in order to act as 
America's special envoy to the region and negotiate a peace), tensions in Lebanon 
came to a head in June of 1982.29 
On 4 th June, Israel's ambassador to Britain, Shiomo Argov, was shot and 
seriously wounded in London. Blaming the PLO, and pointing to continuing attacks 
from missile batteries in Southern Lebanon, Israel launched air-strikes against PLO 
positions in Beirut the very next day, killing 45 and wounding 150.30 Then, on 6 th 
June, the Israelis launched Operation Peace for Galilee, a massive three-pronged 
invasion into Lebanon itself. 31 However, rather than merely occupying Southern 
Lebanon in order to re-establish a defensive 'buffer zone', as Israel had indicated it 
28 Kelly (1996), p. 2; Nora Boustany, 'Palestinians Pledge to Attack in Response', The Washington 
Post, 5th June, 1982; 'Israel and the PLO: 7 Years of Strife', New York Times, 8ý' June, 1982. Seealso, 
the United Nations' UNIFIL website (Vt April 2008) at: 
http: //www. un. org/Depts/dpko/missions/unifil/index. html 
29 'Israel and the PLO: 7 Years of Strife', New York Times. 
30 Kelly (1996), pp. 2&4; William Claiborne, 'Raid is in Retaliation for Shooting Envoy', The 
Washington Post, 5h June, 1982; 'Israel and the PLO: 7 Years of Strife', New York Times, 8th June, 
1982. 
31 Kelly (1996), pp. 2&4; 'Key Events Listed in Lebanon Conflict', Los Angeles Times, 4 
th August, 
1982. 
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would do, the IDF pushed all the way to Beirut itself with the clear intention of 
eradicating the PLO base in the city. 32 
The international community condemned the invasion. The UN invoked 
Resolutions 508 and 509, demanding both a cease-fire and a withdrawal of Israeli 
forces. These demands were stridently rejected by Israel's UN delegate Yehuda 
Blum, who stated that Israel faced 'intolerable provocation' from terrorists operating 
inside a lawless state. 33 Despite the international pressure, the Israeli government 
maintained its obstinacy. Now holding military control of almost half of Lebanon, 
and reluctant to compromise his position of strength, the Israeli Prime Minister 
Menachem Begin made it clear to a disgruntled President Reagan that he was 
prepared to continue relying upon Israel's military dominance - and not Philip 
Habib's diplomatic efforts - in order to influence the direction Lebanon would take 
when it emerged from the current war. Adopting this stance was, Begin argued, vital, 
given the hope in Jerusalem that the 'new' Lebanon would be prepared to commit to 
peace with Israel. 34 This bold Israeli stance brought Lebanon's hostilities to boiling 
point. With Iran airlifting several thousand of its troops into neighbouring Syria, 
ongoing battles between Syrian and Israeli forces, and Israel pushing to completely 
seal off Beirut and trap the thousands of PLO fighters based there, Lebanese delegates 
at the UN talked openly of 'an all-out Middle East war. ' 35 
As the siege of Beirut continued throughout June, Philip Habib's frantic 
shuttle diplomacy between Beirut, Damascus and Jerusalem finally bore fruit. 
32 Ibid; Ball (1984), p. 7. 
33 'Key Events Listed in Lebanon Conflict', Los Angeles Times, 4h August, 1982; Bernard D. Nossiter, 
'UN Council Asks Israeli Pullback', New York Times, 7th June, 1982. 
34 Walter A. Taylor, 'US Tightrope in the Middle East', US News & World Report, 5 th July, 1982, pp. 
1-3; Record (2002), p. 82; Reagan (1990), pp. 423-424 & 427. 
35 Frank J. Prial, 'General Assembly Meeting is Sought by Some Delegates', New York Times, 10 th 
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President Reagan's envoy secured a force withdrawal commitment from both Israel 
and Syria, this commitment dependent upon PLO forces first being evacuated from 
Beirut. Once the PLO left Beirut, Begin pledged that he would withdraw the IDF, a 
commitment which was matched by the Syrian government. 36 Predictably, however, 
there were notable preconditions; Israel refused to accept a UN force overseeing the 
evacuation process, resentful at what it saw as the one-sided nature of the criticism 
emanating from the UN over its invasion (Israeli disdain for the UN was evident on 
the ground within the conflict-zone, with the IDF limiting the movements of UNIFIL 
units in Southern Lebanon). 37 Aware of Jerusalem's view, and eager to force through 
Habib's peace initiative and remove the warring parties from Lebanese soil, the 
Lebanese cabinet itself officially requested (Habib having cemented agreement over 
this request with Israeli and Palestinian leaders) that the American, French and the 
Italian governments provide a 2000-strong international multinational force (MNF) to 
oversee the withdrawal. 
38 
Direct American involvement 
George Ball has described how the American government 'reluctantly' agreed to send 
a contingent of US Marines as part of the MNF. However, if there was reluctance 
in 
Washington over this deployment - and, as will be discussed, there most certainly 
was - it is doubtful whether it was particularly evident 
in President Reagan. 39 Reagan 
36 Reagan (1990), pp. 412 & 430. 
37 Jonathan Spivak, 'Israel Relaxes its Conditions Involving PLO', Wall Street Journal, 16d' August, 
1982; Ball (1984), pp. 7&9; Herspring (2005), p. 278. 
38 Loren Jenkins, 'Lebanese Leader Predicts PLO to Start Leaving by End of Week', The Washington 
Post, 17th August, 1982. 
39 Ball (1984), pp. 7-8. 
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was eager to sanction a fuller American engagement with the crisis and he was more 
than willing to overlook the strident reservations of some of his 'inner circle' in 
ordering it. 
The MNF force tasked with overseeing the PLO withdrawal plan comprised 
800 American, 800 French and 400 Italian troops. Its mandate was simple; namely, to 
ensure the conditions of Lebanon's peace agreement by interposing itself between the 
warring factions and supervising the evacuation of around 12,000 PLO and Syrian 
fighters from Beirut, over a period of 30 days. 40 However, whilst the plan seemed 
straightforward enough, the mission was immediately criticised from some quarters in 
Washington as being 'a vague and open-ended mandate for committing American 
41 
military personnel' . Significantly, the 
MNF deployment was not even wholly 
supported within the Reagan administration itself Despite its professed need to speak 
with one voice on foreign policy issues, disagreement emerged between the State and 
Defence Departments, headed by George Schultz and Caspar Weinberger, 
respectively. 
42 
From the onset of the crisis, Weinberger had closed ranks with a military 
establishment which had welcomed Reagan's self-declared admiration for the US 
military but which also maintained a prudent wariness of what it perceived to be an 
impulsive, unstructured approach to policy. 
43 The Defence Secretary shared the 
Pentagon's reluctance to use US forces for 'peripheral' or 'symbolic' political tasks, 
viewing such utility as diverting the military's focus and strength from addressing 
its 
proper task; prevailing over the Soviet Union. From this perspective, the 
MNF 
40 Loren Jenkins, 'US Envoy Flies To Israel to Seek Final Beirut Pact', The Washington Post, 15 
th 
August, 1982; Loren Jenkins, 'Lebanese Leader Predicts PLO to Start Leaving by End of Week', 
The 
Washington Post, 17ffi August, 1982. 
41 Kelly (1996), p. 5. 
42 McKrisken (2003), p. 9 1. 
43 Herspring (2005), pp. 268-269. 
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deployment appeared to be an unnecessary risk. However, the State Department took 
a different view. State officials saw the crisis as requiring 'the intennixture of 
diplomacy and the military', and viewed an American military presence as something 
which would add considerable leverage to the peace process. 44 The State 
Department's willingness for US military involvement in the crisis, evident in both 
Alexander Haig (who resigned in late June of 1982) and his successor George 
Schultz, would continue to conflict with the Pentagon's opposition and would 
preclude administration consensus over Reagan's Lebanon policy. 
However, the absence of inter-department consensus did little to change the 
President's commitment. Reagan's preference was that the MNF would proceed and 
that US forces would be involved; Pentagon concerns were acknowledged by Reagan 
but presidential prerogative won the day. 45 In seeking to placate the Pentagon's 
concerns over the mission, Reagan merely assured Chain-nan of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff (JCS) General John Vessey (who had openly expressed his concerns over the 
deployment to the President) that US troops would not be caught up in hostilities and 
that the deployment time-frame would be strictly limited to thirty days. 46 
44 Weinberger (1990), pp. 110- 111. 
45 Author interview with former State Department official Dr William 
Schneider Jr. Washington DC, 
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The view from Capitol Hill 
On Capitol Hill, reaction to the deployment was mixed. For some legislators, the 
deployment of US troops was an acceptable response to Israeli aggression - there was 
a broad sense amongst representatives that a more forceful White House stance was 
necessary in order to stop Israel's 'relentless attacks' on Lebanon and to force an IDF 
withdrawal. 47 Whilst it had the previous year sanctioned $1.4 billion in military aid 
and $785 million in economic assistance to Israel for each of the next two years, there 
was a distinct feeling on Capitol Hill that the White House should, in the words of one 
representative, find 'some way to slap Israel's wrist ... to 
demonstrate that what's good 
for Israel is not necessarily best for the US. ' 48 Predictably, however, there was also 
palpable opposition to the Reagan commitment. Washington's Israeli lobby protested 
the need for any such stance and drew attention to the fact that Israeli towns were 
constantly being attacked from Southern Lebanon. 
Significantly, even those congressional representatives who were willing to 
see Washington rebuke Israel were not necessarily willing to see this rebuke manifest 
itself in the deployment of US troops to the region. With concerns quickly circulating 
about the fate that might await those troops, it was not long before the subject of US 
military casualties began infusing domestic speculation and commentary on the crisis. 
The American media was quick to report the comments of the Israeli opposition 
leader Shimon Peres, who publicly warned of the 'Vietnamization' of the war in 
Lebanon; sceptics seized upon this warning and speculated that the crisis might end 
in 
a 'bloody impasse. ' 49 The Washington Post and the Los 
Angeles Times also reported 
47 Don Oberdorfer & John M. Goshko, 'Peace-Keeping Force', The Washington Post, 
7 Ih July, 1982. 
48 Walter A. Taylor, 'US Tightrope in the Middle East', US News & World Report, 
51h July, 1982, pp. 
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growing congressional unease over 'the dangers of US casualties and prolonged 
involvement' in the crisis. Whilst some representatives expressed their opposition 
directly to the President himself, others in both the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee and the House Foreign Affairs Committee expressed their concerns 
publicly, warning that 'the commitment of US troops meant the acceptance of 
possible casualties'. 
50 
The White House quickly sought to allay such fears and to convince 
Americans of the necessity, brevity, and safety of the mission. The day after the 
deployment proposal was announced, Reagan personally telephoned some 'key 
members' of Congress 'to smooth the way for the proposal', whilst Deputy Press 
Secretary Larry Speakes told a press conference that the President regarded America's 
presence in the region as 'an essential linchpin' of any Middle East settlement. 
Mindful of the grumblings on Capitol Hill, Speakes emphasised also that President 
Reagan would fully observe the requirements of the War Powers Act by formally 
notifying and working with Congress on the deployment. However, in a telling 
precursor to the executive-legislative dishannony which would quickly unfold over 
the crisis, Speakes qualified this pledge by declaring that the War Powers Act was not 
actually significant in this instance since US forces were not going to be involved 
in 
'hostilities I in Lebanon. Whilst this assertion prompted critics to muse how the White 
House could possibly be so sure about what awaited US troops in war-tom Beirut, 
President Reagan himself reiterated the point as he sought to allay congressional fears 
over the Marines' role in Lebanon. He assured Congress that 
US troops would play 
6 an important but carefully limited non-combat role' and stressed that 
'our agreement 
with the government of Lebanon expressly rules out any combat responsibilities 
for 
50 Don Oberdorfer & John M. Goshko, 'Peace-Keeping Force', The 
Washington Post, 7th July, 1982; 
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Angeles Times, 20 th August, 1982. 
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the US forces'. He added that American troops would not enter Lebanon until all the 
warring factions had agreed to the disengagement plan. 51 
Despite the assurances, Reagan also reminded legislators of his authority as 
Commander-in-Chief He denied any need to specify which part of the War Powers 
Act had empowered him to sanction the Marine deployment, asserting instead that he 
was acting 'pursuant to the president's constitutional authority with respect to the 
conduct of foreign relations and as commander-in-chief of the anned forces. ' 
52 it 
marked the beginning of what would be a protracted struggle over the NINF 
deployment between the White House and Capitol Hill. 
US Marines arrive in Lebanon 
On 25 th August 1982, the first of 800 US Marines began arriving in Beirut to oversee 
the PLO evacuation. Not finding themselves in the heated cross-fire that some 
pessimists had predicted, the evacuation proceeded so smoothly that a still-edgy 
Pentagon pushed to have the Marines withdrawn ahead of schedule. Whilst some 
Reagan administration officials protested a premature withdrawal, Reagan assented to 
the Pentagon s request. On I oth September, far earlier than their mandate had 
specified, American MNF Marines were redeployed to ships moored off the 
Lebanese 
coast. 53 Within just 10 days, however, Reagan would 
be announcing the 
redeployment of the Marines back into Beirut, amidst spiralling violence 
in the city 
and increasing tensions back home in Washington DC. 
51 Ibid; Don Oberdorfer, 'President Orders Marines to Beirut', The Washington 
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Reagan's hopes that the PLO evacuation would mark a successful end to 
Lebanon's hostilities were cruelly dashed. On 14 th September 1982, the Lebanese 
President-elect Bashir Gemayel was assassinated. His brother, Amin Gemayel, was 
quickly elected President. Shortly after the assassination, the IDF entered West Beirut 
in force, clearly abandoning its commitment to withdraw from Lebanon. This 
incursion prompted Syria to renege on its own commitment to withdraw its forces, 
thus ensuring that the two major warring parties remained in the conflict-zone. Then, 
between 16 th and 18 th September, the IDF sent up flares to assist Christian Phalangist 
militias as they massacred nearly 1,000 Palestinians residing in Beirut's Sabra and 
Shatilla refugee camps. The slaughter sparked international condemnation and 
prompted President Gemayel to request the immediate redeployment of the NlNF, 
asking that it remain in Beirut until Lebanese government forces were in a position to 
54 
secure the capital . 
Back in Washington, these events were viewed with a sense of disbelief. 
President Reagan was horrified at the refugee camp massacres. He felt himself 
personally implicated in the atrocity, given that his special envoy Philip Habib had 
promised the PLO during negotiations both that Israeli forces would not re-enter 
Beirut and that remaining Palestinians would be safe from hann. 
55 Reagan's feelings 
were shared by many within his administration and there was a broad 
feeling that it 
was the premature MNF withdrawal which had failed the Palestinians. 
Secretary of 
State George Schultz summed up this mood in just a few short words: 'The brutal 
fact is', he told a colleague, 'we are partially responsible. ' 
56 
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The events in Lebanon further nourished the frictions between the State and 
Defence Departments about America's role in the crisis. The deteriorating situation 
in the light of the MNF withdrawal was viewed by some senior State officials as a 
stark vindication of their wish for an assertive US military presence in Beirut, and a 
sobering demonstration of how the Pentagon's post-Vietnam timidity could 
compromise US foreign policy. Schultz - who, along with Deputy National Security 
Advisor (NSA) Robert 'Bud' McFarlane, had criticised the Pentagon-driven decision 
to withdraw prematurely as 'criminally irresponsible' - now urged Reagan to accept 
President Gemayel's invitation to redeploy the MNF back into Lebanon. McFarlane 
and some of his NSC colleagues even pushed to bolster the MNF by several divisions, 
and to extend its mandate to one of actuallyforcing a Syrian and Israeli withdrawal 
from Beirut. The Joint Chiefs of Staff and Defence Secretary Weinberger vehemently 
opposed this idea. 57 However, arguing that it was the early departure of the MNF 
which had allowed the violence to spiral in the first place, and that it was very much 
in America's interest to have a say in what happened in Lebanon, McFarlane and 
Schultz 'won' the argument over redeploying the NINF. With the French and Italian 
govermuents both expressing a willingness to re-deploy their troops in the wake of the 
massacre9 President Reagan agreed that the MNF should be refonned and that US 
Marines would play a central role. 
58 
As before, the Joint Chiefs and the Defence Secretary vigorously opposed US 
involvement in the MNF. They argued that the sheer intimacy of the 
fighting, the 
many factions involved, and the fact that many of these 
factions would view US 
troops as the enemy, made it almost impossible 
for Washington to exert any fruitful 
influence inside Lebanon without getting involved in war-fighting operations. 
57 Ibid; Kelly (1996), p. 6; HersPr'ng (2005), p. 279; Weinberger 
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Providing an American 'presence', Weinberger reiterated once more, was insufficient 
grounds to deploy US forces. Furthermore, he argued that if US troops really were to 
help the Lebanese government regain control, then they would need to number far 
more than the 1,200 which were to be deployed. Senior Pentagon officials had 
recommended that anything between 5,000 and 20,000 US troops would be required 
for such a task. 
59 
President Reagan made his decision. He decided that US forces would play a 
central role in the second MNF operation. However he rejected, once again, State 
Department calls for the MNF to be significantly beefed-up, deciding instead to stick 
to the original limited troop numbers. Despite the rumblings of concern reverberating 
around Washington DC (from both opponents and proponents of the venture), the 
second MNF deployment thus proceeded and did so very much according to Reagan's 
own stipulations. Despite their importance to the planning process, the President was 
little swayed by the opposition emanating from the military chiefs; he had been 
genuinely stung by the refugee camp massacres and he was convinced that sending 
US troops back into Beirut was the right thing to do, regardless the uncertainties and 
dangers. 60 However, Reagan's rationalising of the mission along these lines did little 
to change the minds of sceptics within his 'inner-circle'. For Defence Secretary 
Weinberger, the redeployment of Marines into Lebanon loomed large as 'a nightmare 
of epic proportions. ' 
61 Weinberger's gloomy forecast would ultimately be proven 
correct. 
Aware that its divergences over the redeployment decision were commanding 
media attention, and recognising the need to publicly 
demonstrate a unified stance on 
59 Herspring (2005), pp. 279-280; Weinberger (1990), p. 94. 
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policy, the Reagan administration now started upon what would be a protracted effort 
to garner broad public-political support for the second NINF mission. So concerned 
was Reagan with making a convincing public case for it that on 20th September 1982, 
the day he announced it on American television, he spent the morning with the 
National Security Planning Group (NSPG) working on how to tell the nation that US 
Marines were going back into Lebanon's hostilities. 62 
Reagan announced the redeployment from the Oval Office at 5 pm that 
evening. 63 In his statement, he told Americans that US Marines were to return to 
Lebanon, along with their French and Italian counterparts, and that this second MNF 
mission would only be for 'a limited period of time. ' The mission was simple, the 
President stated; to enable the Lebanese government 'to resume full authority over its 
capital. ý 64 The President's message indicated a straightforward and limited mission, 
one which would not take very long. To many, however, the redeployment was a 
decision, and a mission, over which the shadows of Vietnam loomed large. 
Back into the fire: US Marines are redeployed to Lebanon 
The decision to deploy the MNF into Beirut for the second time received - as had the 
first deployment -a mixed reception in 
domestic political and media circles. Support 
for the mission was increasingly evident on Capitol Hill as more 
details emerged of 
Israel's part in the massacre of Palestinian civilians. Senators even 
discussed cutting 
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64 Reagan quoted from Weekly Compilation of White 
House Documents, 27h September 1982, pp. 
1182-1184, cited in Kelly (1996). 
138 
Washington's multibillion dollar foreign and economic aid package to Jerusalem. 65 
However, there were also considerable fears over the safety of the Marines and, as 
The Washington Post reported, concerns on Capitol Hill were 'not along partisan 
lines'. Congressmen variously expressed fears that US forces were 'going into the 
fire' and that America was getting involved 'in the middle of a civil war' in a place 
4where revenge, revenge, revenge is the order of the day. ' 'There's a sense that we're 
getting into a quagmire', Senator Paul Tsongas (Dem. MA) told reporters. 'How are 
we going to get those troops out again, once they go in? 566 
The White House quickly rallied to allay quagmire-fears, intra-administration 
disagreements over the deployment seemingly dispelled. Defence Secretary 
Weinberger publicly assured Americans that US forces would only go ashore into 
Beirut 'under conditions for a peaceful mission' whilst President Reagan insisted that 
the Marines were being sent into a situation in which they had a 'definite 
understanding as to what they're supposed to do', and that they would depart as soon 
67 
as their limited task had been accomplished. 
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Vietnam radars start to buzz 
Despite the White House's assurances, the subject of Vietnam was featured 
prominently in Washington's debates over the redeployment. In the week leading up 
to the Marines' landing in Beirut, all three of the administration's key figures had 
faced public questions about the relevance of the Vietnam experience. In an interview 
on 26 th September, Defence Secretary Weinberger was asked about the 'agitation' the 
re-deployment had caused on Capitol Hill, and about whether 'anxiety' over the 
mission was down to the 'Vietnam quagmire fixation'. Weinberger replied that whilst 
'that Syndrome will probably be with us for a very long time', the difference between 
then and now was that administration 'did not have the understanding of the 
American people' during Vietnam. The mistakes of Vietnam, he asserted, would not 
be repeated by the Reagan administration over Lebanon. 68 Secretary of State George 
Schultz faced similar questions. In a subsequent television interview, he was asked: 
During the deliberations on sending the Marines back, did any of you - you yourself 
perhaps - have the feeling that you were getting on a slippery slope? 
Did any 
memories of Vietnam come to mind? 
69 
Like Weinberger, Schultz re ected the appropriateness of the Vietnam analogy, i 
replying that he didn't think that the current crisis 
had 'any analogous aspect of 
Vietnam at all' . 
70 President Reagan himself faced similar questions. In a White 
House press conference on 28 
th September, having announced that US troops would 
68 'An interview with Caspar Weinberger', The Washington 
Post, 26b September, 1982. 
69 Schultz quoted in the Department of State Bulletin, 
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land in Beirut the next morning, Reagan was asked how long the Marines would have 
to stay in Lebanon for. He replied that there was 'no way to judge'. He was then 
asked if he feared 'that the United States could be dragged into a long, Vietnam-like 
entanglement there [in Lebanon]'. 'No', he responded, 'I don't see anything of that 
kind taking place at all. 1 
71 
Vietnam was not the only subject which was stymieing the White House's 
efforts to foment broad domestic support for the MNF deployment. It was not long 
before the War Powers Act also became a bone of contention. Whilst the early news 
from Beirut was very positive - the arrival of the MNF had paved the way for relative 
order and the re-opening of roads which had not been opened for nearly a decade; 
President Gemayel buoyantly declared that 'Beirut has again become the capital city 
of all Lebanon' - this news was largely overshadowed by the beginnings of what The 
Washington Post tenned 'a battle' between the White House and Congress over 
whether War Powers legislation should be brought to bear on the Lebanon 
deployment. 72 This 'battle' was given a vigorous jolt when, on 3 Oth September, one 
Marine was killed and three others were injured in an explosion. 
73 Pointing to these 
first casualties, and the 'chaotic situation' of 'war-ravaged Lebanon', congressional 
critics argued that the American force in Lebanon was now clearly 
involved in 
'hostilities 9 and should thus come under the authority of War Powers 
legislation 
which would allow Congress to negotiate a time-frame 
for the mission. 74 Declaring 
that an open-ended deployment 'could be tragic 
beyond even the pain of US 
casualties', Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs 
Committee Clement Zablocki 
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The Washington Post, 29h September, 
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(Dem. WI) criticised Reagan's 'skirting of the War Powers Act' and declared that this 
ignoring of Congress was 'eroding the integrity of the law'. Reagan's commitment 
could, Zablocki argued, see the United States 'unilaterally stumbling into a possibly 
intractable ... military involvement. ' 
75 
Those first US casualties also generated criticism in the media. A Washington 
Post editorial censured the White House for launching the second MNF mission with 
'too little public or congressional discussion'. 'The concept of "quagmire"', the 
article stated, 'is still for many Americans a controlling metaphor, an automatic reflex 
against foreign risk-taking'. 76 Similarly, the Chicago Tribune discussed whether there 
was a 'Vietnam analogy' in its reporting of the Marine casualties and reported that the 
State Department was stridently denying accusations that US forces were getting 
involved in a 'foreign entanglement'. 77 The growing tensions between the White 
House and Capitol Hill over the applicability of War Powers Resolutions also 
captured media attention and fuelled concerns over the nature, and rationales, of the 
N4NF mission itself Declaring on its front-page 'Confusion Surrounds Timetable for 
Mission'. the New York Times observed that 'conflicting statements' were coming 
from the White House over the timeframe for the troops' withdrawal and reported that 
Caspar Weinberger was once again expressing fears that American forces 'might get 
drawn into an extended commitment and maybe into combat as well'. This public 
acknowledgement of Weinberger's concerns was another clear sign that the Reagan 
administration's disharmony over the mission was no secret, despite its efforts to 
maintain a unified front. 
78 
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A minor, but instructive, altercation between Paris and Washington over the 
MNF mission fuelled suspicions that what the Reagan administration was telling 
America about the aims of the deployment was not necessarily accurate. Wrhilst 
President Reagan had publicly designated a very limited mission mandate for US 
MNF troops (he had described them as an 'interposition force', a vague concept in 
itself), the French government's public declaration that the MNF mission was actually 
one of 'maintaining peace and protecting the civil population' sparked a transatlantic 
argument and increased domestic concerns back in the United States. Eager to 
downplay the suggestion that US troops were charged with any such responsibility 
(publicly, Reagan had given no hint whatsoever that US Marines would be tasked 
with actively maintaining peace), the Pentagon vigorously denied Paris's 
interpretation, asserting instead that 'the MNF is not a force to maintain peace' but 
merely 'a deterrent force'. 79 A somewhat embarrassing public contretemps between 
allies, this confusion fed fears in Washington that America's role and mission in 
Lebanon remained worryingly unclear, an ambiguousness resonant of that which had 
drawn the United States into Vietnam. 
Escalating hostilities in Lebanon; escalating American involvement as well? 
Even as domestic concerns grew over the MNF's role 
in Lebanon, Reagan increased 
American involvement in the crisis. Having hosted President Gemayel in Washington 
in October, Reagan agreed to send artillery pieces and annoured personnel carriers to 
the Lebanese government, payment for this equipment coming 
from a $500 million 
79 Kelly (1996), pp. 3&7. 
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fund that the Gemayel government had set aside for arms purchases from the United 
States. Concurring with President Gemayel's assertion that the continuing presence 
of the MNF was the only way of guaranteeing an Israeli and Syrian withdrawal from 
Lebanon, Reagan decided to send a US military advisory group to Lebanon to oversee 
the training of Lebanese forces. He also agreed to consider Gemayel's suggestion that 
the MNF itself should be supplemented, a move which key figures in the State 
Department had been advocating for quite some time. 80 
Americans' concerns over the rising commitment to Lebanon were spurred in 
no small part by the continuing discrepancies emanating from the White House over 
the rationales for this commitment. In response to growing domestic criticism, the 
White House sought to make a stronger case for the mission, in order to win over the 
growing number of doubters. It did not appear to be very successful in achieving this. 
In one notable public statement, Reagan invoked Cold War imperatives as a 
justification for the US presence in Lebanon, declaring that the MNF deployment was 
aimed at stopping the Middle East 'being incorporated into the Soviet bloc'. Given 
how the White House had reacted to the recent French depiction of the MNF role, this 
latest statement was perhaps surprising since it depicted a far graver role for US 
troops in Lebanon. 81 Indeed it spurred concerns in Washington, in direct contrast to 
what Reagan had intended. In a subsequent letter to the President, a concerned 
Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee stated that it expected to be consulted if the White 
House wanted to keep US troops in Beirut. Public statements 
from influential 
congressmen - that there was 'slowly escalating violence' 
in Lebanon and that Beirut 
was a 4war-ravaged capital, - also served notice to 
the White House that Capitol Hill 
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was still pushing for the enactment of the War Powers Resolutions. Indeed by now, 
some legislators were advocating a full withdrawal of US forces. 82 
These political and media concerns also appeared to be reflected in domestic 
opinion polls. Throughout October of 1982, polls indicated that only 54% of 
Americans supported an 'active' American part in world affairs. This was the lowest 
level of support in decades, lower even than in the aftermath of America's withdrawal 
from Vietnam itself. 83 With some of Reagan's top foreign policy aides openly 
blaming the public mood on the Vietnam Syndrome, White House officials admitted 
that they were 'working furiously' on a public campaign to win over public and 
congTessional support for the MNF deployment. 84 For all this effort, however, both 
the Lebanon mission and President Reagan's project to eradicate the Vietnam 
Syndrome now started to unravel. 
Increasing tensions over War Powers; when are hostilities 'imminent". 
As anxieties increased in Washington, it was not just events in the Middle East which 
were stirring the Vietnam Syndrome. Even as disgruntlement increased over US 
involvement in Lebanon, political and media critics were raising concerns over 
Reagan s continuing focus upon Central America and were warning that the 
United 
States risked being propelled towards another Vietnam-style quagmire. 
On 28 th April 
1983, the Commission on US-Central American Relations took a full-page advert in 
82 Ibid. 
83 For the poll, see: Michael Getler, 'Failure to Persuade 
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84 poll cited in Sobel (200 1), pp. 46-47. See also 
figures in: 'Washington Whispers', US News & 
World Report, 11 thOctober, 1982, p. 20. 
145 
the New York Times urging Congress to 'Veto Another Vietnam'. 85 With the MNF in 
Beirut suffering further casualties, Reagan's Lebanon policy then suffered yet another 
serious blow. 86 Citing the continuing hostilities in Lebanon, and Syria's continuing 
military threat, Jerusalem announced that it would keep the IDF in Lebanon for the 
foreseeable future, in order to protect Israel's northern border. 87 This decision was 
significant since it guaranteed that there would be no Syrian withdrawal either. With 
no apparent end to the political stalemate, and with the warring factions still 
concentrated firmly in and around Beirut, a dismayed Reagan noted that Israel's 
decision left his Middle East peace initiative 'in limbo. ' 88 
If this development somewhat soured diplomatic relations between 
Washington and Jerusalem, American-Israeli relations on the ground inside Lebanon 
were also becoming strained. These tensions were evidenced in a series of flashpoints 
between US and IDF troops. One notable, and widely reported, incident even saw a 
US Marine Captain drawing his sidearm in order to warn off an IDF tank unit which 
was attempting to encroach upon an American-held position. 'Continued 
provocation 1) from Israeli forces prompted the Commander of the US Marine Corps, 
General Robert H. Barrow, to write a personal letter of protest to Defence Secretary 
Weinberger, on 14 th March 1983.89 It was a measure of the intimate volatility of the 
crisis that US forces found themselves in altercations with their erstwhile ally. 
Back in Washington, tensions were also continuing to escalate. The White 
House's continuing insistence that US forces were not involved in 'hostilities' in 
Beirut - in order to deflect ongoing congressional 
demands that the US mission 
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should be brought under War Powers authority - appeared increasingly implausible. 
Despite the fact that US forces were officially designated as being part of an impartial 
multinational interposition force in Beirut, it was clear that Lebanese Muslims, 
Syrians and Palestinians did not hold this view. Indeed, the United States was viewed 
by these factions - just as Defence Secretary Weinberger had predicted - as both a 
fiiend and protector of Israel and of the Lebanese Christian militias which were 
receiving weapons and funding from Israel. 90 The contempt felt for the US military 
presence was made startlingly clear on 18 th April, 1983, when a bomb at the 
American Embassy in West Beirut killed 17 Americans and several foreign nationals. 
It was the Marines' biggest setback of the deployment thus far and prompted a more 
muscular approach to how US military operations were conducted. 91 The Marines 
subsequently increased their firepower and started using helicopter gunships for 
'defensive operations' when they were on patrol. 92 
Greatly concerned by the increasing violence, Secretary of State George 
Schultz himself travelled to the region in an effort to reinvigorate the peace 
negotiations. Yet again, however, American aspirations for the crisis were thwarted 
by the aspirations of the protagonists. Having managed to negotiate a tentative 
preliminary withdrawal commitment from Israel, Schultz's efforts were then dashed 
when Damascus announced that it would not sanction a simultaneous withdrawal of 
its own forces. 93 Syria's decision meant that there would be no Israeli withdrawal 
either, thus ensuring a continuation of Lebanon's increasingly violent stalemate. 
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From peacekeepers to protagonists 
Throughout the summer of 1983, the intensity of the fighting between rival Lebanese 
Christian, Muslim and Druze militias saw MNF troops based at Beirut airport coming 
under increasing fire. 94 The White House did not need the Washington Post declaring 
that the Vietnam Syndrome was 'at work' to be aware of growing domestic concerns 
over these developments, or of the subject which was now dominating Washington's 
debates over the US mission. 95 In heated debates on Capitol Hill, legislators of both 
parties argued passionately over bringing President Reagan to account over the 
Lebanon deployment; Senator Toby Roth (Rep. WI) asserted that Lebanon was 'a 
quagmire ... a tragedy waiting to happen', whilst Senator Dale Bumpers (Dem. AR) 
pleaded for 'no more Vietnams, no more undeclared wars, no more presidential 
wars I. 
96 
Reagan went on the public offensive in the face of such criticisms, warning 
congressional dissenters that their protestations were not only undermining America's 
Lebanon policy but also giving 'aid and comfort' to Moscow. However, within the 
White House itself, the deployment was increasingly being talked about in similarly 
fateful terms. The New York Times quoted one White House official who described 
Lebanon as 'a Greek tragedy' and that 'we're in a terrible, terrible situation. 97 
President Reagan himself was also more than aware of the increasing seriousness of 
events. Despite his bold public stance he harboured grave private concerns, 
increasingly convinced that US forces were - despite his initial intentions - now 
94 Ibid., pp. 444-445. 
95 Philip Geyelin, 'A Desert Doesn't Look Like a Quagmire', Washington Post, 14 th August 1983; 
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firmly embroiled in Lebanon's war. As two more Marines were killed at the end of 
September, Reagan noted in his diary that 'this civil war is running wild'. 98 
This period, and President Reagan's growing disillusionment with it, marked a 
significant turning point in America's Lebanon policy. Throughout the late summer, 
increasingly frustrated, Reagan had been toying with the idea of bringing US naval 
and air power to bear against Syrian and PLO forces which were stepping up attacks 
against Lebanese government forces. On 7 th September 1982, he noted in his diary: 
I can't get the idea out of my head that some F- 1 4's off the Eisenhower [a US aircraft 
carrier moored off the Lebanese coast] coming in at about 200 feet over the Mannes 
and blowing hell out of a couple of artillery placements would be a tonic for the 
Marines and at the same time deliver a message to those gun happy Middle East 
terrorists. 99 
Reagan's sentiments hardly seem to be a detached, strategic justification for such a 
significant escalation of US policy. However, they vividly reflected his personal 
frustration at the ongoing stalemate and the toll it was taking on the United States; the 
day before this diary entry, Reagan had personally telephoned the parents of two US 
Marines who had recently been killed in Beirut. 
'00 
The very next day, in a watershed moment for American involvement in the 
conflict, President Reagan ordered US artillery and warships to 
begin firing on 
Syrian-backed Lebanese Druze positions around Beirut. Having given this order, 
Reagan now wrestled with the dilemma of whether or not to continue with this 
forceful new strategy. In deliberating the options, he was tom between wanting to 
fulfil his commitment to aid the Lebanese government, and uncertainty that America's 
98 Reagan (1990), p. 445. 
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'aid' should extend to actually conducting aerial and sea bombardments. Having 
consulted with his NINF partners on this issue, Reagan concluded that adopting this 
more aggressive approach was the only way of pushing back the Syrian offensive. By 
the end of that month, US warships and F- 14 jets were pounding positions on the hills 
overlooking Beirut, in support of Lebanese government forces. This escalation may 
have been 'under the head of defence', as President Reagan contended, but it was a 
classic example of the 'mission creep' that the Pentagon had feared and it ended any 
semblance of American neutrality in the conflict. 10 1 
Reagan's decisions would have serious repercussions for the MNF troops on 
the ground inside Beirut. Knowing that they were being targeted by US ships and 
planes, Druze forces now began firing upon US troops based at Beirut airport. Very 
soon, as John Murtha notes, 'US Marines were hunkered down at the airport under 
fire from the surrounding hills', their military effectiveness still compromised by the 
restricted rules-of- engagement which had not been revised since the very start of the 
mission. 
102 
War Powers agreement in Washington - the shedding of the Vietnam Syndrome? 
Reagan's decision to escalate America's military involvement in the crisis coincided 
with a similarly dramatic change in his attitude towards congressional 
involvement in 
his Lebanon policy. With the New York Times reporting 'no end in sight to the 
fighting in Lebanon', the crisis was now the number one issue on Capitol Hill. 
103 
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Well aware of growing public opposition to US involvement - Reagan lamented that 
there is 'a deeply buried isolationist sentiment within our land' - but convinced that 
he needed to maintain a strong US military presence in Lebanon, Reagan now turned 
to Congress in order to provide much-needed support for his Lebanon policy. Reagan 
hoped that, having demanded it for so long, Congress would agree to bring the US 
Lebanon mission under the War Powers Act. Not only, he reasoned, would this 
appease the grumblings of Lebanon sceptics if they saw Congress effectively 
endorsing the mission; he also thought that a formal congressional endorsement under 
the War Powers provisions 'would settle their [the Marines'] presence in Lebanon' 
and thus allow his planners to focus upon a sounder strategy for the MNF. 104 
Reagan's wishes were met. After vigorous consultation with senior 
legislators, the year-long wrangle over enacting War Powers provisions for the 
Lebanon mission finally ended, on 20th September 1983 . 
105 Reagan agreed to a 
resolution invoking section 4 (a) (1) of the War Powers Act. In response, 
congressional leaders agreed to impose an 18-month time-frame on the Marines' 
Lebanon deployment, as requested by the White House. The Resolution passed in 
both Houses. 106 
From the congressional perspective, the conciliatory shift was largely due to 
two key factors: firstly, a growing realism amongst senior legislators that President 
Reagan could not feasibly back-pedal from his commitment to an international peace- 
keeping mission at this critical juncture; secondly, that continuing 
legislative 
obstinacy risked compromising both the President and the mission 
itself Whilst there 
was by no means a majority swing behind the Lebanon 
deployment, there now 
104 Reagan (1990), pp. 446-447. 
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seemed to be a broad consensus on Capitol Hill that - against the backdrop of an 
ongoing Cold War standoff - American credibility was at stake in Lebanon and that 
the White House could not withdraw US forces just because the situation was getting 
more dangerous. The bipartisan nature of this recognition was encapsulated by the 
Democratic Speaker of the House, Thomas 'Tip' O'Neill (Dem. MA), when he told 
reporters that the United States 'Can't cut and run ... The people of the world will lose 
faith and confidence and credence in our government. ' 107 
From the White House perspective, the 'concession' to bring the mission 
under War Powers agreement was a considerable boon. Not only did it give President 
Reagan the flexibility to extend the US military presence in Lebanon, if he saw fit; it 
also made Congress complicit in a mission which it had been increasingly criticising. 
Now, having tacitly endorsed it, Congress had little grounds to criticise the Lebanon 
mission, thus ensuring that a significant swathe of the deployment-opposition Reagan 
had faced was now effectively gone. Indeed, Congress would now likely shoulder 
some of the responsibility for the mission if things were to go awry. 
Reagan officials were thus understandably buoyant about the agreement and 
they viewed it as yet another opportunity to remind Americans that the Vietnam 
Syndrome was not longer an impediment to the nation's foreign policy. The 
4 consensus on Capitol Hill in favour of keeping American troops in a 
battle zone' 
was, they proclaimed, a clear indication that Congress was now 'over the Vietnam 
Syndromei. 108 Indeed, some legislators drew similar conclusions. Howard Berman 
(Dem. CA) emphasised the post-Vietnam pertinence of the Lebanon agreement, 
stating that now was the time to demonstrate that 'Vietnam 
did not paralyze the 
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United States for all time'. However, Senator Sam Nunn (Dem. GA), who had 
opposed the agreement, offered a markedly different conclusion: 
What we did in Vietnam, we went in without knowing what we were doing and the 
mission kept expanding and expanding without sufficient forces to carry it out. The 
resolution before us is the most clear expression in advance [sic] I've ever seen of a 
repeat of that mistake. 109 
Responding to Nunn's warning, House Speaker O'Neill rejected any repeat of 
Vietnam and denied that congressional endorsement of the deployment amounted to a 
'blank check' which could 'lead to another Gulf of Tonkin Resolution'. Conversely, 
he argued, Congress assented to the Bill because it 'clearly limits the scope and role 
of US forces in Lebanon ... so that the 
danger of a Vietnam-type escalation is 
avoided. "10 
However, if the agreement to bring War Powers authority to bear on the 
Lebanon deployment suggested a growing political consensus in Washington DC, it 
did little to soothe a broader domestic disquiet which showed no signs of dissipating 
whilst Lebanon's hostilities continued making front page news. Reagan's domestic 
foreign policy ratings were, in his own words, 'way down', and with Vietnam 
continuing to dominate America's Lebanon debates, polling organisations 
had even 
started asking Americans if they thought that Lebanon resembled Vietnam - whether 
III 
it mattered or not, two out of every three Americans polled thought that 
it i. 
Criticising the recent War Powers agreement, declaring that it was (no solution' to the 
questions over presidential dominance of crisis 
foreign policymaking, Philip Geyelin 
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of The Washington Post warned that 'A dangerous delusion is setting in ... with the 
bipartisan compromise, amongst those who think that they have 'laid to rest in 
Lebanon the Vietnam analogy'. How, the paper asked, can the politicians claim that 
'the Vietnam syndrome is behind us' when the American public remain so 
sceptical? 
112 
This period also marked the apex of the Reagan administration's own internal 
battle over Lebanon policy, with fierce cabinet-level divergences between the State 
Department and Pentagon over how to respond to the increasing vulnerability of US 
forces in Lebanon. Arguing that US forces were 'sitting ducks' as they came under 
increasing sniper and mortar fire at the airport, Secretary of State Schultz advocated a 
bolder mandate for the Marines, asserting that they should 'not sit at the airport' but 
'be used proactively to advance American policy in getting the foreign forces out'. 
The Pentagon maintained its opposition to these demands. Defence Secretary 
Weinberger argued that more aggressive US manoeuvring inside Lebanon would 
inevitably create more casualties and deaths: this would not only escalate domestic 
opposition to the deployment, he argued; it might also be detrimental to America's 
relations with neighbouring states in the region. Still looking at the broader picture, 
and mindful of intelligence rumours which predicted an impending terrorist attack 
against US Marines in Lebanon, Weinberger continued to advocate nothing 
less than 
a full US withdrawal. 
113 
Caught between these two perspectives, Reagan was now under intense 
pressure to retneve the deteriorating fortunes of the 
MNF inside Beirut. However, 
neither of the two main options appealed to him. He was extremely unwilling 
to 
withdraw US forces; however, he was equally 
focussed upon keeping the US 
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casualty-count to a minimum and so he ruled out a more expansive mandate for the 
Marines. 114 As the administration continued to brainstorm for effective alternatives, 
some harboured grave concerns about how the current policy stalemate might affect 
the safety of the MNF troops. As far as Reagan's National Security Advisor Robert 
McFarlane was concerned, the decision to maintain the current force size and mandate 
cemented not only the MNF's policy 'paralysis' but also the continuing vulnerability 
of the US Marines at Beirut airport. 115 
Worst fears reaUsed 
McFarlane's concerns were realised on the morning of 23 rd October, 1983. The US 
Marine barracks at Beirut International Airport was blown up by a massive truck 
bomb. The explosion killed 241 Marines; a simultaneous explosion killed 77 soldiers 
at the French barracks. 116 A devastating setback, it marked the beginning of the end 
of America's presence in Lebanon. The increasing confusion and disillusionment 
over America's role in the conflict was not helped by President Reagan's inexplicable 
public assertion that the bombing proved that the Marine contingent was doing the job 
it was sent to do in Beirut. 
117 It was an assessment highly unlikely to quell 
Americans I scepticism over a mission which - despite Reagan's initial assertion of 
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there being 'no intention or expectation that US armed forces will become involved in 
hostilities' - was now clearly a major urban war-fighting operation. 118 
However, whilst withdrawal demands resonated around Washington DC in the 
aftermath of the bombing, there remained a strident body of opinion which castigated 
any US withdrawal as 'creeping cowardice'. 119 For Secretary of State Schultz, the 
bombing vindicated his calls for a more muscular US policy in Lebanon and 
demonstrated, albeit at great cost, the futility of trying to maintain a cautious, 
ýpolitical' military presence in a war-zone. Re-emphasising the logic of the 
'overwhelming force' approach, Schultz continued to argue for a strengthened 
mandate for the MNF. Indeed, such an escalation was discussed at an NSC meeting 
convened by Reagan shortly after the bombing, in which intelligence supplied by the 
Pentagon was used to plan attacks against suspected militias in the Beqaa valley. By 
this time, however, the protestations of Weinberger and the military chiefs were very 
much in keeping with President Reagan's own view of the crisis and the attacks were 
aborted. Weinberger pushed instead to start a complete withdrawal of US forces, in 
the face of stubborn demands from Schultz that the Marines remain in Lebanon, 
regardless of their mission remit and force size. 
120 
The decision at this critical point weighed heavily upon Reagan, who was 
understandably torn between the merits of each policy option. Stung 
by the fear that 
American prestige would suffer if it were to 'cut and run' from Lebanon (and very 
encouraged in those concerns by some NSC figures), 
he was equally anxious not to 
lose any more lives, or to incur any more criticism 
from an increasingly restless 
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domestic arena. "' Ultimately, Reagan knew that to increase American military 
involvement in the region risked leading America into the very quagmire that 
opponents of the deployment had warned of from the beginning. If it had not turned 
into such a quagmire already, staying in Lebanon and sustaining further losses would 
not only compound the mission failures thus far but, more broadly, would badly 
damage his mission to dispel the Vietnam Syndrome and bolster America's foreign 
policy confidence. 
Faced with these dilemmas, Reagan concluded that Lebanon's war would 
continue, regardless of the presence of the MNF. This fact, he knew, effectively left 
his Lebanon policy - one which was initially based upon US forces overseeing a 
transition to regional peace - dead in the water. On 7 th February 1984, he announced 
that US Marines were to be withdrawn from Beirut and relocated to American ships 
waiting offshore. On 3 oth March, he reported to Congress that America's 
pafticipation in the N4NF was at an end. 
122 
Conclusion 
The response of the White House to the conflict in Lebanon fits neatly with the 
characterisation of post-Vietnam American deployment decision-making 
forwarded 
by this thesis. President Reagan's Lebanon policy was executed in a manner of his 
choosing, despite an array of dissenting voices throughout the crisis, and 
despite the 
fact that this dissent ensured that the Vietnam Syndrome hung, pall-like, over 
Washington DC. The exposure of the public-political debates over the Lebanon 
"' Weinberger (1990), P. 111 - 
122 Reagan (1990), p. 465; Grimmett, I" March, 2007, p. 
17. 
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deployment show that the Vietnam experience provided the dominant theme for both 
congressional and media critics of the mission. It also shows how the Reagan White 
House sought to publicly respond to this invoking of the Vietnam analogy and how it 
sought to reassure America over its inappropriateness. 
In focussing upon the public diplomacy of the Reagan administration during 
this period, examples emerged of how strong domestic deployment-opposition can 
prompt the White House to be both exaggerative and evasive in its rhetoric, in an 
effort to win over dissenters and diffuse public criticism. Reagan's efforts to 
emphasise the Cold War imperatives for the US presence in Lebanon may or may not 
have been exaggerated; however, there seems little doubt that he intentionally 
downplayed the remit (and thus the potential dangers) of the Marines' mission in 
Lebanon, something which the public contretemps with Paris exposed. The 
President's interpretive dominance of the crisis was also evident in the way he 
blocked legislators' demands to enact the War Powers resolutions in order to bring 
Congress in on the Lebanon mission. When Reagan did eventually agree to enact 
War Powers resolutions, this was done entirely at his own discretion and in 
accordance with his own wishes. 
The domestic opposition to the Marine deployment, and the palpable presence 
of the Vietnam Syndrome, clearly never dampened Reagan's desire or ability to 
deploy - and then redeploy for a second time - 
US forces. However, for all his 
willingness to circumvent the notional obstacles of the Vietnam Syndrome in order to 
give the United States a central role in the Lebanese crisis, Reagan appeared to 
be 
extremely mindful of the dangers of seeing US forces sucked 
into a bloody and 
intractable military mission. On the one hand, it could be argued that for much of the 
period detailed here, Reagan's decisions could be interpreted as those of a man who 
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was largely in concurrence with those hawkish 'anti-Syndrome forces' within his 
administration. On the other hand, however, the parameters that Reagan set for the 
Lebanon mission actually demonstrated much of the caution advocated by those for 
whom the Syndrome taught a very different lesson. He repeatedly refused to increase 
the number of US troops in Lebanon and he refused to increase the role and vigour of 
the Marines' role - escalations in US military action largely evidenced themselves in 
the 'safe' options of naval and air bombardments. For Reagan, casualty- avoidance 
was an over-riding concern in steering his decisions. 
In the aftermath of the barracks bombings, Reagan rejected State Department 
proposals to respond punitively to the attack; instead, he sided with a more-cautious 
Defence Department, ultimately ordering a military withdrawal. Often depicted as a 
'classic' Cold War conservative and an ardent champion of the various use-of-force 
conclusions that the American 'right-wing' had drawn from Vietnam, Reagan was 
perhaps not as 'anti-Syndrome' as his rhetoric frequently suggested. However, whilst 
his 'performance' throughout this episode (a perfort-nance which saw him flit between 
not allowing the Vietnam Syndrome to proscribe the deployment of US forces, whilst 
demonstrating much of the use-of-force timidity associated with the Syndrome in the 
parameters he set for the deployment), one thing was patently clear: presidential 
preference dominated; the deployment, its direction and its duration were decided by 
the President himself The nature of this 'dominance' is given a little more 
consideration below. 
Schisms over deploying US troops to Lebanon were notable within Reagan's 
inner-circle, most notably between the State and Defence Departments. The standoff 
between the 'hawks' and 'doves' on this issue very much encapsulates America's 
post-Vietnam divergences over the 'ifs' and 'hows' of using military 
force. It is 
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notable (and very much in keeping with the depiction forwarded by this study) that, 
amidst the policy confrontations between the two departments, presidential preference 
was the decisive factor. As one senior State Department official subsequently 
remarked, the policyinaking confrontations over Lebanon policy between State and 
Defence could never be described as having reached a stage of 'policy impasse', since 
President Reagan's decisions always resolved the issue before any 'impasse' could 
occur. 
123 
Reagan faced direct opposition to the mission from the military chiefs, many 
of them still bearing the mental scars of the Vietnam experience and adopting the 
post-Vietnam deployment-caution that has largely come to characterise the 
Pentagon's mindset throughout the post-Vietnam era. The military chiefs' 
deployment-reluctance over the Lebanon crisis was perhaps unsurprising given that 
their fears over Reagan's vague and disjointed foreign policy thinking; these concerns 
appeared to be crystallised as they talked with their President about the rationales for, 
and aims of, deploying US troops to Lebanon. In seeking clarity over precisely what 
the mission was and how it was to be achieved, the chiefs' questions were never 
answered. As Jeffrey Record observes: 
During and after ... the redeployment of 
US Marines back into Beirut, Reagan and 
other administration spokesmen cited at least a dozen political objectives [for the 
mission], some incompatible with each other and others clearly 
beyond the reach of 
the intervention forces and their rules of engagement. 
124 
123 Author interview with former State Department official Dr 
William Schneider Jr. Washington DC, 
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124 Record (2002), p. 83. 
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The military chiefs may not have believed that Reagan's mixture of American 
exceptionalism and Cold War bullishness were appropriate motivations for sending 
US forces into Lebanon. However, this mattered little in the face of their President's 
wishes and his authority as Commander-in- Chief As Dale Herspring observes, the 
Pentagon 'did everything it could within the parameters of military obedience to 
convince Reagan that the mission was a bad idea'. 125 The President responded by 
continuing to solicit the advice and opinion of his military chiefs and by 
acknowledging their experience and expertise. Ultimately however, given that he 
wanted to deploy, their opinions and concerns informed Reagan's view of how he 
would deploy but did not persuade him against the deployment itself 
Executive dominance was also evident in the White House's dealings with 
Congress. Whilst Congress demonstrated a generally cautious willingness to support 
Reagan's deployments - many congressional members wanted the White House to 
respond to what was broadly seen to be a punitive Israeli incursion into Lebanon - 
congressional demands for greater executive-legislative co-operation over the MNF 
mission were, for a long time, given scant attention by Reagan. Indeed, congressional 
opinion seemed almost irrelevant to his planning. Both decisions to deploy US 
Marines to Lebanon - the initial MNF deployment and the second MNF 
deployment 
after the Sabra and Shattila massacres - were done at President Reagan's own 
discretion and without fonnal consultation with Congress. Congressional leaders 
were typically telephoned by administration officials once the White House had 
ironed out the deployment details with appropriate policymaking officials and other 
national governments. 
125 Herspring (2005), p. 278. 
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Indeed, the possible deployment of US forces was possibly known to actors 
out-with the United States be re it was known to many congressional members. fo 
Reagan gave his special emissary Philip Habib permission to use the President's 
'conditional pledge' to deploy US forces as 'a bargaining chip', in the critical round 
of diplomatic discussions through June and early July of 1982.126 One could rightly 
question whether these tense events, and the fraught negotiations which accompanied 
them, could have allowed anything other than a guarded, non-revelatory engagement 
on the part of the White House. Nonetheless, whilst this discretion is undoubtedly 
justified at such times, it also vividly demonstrates that the American public-political 
arenaýs involvement in, and awareness of, deployment decision-making is frequently 
marginal, on a need-to-know basis and ex post facto. This marginalisation extends 
even to Congress, despite its formal empowerments in this all-important policy area. 
The executive-legislative 'battle' over enacting War Powers authority also 
invites attention. The study's focus upon language-use shows that disgruntled 
legislators consistently criticised President Reagan for his unilateral approach to 
policy, frequently invoking the Vietnam experience as they did so. Media critics did 
likewise. In response, Reagan's ability to dictate the terms and implications of the 
events in Lebanon saw him continue to deny any need for formal congressional 
involvement through the enactment of the War Powers resolutions. This rejection 
reached the point where Reagan was - quite incredibly - continuing to 
deny that 
Beirut's volatile conflict-zone actually merited the designation 'hostilities', even as 
American troops were under attack and sustaining casualties. If the 'Imperial 
Presidency' arises from the power of what Presidents say as much as 
it does from 
what they can do in policy terms, then it is hard to 
find a clearer example than this. 
126 Howell Raines, 'Offer By President', New York Times, 7h July, 1982. 
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Of course, President Reagan eventually did assent to congressional demands 
to enact the War Powers resolutions. However, his doing so can hardly be read as an 
instance of an embattled President succumbing to the will of a strident Congress. 
Reagan's decision was instead a calculated one, made by a President who saw the 
sense of tying Congress into a deteriorating mission and ensuring that blame would be 
shared between the White House and Capitol Hill if things were to go awry. In fact, 
this executive-legislative 'compromise' over enacting the War Powers resolutions did 
nothing to draw discretionary authority away from the White House. It also did little 
to increase Capitol Hill's input into the decision-making process. It did, however, 
fon-nally legitimise Reagan's Lebanon policy in the eyes of much of the American 
public. Not only did Congress' agreement to extend the deployment timeframe - 
from the standard 60-90 days to an incredible 18 months - give Reagan a degree of 
latitude which bordered on the very open-endedness that congressional dissenters 
were declaring they wanted to avoid; this formal congressional support also 
effectively 'tied Congress in' to the risks of the mission, making it almost impossible 
for legislators to publicly criticise a plan that they had formally endorsed. Ultimately, 
in all of his interactions with the legislature over Lebanon, Reagan never left anyone 
in doubt that his consultations were instigated purely at his own discretion and not 
through obligation. His willingness to enact War Powers resolutions should not, he 
reminded Capitol Hill more than once, be viewed as any acknowledgement that the 
President s constitutional authority can be impermissibly infringed by statute. 
President Reagan's deployment decisions also appeared to give scant regard to 
the concerns of a Vietnam-sensitive American polity. 
In stewarding Lebanon policy, 
Reagan pursued chosen policy options and tried, subsequently, to 
lead opinion on 
these options. He never really managed to do this effectively and even 
towards the 
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end of the Lebanon venture - with escalating American casualties, US warplanes shot 
down, pilots captured and killed, not to mention the October Marine barracks 
bombing - Reagan was still receptive to State Department and NSC calls for a more 
muscular US engagement with the crisis. Reagan's refusal to reject these demands 
outright suggests that he seriously considered maintaining the US presence in Beirut, 
a move which he knew would be very unpopular with the American public and on 
Capitol Hill. Americans' negativity towards the deployment ultimately influenced 
Reagan's decision to cut short the deployment. However, that does not obscure the 
fact that he had initially sanctioned two MNF deployments (and significantly 
prolonged the duration of the second deployment) in the face of opinion polls which 
frequently indicated low domestic support for a US presence in Lebanon. As one 
senior Reagan administration official subsequently admitted: 'For the 
administration ... the importance of public opinion was relatively 
low. It was not a 
direct constraint. ' 
127 
Despite its best efforts, Reagan's 'anti-Syndrome' mission was unsuccessful. 
After Lebanon, Lawrence Eagleburger, Reagan's Under Secretary of State, confinned 
that the American public's enthusiasm remained low for military intervention because 
there was still 'a lot left of the Vietnam Syndrome, the concern that we will become 
directly involved militarily and that it's a bottomless pit'. 
128 The Lebanon experience 
was undoubtedly instrumental in fuelling these concerns. Where Reagan 
failed, 
however, his successor would try to succeed. 
127 Sobel (200 1), p. 125. nd A ril, 128 'The State of Things as Seen From the State', 
Week in Review, New York Times, 22 p 1984. 
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Chapter 5 
Kicking the Vietnam Syndrome: 
The Bush Administration and Iraq's Invasion of Kuwait, 1990-1991 
President Bush, Vietnam and the use of military force 
President George H. W. Bush took office in January of 1989, at the very end of the 
Cold War. He was the fourth post-Vietnam President. Having been Reagan's Vice- 
President, Bush told Americans when he assumed office that he would carry on with 
'the mission we started in 1980'. A significant part of that mission was undoubtedly 
to dispel the Vietnam Syndrome. 1 During his single term in office, allusion to the 
Syndrome featured prominently, both in Bush's foreign policy decision-making and 
in his public diplomacy. Indeed, the subject was given unprecedented public 
exposure in his very first major appearance as President. Incredibly, given that it was 
a topic whose public 'presence' he viewed - as had his predecessor - as detrimental, 
Bush actually introduced the subject of Vietnam in his inaugural address: 
Congress, too, has changed in our time. There has grown a certain divisiveness ... in 
which not each other's ideas are challenged, but each other's motives. And our great 
parties have too often been far apart and untrusting of each other. It has been this way 
since Vietnam. That war cleaves us still. But, 
friends, that war began in earnest a 
quarter of a century ago; and surely the statute of 
limitations has been reached. This 
1 Roper (2000), p. 161. 
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is a fact: the final lesson of Vietnam is that no great nation can long afford to be 
sundered by a memory. 
2 
Bush's allusion to Vietnam might perhaps be viewed as being somewhat 
disingenuous; he may well have personally lamented the persisting 'presence' of the 
Vietnam Syndrome but its persistence was surely little helped by his giving the 
subject a national airing in his first major speech. Whatever the wisdom of this 
reference, it seemed clear that Bush's commitment to overseeing the Syndrome's 
demise was, like Reagan's, resolute. 3 Arnold Isaacs contends that the banishing of the 
Vietnam Syndrome was 'a ma or administration goal' for the Bush White House, i 
perhaps even as important as winning the war that Bush would eventually order US 
forces to fight against Iraq. 4 
However, if there were continuities between the Reagan and Bush 
presidencies, there were also significant differences. Bush was far less the ideologist 
than Reagan; he was, by his own admission, 'a practical man ... not much 
for the airy 
and the abstract'. 5 Whereas Reagan's use-of-force initiatives had frequently been 
underpinned by what almost appeared to be idealistic notions of what America should 
be, and what the leader of the free world should do in any given situation, Bush's 
decisions invariablY reflected a far greater knowledge of, and involvement with, the 
issues in question and were more likely to be grounded in a measured evaluation of 
6 
event, threat and context. In taking deployment decisions, Bush was far more willing 
to involve himself in the minutiae of policy than his predecessor had been, and also 
2 George H. W. Bush, Inaugural Address, January 20th 1989. * NB - unless stated otherwise, all 
presidential communications can be found (by date & statement title) 
in the 'public papers' sections of 
the presidential libraries. For the Bush Library, go to: 
http: //bushlibrary. tamu. edu/research/public_papers. php 
3 At least in the first three years of his presidency. 
4 Isaacs (1997), p. 76. 
5 McCrisken (2003), p. 13 1. 
6 Record (2002), p. 97; Herspring (2005), p. 298. 
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more likely to defer military policy to his military commanders rather than to his 
civilian aides, thus maximising the chance of US victory in the field. 7 As Bush 
himself acknowledged, more than once, 'I have learned from Vietnam. 8 
Bush was not the only one in his policyrnaking 'inner-circle' for whom the 
Vietnam experience was instructive. His Secretary of State, James Baker, was also 
very much aware of the lingering Vietnam Syndrome whilst his chief military 
counsel, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJS) General Colin Powell, was a 
Vietnam veteran with a very sensitive Vietnam radar of his own. An extremely 
influential and much-respected figure, Powell would bring much of Caspar 
Weinberger's use-of-force prudence into the military advice he gave President Bush. 9 
In fact, President Bush sometimes viewed Powell's approach as being overly cautious 
as he sought to implement decisive American responses to foreign crises. 
Whilst Bush was very much the foreign policy President - he was a fon-ner 
director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) - much of his success in this area 
was eclipsed by accompanying domestic problems and the fact that he had little in the 
way of a public persona which might encourage Americans to overlook them. Bush 
took office to face a divisive partisan domestic political climate underpinned by an 
economic downturn. Whilst this recession was due in no small part to the huge 
remilitarisation programme sanctioned by President Reagan - Dale Herspring makes 
the wry observation that if the US military had been a civilian organisation, it would 
have been bankrupt by the time Bush took office - America's sizeable budget deficit 
was not helped by Bush's own costly initiatives, which included a revival of Reagan's 
expensive missile defence programme and a $400 billion Medicare increase. 
10 
7 Record (2002), p. 104. 
8 George Bush (1999), All My Best. - My Life in Letters and Other Writings, New York: Scribner, p. 511. 
9 Record (2002), p. 10 1. 
10 George Bush & Brent Scowcroft (1998), A World Transformed, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, p. 380. 
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America's grim economic plight had a considerable impact upon the Bush presidency; 
it infused critical commentary on his foreign policymaking and stoked congressional 
Democratic demands for Bush to cut America's military budget and reap the post- 
Cold War 'peace-dividend'. " Facing near-constant opposition from a Democrat- 
controlled Congress and Senate, Bush would subsequently admit that the merging of 
domestic budget politics into his key crisis foreign policy decisions created 'one of 
the most frustrating periods of my presidency. '12 
Aside from these budgetary and policy difficulties, Bush's efforts to build 
domestic support for his policies were not helped by his public presentation. The 
charismatic Reagan was a very hard act to follow and this worked against Bush when 
he was trying to rally Americans behind crucial foreign policy initiatives such as force 
deployments. 13 Bush continued to publicly articulate many of the exceptionalist 
themes which had underpinned his predecessor's public diplomacy. He also 
demonstrated that, like Reagan, he was more than willing to exaggerate the reasons 
for deploying US forces in an effort to dispel the inhibitions of the Vietnam Syndrome 
and sway Americans behind his deployment decisions. However, he appeared ill- 
equipped to make a truly persuasive public case for such actions. Bush's many critics 
castigated his 'extravagant lack of interest in ideas' whilst others argued that his 
conservative, reactive policymaking style 'tested the patience of much of the 
American public'. 14 Whilst it clearly had not stopped him being voted into office, the 
label 'wimp' had dogged Bush's run for the presidency. 15 
11 Herspring (2005), p. 297. 
12 Bush & Scowcroft (1998), p. 357. 
13 Ibid, p. 340. 
14 David Mervin (1996), George Bush and the Guardianship Presidency, Palgrave Macmillan, p. 33; 
McCrisken (2003), p. 134. 
15 Roper (2000), pp. 159-160. 
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Critics may have derided Bush as a wimp but the 41't President of the United 
States certainly had the fortitude to take the toughest decision of all - using military 
force. Despite being very much aware of the lingering presence of the Vietnam 
Syndrome, Bush was - like Reagan - more than willing to deploy US forces if he saw 
fit and he was certainly not constrained by a negative public view of such action. 
Jeffrey Record observes that Bush was 'self-assured' when it came to using force, his 
attitude towards this recourse very much reflective of his generation's experience of 
world affairs in the 1930s and 1940s, and his own active service in World War Two 
when he enlisted to become the navy's youngest fighter pilot. Bush sanctioned two 
major military interventions in his time in office. In December of 1989, he deployed 
25ý000 US troops to Panama in order to remove the regime of Manuel Noriega, a 
dictator whose reputed drug links, and his actions against both his own people and 
Americans living in Panama, had been a source of concern to Washington since the 
mid-1980s. As fonner Director of the CIA, Bush personally disliked Noriega (who 
had been on the CIA payroll), and a series of highly publicised attacks on American 
citizens in Panama - including the detention of a US Navy officer and the threatened 
rape of his wife - was enough to prompt Bush to launch a military operation to 
overthrow his regime. 
16 
Bush's next challenge would be of far greater proportions. Indeed, it would 
come to define his presidency. After months of accusations and threats towards 
Kuwait, Iraq called the bluff of the international community and invaded its 
neighbour, on 2dAugust 
1990.17 At the time of the invasion, the Bush administration 
had its eyes fixed upon Europe and the ending of the Cold War but this 
did not stop 
16 Record (2002), pp. 96-101. 
17 Bush & Scowcroft (1998), pp. 302-314. See also: 
http: //www. armyradio. com/publish/A, rticles/Desert_Storm_Equipment/Desert_Shield_Storm. 
htm 
(accessed 02/04/06). 
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President Bush from ordering US forces to lead a massive international military 
response to Iraq's incursion. 18 However, whilst the awesome task of marshalling and 
sustaining a durable international military coalition in the Persian Gulf was 
accomplished most impressively by Bush, he found garnering domestic support for 
his actions a far more difficult task. Greatly concerned about seeing US troops face 
both the half-million strong Iraqi Army and the chemical and biological weapons 
which it was thought to have at its disposal, Americans responded to the deployment 
of US forces with considerable scepticism. In seeking to banish this public 
scepticism, Bush failed. He could not stop the subject of Vietnam from dominating 
America's public-political debates over a possible military confrontation with Iraqi 
forces; he also failed to gamer broad domestic support for the allied war which was 
eventually unleashed against Iraq. 
Whilst he had taken office determined to complete Reagan's 'revisionist 
project' to finally overcome the Vietnam Syndrome, Bush's decision to deploy US 
troops to the Persian Gulf effectively ended any chance he had of achieving this. 19 
Whilst the overwhelming victory that the US-led coalition achieved over Iraqi forces 
in the Persian Gulf might conceivably have exorcised Vietnam's demons once and for 
all (President Bush publicly claimed just this in the aftermath of military operations 
against Iraq), domestic critics subsequently pointed to Bush's imperious stewardship 
of the crisis and his consistent neglect of the domestic mood to accuse him instead of 
being the 'chief purveyor' of the Vietnam Syndrome. 20 
As this case study demonstrates, Bush's parameters for his Persian Gulf 
deployment certainly had the Vietnam Syndrome indelibly etched upon them. It also 
18 Lawrence Freedman & Efraim. Karsh (1994), The Gul(Conflict 1990-1991. Diplomacy and War in 
the New World Order, Faber & Faber, updated 2d edition, pp. I&4. 
19 Roper (2000), p. 16 1. 
20 Ibid, p. 173. 
170 
shows that - like his predecessor - he was perfectly willing to exercise his powers as 
Commander-in-Chief and to demonstrate that the buzzing of Vietnam radars is not 
enough to stop a President who is committed to using military force. Amidst a 
veritable maelstrom of public-political dissent and opposition, President Bush ordered 
US forces into their biggest military conflict since the Vietnam War. 
Conflict in Kuwait - an overview 
Iraq's invasion of Kuwait was, in no small part, related to the Iran-Iraq War which 
was fought between 1980 and 1988 .21 The conflict 
had its roots in the efforts of 
Iran's Shi'ite leadership to 'export' the religious-political spirit of its 1979 revolution 
beyond its borders. Amongst the several Gulf regimes it focussed upon was the 
nationalist and secularist Ba'athist regime of Saddam Hussein's Iraq. Tehran began 
attempting to undermine the Hussein regime, providing substantial support both to 
underground Sh'ite movements inside Iraq and to Iraq's Kurds in their long-standing 
struggle against the Iraqi central govenunent. Hussein responded by sanctioning a 
series of ruthless reprisals against both of these groups. After Tehran had 
subsequently called for Iraqis to rise up against him, Hussein responded with vigour - 
he invaded Iran itself 
Despite the undoubted hostility of this act, however, Lawrence Freedman and 
Efraim Karsh depict Hussein as something of a reluctant belligerent. He had made 
several efforts to placate the regime in Tehran and it was only when these efforts were 
rejected that he chose the military option. Hussein's reluctance to sanction hostilities 
21 See for example: Dilip Hiro (1990), The Longest War: The Iran-Iraq Military Conflict, Routledge, 
reprint edition; Efraim Karsh (2002), The Iran-Iraq War 1980-1988, Essential Histories, Osprey 
Publishing. 
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may have been grounded less in any particular conflict-aversion on the part of the 
Iraqi leader than in a pragmatic concern that war was an undesirably costly venture at 
a time when Iraq's oil wealth was allowing it to pursue ambitious national 
development programmes. War against Iran would, Hussein knew, drastically change 
Iraq's economic position. His concerns were proven correct. The eight-year Iran-Iraq 
War pushed Iraq towards a financial crisis which would steer Saddam Hussein's 
subsequent actions and ultimately see him facing war with the United States. 22 
Post-war antagonisms, reprieve.. -then invasion 
The debts accrued by Baghdad in its war against Iran ran to around $70 billion. With 
oil prices plummeting during the latter period of the conflict, Saddam Hussein asked 
some of his principal lenders, notably Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, to effectively write 
off Iraq's debts. Hussein reminded them that Iraqi blood had been spilt to protect 
them against fundamentalist Islam. At a meeting of the Arab Co-operation Council in 
February of 1990, six months before Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, Hussein requested a 
further $30 billion of funding. This request coincided with the onset of Iraqi military 
manoeuvres near the Kuwaiti border. 23 
Hussein's frustrations with Kuwait increased in the following months. Kuwait 
and the United Arab Emirates (UAE)) repeatedly refused Baghdad's requests to limit 
their oil production, a move which would let Iraq boost its own production and 
increase its revenues. With Kuwait and the UAE continuing to far exceed their 
production quotas, and with world oil prices remaining low, Hussein calculated that 
22 Freedman & Karsh (1994), pp. 8-9 & 19-20. 
23 Murtha (2006), pp. 108-109; Freedman & Karsh (1994), p. 45. 
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the economic loss to Iraq, which was rapidly sliding into impoverishment, amounted 
to some $89 billion. The role that both the UAE and Kuwait were playing in heaping 
this financial loss upon Baghdad was, the Iraqi leader declared, tantamount to a 
declaration of war. 
24 
Aside from the issue of oil production and its economic impact upon Iraq, the 
subject of Iraq's debt itself was also an increasing source of tension between Kuwait 
City and Baghdad. Despite being pressurised by Saddam Hussein, the Emir of 
Kuwait continued to refuse to waive the repayment of Kuwait's war loans to Baghdad 
and subsequently refused a request from Hussein for a$ 10 billion contribution to the 
Iraqi economy. The Emir stated that $500 million was all that Kuwait would provide 
for the Hussein regime, any further support being dependent upon resolving ongoing 
border and oil disputes between the two countries. Amidst continuing disagreements 
on these issues, Hussein accused Kuwait of setting up military installations, oil 
installations and farms on Iraq's territory, during the years when Baghdad's attention 
had been focussed on waging its war against Iran. Whether or not there was any basis 
to these accusations, they provided Hussein with the rationale for a more aggressive 
stance towards his neighbour. By mid-July, Iraqi forces began mustering in south- 
eastern Iraq, just north of the Kuwaiti border. 
25 
US military intelligence had been monitoring these altercations. However, 
Iraq's show of force on the Iraq-Kuwait border did not overly concern the Bush White 
House. The administration remained confident that Saddam Hussein was merely 
4 strong-arming' the Kuwaitis, a view which was nourished in no small part by a series 
of meetings between April Glaspie, the US Ambassador to Iraq, and Hussein 
24 lbid, pp. 46 & 48; Murtha (2006), pp. 108-109. 
25 Freedman & Karsh (1994), pp. 46-48. 
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himself. 26 Whilst these meetings were often heated, and persistently peppered by 
Hussein's tirades over various injustices suffered by Iraq, they left Glaspie with the 
impression that the Iraqi leader had no intention of actually invading Kuwait. Having 
assuaged Hussein's apparent paranoia that President Bush was going to declare an 
ýeconomic war' on Iraq, Glaspie told Hussein that the United States did not have an 
opinion on such inter-Arab disputes as the one Hussein currently found himself in 
with Kuwait City. Hussein subsequently gave Ambassador Glaspie an 'unconditional 
pledge' that he would not use force against Kuwait. 27 
Thus towards the end of July 1990, notwithstanding rumblings to the contrary 
from within the American intelligence community, the view from the White House 
was that the crisis had dissipated. 28 It proved to be the wrong view. On 2'd August, 
Iraqi forces invaded Kuwait, seized Kuwaiti oil fields, installed a new goverranent in 
Kuwait City and then moved towards the Saudi Arabian border. Henceforth, Saddam 
Hussein declared, Kuwait should be considered Iraq's 1 gth Province . 
29 
First decisions in Washington - what should America's response be? 
The invasion galvanised a swift response from the international community. The 
United Nations condemned the invasion that very day, passing Resolution 660 which 
ordered Iraq to 'withdraw immediately and unconditionally all its forces to the 
positions in which they were located on I" August 1990'. 
30 By the end of the month, 
the UN Security Council had passed other resolutions imposing full economic 
26 Bush & Scowcroft (1998), pp. 302-313 & 314. 
27 Freedman & Karsh (1994), pp. 52-55. 
28 lbid, pp. 54 & 57. 
29 Grimmett, I s' March, 2007, p. 24. 
30 Freedman & Karsh (1994), p. 8 1. 
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sanctions upon Iraq (Resolution 661, passed on 6th August; only Cuba and Yemen 
abstained), formally rejecting Iraq's declared annexation of Kuwait (Resolution 662, 
passed on 9th August with no abstentions), demanding that Iraq respect international 
law and order the 'immediate release' of held foreign nationals (Resolution 664, 
passed unanimously on 18 th August), and permitting the United States and its allies to 
use 'all measures commensurate to the specific circumstances as may be necessary', 
in order to stop and board ships violating the embargo implemented under Resolution 
th 31 661 (Resolution 665, passed on Saturday 25 , with Cuba and Yemen abstaining). 
The response of the Bush White House to the invasion was also strident. Denouncing 
the invasion as 'a blatant use of military aggression and violation of the UN Charter', 
President Bush demanded 'the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of all Iraqi 
forces'. 32 This language was backed by vigorous action. Within hours of the 
invasion, Bush had ordered US warships to the Persian Gulf and had frozen Iraqi and 
KuWaiti assets in the United States. 33 
The boldness of Bush's response quickly sparked public concerns in the 
United States. Bush himself notes that almost as soon as news of the invasion broke, 
the American media were 'speculating wildly' about the possibility of a US military 
response. Indeed, the very first question at the first White House press conference 
held after the invasion was whether the President was 'considering intervention' as an 
option. Already thinking of such a possibility, but mindful also that he could 'little 
afford bellicose mistakes' in public, Bush responded in the negative, convinced that 
31 Ibid, pp. 83-84 (Resolution 661); p. 99 (Resolution 661); p. 137 (Resolution 664); pp. 149-150 
(Resolution 665. See also: 'Chrononlogy, The Gulf Crisis: UN Security Council Actions', Bush 
Presidential Records, White House Office of Public Affairs, Kristen Gear files: 'Tips/Fact Sheet 
Persian Gulf. [OD/ID 03417]. The George H. W. Bush Presidential Library (Henceforth 'BPL' (Bush 
Presidential Library)). 
32 'Statement by the Deputy Press Secretary', lst August 1990, Bush Presidential Records, White 
House Office of Public Affairs, Kristen Gear files: 'Iraq' [2] [OD/ID 03417]. BPL. 
33 Freedman & Karsh (1994) p. 85; Bush & Scowcroft (1998), p. 314. 
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he and his administration 'had a big job ahead' if they were to rally domestic and 
international opinion behind such an option. 34 
Despite his concerns about Americans' conflict-aversions, it was clear that not 
everyone advocated a cautious stance from the White House. The Dallas Morning 
News, for example, asserted that the US 'must act forcefully' and that Iraq's 'blatant 
show of power politics must be met with equally strong action. ' 35 Far more forceful 
than this, some of the language in The Wall Street Journal bordered on the 
belligerent; it criticised 'the West's aversion to military involvement' and voiced 
disapproval that it took President Bush 'four days even to suggest forcing the eviction 
of Iraqi invaders from Kuwait'. Lamenting that any Western response to the crisis 
would probably be 'too little too late', the article criticised Saddam Hussein as being 
6vain, amoral' and 'caring nothing for the human costs of his people'. Drawing 
attention to the 'lessons of Munich'. the Journal asserted that 'barring military action, 
little stands in his [Hussein's] way'. America's response, it warned, 'cannot be 
allowed to wallow in the experience of Vietnam. ' 36 
Despite the early appearance of the subject of Vietnam, it was the Munich 
analogy which steered much of Bush's initial thinking on the crisis. He felt that 
Hussein's actions were a glaring example of naked international aggression, resonant 
of the actions of Hitler during the 1930s and 1940s, and that such flagrant aggression 
should be checked. 37 Precisely how to achieve this was the key question his foreign 
policy team now deliberated. At the first National Security Council (NSC) meeting 
after the invasion, it was the plight of Saudi Arabia - specifically, the possibility that 
it might fall next to Iraqi forces - which dominated much of the agenda. It was 
34 Bush & Scowcroft (1998), p. 315. 
35 'Iraq Invasion. US Must Act Forcefully', Dallas Morning News editorial, P August, 1990. 
36 Karen Elliot House, 'No Appeasement of Iraq', The Wall Street Journal, 7th August, 1990. 
37 Freedman & Karsh (1994), p. 75; Halberstam (2001), p. 75; Record (2002), pp. 101-104; Bush & 
Scowcroft (1998), pp. 374-375. 
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estimated that in controlling Kuwait, Iraq now held roughly 20% of the world's oil 
reserves and that this could double if Iraqi forces were to go to invade Kuwait's 
neighbour. 38 Whilst there were genuine concerns about this possibility, this threat to 
Saudi Arabia was also flagged as a possible way of publicly justifying the deployment 
of US forces to the Persian Gulf region. Some within the Bush team speculated that 
Americans would be more likely to support a deployment if that deployment was 
tasked with defending 'innocent' Saudi Arabia against marauding Iraqi forces. 
However, whilst the defence of Saudi Arabia did appear to be a powerful 
justification for deploying, others at the meeting felt that publicly declaring the fate of 
Saudi Arabia as a prime American concern at this early stage in the crisis had serious 
implications. Foremost amongst these was that if the White House was to publicly 
commit itself to saving Saudi Arabia from falling next to Iraq, then it was effectively 
committing itself to the military defence of that country and would have no option but 
to stand and fight if Iraq forces breeched the Saudi border. Wary of pushing the 
United States into an early - and perhaps unnecessary - military confrontation, 
Bush's Secretary of State, James Baker, argued that the administration should 
accentuate the need for a diplomatic resolution to the crisis and publicly declare this 
intention to Americans and to the international community. Baker also made clear his 
reluctance to contemplate the use of military force - he was, in President Bush's own 
words, 'worried that we could get bogged down in another Vietnam. ' Defence 
Secretary Dick Cheney also worried about the Vietnam Syndrome and expressed 
concerns that Americans would have a low tolerance for any protracted conflict and 
US military casualties. However, National Security Advisor (NSA) Brent Scowcroft 
disagreed with those viewpoints; he believed that Americans would support US 
38 Freedman & Karsh (1994), p. 74. 
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military action in the Persian Gulf as long as the White House was able to convince 
them that such action was really necessary. Citing the need to protect 'defenceless' 
Saudi Arabia, he asserted, might be effective in generating that support. 39 
Aside from the domestic considerations, Defence Secretary Cheney also 
highlighted the importance of how the wider international community might respond 
to any forceful American response. The United States must, Cheney stressed, tread a 
prudent line - specifically, it should not become isolated in any stance it might take 
against Iraq, especially if the chosen recourse was military action. Whilst the 
American response should not come across as overly belligerent, it was also 
necessary, he argued, for the administration to display a stance of conviction and 
strength to the world, if it was to generate allied support; 'Saudi Arabia and others 
will cut and run if we are weak', he wamed his colleagues. 40 
How the United States was perceived by the international community was a 
source of genuine concern in those first few meetings, especially since there was a 
degree of acceptance within the administration that it had possibly made a mistake in 
dealing so offhandedly with Saddam Hussein in the previous months. Some 
wondered whether the White House's somewhat nonchalant view of the growing 
tensions between Kuwait and Iraq may even have given Saddam Hussein the 
impression that Washington would overlook any aggression on his part, especially 
given Ambassador Glaspie's message to him shortly before the invasion. 
41 The 
administration thus agreed on the strategy of publicly depicting Saudi Arabia as 
being 
a ývital interest' to the United States. Aside from offering a stark public warning to 
Baghdad against any further military incursions, positing the United States as 
39 Bush & Scowcroft (1998), pp. 353-354. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Ibid, pp. 310-312,317 & 354; Powell (1995), pp. 461-462. 
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Riyadh's defender would also, it was hoped, justify the deployment of US forces to 
the region, both domestically and internationally. 
Announcing this position was not without its difficulties, however. Aside 
from the problem of selling this stance to the American public-political arena (a point 
that CJS General Colin Powell explicitly raised with President Bush during the course 
of that first meeting), a more immediate difficulty lay in persuading King Fahd, the 
Saudi ruler, to actually agree to host US military forces on his territory. From the 
perspective of the Bush White House, this was clearly a fundamental concession, not 
only if the US were to act to defend the country against a possible Iraqi invasion but 
also if it were going to offer credible public justifications for deploying US forces to 
the Persian Gulf - it was obvious that 'the defence of Saudi Arabia' would look like a 
ridiculous excuse if the Saudi leader refused to let his 'defenders' cross his borders. 42 
King Fahd took some persuading on this issue. Despite recognising the very 
real threat represented by the Iraqi forces mustering near his border, he expressed 
concerns over having American soldiers based in his conservative Muslim kingdom. 
He was also concerned about the likely strength of the US commitment. In a meeting 
with Defence Secretary Dick Cheney, Fahd pointed to the Reagan administration's 
lukewarm commitment to the Lebanese government back in 1983; he wanted 
assurances that the current President would not be similarly irresolute if American 
troops were to come under threat. 
43 
Cheney managed to assuage the King's concerns. On 6th August (the same 
day that the UN Security Council passed Resolution 661, prohibiting all trade with 
Iraq) he telephoned the White Housed from Jidda to inform President Bush of the 
42 Bush& Scowcroft(1998), pp. 317,324-325 &329-333. See also the PBS Frontline intervlew w, th 
Colin Powell (accessed 29/03/06) at: http: //www. pbs. org/wgbh/pages/frontline/gulf/oral/powell/l. html 
43 Freedman & Karsh (1994), pp. 83-84 & 87. 
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King's approval. 44 It was an important moment since the White House could now 
begin publicly enacting its self-professed commitment to Riyadh. The next day, US 
forces moved into positions inside Saudi Arabia, as part of Operation Desert Shield. 
The operation was formally announced the following day and President Bush made 
the case for the deployment, in anticipation of the domestic opposition which it would 
undoubtedly provoke. He proceeded with a strong argument, one that he would return 
to consistently in the coming months - he publicly compared America's challenge in 
the Persian Gulf to that which faced the world as Nazi Germany started its aggressive 
expansion through Europe. In a national address on 8 th August, Bush told Americans 
that Iraqi forces had invaded Kuwait 'blitzkrieg fashion' and that 'if history teaches us 
anything, it is that we must resist aggression or it will destroy our freedoms. 
Appeasement does not work. As was the case in the 1930s'. 45 
The legitimacy of America's military presence in the region was then given a 
considerable boost when, after a1 Oth August meeting of The Arab League in Cairo, 
member states agreed (albeit by a narrow vote) that Egyptian, Syrian and Moroccan 
troops would be deployed to join US forces in the Persian 
Gulf. 46 Bush's initial 
concerns over leading the response to the invasion - principally that Washington 
should not have 'a solo US effort in the Middle East' - thus appeared to be 
dissipating. Over the next two weeks, the number of US troops in the region swelled 
to over thirty thousand, the international legitimacy of their presence cemented by the 
44 Powell (1995), pp. 465-467; Freedman & Karsh (1994), pp. 83-84. 
45 President Bush, 'Address to the Nation Announcing the Deployment of United States Armed Forces 
to Saudi Arabia', 8t" August, 1990. 
46 For details, see the BBC website (accessed 02/04/06) at: 
http: //news. bbc. co. uk/l/hi/world/middle_east/861164. stm. 
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array of regional and international allies who were now committing themselves to 
joining the American-led international coalition. 47 
Despite the growing support for the American position, however, Baghdad 
appeared to be unmoved. Aside from ignoring demands that Iraqi forces withdraw 
from Kuwait, Iraqi ships continued to break the UN-enforced trade embargo, actions 
which stirred the ire of President Bush and prompted his administration to discuss 
whether it really could punish an impenitent Iraq through the laborious channels of 
the UN. Some administration figures now advocated avoiding the inevitable UN 
protractions and 'going it alone'; this view was shared by Bush's key ally, the 
hawkish British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. However, whilst he himself felt 
frustrated at Iraq's apparent nonchalance, Bush dismissed this option. He reasoned 
that any US unilateralist actions might unravel the legitimising UN consensus he had 
striven to build up over the previous weeks. If the coalition were seen to be 
fragmenting because America's international allies were unhappy at Washington's 
belligerence, it would also weaken the administration's stated commitment to 
diplomacy and international consensus-building. Bush decided to stick with the 
multilateral approach, opting for a strategy of trying to convince America's allies to 
invoke tougher measures through the U-N so that the embargo could be enforced with 
tough - but legitimate - measures. 
48 Bush's prudence paid off when Resolution 661 
passed through the United Nations on 25hAugust. The Resolution set 
in motion 
precisely the measures that he had been pushing his allies to 
implement; legitimate 
recourse to stop, board and - if necessary - disable any vessel suspected of 
breaking 
47 John Mueller (1994), Policy and Opinion in the Gulf War, University of Chicago Press, table 
8 
p. 193; PBS Frontline interview with Colin Powell. 
48 Freedman& Karsh (1994), pp. 145-150. 
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the embargo against Iraq. 49 Bush hoped that this latest legislation would spell out 
clearly to Baghdad that the international community was not bluffing and that it 
would not tolerate Iraq's efforts to ignore due international process. 
Thus, by the end of August, President Bush could look back on a month of 
genuine success in dealing with the Persian Gulf crisis. His response to Iraq's 
invasion had been quick and decisive and he had garnered both an international 
military coalition and legitimate international consensus behind him. However, this 
international success was achieved amidst growing rumblings of concern back home 
in the United States. 
September - the first cracks appear 
Despite the sanctions, Saddam Hussein's obduracy continued and President Bush 
started to feel more frustration with the lack of progress. He was becoming convinced 
that the international diplomatic posturing would do nothing to persuade the Iraqi 
leader to withdraw his forces. Iraqi troops would, Bush thought, very likely have to 
be removed from Kuwait through force. However, whilst he was frustrated by 
Hussein's stance, he was also growing increasingly frustrated by attitudes much closer 
to home. Eager to prepare for what lay ahead - Bush felt that time was of the essence 
since the international coalition would likely only hold together 
for a limited amount 
of time - he felt that he was 
having to repeatedly demand information and 
clarification from his policy advisors. He experienced particular 
frustration with the 
military chiefs at the Pentagon. 
49 Ibid. 
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For all that he enjoyed a very good working relationship with them, Bush was 
becoming increasingly exasperated with the chiefs, as they deliberated the options for 
possible military action in the Persian Gulf However, the chiefs were also showing 
signs of exasperation and it was their Commander-in-Chief who was the cause of 
their anxieties. Amidst the various policy options he had solicited in the aftermath of 
Iraq's invasion, that President Bush had been impressed by the arguments made by 
'air power advocates' in both the US and Saudi Air Forces, who were convinced that 
an air offensive alone would be sufficient to oust Iraqi forces from Kuwait. Eager to 
find a speedy and decisive option (one which would minimise as much as possible the 
risk of incurring US military casualties), Bush appeared to have settled upon a quick 
air war as the ideal strategy for dealing with Iraqi forces. He now repeatedly pushed 
this option to the chiefs. However, an aerial bombing campaign was certainly not 
what chief planners in the Pentagon had in mind. They envisioned a far more 
comprehensive military offensive, even although they knew that it would take quite 
some time to prepare it. Worried at the President's restlessness and concerned that he 
appeared to have been 'oversold on air power', CJS General Colin Powell raised his 
concerns with Defence Secretary Cheney: 'The President's getting really impatient', 
he told Cheney; 'He keeps asking if we can't get the Iraqis out of Kuwait with air 
stfikes. ' 
50 
General Powell was certainly not unsympathetic to his Commander-in-Chief s 
position; he appreciated Bush's agitation over the current stalemate and he certainly 
shared Bush's desire for a decisive military victory. However, Powell harboured 
grave concerns over the President's assumption that an air campaign would be simple, 
quick and effective. He felt that if Iraqi forces were facedjust with an onslaught from 
Powell (1995), pp. 476,478-479. 
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the air, they would simply dig into defensive positions. This would effectively let the 
leadership in Baghdad decide when it had had enough of the allied bombardments. 
As far as Powell was concerned (and his views were shared by General Nonnan 
Schwarzkopf, whom Powell had tasked with leading the military planning process), 
this was a completely unacceptable scenario; he felt that it should be the Americans 
and not the Iraqis who decided when enough was enough. Since the United States 
had both the power and capacity to do so, Powell was convinced that the surest 
strategy was to 'go in big and end it quickly' with a full land, sea and air campaign. 
This strategy was thus one which was very much in keeping with the 'overwhelming 
force' ethos which was so deeply ingrained in the Pentagon psyche. 51 
For his part, President Bush felt that the clock was ticking and he felt 
frustrated by the sluggishness of the military planning process. He was not wholly 
convinced by the chiefs' coolness over the viability of a quick air campaign. Bush 
harboured suspicions that they were simply reluctant to confront Iraq militarily and 
that they were constantly overestimating the threat posed by the Iraqi army in an 
effort to test his willingness to commit to full military action. 52 
The military chiefs were not the only doubters that Bush had to deal with 
amongst his key advisors at this point. NSA Brent Scowcroft also continued to 
express doubts about possible military actions against Iraq and about how the 
international community would view American aggression. In particular, he doubted 
that Washington's European allies - especially in Moscow - would consider war 
unless every other option had been explored. 53 However, concerns over the pros and 
cons of a possible military showdown in the Persian Gulf were not confined to the 
corridors of power in Washington. 
51 Ibid, pp. 476 & 487. 
52 Bush & Scowcroft (1998), p. 353. 
53 Ibid. 
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Whilst Bush's assured response to Iraq's invasion met with early public 
approval in the United States - some opinion polls suggested 80% approval for his 
54 handling of the crisis - by September, this endorsement had slipped somewhat . At 
the heart of America's growing unease over the crisis was the Bush administration's 
struggle to simultaneously deliver two entirely different messages to two very 
different constituencies. On the one hand, Bush felt that Saddam Hussein needed to 
receive a clear warning that the United States was quite prepared to lead an 
international military coalition to use force against him if he did not withdraw his 
forces from Kuwait. Bush was thus transparent in his intention to assemble a massive 
military force in the Persian Gulf region and he communicated intentionally stem 
words to the regime in Baghdad about the consequences of maintaining its 
occupation. 
However, this deliberately strident message to Baghdad had a detrimental 
impact upon the message that President Bush was simultaneously trying to 
communicate to Americans back home - namely, that he was committed to a 
diplomatic solution and so there was no basis for domestic critics to forecast an 
intractable military quagmire involving US forces in the Persian Gulf. As they 
watched the White House's vigorous coalition-building efforts and the deployment of 
more and more US forces to the Persian Gulf, increasing numbers of Americans 
appeared to view the White House line with scepticism. In an effort to calm 
speculation about an imminent war, President Bush consciously toned down the 
belligerence of his public statements about the crisis and administration figures 
stepped up their public declarations over their commitment to a diplomatic solution. 55 
54 Available on the BBC website (accessed 02/04/06) at: 
http: //news. bbc. co. uk/l/hi/world/middle-east/861164. stm. Freedman & Karsh (1994), p. 201; Mueller 
(1994), table 8, p. 193. 
55 Freedman & Karsh (1994), p. 202. 
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Concerned at this apparent slide in public support, CJS Powell warned Bush that 
successfully achieving the required dual-diplomatic task - sending placatory signals 
to a wary American polity whilst offering a forthright warning to Baghdad - now 
represented 'a major political problem'. 56 
Powell was correct; indeed, this problem soon evidenced itself still further. As 
media commentary on the crisis continued to reverberate to accusations that the 
President was 'rattling sabers', a growing array of voices on Capitol Hill was 
questioning the lack of political debate that had taken place prior to Bush's initial 
sanctioning, and subsequent escalation, of the US military presence in the Persian 
Gulf .. 57 Partisan wrangling over the American economy also began to infuse 
commentary and analysis of Bush's performance. Notwithstanding the fact that 
Operation Desert Shield was an exercise costing around $30 million per day, many 
Democrats were now claiming that the White House was so keen to focus America's 
attention on Kuwait because it distracted attention away from President Bush's 
domestic budgetary failings. 58 Critics also focussed upon proposed cutbacks to the 
US armed forces. These cutbacks - which, if enacted, would see the smallest US 
military since the 1950s - were widely known to be opposed by key administration 
figures, something which prompted political and media critics to suggest that Bush's 
strident Persian Gulf policy was nothing less than an exercise aimed at convincing 
Congress of the need to uphold defence spending. 59 Writing in The New York Times, 
56 PBS Frontline interview with Colin Powell. 
57 'A New World Order. Bush speech rings with resolve to tame Saddam', The Houston Post, 12 th 
September, 1990. For media suggestions that Bush was sabre-rattling, see the President's question- 
and-answer session in President Bush, 'Remarks on the Persian Gulf Crisis and an Exchange With 
Reporters', 14 th September, 1990. 
58 Freedman & Karsh (1994), p216. 
59 Michael Oreskes, 'Bush Trying a New Topic. Is Talk of War Driven by Policy or Politics? ' New 
York Times, 3 I't October, 1990. 
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James Webb asked whether the President's willingness to pick up the gauntlet thrown 
60 down by Saddam Hussein was merely part of a 'Pentagon budget drill' . 
Bush felt dismayed by such commentary and also by opinion polls which 
suggested a further deterioration of domestic support for how he was handling the 
crisis. However, things were set to get even more difficult for his now-faltering 
public offensive. 
61 At a White House press briefing on 17 th September, Defence 
Secretary Cheney fuelled congressional unrest over the administration's lack of 
legislative consultation and invigorated fears of an imminent war. When challenged 
by journalists that the administration would have to 'come to grips' with the War 
Powers Act and infonn Congress about possible hostilities in the Persian Gulf, 
Cheney was vehement in his response. He told reporters that the administration had 
reported to Congress 'in a manner that was consistent with the War Powers Act 
provisions' and that whilst he hoped to avoid 'major confrontation' with Congress, 
the Act 'may well be unconstitutional' and 'an inappropriate limitation upon 
Presidential power and authority'. Having effectively dismissed legislators' concerns 
over expanding US involvement in the crisis, he then made a statement which very 
much contravened the administration line that there was no looming war in the 
Persian Gulf Responding to one reporter's suggestion that it was time to 'wrap up 
the deployment now', Cheney rejected the suggestion, asserting that American 
military personnel 'may be engaged in hostilities in the very near future. ' 62 
Cheney's inopportune allusion to possible imminent hostilities was just what 
the administration had been taking pains to publicly deny. The remark paved the way 
for a difficult White House press conference for President Bush, just a few hours later. 
60 James Webb, 'In the Gulf, the Danger of a Diplomatic Solution... And the Horrors of a Desert War, 
New York Times, 23rd September 1990. 
61 Bush & Scowcroft (1998), p. 372. 
62 'Press Briefing by Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney', 17t" September, 1990, Bush Presidential 
Records, White House Office of Public Affairs. Kristen Gear Files. 'Iraq 2' [OA/ ID 03418], BPL. 
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In it, he sought to quell speculation of a looming conflict but Cheney's earlier 
reference seemed to have set Vietnam radars buzzing amongst the assembled 
journalists. Bush was forced to deny suggestions that the chances of avoiding a 
'shooting war' were fast diminishing and he responded carefully to questions 
regarding the numbers of US military casualties which could be expected from any 
confrontation with Iraqi forces. When one journalist put it to Bush that US troops 
might soon be facing 'thousands and thousands' of casualties, Bush remarked only 
that the American people were 'magnificently united' in standing up to Iraq's 
aggression and that he didn't 'feel comfortable going beyond that'. Responding to 
another reporter's reminder that the American public 'doesn't support stalemates that 
last a long, long time', Bush assured his audience that US forces would not be tied 
down in the Gulf region for in indefinite period of time. I want American troops out 
of the Gulf 'as soon as possible', he declared; 'I want them all out ... all out, period. -) 
63 
Bush and Cheney's mixed public messages during this period refocused the 
administration's awareness of the difficulty of its public diplomatic task - namely, 
communicating threatening warnings to Baghdad about the consequences of its 
continuing occupation, whilst simultaneously denying belligerence and emphasising 
diplomacy to Americans back home. However, as it struggled to rein in domestic war 
speculation, and as the wait for Baghdad to respond to sanctions dragged on, the 
administration was fast becoming disenchanted with its 'passive' response to the 
crisis. 
In a 24 th September White House meeting, the Bush team discussed its current 
options and the frustration of being hostage to Saddam Hussein's decisions. General 
Powell outlined to President Bush, in candid terms, the problems he was creating for 
63 'Remarks by the President during briefing for regional reporters', 17th September, 1990, Bush 
Presidential Records, White House Office of Public Affairs, Kristen Gear Files, 'Iraq 2' [OA/ ID 
03418], BPL. 
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himself in simply waiting for the UN sanctions to work. He told Bush that in 
adopting this policy, he was not seizing the initiative from his enemy and 'essentially 
hoping that this pressure will cause your enemy to come to a decision rather than you 
making the decision for him. ' 64 Powell's warning to the President coincided with 
concerns raised by the United States Information Agency (USIA), which had been 
maintaining a watchful eye on what it described as an 'extremely active' 
disinfon-nation campaign against the United States. Slanderous propaganda - both 
from 'unfriendly' media sources and from the Iraqi goveniment itself - could, it 
warned, undennine Washington's position and 'erode Arab support for Operation 
Desert Shield'. Whilst acknowledging that much of Iraq's propaganda was 'crude', 
'ridiculous' and 'primitive', the agency echoed Powell's concerns by warning that 
prolonging the standoff increased the chances that Iraq's seditions could create doubts 
and divisions amongst Washington's Arab allies, allies which were absolutely crucial 
to America's legitimacy in leading the crisis. 65 
Convinced that straying from the UN pathway would create these alliance 
divisions anyway, Bush resolved to remain focussed upon coalition-building and upon 
trying to improve the public diplomatic offensive. In Burlington, Vermont, on 23rd 
October, he declared that his strident response to the crisis was for the cause of 'a 
world order ftee ftom unlawful aggression, free ftom violence, ftee from plunder'. 
Mindful of accusations that his administration's strong stance was aimed at defending 
Western oil supplies and not Kuwait's liberty, Bush acknowledged the criticisms and 
admitted that he recognised protestors' concems: 
64 PBS Frontline interview with Colin Powell. 
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AIDS, that they were defiling Muslim holy sites and that many American troops were actually 'Israelis 
disguised as Americans, with fake IDS and false names'. United States Information Agency, Press 
Intelligence: 'Saddam's Propaganda War', Bush Presidential Records, White House Office of Public 
Affairs, Kristen Gear Files, 'Iraqi Disinformation' [OA/ ID 03418], BPL. 
189 
I saw some signs coming in [to the venue]: 'No War for Oil'. I can understand the 
sentiment by some of those young people. But I would simply say that the rape and 
the systematic dismantling of Kuwait defies description. The holding of hostages, 
innocent men and women whose only mistake was to be in Kuwait or be in Iraq when 
the invader took over Kuwait - holding them goes against the conscience of the entire 
world. The starving of embassies - good God, this is 1990. And you see this man 
[Saddam Hussein] starving out small embassies in Kuwait. These are crimes against 
humanity. " 
Bush then returned to the nub of why Saddam Hussein should face the threat of 
international reprisals from an American-led coalition: 
I'm reading a book, and it's a book of history - great, big, thick history about World 
War Two. And there's a parallel between what Hitler did to Poland and what Saddam 
Hussein has done to Kuwait. Hitler rolled his tanks and troops into Poland ... 
And do 
you know what followed the troops? It was the Death's Head regiment. Do you 
know what the Death's Head regiments of the SS were? They were the ones that went 
in and lined up the kids that were passing out leaflets. Do you know what happened 
in Kuwait the other day? Two young kids, mid-teens, passing out leaflets - Iraqi 
soldiers came, got their parents out and watched as they killed them ... 
So, it isn't oil 
that we're concerned about. It is aggression. And this aggression is not going to 
stand. 67 
Despite this strident tone, and yet another emotive attempt to liken Hussein to Hitler, 
the Bush administration remained concerned about the effectiveness of its public 
diplomacy. Americans simply did not appear particularly receptive to the case being 
made. Administration officials were also growing increasingly concerned about how 
committed some of its key allies were to maintaining a unified stance against Iraq. 
66 President Bush, 'Remarks at a Republican Fundraising Breakfast in Burlington, Vermont', 23d 
October, 1990. 
67 Ibid. 
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With the USIA reporting that Saddam Hussein's negotiators were actively 4probing 
for weaknesses in the alliance's resolve', the administration now suspected that 
France and the Soviet Union were themselves actively undermining America's 
efforts. On 31" October, The Washington Post reported that Paris and Moscow were 
both 'staking out positions somewhat independent of the United States' in an effort to 
cpreserve their long-standing relationships in the Middle-East'. 68 These concerns 
were nourished by the October visit to Baghdad of Yevgeny Primakov, President 
Gorbachev's senior aide and special envoy to Iraq. A 'vociferous critic' of what some 
key Soviet figures castigated as the pro-American line adopted by Moscow in 
response to the crisis, Primakov had travelled to Baghdad, Washington feared, to 'cut 
a deal' with Saddam Hussein over the crisis. 69 Concerned that Paris and Moscow's 
divergent diplomatic overtures risked undermining what he knew would be a finite 
period of coalition solidarity in the Persian Gulf, Bush now realised that pressure had 
to be stepped up on Iraq once more, if the standoff was to be pushed to a conclusion. 
If the fragile coalition were to start fragmenting and Iraq did indeed have to be 
confronted militarily, it would leave the United States isolated and bereft of the 
international legitimacy it currently enjoyed. 
In the face of these frustrating new developments, Bush told his foreign policy 
team that he did not think that they could afford to wait for sanctions to work and that 
pressure now had to be ratcheted up considerably on Baghdad . 
70 However, the 
administration knew that the act of escalating the forcefulness of its stance against 
68 David Hoffman, 'US Raises the Pressure and The Risks', The Washington Post, 31s'October, 1990. 
France and the Soviet Union had significant trade links with Iraq and were Iraq's largest arms 
suppliers; Freedman & Karsh (1994), p. 38. 
69 Primakov also traveled to Washington in an effort to persuade President Bush not to pursue 
hostilities with Baghdad. See Ariel Cohen, 'Shevardnadze's Journey', Policy Review, Vol. 73, No. 1, 
April & May, 2004, p. 124; Paul Bedard, 'Bush Prepares the Country for War', The Washington Times, 
2 nd November, 1990; Bush & Scowcroft (1998), pp. 366 & 377-378. 
70 PBS Frontline interview with Colin Powell. 
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Saddam Hussein -a necessary act, it seemed - would further undermine its faltering 
efforts to convince Americans that it was trying to avoid military confrontation. 
Caught between what The Washington Post tenned an 'increasingly sceptical 
American public' (a public which, Bush noted resentfully, appeared to be 'unmoved' 
by the atrocities being perpetrated by Iraqi forces inside Kuwait) and a recalcitrant 
Saddarn Hussein who appeared impervious to any intimidation, a senior State 
Department official admitted that the Bush White House had 'two very distinct 
audiences' to persuade. 
71 
Whilst Bush was concerned that neither of these 'audiences' seemed 
particularly receptive to what the White House had to say, his concerns were also 
being roused by the planning process at the Pentagon. Himself, Cheney and 
Scowcroft were growing increasingly anxious over the military chiefs' attitude 
towards the crisis. The military planners were, in Bush's own words, 'waffling and 
vacillating in tenns of what we can do on the ground' and after one NSC meeting, 
NSA Scowcroft was so 'appalled' by the tepid presentation prepared by the military 
chiefs that Defence Secretary Cheney 'sent the planners back to the drawing board'. 72 
The military's deployment-caution was now starting to seriously test the patience of 
their civilian masters. 
This was a very difficult period for Bush. His diary records that he worried 
over declaring war, experienced doubts as to whether he could win public and 
congressional support for such a move, and that he felt unsettled over the possibility 
of 'sending kids into battle and the lives being lost. ' 
73 The President's pensive 
deliberations over the crisis were not helped by deteriorating relations between the 
71 David Hoffman, 'US Raises the Pressure and The Risks', The Washington Post, 31" October, 1990; 
Bush & Scowcroft (1998), p. 358. 
72 lbid, pp. 377,381 & 383; Powell (1995), pp. 484-485. 
73 lbid, p. 381. 
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White House and Capitol Hill, as restive legislators continued attacking Bush's 
domestic showing and reminding him that decisions on the commitment of US forces 
had to be made through consultation. 74 
On 2 nd October 1990, the Senate passed Congressional Resolution 147, which 
fonnally appropriated funds for operations in the Persian Gulf The Resolution stated 
that 'Congress supports continued action by the President in accordance with the 
decisions of the United Nations'. However, if Bush felt a degree of relief at the move 
- it was, he acknowledged, the first time that Congress had officially 'gone on record 
behind our troop deployment' - leaders on Capitol Hill were quick to remind the 
President that it should not be interpreted as an open-ended resolution akin to the Gulf 
of Tonkin Resolution. 75 If Congress' measure of support might have been viewed as 
an olive branch to the White House at this time of crisis, Bush openly rejected the 
chance to reciprocate. He refused Congress' offer to establish a bipartisan 'special 
consultation group' over the Persian Gulf crisis. Predictably, the President's refusal 
did not go down well on Capitol Hill. With a substantial US force now in the Persian 
Gulf region (including around 200,000 American troops), Bush's rejection fuelled 
accusations that the White House was continuing to marginalise Congress even as it 
continued deploying US forces to the periphery of a war-zone. 76 
He may have been marginalising Congress from the deployment planning 
process but Bush now acted on legislators' demands that any escalation in action 
against Iraq should be done through the United Nations. He ordered the drawing up 
of a draft UN resolution which would authorize the use of military force, should Iraq 
continue its military occupation of Kuwait. Aside from the demands of an 
74 Ibid, p. 379; Grimmett, 0 March, 2007, p. 24. 
75 Michael Oreskes, 'Bush Trying a New Topic. Is Talk of War Driven by Policy or Politics? ' New 
York Times, 31' October, 1990; David Hoffman, 'US Raises the Pressure and The Risks', The 
Washington Post, 31" October, 1990. 
76 Grimmett, 0 March, 2007, p. 25; Bush & Scowcroft (1998), p. 379. 
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increasingly restive Congress, it seemed to Bush that the current climate made this 
action a necessity. For a start, there remained absolutely no sign of an Iraqi 
withdrawal from Kuwait. Also, Paris and Moscow were insistent on attaining 
legitimising UN resolutions for any further action against Baghdad. Bush was also 
very well aware that he did not have anything like broad domestic backing for his 
handling of the Persian Gulf crisis and that one of the chief criticisms he faced was 
that he was unilaterally marching the United States into a war. It thus seemed clear 
that sticking to the UN pathway was the key to legitimising - both domestically and 
internationally - any possible military action against Iraqi forces. The basic format of 
the resolution was finalised by the end of the month and the administration pencilled 
in mid-November for it to be formally presented to, and voted on by, the Security 
Council. 77 
Vietnam shadows loom 
As executive-legislative relations grew increasingly sour through October, Bush took 
to reading about how Lyndon Johnson had engaged with Congress over escalating 
American involvement in Vietnam, as he contemplated how he might sway Capitol 
Hill behind his Persian Gulf efforts. 78 However, the President wasn't the only one in 
Washington with Vietnam on his mind. The subject was also infusing Persian Gulf 
debates on Capitol Hill. Representative James McDermott (Dem. WA), for example, 
openly criticised Bush's handling of the crisis and drew parallels between the current 
US deployments sanctioned by the President and those as American involvement in 
77 Freedman & Karsh (1994), pp. 228-230. 
78 lbid, p. 371. 
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Vietnam escalated. However, whilst McDermott sought to criticise Bush's attitude to 
Congress and the wisdom of deploying US forces to the Gulf, he also reminded his 
colleagues of the role that Congress played in allowing the US escalation in Vietnam. 
Warning the House that 'Congress has given the President a free hand to resolve the 
crisis in Kuwait' and that he (McDermott) had begun to question 'the strength of our 
commitment, the length of our commitment, and the fundamental purpose of our 
commitment', he declared that whilst the Iraq crisis was 'not the Gulf of Tonkin', 
similar questions were asked of the government in 1964 during debate of the Gulf of 
Tonkin Resolution. He reminded the House that he himself had served in Vietnam 
and that he had 'treated the casualties of that war'. 'For too long', he asserted, 'our 
country lied to those soldiers, and we deluded ourselves'. Concluding that the White 
House should 'look beyond the deployment of US troops', he asserted that he would 
C 79 never again ... consent to risking 
American lives for vague "national interests"' . 
This argument was sustained by New York Democrat Charles Rangel on I 9th 
October, after the announcement of a further deployment of US troops to the Persian 
Gulf Rangel reminded the House of the War Powers Act which, he maintained, was 
ignored by the Bush administration when it sent troops to Panama in December 1989, 
and which was being ignored again in the current crisis. The Act, Rangel asserted, 
was: 
Far from academic. Following the calamity of Vietnam, the law represents our 
only protection against unilateral, and potentially disastrous military adventures by 
the executive branch ... to prevent another tragedy of 
the kind witnessed in Vietnam. 80 
79 James A. McDermott (1990), 'Opposing the Persian Gulf Resolution'; Extension of Remarks in 
House of Representatives, 5th October 1990. * NB - unless stated otherwise, all of the congressional 
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Much of the American media reflected this criticism. The following week the Detroit 
News - carrying the headline 'Only Congress Can Declare War' - acknowledged that 
despite the risks of 'binding the President's hands', only a formal congressional 
declaration of war would clarify the administration's aims sufficiently that the nation 
might fully unite behind the President's plans. Korea and Vietnam, the paper 
reminded readers, were both fought without formal declarations of war and both were 
divisive: the United States 'won' neither conflict, and 'troops were sent to die or 
molder in prison camps with no clear idea of what they were fighting for'. The 
headline story concluded that: 
The US Constitution is clear: Only Congress has the right to commit US troops to 
offensive action. If America isn't united behind the President, then American boys 
shouldn't be committed to battle. And if they are committed to battle, then America 
should fight to win. Both Congress and the President's feet should be held to the 
constitutional fire. 81 
This mounting criticism simply galvanised Bush's conviction that the crisis had to be 
concluded sooner rather than later. Having been under extreme pressure from an 
adversarial Democrat-controlled Capitol Hill all through October, Bush had already 
been forced to break his election mantra - 'read my lips: no new taxes' - in order to 
strike a compromise deal with legislators over the budget. Much to his 
disgruntlement, he continued to face accusations that he was only focussing so much 
upon Kuwait in an effort to shift America's attention away from his domestic travails. 
With opinion Polls suggesting yet another slide in domestic support for his handling 
of the Persian Gulf crisis, Bush knew that he could not sustain even moderate 
81 'Only Congress Can Declare War', The Detroit News editorial, 26ýh October 1990. 
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domestic support for keeping US troops stationed in the Persian Gulf for any length of 
time. 82 'We must get this over with. The longer it goes, the longer the erosion', he 
noted in his diary. Bush's key ally, Prime Minister Thatcher was of a similar mind 
and she strongly encouraged Bush to move things forward. She reminded the 
President that the longer the crisis dragged on, the greater the likelihood that 
Washington would lose its Middle Eastern allies and, thus, much of the legitimacy for 
maintaining allied troops in the Gulf Furthermore, since military action appeared 
increasingly likely to be the only solution to the crisis anyway, she declared that 'it 
was better to go to war on our terms. ' 83 
Bush concurred and he took a decisive decision in a3 oth October White House 
meeting on the crisis. It was a decision which pushed the United States towards 
military confrontation with Iraq. Having heard NSA Scowcroft present the various 
questions facing the Bush White House at this point in the crisis (should the US seek 
to use force along with willing allies if there was no support in the Security Council 
for the administration's new draft UN resolution? What should be done to placate a 
nervous Israel, as tensions continued to mount in the Middle East? ), CJS Powell was 
then asked to present the options for switching America's projected military strategy 
from a defensive operation (one of merely defending Saudi Arabia) to an offensive 
one, tasked with actually ejecting Iraqi forces from Kuwait. 
Powell's detailing of the military operation his planning team had constructed 
evoked one immediate question from NSA Scowcroft: 'What size force are we talking 
aboutT Powell's response - around 450,000 troops; more than a doubling of the 
current deployment - drew gasps from all of the assembled officials, save 
from the 
82 Michael Oreskes, 'Bush Trying a New Topic. Is Talk of War Driven by Policy or Politics? ' New 
York Times, 31" October, 1990; Mueller (1994), p. 19. See also Bush & Scoweroft (1998), pp. 379- 
380. 
83 Bush & Scowcroft (1998), pp. 382 & 384-385. 
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President himself After having been told what the 'liberation of Kuwait' would take 
in terms of manpower, Powell recalls that Bush responded without even blinking. He 
asked one final time whether Powell was 'really sure' that the liberation of Kuwait 
could not be achieved through the use of airpower alone. Powell, who later admitted 
that he represented both 'the ghost of Vietnam' and 'the ghost of Beirut' sitting at the 
policymaking table, responded by saying that only combining air power with a 
massive ground assault would come close to guaranteeing the outcome that Bush was 
looking for. This answer seemed to galvanise the President, who effectively gave 
Powell permission to proceed with preparations for a military offensive with just three 
words: 'Okay, do it'. 
84 
With the administration's draft UN resolution near-completed and ready to be 
circulated to America's key allies in the UN, the Bush team agreed that if the 
resolution was accepted by the allies in the Security Council, Saddam Hussein should 
then be issued with a public ultimatum to withdraw his forces from Kuwait or have 
them evicted - legitimately - by force. 
85 The Bush team earmarked I" February 1991 
as a possible cut-off date for withdrawal. 
With those two momentous decisions, the pathway of President Bush's 
Persian Gulf policy was now unmistakeably clear - if things did not change and Iraqi 
forces remained in Kuwait, US forces would go to war in three months time. All that 
was needed in the meantime was to sell the UN resolution to the allies and - perhaps 
more challenging - to rally American behind the possibility of military confrontation 
with Iraq. 
86 
84 PBS Frontline interview with Colin Powell. See also Powell (1995), pp. 488-489. 
85 Freedman & Karsh (1994), pp. 229-230. 
86 Powell (1995), pp. 488-489. 
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Military escalation, increasing domestic resistance and War Powers pressure 
President Bush may have set the cogs in motion for military action; however, he had 
done very little to develop domestic support for this recourse. 87 Indeed, he found over 
the next two months or so that the domestic challenges associated with the Persian 
Gulf crisis were, in many ways, more complicated than the complex international 
diplomacy and military coalition building he had led so skilfully. 88 A most 
immediately after the decisive White House meeting on the crisis, rumours began 
circulating around Washington over Pentagon plans to move a further 100,000 US 
troops from Europe to the Persian Gulf These troops would supplement the 
approximately 200,000 American service personnel already in the region. Referring 
to the escalation, The Washington Post stated that President Bush was moving the 
United States far beyond a stance of 'deterrent posturing'; this latest White House 
89 
troop escalation was, it declared, 'clearly a move towards war fighting' . White 
House officials continued to deny these accusations. However, despite the 
administration's repeated public proclamations to the contrary, The Washington Times 
ran (on 2 nd November) a front-page headline declaring: 'Bush prepares the country for 
war -) . 
90 
As the American media continued to refer to an imminent war, the Bush 
administration continued to face accusations from political and media critics of 
sending out 'conflicting messages about its intentions in the Gulf. 
91 Public approval 
87 Freedman & Karsh (1994), p. 209. 
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for the President's handling of the crisis continued to fall slowly. Having enjoyed 
ratings of around 80% after his initial response to Iraq's invasion, public endorsement 
of Bush would slide to a low of around 50% over the coming month. As a 'Vietnam- 
style antiwar movement' grew across America, Bush found his public speeches 
interrupted by anti-war protesters. For some observers, it seemed that the echoes of 
the Vietnam years were palpable. 92 
Bush felt privately frustrated at how his perfonnance was being perceived. He 
was particularly angry at the criticism he was receiving over the budget compromises 
he had made, compromises that he thought were necessary simply 'to keep the 
government open'. Some of the administration's press conferences during this time 
were heated affairs, and administration figures repeatedly 'bristled' in response to 
journalists' accusations that the administration was continuing to focus so much on 
Kuwait due to the President's poor domestic showings and continuing Republican 
divisions over his budget compromises. 93 The President's spokesman, Marlin 
Fitzwater, tried to warn Americans against letting these domestic wrangles drag 
attention away from a serious international crisis in the Persian Gulf, we 'want the 
American people to stay with the situation, to continue to focus on it, to understand all 
the options', he declared, 'If we do have to take dramatic action, we want them [the 
American people] to be ready. ' 94 
However, deployment-sceptics continued to criticise the President's over- 
readiness for conflict and these critics seemed to be actively searching for any sign of 
it. In a telling example of the fine line he was walking in publicly speaking about the 
crisis under this laser-like focus, Bush publicly vented his frustrations over Baghdad's 
92 Mueller (1994), p. 2 1; Nicholas M. Horrock, 'For Bush, Period of Bluffmg is Over', The 
Chicago 
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refusal to allow shipments of food into a beleaguered US Embassy in Kuwait. When 
he was questioned about this, and about the treatment of American and British 
hostages in Iraq and Kuwait, the President Bush responded with anger, declaring 'I've 
had it'. Bush's statement must have triggered the media's hair-sensitive 'conflict 
radars' because he quickly had to reject media suggestions that his brief outburst was 
another example of him 'sounding the tocsin for war'. He was merely trying 'to keep 
the American people focused on the conflict', he assured journalists. 95 
On 8 th November, Bush publicly confirmed the rumours and made known the 
agreement his team had reached during the decisive meeting on 3 oth October. He 
publicly announced that 200,000 more US troops were to be deployed to the Persian 
Gulf He explained that the escalation was to ensure that the international coalition 
has 'an adequate offensive military option' in the region. 96 Most observers took this 
announcement as a clear confirmation that the President now had his eye on a possible 
military confrontation with Iraq. 
However, whilst the announcement took the American public by storm, it was 
also heralded as a 'stunning surprise' for much of the US military hierarchy and also 
for legislators on Capitol Hill. Indeed, the President's announcement was regarded in 
a similar way by some key administration officials themselves. Secretary of State 
James Baker was in Moscow when the deployment announcement was made, meeting 
with Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev in what The Washington Post described as 'one 
of the most intense rounds of diplomacy yet in the Persian Gulf crisis. ' Eager to win 
support from a divided Kremlin for the administration's draft UN resolution (the 
Gorbachev administration was split roughly along 'pro-Arab' and 'pro-American' 
lines in its view of how Iraq should be dealt with), Baker had strongly advised against 
95 Ibid. 
96 Bush quote cited in Powell (1995), p. 489 (emphasis in the text). 
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any announcement of the troop escalation at that particular time. 97 He was 'furious' 
when he heard the announcement, asserting that it looked as if the White House had 
made up its mind on a military option even as he (Baker) was engaged in delicate 
diplomacy aimed, ostensibly, at manufacturing the diplomatic solution which would 
make this option unnecessary. 98 It was, Baker later acknowledged, yet another clear 
sign of the incoherence which had dogged the administration's public handling of the 
.. a7 cnsis. 
Congressional backlash 
If Congress had been decrying President Bush's imperious handling of the crisis 
before, President Bush's confirmation of the latest troop deployment sparked outrage 
- General Colin Powell likened the outcry to the 'acrimony of the hawk-dove 
controversy of the sixties over Vietnam'. 100 Significantly, the deployment had been 
announced after the adjoununent of the 101" Congress, thus feeding suspicions that 
the legislature had been duped. This feeling was nourished by the fact that Bush had 
met with a legislative consultation group on 3 oth October and had mentioned nothing 
of a further deployment. 101 With even senior legislators such as the Chainnan of the 
Senate Armed Services Committee Sam Nunn (Dem. GA. ) only hearing of the 
deployment shortly before its formal announcement (Nunn was actually notified by 
97 Freedman & Karsh (1994), pp. 230-23 1. 
98 Rick Atkinson & Bon Woodward, 'Gulf Turning Points: Strategy, Diplomacy', The Washington 
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100 Powell (1995), p. 489. 
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telephone whilst dining in a restaurant), it seemed that any chance of maintaining a 
bipartisan consensus over the crisis was now lost. 1 02 
And so it turned out. Nunn immediately called a series of hearings to 
critically debate America's Persian Gulf policy and Bush now found himself facing 
'furious attacks' from senior Democrats. The President was accused of 'rushing the 
nation down the path to war without clear justification to the American public or 
reciprocal commitments from allied Arab nations. ' Warning that 'this could easily 
turn into a war of the Arab nations versus the United States', Chairman of the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee Claiborne Pell (Dem. RI) stated in an NBC interview 
that 'We don't wish to be the sole policeman in that part of the world ... I'm not sure 
the American people want to take on that responsibility. ' 103 Appearing on CBS's 
Face the Nation, Senator Nunn invoked Vietnam as he issued a stark warning to 
Bush: 
The last thing we need is to have a war over there, a bloody war, and have American 
boys being sent and brought back in body bags and yet not have the American people 
behind them ... We've gone that route one time. 
We don't want to do it again. 104 
The Bush administration responded by emphasising the priority of security for 
American troops stationed in the Gulf, and by highlighting the measured stability of 
the administration's Persian Gulf policy. 
105 It also sought to assuage congressional 
anger by re-emphasising its willingness to include Congress in its policy 
deliberations. In a letter to congressional leaders on 16'hNovember, President Bush 
102 Freedman & Karsh (1994), pp. 210-211. 
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emphasised that 'the mission of our An-ned Forces has not changed', and that he 
looked forward to 'continued consultation and cooperation' with Congress over US 
policy in the Gulf However, Bush simultaneously rejected congressional demands 
for an enactment of the War Powers Resolution, stressing (though he can hardly have 
believed it himself) that he 'did not believe that involvement in hostilities was 
imminent'. Bush also reminded legislators that his stand against Baghdad was not 
unilateral but was representative of a widespread global concern over Iraq's 
aggression. 
106 
The President's assurances did little to quell legislative dissent as the prospect 
of a war without congressional authority appeared to loom ever larger. 
Representative Ron Dellums (Dem. CA) led forty four other Democrats in seeking a 
judicial order instructing President Bush against offensive military actions as part of 
Operation Desert Shield, unless he had first consulted with, and received 
authorisation from, Congress as per the War Powers Act. It was a challenge which 
would falter by mid-December, when Federal District Judge Harold H. Greene denied 
the injunction. Greene justified his denial by declaring that a congressional majority 
had not been behind the Dellums proposal and that the move was not ready for 
judicial determination anyway, given that the President had not yet demonstrated 
sufficient commitment to military action. However, Greene's ruling simultaneously 
rejected the Justice Department's request that President Bush be granted full 
presidential war powers, arguing that if the President 
had the sole power to determine that any particular offensive military operation, no 
matter how vast, does not constitute war-making but only an offensive military 
106 George H. W. Bush (1990), 'Letter to Congressional Leaders on the Deployment of Additional 
United States Armed Forces to the Persian Gulf', 16th November, 1990. See also, Grimmett, I" March, 
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attack, the congressional power to declare war will be at the mercy of a semantic 
decision by the Executive. Such an 'interpretation' would evade the plain language 
of the Constitution, and it cannot stand. ' 07 
Greene's decision may have been both strict and principled in tone; however, there is 
little doubt that the 'nightmare' scenario he postulated - that the formal status of US 
military operations would be determined by how any given operation was defined by 
the President - was already an established convention, something which President 
Bush's ongoing refusal to enact the War Powers Act surely demonstrated. Ultimately, 
both the Dellums challenge and Greene's decision did nothing to help congressional 
dissenters rein in a Persian Gulf policy which, for all the legislative bluster, was now 
in full flow and entirely under the control of the White House. 
Success at the United Nations: ndlitary force will be used against Iraq if 
necessary 
Having undertaken vigorous diplomatic efforts to secure Security Council support for 
its draft resolution during the previous two months, the Bush administration's efforts 
finally bore fruit. On 29th November 1990, Resolution 678 passed overwhelmingly 
through the Security Council - only Cuba and Yemen voted against it; China 
abstained. Resolution 678 specified that Iraq had 'one final opportunity, one final 
pause for goodwill' to comply with the various UN resolutions it already faced. If it 
had not done so by 15 th January 1991, 'member states cooperating with the 
government of Kuwait' were now authorised to use 'all necessary means' to restore 
107 Ibid; Fisher & Gray Adler (199 8), pp - 13 -14. 
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peace and security in the area. In a later unilateral statement on behalf of the United 
States, Secretary of State Baker clarified that 'all necessary means' essentially meant 
the use of military force. 
108 
This development now delivered the strong warning to Baghdad that the Bush 
administration had long desired. It also took considerable pressure off the President 
himself Not only were his efforts to set in place a 'liberating' international military 
coalition now legitimised by due international process; the clock was now officially 
ticking for Baghdad to withdraw its forces or face - legitimately - the ultimate 
international sanction. The crisis would now be brought to a head, one way of the 
other. 
The passing of Resolution 678 also provided the Bush White House with a 
platform on which to step up its public diplomatic offensive at home. It was a 
development which was badly needed, as the administration had long been aware of 
its poor public relations on the crisis. A White House Gulf Policy Communications 
Plan designated an array of 'opportunity groups' which the Bush administration 
should now target if it was to 'sell' war-fighting operations in the Persian Gulf. The 
plan also stressed the need to 'focus all the appropriate resources of the 
Administration' on selling its policy to the public and that: 
The message that the President has gone to historic lengths to avoid war (economic 
embargo and ten UN resolutions) and garnered unprecedented international support 
should be a fundamental component of all outreach activity. 109 
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In an extended press conference on 3 Oth November, President Bush sought to push 
these buttons and also to dispel the Vietnam Syndrome. He began by drawing 
attention to the 'aggression' and 'brutality' of Saddam Hussein, a 'dangerous dictator 
who has weapons of mass destruction and is seeking new ones'. He then openly 
raised the subject of Vietnam. Assuring the nation that 'this will not be another 
Vietnam', he proceeded to tell Americans that: 
This will not be a protracted, drawn-out war. The forces arrayed are different. The 
opposition is different. The topography of Kuwait is different. And the motivation of 
our all-volunteer force is superb. And I pledge to you: There will not be any murky 
ending. If one American soldier has to go into battle, that soldier will have enough 
force behind him to win and then get out as soon as possible. I will never-ever-agree 
to a halfway effort. "0 
Bush's willingness to engage with this topic at this time of seemingly imminent 
hostilities represents a striking moment in the White House's 'relationship' with the 
Vietnam Syndrome. Allusion to various elements of the Vietnam experience are 
unmistakeable in Bush's speech and demonstrate a clear effort on the part of the 
President to convince Americans that various widely-recognised features of 
America's Vietnam experience - challenging physical terrain, under-motivated 
American troops (alluding to the commonly voiced perception that American troops 
fighting in Vietnam were unsure about precisely what they were fighting for), the lack 
of domestic backing for American soldiers, and the 'halfway' effort of the American 
government to formulate a policy that was militarily and morally defendable - would 
be absent from any conflict that he might command in the Persian Gulf in the 
110 Bush Presidential Records, White House Office of Public Affairs, Kristen Gear files, POTUS 
remarks/Persian Gulf. 'Press Conference By The President', [OA/ID 03418], BPL. 
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following question-and-answer session with journalists, Bush was pressed repeatedly 
over the likelihood that US forces would incur casualties. When questioned on how 
the parents of American service personnel would feel about casualties, Bush 
responded that he had deliberately 'added that language [to his speech] this morning 
nil about how this will not be another Vietnam', because 'that question weighs on my 
mind. ' III 
Despite the vehemence of Bush's sentiments, opinion polls suggested that he 
was still not bringing the American public along with him to any significant degree. 
The ongoing military deployments to the region, significant congressional resistance, 
and the extent to which prominent public and political figures were publicly airing 
their concerns over these issues, kept Bush's approval ratings lingering at only around 
50%. 112 The Vietnam Syndrome was, it seemed, still very much in evidence despite 
the President's best efforts. 
Hammering out a consensus ... and Vietnam fears 
December saw the possibility of conflict taking on a semblance of inevitability, as 
Saddam Hussein continued to display a seemingly bewildering indifference to the 
withdrawal deadline specified by UN Resolution 678; 'In the Pentagon', The 
Washington Post reported, 'civilians and military officers talk increasingly of the 
11 Ibid. 
Data taken from Gallup poll monthly, December 1990 & New York TimesICBS poll releases, cited 
in Mueller (1994), tables 8&9, pp. 193-194. 
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coming war'. 1 13 Predictably, the growing assumption of imminent hostilities 
increased talk of Vietnam and the Bush administration worked ever harder as 
politicians and journalists expressed fears over the battle to come. Arnold Isaacs 
notes that in press conferences during this period, President Bush and senior 
administration officials 'came close to sounding frantic' in their repeated efforts to 
dispel the Vietnam Syndrome; in delivering one press statement, Bush repeated three 
times that Iraq would not be 'another Vietnam' - his statement was just seven 
sentences long. 
114 
The 102 nd Congress reconvened on 4 th January 199 1, just II days before the 
UN-designated withdrawal deadline for Iraqi forces. On the 8 th , Bush sent a letter to 
congressional leaders, requesting a congressional resolution in support of UN 
Resolution 678, sanctioning the use of 'all necessary means' to liberate Kuwait ftom 
occupying Iraqi forces. Stepping up the emotional pressure on legislative members to 
support actions which were clearly going to unfold anyway, Bush stressed that he was 
working to 'protect America's security' and that he could 'think of no better way than 
for Congress to express its support for the President at this critical time. ' However, as 
Richard Grimmett comments, it is significant to note that Bush's request at this point 
was actually for congressional support for participation in the operation and not for 
authorisation for the military actions which the operation demanded. 115 His notice to 
Congress was thus, for all its fonnal courtesy, very much in keeping with the 
executive dominance which had hitherto characterised his stewardship of the crisis. 
Despite stepping up its lip service to legislative collaboration - Secretary of 
State James Baker publicly asserted that 'I must go to Baghdad with the full support 
113 Rick Atkinson & Bon Woodward, 'Gulf Turning Points: Strategy, Diplomacy', The Washington 
Post, 2 nd December, 1990. 
114 Bush's press conference cited in Isaacs (1997), p. 76; no source provided. 
115 Grimmett, March 1,2007, p. 26. 
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of the Congress and of the American people ... we couldn't use force in the face of 
explicit congressional disapproval' - the White House's policy guardedness vis-a-vis 
Congress continued apace. It was vividly evident at a press conference on 9 th January 
where President Bush faced reporters' questions over his administration's 
unwillingness to include Congress in the planning process. Brushing aside repeated 
journalists' questions about Vietnam - he repeated once again that Kuwait 'won't be 
another Vietnam' - Bush responded to a question over whether he thought he needed 
a use-of-force resolution from Congress and whether he would be bound to any 
resolution enacted on Capitol Hill. ' 16 Bush responded that he didn't think he needed 
any formal authorisation from Congress - 'I have the authority to fully implement the 
United Nations resolutions' - adding that he had had this confirmed by 'many 
attomeys'. 11 7 
Despite yet another White House rebuff, there was some vocal criticism on 
Capitol Hill - but little else. Just three days later, both Houses passed the 
'Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution' (PL 102-1). 
Contained within its various sections was an emphasis upon the continuing relevance 
of the War Powers Resolution and the requirement that the President should report to 
Congress every 60 days. However, Bush's unflinching conviction in his executive 
privilege was evident in the statement he made after he had signed the Resolution into 
law: 
As I made clear to congressional leaders at the outset, my request for congressional 
support did not, and my signing of this resolution does not, constitute any change in 
the long-standing positions of the executive branch on either the President's 
116 Baker (1995), pp. 340 & 337. Also, George H. W. Bush, 'The President's News Conference on the 
Persian Gulf Crisis', 9th January, 199 1. 
117 Grimmett (March 1,2007), p. 26. 
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constitutional authority to use the anned forces to defend vital US interests or the 
constitutionality of the War Powers Resolution. 
' 18 
The passing of the deadline and the onset of Operation Desert Storm 
With the passing of the 15 th January UN deadline for an Iraqi withdrawal from 
Kuwait, President Bush fon-nally announced the commencement of allied air-strikes 
against Iraqi forces. In an address from the Oval Office, on the evening of 16 th 
January, he stated that: 
While the world waited, Saddam Hussein systematically raped, pillaged, and 
plundered a tiny nation, no threat to his own. He subjected the people of Kuwait to 
unspeakable atrocities and among those maimed and murdered, innocent children. 
While the world waited, Saddam sought to add to the chemical weapons arsenal he 
now possesses, an infinitely more dangerous weapon of mass destruction -a nuclear 
weapon. While the world waited, while Saddam stalled, more damage was being 
done to the Eragile economies of the Third World, emerging democracies of Eastern 
Europe, to the entire world, including to our own economy. 119 
Having extended his vilification of Saddam Hussein to (rather improbably) the impact 
that Iraq's action was having on the Third World and the global economy, Bush 
sought once more to address America's Vietnam fears. He declared that 'our 
objectives are clear': he accentuated the idea of executive-legislative conciliation and 
118 Ibid, p. 27. 
119 George H. W. Bush, 'Address to the Nation Announcing Allied Military Action in the Persian Gulf, 
16th January, 1990. 
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solidarity by emphasising the 'resolute action' taken by Congress in its 'historic 
debate' over what to do about Iraq; and he dispelled any existing fears of American 
isolation on the issue by stating that 'twenty eight nations ... stand shoulder to shoulder 
against Saddam Hussein. ' He then explicitly addressed perhaps the most emotive 
elements of all: 
Prior to ordering our forces into battle, I instructed our military commanders to take 
every necessary step to prevail as quickly as possible, and with the greatest degree of 
protection possible for American and allied service men and women. I've told the 
American people before that this will not be another Vietnam, and I repeat this here 
tonight. Our troops will have the best possible support in the entire world, and they 
will not be asked to fight with one hand tied behind their back. I'm hopeful that this 
fighting will not go on for long and that casualties will be held to an absolute 
minimum. 120 
Bush's assurances to America took place amidst a sea-change in the nation's 
perspective of the crisis, and an apparent submission to the imperious leadership that 
Bush had been so roundly criticised for in the previous months. Despite the Bush 
administration's prolonged inability to galvanise broad public-political support for its 
Persian Gulf policy, Americans' concerns over the crisis appeared to dissipate in the 
face of a broad welling of national support for the US forces stationed in the Persian 
Gulf, at the brink of war. Despite the considerable 'presence' of the Vietnam 
Syndrome in the months leading up to the onset of hostilities in Iraq -a presence 
which seemed intimately linked to America's apparently lukewarm support 
for US 
military action in the Persian Gulf - by the time US forces engaged Iraqi Republican 
120 Ibid. 
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Guard units, more than 80% of Americans polled declared that they now backed 
President Bush's decision to use force. 
121 
Conclusion 
President Bush's response to, and stewardship of, the Persian Gulf crisis is very much 
in keeping with the model of presidential use-of-force dominance depicted in this 
thesis. Indeed, his 'performance' during this period has much in common with that of 
President Reagan as he responded to the Lebanese conflict. Like Reagan, Bush faced 
the Vietnam Syndrome as he tried to rally Americans behind the deployment of US 
forces. Like Reagan, Bush was fully aware of America's Vietnam sensitivities and he 
tried to dispel Vietnam's shadows in his efforts to sway public, political and media 
opinion behind the decision to deploy. As was also the case with his predecessor, 
Bush's own sensitivity to the Vietnam Syndrome did not dampen his willingness to 
deploy US forces. 
Bush was perfectly willing to utilise his powers as Commander-in-Chief and 
ignore the wishes of deployment-opponents by ordering US forces to the Persian 
Gulf Having set the deployment in motion, he then strove to offer persuasive 
justifications for his actions, at times by offering what appeared to be quite unrealistic 
rationales. Aside from trying to tie Iraq's invasion to impact that this action might 
have on the global economy, Bush also strove to depict Saddam Hussein as a 
tyrannical Political leader who could be likened to Hitler. Bush did not have to do 
much to demonise Saddam Hussein in the collective mind of the American public; 
121 Data taken from Gallup poll monthly, February 199 1, cited in Mueller (1994), 
Table 8, p. 193. 
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however, his attempts to draw parallels between Hussein and Hitler were clearly 
questionable and they did not have the impact that Bush may have expected. Indeed, 
some within the Bush 'inner-circle' saw this strategy as quite unhelpful and the 
President was advised, at least once, to 'tone down' his Hitler references. 122 
However, whilst domestic critics consistently levelled accusations of 
belligerence against the Bush White House over its response to Iraq's invasion, 
Bush's deployment decision-making was far from the reckless warmongering that 
some critics tried to depict. In fact, whilst he was leaning towards a military response 
from early on in the crisis, Bush's thinking on precisely what form this response 
should entail seemed very much influenced by the Vietnam Syndrome. Indeed, whilst 
the President and his military chiefs initially disagreed over what the appropriate 
military strategy should be in the Gulf, both sides' perspectives were predicated upon 
a wish for a quick victory and casualty avoidance - it just so happens that Bush 
thought that an air campaign could achieve these aims whilst the chiefs opted for a 
more comprehensive air and ground strategy. President Bush's respect for General 
Colin Powell saw him defer to the latter option. Unquestionably, in Bush and Powell, 
Operation Desert Storm was presided over by two astute policy practitioners who had 
the prudence associated with the Vietnam Syndrome etched indelibly in their minds. 
One could argue that Desert Storm remains the archetypal 'overwhelming force' 
approach which American conservatives and the Pentagon have championed since the 
end of the Vietnam War. 
Bush was a pragmatic and proficient leader when it came to crisis foreign 
policymaking; more hands-on' than Reagan, and more attuned to the 
details and 
ramifications of policy. Whilst there were differences 
in opinion within his 'inner- 
122 powell (1995), p. 491. 
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circle' over how to respond to the invasion of Kuwait, these disagreements were slight 
when compared to the very public rifts which characterised the Reagan 
administration's policy deliberations over Lebanon. If there were failings in Bush's 
'perfonnance' throughout this episode, it was the consistent lack of synchronicity 
between policyrnaking and public diplomacy as he sought to send an aggressive 
message of warning to Iraq whilst simultaneously emphasising peace and diplomacy 
to his domestic audience. This dual public diplomatic task was, admittedly, an 
extremely challenging one. 
The study's focus upon public diplomacy clearly exposes the difficulties that 
the Bush White House experienced in trying to 'sell' its Persian Gulf policy to 
America. However, it also illuminates the imperiousness of Bush's handling of the 
crisis, throughout this period. Winning public-political support was clearly not a 
prerequisite for his key decisions on the crisis and the staged force deployments 
continued apace, even as America grew more and more critical. This demonstrates 
unmistakeably that at such times, it is ultimately what the President wants which 
decides whether or not US forces are deployed. Every President wants to take 
domestic opinion with him but winning this support is an aim, not a must. This was 
made quite clear during the course of President Bush's response to the Persian Gulf 
crisis. 
There is no doubt that President Bush ably assumed the role of Commander- 
in-Chief during this crisis. He achieved a tremendous feat in garnering and 
maintaining the international coalition which eventually engaged 
Iraqi forces in the 
Persian Gulf-, indeed, for some commentators, his handling of the Persian Gulf crisis 
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should be 'a case study on coalition building for years, if not decades, to come'. 123 
Notwithstanding his limitations in garnering domestic support, Bush proved himself 
to be extremely proficient in orchestrating his foreign policy team and the decision- 
making process. He pushed the military chiefs to move beyond their instinctive 
intervention-scepticism and ordered them to assemble a range of military strategies 
for possible action against Iraq. The chiefs were under no doubt as to Bush's 
commitment to the mission. However despite his authoritative stance, Bush was no 
officious Commander-in-Chief, He proved himself more than willing to have the 
military chiefs' expertise and opinions at the centre of the planning process and 
indeed the military plan itself If his predecessor had been criticised for letting his 
exceptionalist belief in America's 'mission' influence his use-of-force thinking, Bush 
stewarded a military strategy from a rational analysis of the events, the terrain and the 
perceived strength of the Iraqi military. He did not copy President Reagan's approach 
of trying to limit the number of troops he sent into danger. Instead, once Bush had 
been persuaded by Powell's argument that ground forces would have to be employed 
and in sufficient numbers to 'win decisively', Bush reportedly responded with an 
assurance, 'if that's what you need, we'll do 
it-). 124 The Bush approach - prudence, 
careful build-up and an 'overwhelming force' approach when the battle was 
eventually unleashed - demonstrated a very different presidential response to the 
Vietnam Syndrome, one which believed that America's Vietnam fears might indeed 
be dissipated by seeing a rallying US military victory but that it was victory itself, and 
not the mere symbolism of sending US forces into action, which would achieve this 
goal. 
123 Jackson (2000), pp. 243 & 216. For the quote on Bush's handling of the Persian Gulf crisis, see: 
PBS Frontline interview with Barnard Taylor (accessed 29/03/06), available at: 
http: //www. pbs. org/wgbh/pages/frontline/gulf/oral/trainor/l. html 
124 Bob Woodward (199 1), The Commanders. New York: Simon & Schuster, pp. 319-320. 
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As was the case with President Reagan vis-a-vis Lebanon, Bush's position 
with respect to Congress over the Persian Gulf crisis was nothing short of imperious. 
As Ryan Hendrickson notes, at no time during the crisis did Bush recognize any legal 
authority for Congress on the issue of deploying US forces. 125 Whilst he did pay 
considerable lip service to generating bipartisan legislative support for both the 
deployment and the subsequent hostilities with Iraqi forces, Bush rejected any 
concession to congressional input into the planning process. Bush held the view that 
since he would not 'win over every last congressman, or the last American' anyway, 
he should 'rely upon my conviction about what is right and just to guide me. ' 126 This 
statement - they are Bush's own words - is a vivid demonstration of how the 
perspective of just one man can largely dictate whether and how US forces will be 
deployed. That the President can draw such conclusions, and that he can act upon 
them without any serious opposition from the nation's elected legislature, is a clear 
demonstration of the extent to which use-of-force authority resides well and truly in 
the White House. 
This um-nistakeable location of power could also be seen to sit uneasily with 
what many would deem to be the 'democratic ideal'. Given the authoritative 
equivalence that the constitution and the 1973 War Powers Resolutions are supposed 
to facilitate between the White House and Capitol Hill, it seems incredible to note that 
President Bush (i) committed hundreds of thousands of US troops to a war-zone, and 
(ii) assumed leadership of an international coalition in a waiting game in which war 
was the recognised end-point, without serious consultation with, or input from, 
Capitol Hill. Whilst it may well be the case that Congress and the Supreme Court are 
a n, k ble to hold the President accountable for any military missions which go seriously 
125 Hendrickson, (1998), p. 25 1. 
126 Bush & Scowcroft (1998), p357. 
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awry, any such actions would be ex post facto, with the deployment in question 
having already been ordered by the White House. Whilst this may well act to deter 
any seriously wayward presidential use-of-force actions, the ability of the legislature 
to encroach upon the President before the deployment, and to do so in a way which 
might actually arrest it, appears to be most unlikely. 
Just as incredible, in the face of this effective marginalisation of the 
legislature, is the announcement from the Chairman of the House Committee on 
Foreign Affairs - Dante Fascell (Dem. FL) - as hostilities unfolded in the Persian 
Gulf. he declared that 'the War Powers Resolution is alive and well. ' 127 Congress 
may well ultimately have fulfilled its role in providing President Bush with both 
money and formal authority for the use of military force against Iraq. However, given 
that America's Persian Gulf policy had unfolded exclusively at the behest of President 
Bush and his 'inner-circle'. and given that Bush's 'consultations' with Congress were 
done entirely at his own discretion and were decried as inadequate by legislators 
throughout the entire crisis, Fascell's declaration appears to be nothing short of 
bizarre. 
In terms of the broader domestic arena, President Bush appeared to be more 
concerned with winning the public opinion battle than did President Reagan during 
his engagement with Lebanon. Even so, it is clear that Bush failed in his task and that 
he did not push the United States towards war on the back of broad congressional and 
public support. John Mueller contends that the best the Bush White House was able 
to do was 'arrest a deterioration' of the support that President Bush had garnered for 
his initial handling of the crisis and then hang on until the inevitable 'rally-round-the- 
flag' effect kicked in and galvanised broad support amongst Americans, as US troops 
127 Fascell cited in Grimmett, I't March 2007, p. 27. 
218 
stood at the brink of battle. The onset of hostilities did indeed generate a broad 
welling of support but it was not a level of domestic backing which the Bush 
administration managed to achieve through its own public diplomatic efforts. 128 
The 'rallying effect' which typically evidences itself at this point is a 
significant phenomenon in the politics of military intervention in the United States. It 
may do much to sustain the imperiousness which Presidents often appear to 
demonstrate as they take deployment decisions. It means that a President can be 
confident that he will ultimately garner domestic support for a force deployment, even 
if America initially appears to oppose this action and even if his own efforts to 
persuade the nation are unsuccessful. If Presidents can make such assumptions, then 
it may effectively eradicate 'public-political opposition' from the list of 'checks and 
balances' which are supposed to restrain foreign policy decision-making in a liberal 
democracy such as the United States. The American public's support for a force 
deployment will very likely change if the deployment in question prolongs, or if it 
starts to go awry. However, this goes for 'popular' as well as 'unpopular' 
deployments. 
The Vietnam Syndrome was a considerable preoccupation for President Bush 
but it did not stop him from sanctioning the largest US force deployment - and US 
war-fighting operation - since Vietnam. Bush's interpretation of Vietnam's 'lessons' 
did, however, compel him to try and ensure, firstly; that he avoided involving US 
forces in an open-ended Vietnam-style military commitment, and secondly; that he 
would assuage domestic fears and opposition so that his Persian Gulf commitment 
would avoid the morale-sapping domestic unrest which had so undermined America's 
Vietnam endeavour. 
128 Mueller (1994), p. 116. 
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Whilst Bush triumphantly declared, in the victorious aftermath of Operation 
Desert Storm, that America had 'kicked the Vietnam Syndrome once and for all', 
there is considerable evidence to suggest that President Reagan was not the only 'anti- 
Syndrome' President who failed to persuade Americans on this issue. 129 Numerous 
subsequent opinion polls suggested that neither the lightening victory in the Persian 
Gulf, nor the American media's often-fawning coverage of America's new stealth 
aircraft and precision missiles, had actually increased Americans' willingness to see 
greater US military activity on the world stage. Indeed, just two days after Bush's 
buoyant declaration about the Vietnam Syndrome's demise, polls asking Americans 
whether the easy victory in the Persian Gulf made them feel that the White House 
should be more willing to use military force in order to solve international problems 
drew a striking response; around 60% of respondents answered 'No'. 130 
Significantly, some commentators have speculated that President Bush himself 
may not have genuinely believed that either the Vietnam Syndrome or America's 
conflict-aversions were confined to history. Jeffrey Record contends that the speed 
with which Bush withdrew US forces from the Persian Gulf - rejecting the chance to 
move to Baghdad in order to overthrow Saddam Hussein - is confirmation that Bush 
feared US forces could be 'sucked into a bloody Arab quagmire. ' 13 1 As will be shown 
in the next chapter, Bush may have been willing to declare the Syndrome 'kicked' in 
the aftermath of Kuwait. However it would not take him long, with an entirely new 
type of conflict looming on the horizon, to publicly announce its resurrection. 
129 E. J. Dionne, 'Kicking the "Vietnam Syndrome"; Victory Sweeps Away U. S. Doomed-to-Failure 
Feeling', The Washington Post, 4h March, 199 1. 
130 Poll quoted in Kenneth Oye, Donald Lieber & Donald Rothchild (1992), Eagle in a New World: 
American Grand Strategy in the post- Cold War Era, New York: Harper Collins, pp. 66-67. Citedin 
McCrisken (2003), p. 152. 
13 1 Record (2002), p. 104-105. 
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Chapter 6 
The Return of the Vietnam Syndrome: 
The Clinton Administration and the War in Bosnia Herzegovina, 1993- 
1995 
The previous two chapters detailed the deliberations, public diplomacy and leadership 
of post-Vietnam Presidents who had decided to deploy US ground forces to a high- 
profile international conflict. The role of the Vietnam Syndrome in influencing these 
processes, and the ways in these Presidents publicly 'dealt' with the Vietnam 
Syndrome, was explored. This chapter also focuses upon these issues but it differs in 
one key respect; namely, that the conflict under focus was one to which, for a 
considerable period of time, the White House was opposed to deploying US forces. 
The ending of the Cold War changed many of the dynamics and normative 
expectations of international politics. It also prompted the White House to stop 
viewing every international conflict as one in which US military involvement - 
whether overtly or covertly - might be necessary. Absent the driving imperatives of 
the fight against global Communism, the ethnic conflicts which emerged in the 
immediate post-Cold War years were thus viewed very differently to how they might 
have been just a few years earlier. Presidents typically regarded them not as events 
which required some form of US involvement but as perilous killing fields which 
were best avoided. 
Despite the fact that America's post-Vietnam deployment- aversions were by 
now an established fact, this White House non-interventionism was often heavily 
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criticised by sections of the American public-political arena. As Western media 
organisations broadcast harrowing reports of the plight of civilians caught up in 
conflicts, many political, media and non-governmental actors - in the United States 
and beyond - viewed American military involvement in such crises as both politically 
feasible and morally appropriate to the optimistic liberal values of the new post-Cold 
War international order. Unsurprisingly perhaps, these demands reinvigorated the 
Vietnam Syndrome and spawned a new array of debates in Washington over how the 
US military should be used in the post-Cold War world. This chapter charts the most 
prominent of these events, as the conflict in the former Yugoslav Republic of Bosnia 
Herzegovina captured America's attention in 1992. 
Clinton, Vietnam and the use of military force 
William Jefferson Clinton succeeded George H. W. Bush to become the 42 nd 
President of the United States. The first Democratic President since Jimmy Carter, 
Clinton assumed office on 20th January, 1993. Whilst twenty years had elapsed since 
the Vietnam War, the subject featured heavily during Clinton's presidency, especially 
during his first term. Indeed, it was a ma or issue for him even before he took office. 
' i 
As he ran against Bush during the 1992 election campaign, Clinton was forced to 
address two key issues which threatened to undennine his candidacy: one of these 
concerned his political party; the other was more personal. Both were directly linked 
to the Vietnam War. 
1 Roper (2000), p. 177; McCrisken (2003), p. 163; Bacevich (2005), p. 118; Herspring (2005), p. 335. 
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Whilst it was America's 'economic pain' which largely dominated the 1992 
election campaign, foreign policy issues - most notably, the spiralling conflict in 
Bosnia Herzegovina - also came under the spotlight. 
2 With an ongoing recession 
limiting President Bush's scope to woo the electorate over his domestic competence, 
and given Clinton's glaring foreign policy inexperience, the Bush campaign team 
seized upon the opportunity to publicly challenge Clinton's foreign policy credentials. 
Drawing American voters' memories back to the Vietnam years, Republicans accused 
Clinton of representing the party which had taken the United States into Vietnam's 
conflict and helped steer US forces to a humiliating defeat. Only strong Republican 
leadership had dragged America out of its post-Vietnam nadir, the Bush team argued; 
Democratic Presidents simply couldn't be trusted with America's foreign policy. 3 
Whilst Clinton's inspired electioneering and strident foreign policy rhetoric 
were sufficient to best such arguments, his personal 'relationship' with the Vietnam 
War represented a potentially more serious obstacle to his winning the White House. 
It was widely known that Clinton had been a Rhodes Scholar at Oxford University 
during the Vietnam War and that he had both opposed the war and avoided military 
service. During the election campaign, Bush repeatedly highlighted Clinton's 
'Vietnam record', implying that his 'draft-dodging' indicated Clinton's unsuitability 
for office. 
4 
These attacks, and the perceptions which spawned them, did not stop Clinton's 
election to the White House but they continued to influence the Clinton presidency 
once he won office. For example, within the Pentagon, many senior military figures 
viewed the new President as a 'commander in chief drawn from the ranks of the 
2 Drew (1995), p. 49; Sidney Blumenthal (2003), The Clinton Wars. An Insider's Account of the "ite 
House Years, Viking, Penguin, p. 60; Janda, Berry & Goldman (2008), p. 633. 
3 Bacevich (2005), p. 118. 
4 Roper (2000), p. 177; Bacevich (2005), p. 118; Herspring (2005), p. 335. 
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bearded anti-Vietnam War protesters'. Especially during his first term in office, 
relations between Clinton and the Pentagon were, at times, uncommonly poor. 5 
Admittedly, some of Clinton's early policy proposals did little to smooth this 
relationship. He announced a freeze on military pay and pushed to overturn a policy 
which prohibited homosexuals from openly serving in the military. Clinton promptly 
backed down from the latter, after very public dissention from senior military figures. 
Clinton's 'sloppy' salute was even criticised by some within the military and whilst 
this was probably never a serious issue, it was deemed serious enough to prompt the 
National Security Advisor (NSA) Anthony Lake to raise the subject with his 
Commander-in-Chief. 6 
When looked at in this light, it is perhaps hardly surprising that Clinton - 
unlike Presidents Bush and Reagan - never explicitly placed the eradication of the 
Vietnam Syndrome at the very centre of his presidential vision. 7 He did, however, 
draw attention to the significance of having a Vietnam War protestor such as himself 
winning election into the White House. During the 1992 election campaign, he 
suggested that a Clinton victory might show how far America had moved beyond its 
Vietnam preoccupation. 8 This prediction proved, as had previous similar presidential 
predictions, to be an underestimation of how enshrined the Vietnam Syndrome was in 
the American consciousness. 
Indeed, there is little doubt that the Vietnam Syndrome was very evident in the 
thinking of the Clinton foreign policy team itself. Clinton's use-of-force decisions 
were influenced by advisors and practitioners for whom the Vietnam experience 
provided stem counsel. General Colin Powell was still Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 
5 Drew (1995), pp. 42-48; Blumenthal (2003), pp. 52-53 & 60. 
6 Herspring (2005), pp. 335-337. 
7 Record (2002), p. 115; Janda, Berry & Goldman (2008), pp. 377 & 633; Henriksen (1996), p. 4. 
8 McCrisken (2003), p. 163. 
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of Staff (CJS) when Clinton assumed office and (as had been the case when he had 
served under President Bush) his opinions and advice continued to define him as 
almost the 'living embodiment' of the Vietnam Syndrome. 9 Many of Clinton's 
civilian policy advisors also approached foreign conflicts preoccupied with America's 
Vietnam fixation. America is 'not prepared for a military involvement reminiscent of 
Vietnam', Clinton's political advisor Dick Morris repeatedly warned Clinton as he 
contemplated using military force in Bosnia; 'You don't want to be Lyndon Johnson'. 
Clinton himself needed no reminder of the Democrats' associations with the Vietnam 
failure. 10 
If Vietnam sensitivities were palpable within Clinton foreign policy circles, 
there was no shortage of events to sustain them. On assuming office, Clinton's 
foreign policy caseload was bursting at the seams. Ongoing violence in Haiti was 
sustaining a steady flow of refugees towards the Florida coast, 28,000 US troops were 
overseeing humanitarian operations in war-ravaged Somalia, and the war in Bosnia 
Herzegovina was commanding international attention. It was the latter conflict which 
came to truly dominate Clinton's first term in office. 
As soon as Bosnia's war came to prominence in Washington, it was perfectly 
clear that America's 1991 Persian Gulf War victory had not 'kicked' the Vietnam 
Syndrome from the nation's collective consciousness, despite President Bush's public 
assertion to the contrary. " Not only did the Balkan topography allow deployment- 
9 Record (2002), pp. 104-105 & 114. 
10 McCrisken (2003), pp. 165-166; Thomas H. Henriksen (1996), Clinton's Foreign Policy in Somalia, 
Bosnia, Haiti, and North Korea, Essays in Public Policy, Hoover Institute on War, Revolution and 
Peace, p. 15; Chollet (2005), p. 14. 
" For a range of discussions on the Bosnian War, and various aspects of the West's relationship with it, 
see, for example: Bob Woodward (1996), The Choice, New York: Simon & Schuster; Richard Sobel 
(1998), 'Trends: United States Intervention in Bosnia', Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 62, No. 2, 
Summer, 199 8; Chuck Sudetic (1998), Blood and Vengeance, W. W. Norton; Richard Holbrooke 
(1999), To End a War, Modem Library, New York, revised edition; Ivo Daalder, (2000), Getting to 
Dayton. America's Bosnia Policy, Brookings Institute; Halberstani (200 1); Sobel (200 1); Allin (2002); 
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opponents to draw semi-plausible physical comparisons with Vietnam; the war's 
harrowing violence and its complicated configurations (there were not two but three 
warring sides - Bosnian Muslims, Serbs and Croats - each supported by 'police' units 
and un-uniformed paramilitaries) were more than enough to set Vietnam radars 
buzzing in Washington. This was certainly no 'traditional' battlefield standoff 
between state armies, as had been the case in the Persian Gulf 
However, whilst halting Bosnia's conflict was undoubtedly a considerable 
political and military challenge, it was a challenge which proved especially 
complicated for the Clinton administration. Absent the galvanising parameters which 
had largely steered the Cold War Presidents, and with no foreign policy experience to 
speak of, Clinton found it extremely difficult to offer a decisive response to the crisis 
and his leadership was frequently found wanting. 12 Clinton complained throughout 
his first tenn in office about the inadequacies of his foreign policy team but he 
himself undoubtedly fomented the disjointedness which evidenced itself throughout 
his administration's engagement with the Bosnian crisis. He seldom attended 
National Security Council (NSC) meetings and he was equivocal and overly verbose 
when he did. Clinton left the military chiefs with the impression that their 
Commander-in-Chief was disproportionately preoccupied with domestic policy and 
that he would prevaricate over crisis foreign policy decisions. 
13 
Clinton's stewardship of America's Bosnia policy very much confirmed these 
concerns. Whilst he had Erequently alluded to his interventionist credentials during 
the 1992 presidential election - he publicly castigated President Bush's inaction over 
Bosnia, declaring at one point that the United States should join a multinational 
Power (2002); Brendan Simms (2002), Unfinest Hour. Britain and the Destruction ofBosnia, Penguin 
books, second edition; Chollet (2005). 
12 Janda, Berry & Goldman (2008), pp. 377 & 633; Henriksen (1996), p. 4. 
13 DiPrizio (2002), p. 119; Herspring (2005), pp. 332-335. 
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military coalition and shoot its way into Sarajevo airport in order to relieve that 
besieged city - it was clear when he took office that whilst he was willing to sanction 
'risk-free' applications of military force (principally, air-strikes), he was 'deeply 
uncomfortable' about deploying US troops. 14 This discomfort saw Clinton adopt a 
consistently timid stance towards the crisis, a stance which - for all his efforts to 
remain in touch with public opinion - was often at odds with a domestic mood which 
appeared to be broadly supportive of US participation in multilateral troop operations 
inside Bosnia. 15 
As was the case with his predecessor, Clinton's use-of-force decision-making 
took place against a backdrop of competing domestic issues. Amongst the most 
notable of these was the considerable budget deficit he had inherited from the Bush 
administration. After the Republicans won both Houses in the November 1994 mid- 
term elections, executive-legislative budgetary wrangles became increasingly 
entwined in executive-legislative wrangles over America's Bosnia policy. Clinton's 
stumbling performance over Bosnia came to be viewed by a hostile Congress as the 
centre-piece of a broadly failing Clinton policy portfolio. 
16 
Washington's Bosnia debates were greatly influenced by the international 
uncertainties and challenges prompted by the ending of the Cold War. Despite this 
array of new dynamics and rationales, however, it was one established issue - 
Vietnam - which came to dominate the agenda. As Samantha Power observes, 
throughout Washington's entire engagement with the crisis, 'The one-word bogey 
"Vietnam" became the ubiquitous shorthand for all that could go wrong ... if the 
United States became militarily involved. ' 17 However, if there was nothing 
14 Power (2002), p. 274; Blumenthal (2003), p. 60; DiPrizio (2002), p. 119. 
15 Sobel (2001), p. 228. 
16 Halberstam (2001), pp. 215 & 297-299. 
17 Power (2002), p. 284. 
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exceptional in the fact that Vietnam dominated Washington's debates over the 
Bosnian War, the White House's 'relationship' with the Vietnam Syndrome during 
this period was exceptional since it manifested itself in a way which would have been 
unthinkable just a few years previously. 
Whilst the previous two case studies showed that the White House has worked 
hard to publicly reject the appropriateness of the Vietnam analogy as it has sought to 
get Americans to support the deployment of US forces throughout the post-Vietnam 
years, this last case study demonstrates that the White House has sometimes had to 
work just as hard in its efforts to publicly justify the withholding of US troops from 
foreign conflicts. At such times, Presidents have appeared all too aware of what 
subject they should invoke in order to do this. 
Conflict in Bosnia Herzegovina - an overview 
Before 1991, Yugoslavia had been made up of six republics - Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
Croatia, Serbia, Macedonia, Slovenia and Montenegro. With the break-up of the 
country as a consequence of the end of the Cold War, economic hardships and 
nationalist sentiments sparked demands for each region to seek independence from 
Belgrade. These demands, in turn, led to war. On 25 th June 1991, Croatia and 
Slovenia declared independence from a fragmenting and disharmonious Yugoslav 
federation. Citing the need to protect ethnic Serbs living in those regions, the Serbian 
leader in Belgrade, Slobodan Milosevic, responded with near-immediate military 
action. He deployed the Serb-dominated Yugoslav National Army (JNA) in an effort 
to force these countries back into line. Slovenia, with very few ethnic Serbs living in 
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was the most geographically remote and culturally the most 'Western' of the 
former Yugoslav republics. It had also prepared itself militarily for hostilities against 
JNA forces. As a consequence of these various factors, the JNA withdrew from 
Slovenia after less than a fortnight, in what became known as the 'phoney war'. 18 
Croatia's secession was very different. Directly neighbouring Serbia, it had a 
sizeable Serb minority and a strategically desirable coastline. Reluctant to live as a 
minority under an independent Croat government in Zagreb, Croatian Serbs rallied to 
Milosevic's rallying cry for a 'Greater Serbia' and began an insurgency which was 
considerably bolstered by JNA regulars. They quickly seized around one-third of 
Croatia. The special envoy to the UN, fonner US Secretary of States Cyrus Vance, 
managed to broker a cease-fire between the two sides in November 1991. It was 
enforced by the deployment of a 12,000-strong UN peacekeeping force 
(UNPROFOR) into Serb-held parts of Croatia, in early 1992. Relative peace would 
prevail until late 1994. Renewed hostilities inside Croatia would ultimately leave 
around 10,000 dead and produce nearly three quarters of a million refugees. 
19 
However, Croatia's violence would pale into insignificance when compared to what 
would subsequently unfold inside Bosnia Herzegovina. 
To Balkans watchers, the rise in militant Serb nationalism was particularly 
ominous for Bosnia. With a population of around 4 million, it was the most ethnically 
heterogonous of Yugoslavia's republics (Bosnian Muslims comprised roughly 45% of 
the population, Bosnian Serbs, 30%, and Bosnian Croats 17%) and there were many 
areas in which all three major ethnic groups lived in close proximity. There were 
concerns that if a Bosnian declaration of independence from Belgrade sparked a war - 
as it had in Slovenia and Croatia - then Bosnia's Muslims could 
find themselves 
18 Chollet (2005), p. 3. 
19 DiPrizio (2002), pp. 104,105 & 108; Chollet (2005), p. 3. 
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dangerously vulnerable. Whilst Bosnia's Serbs and Croats would have what 
Samantha Power has described as a 'parent protector in the neighbourhood' (namely, 
the surrounding Serbian Yugoslav and Croatian states themselves), Bosnia's Muslims 
had no such protection and they would have to look to the international community 
for assistance. 20 This imbalance in the provision available to Bosnia's three main 
ethnic groups would have shocking repercussions in the coming years. 
Wary of a bloody secession, the Muslim-Croat majority government of 
Bosnia, centred in Sarajevo, sought Western assistance in organising its independence 
referendum. However, the two Bosnian Serbs who formed part of the government 
publicly urged their fellow Serbs to boycott any such event, before walking out of 
government in protest. 21 Despite the Serb protests, the independence referendum was 
held on 3 rd March 1992. Whilst 99.4% votedfor independence from Belgrade, there 
was only negligible Bosnian Serb participation. Fonnal recognition of Bosnia's 
independence by both the United States and the European Union then spurred hard- 
line Bosnian Serbs into action. The Bosnian Serb leader, Radovan Karadzic, declared 
the Serbs' right for a Serbian state with Sarajevo as its capital. Rallying Bosnian Serb 
paramilitanes which were supplemented by JNA regulars, the Bosnian Serb army 
quickly numbered around 80,000 troops. It then embarked upon a campaign aimed at 
establishing an ethnically homogenous Bosnian Serb state - the Republika Srpska - 
principally through 'ethnically cleansing' the country of its majority Muslim 
population. 
22 
As had been feared, Bosnian Muslim forces found themselves considerably 
disadvantaged in the ensuing hostilities. In late 1991, in an effort to minimise 
, the UN 
had imposed a blanket arms embargo on all of the Yugoslav violence 
20 Power (2002), pp. 247-248. 
21 DiPrizio (2002), p. 105. 
22 Power (2002), pp. 248-249; Di Prizio (2002), p. 
112. 
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territories. However, since the Bosnian Serb forces had access to former JNA 
arsenals located inside Bosnia, they were able to considerably outgun their opponents. 
Consequently, Serb forces quickly mirrored their gains in Croatia, grabbing nearly 
70% of Bosnia and laying siege to Bosnia's capital, Sarajevo. 
The international community responded to these dramatic events. However, in 
a dismal precursor to what would become commonplace in the coming years, its 
response was woefully inadequate. On 5 th June 1992, UNPROFOR's mission was 
expanded from Croatia into Bosnia. It was tasked with delivering humanitarian aid, 
protecting humanitarian supply routes, enforcing a 'no-fly zone' over Bosnia and 
establishing UN-guarded 'safe areas' for Bosnian Muslim civilians. 23 However, it 
quickly became clear that with its modest military presence and restricted mandate, 
UNPROFOR's relocation would do little to protect Bosnia's civilians and that much 
more had to be done. Precisely what should be done and - importantly - who should 
do it, became the most divisive question in international politics over the next three- 
and-a-half years. 
Bosnia captures America's attention 
Bosnia's unfolding conflict captured considerable attention in the United States. 24 
Extensive Western media coverage of civilian massacres, shocking images of Serb- 
run concentration camps, and widespread reports of 'rape camps' outraged Americans 
and galvanised the perception that Bosnia's Serbs were the conflict's principal 
23 fbid, pp. 111-112 & 115. 
24 Power (2002), pp. 247 & 505. 
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belligerents. 25 Two broad coalitions of opinion emerged in Washington as to how the 
White House should respond. In a striking departure from the 'traditional' use-of- 
force delineations of the post-Vietnam years, liberals and hardliners joined voices to 
demand decisive American action to halt the Serbian onslaught: for some advocates, 
this entailed releasing Bosnian Muslim forces from the UN-imposed arms embargo, 
thus allowing them to more effectively engage the Bosnian Serbs; for others, the Serb 
atrocities against Bosnia's civilians demanded nothing less than decisive US military 
intervention into Bosnia. 26 
On the other side of this debate, a sizeable political and media cohort opposed 
virtually any fon-n of American involvement with the conflict. 27 As had so often been 
the case in the post-Vietnam years, deployment-opponents quickly invoked the 
Vietnam experience in making the case for withholding US forces from Bosnia. And 
for all that he had triumphantly declared its death just over one year previously, it was 
President George H. W. Bush himself who brought the Vietnam Syndrome, centre- 
stage, into America's Bosnia debates. 
25 John Simpson (1998), Strange Places, Questionable People, Macmillan Publishing, pp. 444-445; 
Eric V. Larson & Bogdan Savych (2005), American Public Supportfor US Military Operationsftom 
Mogadishu to Baghdad, RAND Corporation, p. 55. For a critique of the anti-Serb bias in the American 
media, and how it influenced America's approach to the war, see Danielle Sremac (1999), War of 
Words. Washington Tackles the Yugoslav Conflict, Praeger Publishing. 
26 Power (2002), p. 247; 'Debate Force on Bosnia. Now'. Editorial, New York Times, 13thApril, 1993; 
David Rieff, 'Not Enough. Send Troops', New York Times, 29th April, 1993; Isaacs (1997), pp. 92-93; 
Western (2005), p. 222. 
27 Western (2005), pp. 133-174. See, for example, Elaine Sciolino, 'Christopher Explains Conditions 
For Use of US Force in Bosnia', New York Times, 28hApril, 1993. 
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President Bush and Bosnia - the Vietnam Syndrome is back 
Bush was President as Bosnia's hostilities came to prominence in the United States. 
However, whilst he had been quite willing to engage Iraqi forces after their invasion 
of Kuwait, he showed no such inclination towards the unfolding crisis in Bosnia. 
Now under considerable domestic pressure, his post-Desert Storm adulation had 
'melted like snow in the spring'. Amidst domestic recession and with re-election at 
stake, he felt that his foreign policy priorities lay in nonnalising post-Cold War 
relations with Russia, not in risking his diminishing political capital on a remote civil 
war. Bush thus gladly deferred to European state leaders' early assertions that Bosnia 
28 
was a 'European problem' . 
As Bosnia's hostilities escalated, however, Bush faced growing demands to 
assume leadership of a weak Western Bosnia policy. 
29 Unmoved, he embarked upon 
a public diplomatic campaign aimed at convincing Americans that maintaining US 
military disengagement from Bosnia's war was the prudent option. Despite the fact 
that his presidency up until that point had been characterised by Reagan-esque efforts 
to convince Americans that the Vietnam Syndrome was behind them, Bush chose an 
established method of trying to dampen America's enthusiasm for military action. It 
was a method that domestic deployment-opponents had used against him as he had 
sought to rally support for his Persian Gulf deployment, just 18 months earlier: he 
publicly suggested that US military involvement in Bosnia might mire the United 
States in 'another Vietnam'. 
In mid-June of 1992, as Congress pressured Bush to work with the UN in 
preparing a budget and a plan for possible military intervention into Bosnia, a White 
28 Powell (1995) p. 559; Ambrose and Brinkley (1997), p. 377; DiPrizio (2002), pp. 117-119. 
29 Chollet (2005), p. 1; Power (2002), p. 306. 
233 
House spokesman told The Washington Post that Bosnia's war was 'two parts 
Lebanon and one part Vietnam'. Sarajevo airport was described as resembling 'Dien 
Bien Phu where Viet Minh artillery pounded the French from surrounding mountains 
in 1954'. 'What we are looking at here', another Bush official noted sagely, 'is a 
quagmire. ' 30 These public statements represented a watershed moment in post- 
Vietnam executive branch foreign policy politicking; it was the first time that the 
White House had moved away from its consistent efforts to dispel mention of the 
Vietnam Syndrome and had actually 'used' it in debates over the deployment of US 
forces. 
Despite this White House endorsement of the Vietnam analogy, however, the 
gravity of the events taking place inside Bosnia (and detailed media coverage of 
them) seemed to sustain broad domestic support for greater US involvement in 
Bosnia's war. On 6 th August 1992, footage was released of two Serb-run 
concentration camps at Omarska and Trnopo1je. The BBC World Affairs editor John 
Simpson recalls that: 
The pictures were quite unforgettable: barbed wire, skeletal figures. It could have 
been Dachau. The pictures went round the world, and ABC television ran them in 
full on their nightly news ... they caused a sensation in the United States. 
31 
They did indeed cause a sensation. Samantha Power notes that they 'concentrated 
grassroots and elite attention' and 'inflamed public outrage' like no post-war 
genocide. 32 Whilst many Americans continued to argue against unilateral US 
intervention into Bosnia, further reports of Bosnian Serb atrocities prompted three- 
30 Barton Gellman, 'Defense Planners Making Case Against Intervention in Yugoslavia', The 
Washington Post, 130' June 1992. See also Western (2005), p. 150. 
31 Simpson (1998), pp. 444-445; Power (2002), p. 271. 
32 Power (2002), p. 276. 
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fifths of polled Americans to support a multilateral military offensive (involving US 
troops) into Bosnia 'if the atrocities could not be prevented by any other means. ' 33 
Although divided over how the United States should respond to the spiralling 
violence, Congress also responded with vigour. Within a week of the ABC broadcast, 
both Houses passed resolutions urging President Bush to draft a UN Security Council 
resolution to provide humanitarian relief to Bosnia's civilians - through the use of 
force if necessary. 34 However, Bush maintained his resolve. He admitted that whilst 
the concentration camps did perhaps invoke memories of the Nazi Holocaust, his 
prime concern was to make sure that the United States did not get 'bogged down in 
any way into some guerrilla warfare'. He added, in a clear allusion to Vietnam, 'We 
lived through that one. ' As senior US statesmen, non-governrnental organisations, 
and international religious leaders continued to demand a more forceful American 
commitment to Bosnia's beleaguered civilians, Bush continued to reject any 
escalation of US policy and he reminded Americans why his stance was the prudent 
one: 'I remember the Vietnam experience'. he elucidated, 'Never get bogged down in 
a guerrilla war where you don't know what the hell you're doing. ' 35 
By now, President Bush was aware that anns were being shipped secretly 
from Iran, via Croatia, to Bosnian Muslim forces, in clear contravention of embargo 
resolutions invoked by the United Nations. 36 Knowing that the Sarajevo government 
was now getting at least some assistance in its war effort may well have cemented 
33 Polling information quoted in Richard Sobel, 'US and European Attitudes Towards Intervention in 
the Former Yugoslavia: Mourir Pour la Bosnie? ' in Richard H. Ullman (ed. ), (1996), The World and 
Yugoslavia's Wars, New York: Council on Foreign Relations. Cited in Sobel (2001), p. 184. 
34 Richard F. Grimmett, I' March, 2007, p. 33. 
35 Bush quoted in a news conference, 7th August 1992, cited in McEvoy-Levy (2001), p. 114. See also 
Power (2002), pp. 276-279; Henriksen (1996), p. 13; Michael Putzel, 'Treading Cautiously: Warnings 
of Military Folly', The Boston Globe, 7 th August, 1992; Sandy Grady, 'Bush Wary of Balkan Snakepit 
Pressured By World ? pinion, President Seeks Low-Risk Military Option For Defending Bosnia', The 
Charlotte Observer, 8 ffi August, 1992; Donald A. Rothberg, 'Sending Troops Could Result in 
Quagmire, Experts Caution', The Charlotte Observer, 9th August, 1992. 
36 Richard Holbrooke (1999), pp. 50-5 1. 
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Bush's resolve to keep the United States at the sidelines of the crisis. Indeed, he 
maintained this position of disengagement throughout his final months in office, even 
though it appeared to be increasingly at odds with the national mood. In stark contrast 
to the scepticism Americans had demonstrated when asked to support the deployment 
of US forces to defend oil-rich Saudi Arabia and Kuwait in 1991, successive opinion 
polls suggested that well over 60% of Americans supported deploying US troops to 
assist Bosnia's beleaguered civilians. This public mood appeared to be evident in the 
corridors of government itself-, in the State Department, 'widespread disdain' for 
Bush's Bosnia policy sparked a widely-publicised staff resignation and the consistent 
leaking of top-level policy deliberations and CIA reports on the crisis. 37 
Given that candidate Bill Clinton had advocated a tougher stance on Bosnia 
throughout the 1992 presidential election campaign, his November victory over Bush 
suggested the likelihood of a more muscular American Bosnia policy. At the very 
least, it was widely expected that he would move to formally lift the arms embargo 
against the Bosnian government. This was a broadly supported measure in the United 
States, given the popular assumption that it would 'even up the fight' between the 
poorly anned Bosnian forces and the Belgrade-backed Bosnian Serbs. 
38 However, 
those who awaited these developments with a sense of anticipation were to be bitterly 
disappointed. 
37 Sobel (200 1), pp. 198 & 199. Throughout the crisis, Americans' opinions on Bosnia did seem to 
be 
more specific than merely supporting 'military intervention' - support was consistent 
(sometimes 
extremely high) for multilateral actions in inside Bosnia; support for unilateral US action was typically 
low. Americans also appeared to be more supportive of air-strikes than ground actions. Rarely 
throughout the conflict, however, did opinion-polling data reveal any constant, 
firmly entrenched 
public stance. Western (2005), pp. 164-165,174 & 230. 
38 Kaufmann (2002), p. 143; Drew (1995), p. 17; McCrisken (2003), p. 169; Western 
(2005), pp. 170 & 
174. 
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A new President -a new policy? 
President Clinton walked into a war of words over Bosnia, one dominated by debates 
over the pros and cons of US military intervention, and concerns over the 
'Vietnamness' of Bosnia and the wider Balkans region. However, this maelstrom of 
commentary was not confined to Washington. Indeed, it was not even confined to the 
United States. Whilst the embattled Bosnian government in Sarajevo had repeatedly 
implored greater American involvement in the crisis, the Bosnian Serb leader 
Radovan Karadzic - well aware of the American public's focus upon the crisis - 
publicly warned the new President against escalating US involvement; American 
troops, he declared, would face 'another Vietnam' if they were sent to Bosnia. 39 The 
Serb Radical Party leader Vojislav SeseIj spoke in even starker ten-ns. Any 
deployment of US forces, he cautioned, would see Bosnian Serb forces supplemented 
by 'tens of thousands of volunteers. ' You 'would have to send thousands of body 
bags', he warned Clinton, 'It would be a new Vietnam. 
ý40 
The spectre of Vietnam initially appeared to have little effect upon the new 
President. At his first Bosnia meeting, he reiterated his commitment to Bosnia: 'If the 
United States doesn't act in situations like this', he asserted, 'nothing will happen. ' 
41 
He subsequently declared his intention to step up efforts to establish peace in Bosnia 
and pledged that US forces would participate in enforcing that peace. 
42 However, 
Clinton's thinking on how to achieve this was soon given pause by the now-standard 
Pentagon counsel on military intervention. After a few more Bosnia meetings, CJS 
General Colin Powell had painted such a daunting picture of what would be required 
39 Sinnns (2002), p. 66; Christine Spolar & Julia Preston, 'Rivals Debate US Role in Balkans Crisis, 
Call for Support of UN Plan', 7he Washington Post, 5th February 1993. 
40 Power (2002), p. 284 
41 Drew (1995), p. 146. 
42 Grimmett, I't March, 2007, p. 33. 
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to bring a military solution to the conflict that Clinton's election deployment- 
advocacy began to wilt. Clinton's was not the only intervention-bubble which was 
burst by those early meetings. His Secretary of State Warren Christopher now took 
the view that the American public would not stomach a military deployment on the 
scale that the military chiefs had outlined. Nor, he forecast, would they tolerate 
military casualties in a remote crisis which appeared to have little obvious relevance 
to the United States. 
43 
It is interesting to note that this early conclusion, drawn by key administration 
figures, may have represented a major misjudgement of America's attitude towards 
Bosnia. The administration's Powell-inspired intervention- scepticism appeared to 
overlook the fact that President Bush had been roundly castigated for his apparent 
ignoring of Bosnia's beleaguered civilians, and that President Clinton himself had 
swept into office on a platform which, amongst other things, advocated a more 
forceful American Bosnia policy. Having won office, there was no suggestion 
whatsoever that the nation's mood had changed any - on the contrary, whilst 
Americans continued to show little willingness to see unilateral US intervention into 
Bosnia, polls over the next three months continued to suggest high public support for 
multilateral operations involving US troops inside Bosnia, either through the UN or 
NATO. Indeed by May, PIPA polls were suggesting nearly 80% support for such 
actions. 44 Clinton's acceptance of the Pentagon's gloomy forecast was thus a 
significant overlooking of the public mood and as he set more modest parameters for 
43 Powell's projected estimations of the numbers of US troops which would 
be required were 
exaggerated. The previous chapters show that both of Clinton's predecessors 
had been faced by this 
Pentagon deployment-opposition as well, and that the military chiefs are not averse to exaggerating 
troop numbers in order to 'test' the President's commitment. See Henriksen 
(1996), p. 15 & Chollet 
(2005), pp. 13 & 18-20. 
44 PIPA poll (1994), cited in Sobel (2001), p. 187. 
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his engagement with the crisis, he paved the way for the first domestic criticisms of 
his foreign policy. 
By February's end, Clinton had confined his Bosnia policy to having the US 
Air Force airdropping supplies to civilians in the region, and helping to enforce a UN- 
authorised 'no-fly zone' over Bosnia. 45 However, even these limited measures were 
constrained by the most timid of mission parameters - for example, when making 
airdrops, US pilots were ordered to fly at such high altitudes (in order to avoid any 
chance of being hit by anti-aircraft fire) that aid packages frequently missed their 
targets; indeed, they often fell into the hands of belligerents. Unsurprisingly, 
Clinton's 'diluted' Bosnia policy quickly came under fire. Castigating the President's 
'disappointing showing so far', The Washington Post criticised a Bosnia policy 'on 
the cheap' and accused Clinton of giving the Bosnian Serbs 'a green light to 
conduct ... unchecked and relatively cost-free ethnic cleansing. 
' 46 The New York 
Times attacked Clinton's willingness to 'bend his knee to the murderous thugs who 
lead Serbian aggression in Bosnia. ý47 In response, Clinton clarified his position on the 
crisis and announced that there were only two circumstances under which US troops 
would enter Bosnia: if the 12,000-strong UNPROFOR contingent needed assistance 
in extricating itself-, or if a formal peace was agreed between the three warring sides. 
Unless either of these conditions arose, Clinton declared, there would be no US 
military presence on Bosnian Soil. 
48 
This was certainly an unambiguous clarification of thefuture policy pathways 
that Clinton's Bosnia policy might take but it did little to clarify just what fonn this 
policy would take in the meantime. Indeed, it simply fuelled Washington's 
debates 
45 Ibid; Drew (1995), pp. 146-147. 
46 Stephen S. Rosenfield, 'Mercy Flights, Merciless Results', The Washington Post 5th March 1993. 
47 Anthony Lewis, 'On Bended Knee? ' New York Times, 5th March 1993. 
48 Chollet (2005), p. 3; Henriksen (1996), p. 14; Holbrooke (1999), p. 39. 
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over Americas obligation to Bosnia. Whilst the new limited policy continued to spur 
discontent and criticism from Bosnia hawks, the President's explicit declaration that 
there were scenarios in which US forces would be sent into Bosnia - coupled to 
persisting reports that elements within the administration were continuing to push for 
this outcome anyway - sustained the concerns of intervention-opponents. In The 
Washington Post, Richard Cohen attributed the growing criticism of the Clinton 
Bosnia policy to the lack of political debate the President had encouraged on the issue 
of possible military intervention. Bosnia was, Cohen argued, 'terribly complicated' 
and 'made all the more complicated by the memory of Vietnam'. VA-filst strategic 
bombing would not be sufficient to curb the Serb onslaught inside Bosnia, he 
asserted, the deployment of US ground troops into the fray was not necessarily the 
answer either. 'Things sometimes just go wrong', Cohen concluded, 'That was the 
experience of Vietnam and no rule of nature says it cannot be repeated'. 
49 
Thus, whilst Clinton's early deployment- advocacy had set Vietnam radars 
buzzing in Washington, it was clear that his climb-down from this position had done 
little to change things. With unrest mounting, Clinton's search for an effective Bosnia 
policy - one which would meet his election promise to 
do something about the crisis, 
and which would please both domestic opponents and proponents of US intervention 
in Bosnia - now began in earnest. It was an endeavour which soon 
faltered. 
49 Richard Cohen, 'The Toughest Case of All', The Washington Post, 27h April 1993. 
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The arresting of the Clinton Bosnia policy: the Europeans reject 'lift-and-strike' 
The military strategy Clinton finally settled upon for his Bosnia policy vividly 
reflected his new-found aversion to risky ground operations inside Bosnia. Ten-ned 
'lift-and-strike', the strategy was simple and - to the United States, at least - nsk-free. 
It entailed, firstly, lifting the UN-imposed arms embargo against the Bosnian Muslims 
(despite the fact that Clinton knew of the illicit anns trail between Iran and the 
Bosnian government in Sarajevo); secondly, it entailed punishing Serb transgressions 
through NATO air-strikes. On I" May, 1993, Secretary of State Warren Christopher 
left for London, Paris, Moscow, Brussels, Bonn and Rome in order to solicit allied 
support for the strategy. 50 
Christopher's departure exposed what would become a characteristically fickle 
domestic attitude towards America's relationship with the Bosnian War. For all that 
Congress had been pressurising the White House to get tough on the Bosnian Serbs, 
the Secretary of State's departure - on a diplomatic mission tasked with persuading 
America's allies to do just that - sparked bipartisan legislative criticisms that the 
administration was now planning an aerial military offensive without consultation. 
Representative Bill Richardson (Dem. NM) denounced Christopher's mission, 
declaring (in yet another misreading of what current opinion polls appeared to 
suggest) that Americans did not support US air-strikes. He then accused 
Clinton of 
secrecy over his Bosnia policy: 
50 Daalder (2000), p. 15. 
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Given the fact that Bosnia could become a Vietnam quagmire if we are not careful, it 
is critically important that the Congress fully debate and authorize such an action. 
The President needs to bring in the American people on his decision. 51 
Republicans also invoked the Vietnam experience as they criticised the 
administration's latest actions. Representative Jim Ramstad (Rep. MN) cautioned 
that: 
Before we put one American pilot or troop in harm's way, the President must clearly 
define our national interest and mission. As General Colin Powell has told us, before 
we send troops into a dangerous situation, we must have a precise mission statement 
that defines how we get in, accomplish our goals, and get out. So far, we have not 
seen such a well-defined strategy from the President. We must not repeat the 
nightmare of Vietnam. As one who lost three friends in Vietnam, it is downright 
eerie to hear another President talk about bombing his enemies to the negotiating 
table. 52 
Reference to Vietnam was not confined to debates on Capitol Hill. Media 
commentary on the crisis continued to be similarly themed, perhaps most strikingly in 
Time Magazine, whose front cover featured pictures of President Clinton and 
President Lyndon Johnson, with the caption: 'Anguish over Bosnia. Will it be 
Clinton's VietnamT Clinton responded by acknowledging America's Vietnam 
concerns but also by reiterating his commitment to do something about Bosnia's 
spiralling civilian disaster: 
51 Bill Richardson, 'Military Engagement in Bosnia', Remarks in House of Representatives, 6th May 
1993. * NIB - unless stated otherwise, all of the congressional 
debates and comments cited in this 
study can be found (by date/legislator's name & comments 'title') at Library of Congress' Thomas 
search facility: http: //thomas. loc. gov/home/rI 04query. html 
52 Jim Ramstad, 'President Has Not Defined Bosnia Strategy', Remarks in House of Representatives, 
1 Ith May 1993. 
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I'm trying to proceed in a very deliberate way to try to make sure there isn't a 
Vietnam problem here. But also to try to make sure that the United States keeps 
pushing to save lives and confine the conflict. I don't think we can just turn away 
from this. Just because we don't want to make the mistakes we did in Vietnam 
doesn't mean we shouldn't be doing anything. 53 
Secretary of State Christopher's failure to sell 'lift-and-strike' to the allies quickly 
arrested these debates. From the White House perspective, the refusal of France and 
Britain to accept the Clinton initiative was the crucial blow. Having shouldered the 
bulk of the transatlantic Bosnia policy between them - they had contributed the 
overwhelming majority of troops to UNPROFOR - Paris and London vehemently 
opposed any lifting of the arms embargo for the Bosnian government. Doing so, they 
argued, would flood Bosnia with more weapons and place French and British 
peacekeeping troops operating inside Bosnia under even greater threat. 
54 
There were, however, other significant factors underlying the Anglo-French 
rejection of 'lift-and-strike'. As had been the case when George Bush was in the 
White House, Paris and London deeply resented the current American President's 
refusal to share the 'peacekeeping risk' and deploy US troops alongside European 
troops inside Bosnia. Unhappy with Clinton's efforts to dictate and lead a new 
transatlantic Bosnia policy which held risks only for his allies, Paris and London thus 
accompanied their rejection of 'lift-and-strike' with a stark warning to the 
VAite 
House; any move to unilaterally lift the arms embargo would see British and French 
troops withdrawn from UNPROFOR, effectively disbanding the UN's peacekeeping 
mission. This would leave President Clinton with no option 
but to make good on his 
1h 
53 President Clinton, 'Interview with Don Imus of WFAN radio, New York City, May 12 
1993. 
Available at the US Government Printing Office archives 
(accessed I" October 2008) at: 
http: //frwebgate6. access. gpo. gov/cgi- 
bin/TEXTgate. cgi? WAISdoclD=323798474536+16+1+0&WAISaction--retrieve 
The Time cover is available to view at: http: //www. time. com/time/covers/0, 
I 6641,19930517,00. htnil 
54 Daalder (2000), p. 17; Chollet (2005), pp. 3&7. 
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commitment to send US forces into Bosnia to oversee UNPROFOR's withdrawal. 
With UNPROFOR gone, the Americans might then even face the possibility of 
having to intervene militarily on behalf of the Bosnian government itself. 
55 For 
President Clinton, this scenario was unthinkable and, taking the view that keeping US 
troops out of Bosnia could only be guaranteed by keeping UNPROFOR in, he decided 
to placate his two key allies; 'lift- and-strike' was shelved. 56 
Justifying inaction: Bosnia is like Vietnam 
Back in the United States, Clinton's concession was criticised as yet another climb- 
down from his bold election pledges and a further betrayal of Bosnia's civilians. 
Newspaper editorials reminded the President that whilst few Americans supported 
unilateral US military action in Bosnia, high numbers continued to support the United 
States taking military action 'along with its allies in Europe'. 57 Under pressure, and 
with no apparent solution to the current transatlantic impasse over Bosnia policy, the 
Clinton White House now began copying its predecessor in an effort to justify its 
continuing inaction over the crisis - it started publicly emphasising the 'Vietnamness' 
of Bosnia. 58 With no clear pathway to follow, damage control now seemed to be the 
key imperative. As one Clinton aide memorably declared, the administration's 
mindset was: 'Bosnia is going to be a quagmire. Let's not make it our quagmire'. In 
55 Ibid, pp. 1-9; Daalder (2000), pp. 18,61-63. See also: Elaine Sciolino, 'Christopher Explains 
Conditions For Use of US Force in Bosnia'. New York Times, 28"' April, 1993; Bruce B. Auster, 
'Heading over there? Chances are growing that US troops will enter the Bosnia conflict'. US News & 
World Report, 19'h December, 1994, pp. 40 & 42. 
56 Sobel (1998), pp. 264 & 265; Morris (1997), pp. 247-248. 
57 Richard Sobel (1998), 'Trends: United States Intervention in Bosnia', Public Opinion Quarterly, 
Volume 62, issue 2, (Summer 1998), pp. 264 & 265; Morris (1997), pp. 247-248. 
58 Henriksen (1996), p. 15; Press Briefing by George Stephanopoulos, 4th 
May 1993. 
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subsequent interviews, Secretary of State Christopher described Bosnia as 'a 
quagmire' and 'a morass'. 'If US troops are put in there', he warned, 'they'll be there 
for an indefinite period of time'. 59 
Despite these sentiments, however, and very much in keeping with the 
indecisiveness which would come to characterise his Bosnia policy, Clinton's 
deployment-aversions appeared to crumble as the siege of Sarajevo became the latest 
bleak event to focus international attention on Bosnia. Since the onset of hostilities, 
the Bosnian capital had been under near-constant bombardment from Serbian artillery 
batteries positioned on the mountains which surrounded the city. The shelling had 
killed nearly 10,000 people and, with aid supplies into the city greatly hindered, 
Sarajevo was now starving. Having been shocked when he watched a harrowing 
CNN report from the city, Clinton ordered his NSA Anthony Lake to re-examine all 
the options on Bosnia - including the introduction of US ground forces. 60 
At this point, there seemed every likelihood that this option would be broadly 
supported in the United States - PIPA polling indicated that 76% of Americans 
supported the introduction of US troops into Bosnia as part of a multilateral 
peacekeeping operation. 61 However, whilst the domestic climate appeared to remain 
permissive for Clinton to solicit allied support for a ground offensive into Bosnia, he 
backed away from this option yet again. Once more, it was the pessimistically lofty 
projections of the military chiefs - Vice-Chairman Admiral David Jeremiah 
contended that 70,000 troops would be required to relieve Sarajevo - which put pay to 
Clinton's timid deployment-advocacy. Having rejected the option of ground forces, 
59 Warren Christopher, 'ABC News Nightline Interview with the Secretary of State Warren 
Christopher', 25th May 1993. Available at the Department of State's US Policy in Bosnia site: 
http: //www. state. gov/www/regions/eur/bosnia/bostal2. html. See also Drew (1995), p. 155. 
60 Chollet (2005), p. 5; Daalder (2000), p. 19. 
61 PIPA poll (1994), cited in Sobel (2001), p. 187. In contrast to the generally strong support for US 
involvement in multilateral operations, support for unilateral US ground operations inside Bosnia was 
rarely high; indeed, it was typically low. 
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the President decided once more to try and persuade the Europeans to coalesce around 
the 'safe' option of using NATO airpower. 62 With the deteriorating situation in 
Sarajevo providing an emotional undercurrent of leverage to persuade his allies, 
Clinton articulated three key aims for his new strategy: firstly, to end the Serbs' 
strangulation of Bosnia's capital; secondly, to assist UNPROFOR troops in protecting 
six Bosnian Muslim 'safe areas' threatened by the Serbs; thirdly, using the threat of 
NATO power to try and force the Bosnian Serbs into negotiations. 63 
Clinton's plan required formal NATO agreement and it took a 'rancorous' 
sixteen-hour meeting of the North Atlantic Council (NAC) on 2d August, before the 
Americans managed to secure it. However, the conditions of agreement were 
extremely significant. Still resentful of Washington's deployment- aversions, France 
and Britain only gave their consent to the Clinton plan on the condition that NATO 
air-strikes were first agreed by both NATO and UNPROFOR command. Under this 
'dual-key' arrangement, both bodies would have to formally give the go-ahead - 'turn 
their key' - before any air-strikes could proceed. 
64 Facing yet another public 
embarrassment if he was seen to be unable to convince his NATO allies, Clinton had 
little option but to accept these stipulations. When announced, the agreement was 
publicly presented as a step forward; in reality, it was nothing of the sort and Clinton 
knew it. It ensured that a weak UN mission was now further compromised by a 
'dual-key' arrangement which allowed Britain and France - who held influential roles 
in UNPROFOR command and who continued to resent the White House's 
depl oyment- aversions - to refuse any air-strikes they felt would threaten their troops 
inside Bosnia. It was, in sum, an arrangement which ensured the continuation of a 
62 Herspring (2005), p. 357. 
63 Daalder (2000), pp. 19-21; Chollet (2005), p. 5. 
64 Author interview with General George Joulwan (USA, retired), Arlington, Virginia, I Ith May 2006. 
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toothless UNPROFOR mission, one which, as Bosnia's atrocities escalated, 
threatened to fracture the transatlantic relationship. 65 Back in Washington, acrimony 
over America's involvement in Bosnia was to come much sooner. 
Bloodshed in Mogadishu and humiliation in Port-au-Prince; Vietnam shadows 
darken over Washington 
If the August NAC agreement closed the door on any imminent US troop deployment 
to Bosnia, events on another continent effectively slammed that door shut. On 3rd 
October 1993,18 US soldiers participating in the UN mission in Somalia were killed 
66 in a major fire-fight on the streets of Mogadishu. As Americans watched harrowing 
television pictures of a dead US soldier being dragged through the city in front of 
baying crowds, a stunned Congress turned its ire towards the White House. 
Legislators ordered the President to 'get his foreign policy right before Somalia 
becomes another Vietnam' whilst others demanded an end to American involvement 
in UN peacekeeping missions altogether. The Mogadishu battle had a significant 
impact upon both the Clinton administration and its foreign policy. It not only 
marked the end of American involvement in what political and media critics quickly 
started calling 'Vietmalia'; it also dismembered any significant consensus of domestic 
support for an offensive US ground intervention into Bosnia. 
67 
Incredibly, given that Washington was ringing to the sound of buzzing 
Vietnam radars, Clinton found himself under pressure to take military action just days 
65 Clinton (2004), p. 534; Daalder (2000), pp. 21-23; Chollet (2005), p. 5. 
66 Henriksen (1996), p. 11. 
67 Power (2002), p. 317; McCrisken (2003), pp. 167-168; Hendrickson (1998), p. 243. 
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later. Even as the political maelstrom was ensuing over Mogadishu, members of the 
Black Caucus in Congress had remained focussed upon the ongoing violence in Haiti 
and now demanded that President Clinton do something to address it. Having 
overthrown Haiti's first democratically elected President, Jean-Bertrand Aristide, in 
September 1991, the military junta of General Raoul Cedras was continuing to 
terrorise Aristide followers, despite the fact that delegations representing both sides 
had signed up to a UN-brokered agreement aimed at restoring Anstide to power. 
With thousands of Haitian refugees fleeing towards the Florida coast (and making 
headline news in the United States), Clinton responded to these congressional 
demands, despite the fact that the smoke from Washington's Somalia debates had 
hardly cleared. 
On I Ith October, he deployed the USS Harlan County to Haiti, as the 
vanguard of the international effort to reinstate the country's democratic 
govenunent. 68 However, the ship arrived in Port-au-Prince to find the harbour lined 
with Cedras supporters, many armed and shouting - in an ominous allusion to the 
events of recent days - 'Somalia! Somalia! ' 
69 With a confrontation-free debarkation 
clearly out of the question, the Harlan County waited offshore all day as the Clinton 
administration discussed a Plan B. There wasn't one. So soon after Mogadishu, 
George Stephanopoulos recalls, 'no-one had the stomach for another fight' and the 
ship was eventually ordered to leave. 70 
The incident was a major international embarrassment for the United States 
and it inflamed criticisms of Clinton's foreign policy. Publicly, Clinton accepted the 
blame. Privately, however, he was irate; he lambasted his 'screwed-up foreign policy 
68 DiPrizio (2002), pp. 86-92; Dobson & Marsh (2006), pp. 189-190. 
69 Halberstam (200 1), p. 27 1; Herspring (2005), pp. 352-353. 
70 Ibid; George Stephanopoulos (1999), All Too Human. A Political Education, Little Brown & 
Company, New York, p. 217. 
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team' and complained that President Reagan had been far better served by his people 
over the crises in Lebanon and Grenada. 
71 In the following days, he reprimanded his 
National Security Advisor Anthony Lake over the Harlan County incident. He also 
continued brooding over the decision of his Defence Secretary, Les Aspin, to refuse 
the military's request for more tanks in Somalia, shortly before the Mogadishu 
debacle. With the backlash from that fateful clash still raging, Clinton dwelt on the 
question many were now asking: would providing the military the protection they had 
asked for in September have averted the carnage in Mogadishu the following month? 
Clinton replaced Aspin in January. 72 
Clinton was now really feeling the strains of the foreign policy front. He was 
politically vulnerable, frustrated and also physically exhausted. He found no respite. 
The Mogadishu setback continued to haunt him and the event had served to increase 
the intensity of Washington's ongoing debates over US involvement in Bosnia. 73 
Whilst deployment-opposition had hardened in some quarters, 'liberal critics' in the 
media continued demanding that US troops be sent to the Balkans, demands which 
pushed Clinton's notorious temper to breaking point. Stephanopoulos recalls that the 
President would sometimes explode in exasperation: "What would they have me do? 
What the fuck would they have me do? ý74 As Bosnia's convolutions continued, 
increasing the pressure still further, Clinton would find few satisfactory answers to 
that question. 
71 Ibid, p. 217; Halberstam (2001), pp. 272-273. 
72 Herspring (2005), pp. 348-349 & 353; Stephanopoulos (1999), p. 218. Two days before the 
Mogadishu fire-fight, CJS Colin Powell had privately suggested to Clinton that he replace Aspin. The 
replacement was announced on 24th January 1994. See Drew (1994), pp. 356-373. 
73 Clinton (2004), p. 552. 
74 Stephanopoulos (1999), p. 215; Henriksen (1996), pp. 12-13; Record (2002), pp. 115-116. 
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A frustrated retreat from 'assertive multilateralism' 
Clinton's increasing disillusionment with America's international entanglements was 
vividly reflected in Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 25. Released on 25 th May 
1994, this foreign policy directive articulated 'a comprehensive policy framework 
suited to the realities of the post-Cold War period'. 75 Perhaps its most significant 
aspect was its climb-down from the administration's early commitment to 'assertive 
multilateralism', something which Mogadishu - and ongoing Bosnia frustrations - 
had prompted. 76 PDD-25 also declared a greater foreign policy role for Congress. 
However, Clinton's Bosnia policy - such as it was - had thus far demonstrated little 
concern for legislative involvement and would very much continue in this vein, 
despite PDD-25's commitment to the contrary. Indeed, just over a month after PDD- 
25's release, Clinton positioned yet another decision-making 'layer' between Capitol 
Hill and America's Bosnia policy, when he organised a five-country 'Contact Group' 
(with Germany, France, Britain and Russia) tasked with better co-ordinating 
international strategy on Bosnia. 77 Still smarting from Somalia, congressional 
Republicans now expressed anger that a 'baggage-laden' UN and other national 
governments were having a greater say in America's Bosnia policy than the American 
legislature itself As the 'Republican Revolution' saw the GOP win both Houses in 
the November 1994 mid-term elections, a spirited 104th Congress steeled itself to 
address this issue. 
78 
75 DiPrizio (2002), p. 173. 
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A legislative renaissance? 
The 104 th Congress convened with Republicans eager to start enacting their much- 
touted ten-point policy platfonn, the Contract With America. The National Security 
Revitalization Bill (NSRB) was introduced in January of 1995, stipulating, amongst 
other things, that White House-UN peacekeeping decisions should have prior 
congressional approval, that US forces operating in UN operations should be under 
US command, and that Congress should be notified 15 days prior to any UN Security 
Council vote on requests for additional peacekeeping funds. The bill passed on the 
House floor (241-181) with near-unanimous Republican support. 79 The Senate also 
acted. Senator Bob Dole (Rep. KS) introduced a Peace Powers Act which sought to 
expand presidential latitude in defending US interests whilst, at the same time, placing 
formal limitations upon the President's ability to deploy US troops in UN operations. 
Dole summed up the prevailing Republican mood with one succinct declaration 'We 
need to rein in the blank check on UN peacekeeping. ' 80 
However, Clinton was not to be out-manoeuvred and he promptly exerted his 
authority as Commander-in-Chief Given that the cornerstone of his Bosnia policy 
was to keep UNPROFOR inside Bosnia in order to keep US forces out, he resisted 
efforts to wrest America's Bosnia policy away from the current UN pathway. In an 
apparent overlooking of the sentiments expressed in PDD-25, the President warned 
senior Republicans that the NSRB violated his constitutional authority and that 
mandatory legislative consultation would limit his ability to 'protect US interests 
79 Hendrickson (1998), p. 243. 
80 Committee on Foreign Relations, US Senate, 'The Peace Powers Act (S-5) and the National Security 
Revitalization Act (H. R. 7)', 21" March 1995, cited in Hendrickson (1998), p. 246. 
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n 1-ý 
81 
Abroad'. Clinton made it clear that 
he would veto both bills if necessary. Doubting 
that a clear two-thirds majority existed in the Senate which could successfully over- 
ride the promised presidential veto, Senate Republicans backed down and ultimately 
never pursued the NSRB proposals. 82 
Clinton thus ably withstood the first salvos of the Republican Revolution, even 
though the Bosnia policy he was now guarding so covetously was an undisguised 
failure. 83 After the Bosnian Serbs stepped up their assault on the UN 'safe area' of 
Bihac, Clinton pushed to defend the town with NATO air-strikes. However, having 
initially consented, Paris and London soon halted the strikes, fearful of Serb 
retaliations against their troops on the ground. Eager not to jeopardise the allies' 
commitment to UNPROFOR, Clinton conceded. It was a decision which effectively 
abandoned Bihac to its fate. 84 Bosnian government forces ultimately held onto Bihac 
without NATO, but this episode made it crystal clear that the West's willingness to 
take risks in Bosnia was now wafer-thin. Angry and humiliated at the transparency of 
their own failings, some European officials openly declared that transatlantic efforts 
to end Bosnia's war were at a 'total dead end' and they vented their anger at 
Washington for continuing to withhold US troops from Bosnia. The French Foreign 
Minister Alain Juppe openly criticised the Clinton administration, telling his National 
Assembly that they want to 'give us lessons when they have not lifted one little finger 
to put even one man on the ground. ý85 
81 Kenneth T Walsh, 'A Polarising President'. US News & World Report, 7 th November 1994, pp. 41. 
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The deployment of US troops remained the locus of debate back in 
Washington as well. A Republican-dominated Capitol Hill continued to push for a 
lifting of the arms embargo as the most prudent (and risk-free) option for America's 
Bosnia policy and vehemently rejected any possibility of US troops joining a feeble 
UN mission. However, other sections of the America Public-political arena continued 
to argue for a more forceful US engagement with the crisis and as domestic media 
coverage of Bosnia's atrocities continued unabated, Clinton complained to aides that 
the American media were trying to force him to get involved in Bosnia's war. 
Washington's intervention-nonintervention debates were also fed by 
competing perspectives from within the US military itself Whilst some senior 
military figures now advocated intervention as the only realistic way of ending the 
conflict - the Supreme Allied Commander of US Forces in Europe (SACEUR) 
himself, General George Joulwan, was adamant that 'the US must put troops on the 
ground'; a policy of bombing alone, he advised, 'would not work' - deployment- 
aversions on Capitol Hill continued to be nourished by three and four-star Generals 
whose congressional testimonies preached a very different story: that 'the Germans 
lost two or three divisions in the Balkans' during the Second World War, and that 
'body-bags would be coming home by the thousands' should US troops be 
deployed. 86 The issue of casualties and exit strategies was continuing to dominate the 
agenda. 'The Vietnamese may be in terrible shape', Meg Greenfield of the 
Washington Post noted sardonically of Washington's Bosnia debates, 'but they have 
certainly got their revenge'. 87 
86 Author interview with General George Joulwan (USA, retired), Arlington, Virginia, I 1'h May 2006. 
See also, Morris (1997), p. 245. 
87 Greenfield cited in Isaacs (1997), p. 95. No source cited. 
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The death-throes of UNPROFOR: US troops to go into Bosnia at last? 
As the transatlantic debates raged, the Bosnian Serb onslaught continued apace. 
Through 1995, they continued to dominate huge swathes of Bosnia. The conflict had 
now killed around 200,000 people and displaced 3 million others. 88 A frustrated 
President Clinton continued to badger his foreign policy team for new policy 
alternatives - 'I never get other options; I never get other information', he complained 
- and his administration continued stimulating Vietnam sensitivities in its efforts to 
justify the withholding of US troops and a near-catatonic transatlantic Bosnia policy. 89 
On 91h March, Defence Secretary William Perry (who had replaced Les Aspin in 
January 1994) warned Americans that 'Bosnia is wooded, mountainous and often 
blanketed by clouds'. He then went onto detail why 'sending American troops for 
ground combat in Bosnia is a nonstarter'. During the course of what was a relatively 
short speech, Perry explicitly mentioned the incurring of US casualties on ten separate 
occasions, frequently allying these references to emotive phrases, such as the 'spilling 
of American blood'. 90 In subsequent speeches during this period, Perry confirmed 
that US casualties 'would be massive' if American forces entered Bosnia. 91 cis 
General John Shalikashvili also emphasised the probability of US casualties, 
reminding Americans that 'A number of our European partners have had soldiers 
killed [in Bosnia] ... we should not overlook the significance of that. 
' 92 
88 Henriksen (1996), p. 16. 
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However, even as the administration continued trying to persuade Americans 
against the wisdom of US military intervention into Bosnia, the passage of the 
conflict was actually making that outcome more likely. After the Bosnian Serbs 
renewed their shelling of Sarajevo, NATO conducted retaliatory air-strikes against 
them, only for the Serbs to respond by taking over 350 UNPROFOR troops hostage. 
This act achieved precisely what the Bosnian Serb leadership had hoped for - fearful 
of exacerbating the situation and placing their troops in even greater danger, the 
European leaders now refused to turn their 'keys' for further air-strikes. Some talked 
of withdrawing their troops altogether. 93 
With air-strikes now seemingly ruled out as a policy option, and with 
UNPROFOR now apparently hamstrung, the transatlantic Bosnia policy appeared to 
be stumbling towards one inevitable outcome: Op-Plan 4014, the NATO operations 
plan for overseeing the withdrawal of UNPROFOR troops from Bosnia. Described 
by one senior US military figure as a 'major war plan', Op-Plan 4014 required the 
United States to provide helicopters and up to 25,000 of the 60,000 NATO troops 
tasked with evacuating UN peacekeepers from designated landing-zones inside 
Bosnia, possibly under Bosnian Serb fire. 94 
From the Oval Office, this turn of events looked disastrous. If the Europeans 
really did decide to disband UNPROFOR, Clinton knew that he had no choice but to 
make good on his commitment and send US troops into a conflict-zone which was too 
dangerous even for an international peacekeeping force. He pondered darkly the 
political damage that this turn of events might do him. Not only was his 
administration keenly aware that 'little public relations groundwork had been laid' for 
such an operation but the financial cost of OP-Plan 4014 - $700 million to the United 
93 Chollet (2005), p. 8; Daalder (2000), pp. 154-155. 
94 Halberstam (2001), p. 306; Chollet (2005), pp. 9& 12. 
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States alone - virtually guaranteed confrontation with the Republican-dominated 
Congress. 95 In short, UNPROFOR's imminent withdrawal loomed large as a political 
- and perhaps a military - disaster for Clinton. He needed a new policy - and fast. 
Agonising over the oPtions 
As the Clinton administration brainstormed how to keep UNPROFOR inside Bosnia, 
the recently elected French President Jacques Chirac now offered a bold new strategy 
for doing just that. Incensed after seeing pictures of French troops tied to Bosnian 
Serb artillery pieces, Chirac telephoned Clinton on 27 th May, suggesting the 
deployment of a heavily-anned Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) tasked with protecting 
UNPROFOR troops inside Bosnia. 96 Clinton supported the plan, in no small part 
because it required Washington to provide various logistical and intelligence support 
but not troops. The RRF, consisting 10,000 French, British and Dutch troops, was 
operational by early July. 97 
Despite this apparent step forward in the transatlantic Bosnia policy, the 
situation inside Bosnia continued to deteriorate and the Clinton administration 
continued to struggle with domestic discord over the crisis. In the aftermath of the 
RRF agreement, the administration met to decide how they might further shore up the 
allies' commitment to UNPROFOR so that Op-Plan 4014 could be avoided once and 
for all. It was agreed that the administration would announce that - should the need 
arise - it would deploy US troops to Bosnia to help relocate UN peacekeepers to 
more defensible positions. However, whilst the administration viewed this 
95 Daalder (2000), p. 48-49. 
96 Ibid., pp. 8,11 & 12; Halberstam (2001), p. 303. 
97 Daalder (2000), pp. 44-45. 
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deployment as a commitment which would only be enacted in a worse-case- scenario, 
Clinton's announcement of the administration's new position - he declared that the 
administration would 'assist' NATO in reconfigunng or strengthening UNPROFOR 
troops inside Bosnia, stressing that this would only be a 'temporary use of our ground 
forces' (emphasis added) - prompted 'uproar' on Capitol Hill and wild media 
speculation over what was behind this apparently seismic policy shift. Then, even as 
this latest domestic uproar over Bosnia unfolded, an American F-16 pilot was shot 
down over Bosnia by a Bosnian Serb missile. The incident allowed political and 
media critics to make comparisons between the plight of the pilot and that of 
American Prisoners of War (POWs) in Vietnam, a subject which has remained one of 
the most poignant and enduring associations with the Vietnam War for many 
Americans. Then, with Vietnam radars in Washington sensitised once more, the 
capital's 'raucous frenzy' over Bosnia increased still further. 98 
Having attended a Defence Ministers' meeting in Paris on 3 rd June, Defence 
Secretary William Perry returned to Washington and briefed senior legislators that the 
recently agreed RRF would be under the command of each contributing nation. This 
information was in fact wrong. Incredibly, Perry had left the Paris meeting early and 
he was unaware of a tardy agreement that the RRF should be under general 
UNPROFOR command. Aside from the fact that the Defence Secretary had returned 
to Washington with entirely the wrong infonnation, the late decision to tie the RRF to 
UNPROFOR also had significant financial implications; it meant that the US was 
obligated to pay 31.7% of its $300 million cost. On discovering this, an incredulous 
Congress refused to sanction the funds, forcing Clinton - undeterred by what he 
98 Chollet (2005), pp. 13-14; Stephanopoulos (1999), p. 355; Author interview with former State 
Department official, Dr William Schneider Jr. Washington DC 10"May, 2006. 
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dismissed as partisan fiscal obstinacy - to blatantly circumvent leg'slators and draw 
$50 million for the RRF operation from the existing Defence Department budget. 99 
Clinton may have been flexing his muscles as Commander-in-Chief but both 
he and his Bosnia policy were now coming under heavy criticism from legislators and 
the media alike. He quickly moved to quell what some of his administration officials 
were describing as a 'national stonn'. 100 Clinton publicly reiterated that US troops 
would be deployed to Bosnia only if there were 'a genuine peace' in Bosnia or if 
UNPROFOR troops were 'stranded'. The latter scenario, he stressed, was 'highly 
unlikely'. 10 1 Defence Secretary Perry also made a public statement aimed at 
demonstrating to Americans that the White House was well aware of the folly of 
sending US troops in Bosnia's war. He returned to a familiar theme in delivering this 
message - to enter the war, he declared, would entail 'the commitment of several 
hundred thousand troops, a long war and thousands of casualties'. 'If you follow 
these proposals to their natural conclusion', he asserted, 'they lead down a slippery 
slope to the same unintended consequence ... the 
drawing in of American combat 
troops. ' 102 
By this stage, feeling as if they were merely lurching from one crisis to the 
next on Bosnia, many administration figures were now convinced that it was 
Washington's 'key allies', France and Britain, who were the major obstacle to 
progress on the crisis. This feeling was apparent when, in mid-June, NSA Anthony 
Lake circulated a new plan for US policy on Bosnia. Lake's plan was bold in the 
extreme - although it could not possibly 
be admitted in public, it actually allowed 
UNPROFOR to fail so that it would be withdrawn from Bosnia. With UNPROFOR 
99 Daalder (2000), pp. 50-51 &54. 
'00 Stephanopoulos (1999), p. 355. 
101 Clinton cited in Morris (1997), pp. 253-254. 
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now out of the picture, Lake reasoned that the United States would then be able to 
dictate policy, absent the hindrance of Anglo-French protestations. With no French or 
British peacekeeping troops on the ground to worry about, he sunnised that the 
administration would effectively have carte blanche to organise and conduct the 
massive NATO air offensive that President Clinton had long advocated. 
Lake's plan was positively received by many Clinton officials but it was 
clearly an extremely risky strategy. It seemed strong on practical simplicity vis-a-vis 
the current situation but President Clinton knew that it would be a public relations 
disaster, one which might also have serious implications for the future of NATO. 
Lake's strategy may have willingly let the feeble UN mission fail but there was little 
doubt that the North Atlantic alliance would also be implicated in this failure since it 
was, after all, NATO's key members who had failed to implement a decisive military 
strategy for stopping the Bosnian Serb anny. With questions still being asked about 
the viability of a Post-Cold War NATO, and knowing that any UNPROFOR 
withdrawal required a substantial US military commitment, Clinton decided to 
persevere with UNPROFOR, despite the criticism that its failures were continuing to 
heap upon him. 
103 
The continuing policy stalemate reinvigorated Clinton's disgruntlement with 
his foreign policy team. It also stirred tensions within the team itself 
104 Christopher 
and Perry complained to Clinton over Anthony Lake's secrecy, arguing that 
it was the 
NSA Is guardedness over policy which was causing so much of the administration's 
disjointedness. Lake denied these accusations. Clinton himself also received 
complaints from the State Department when neither they nor representatives of 
the US 
mission to the UN were invited to a White House 
'defence meeting' about OP-Plan 
103 Halberstam (2001), p. 312. 
104 Stephanopoulos (1999), p. 355. 
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4014 and the RRF. 105 As the administration's Bosnia meetings increasingly turned 
into frustrated arguments over goals and strategy, one of Clinton's most influential 
advisors, Dick Morris -a man reviled by most of Clinton's foreign policy team - 
started covertly soliciting 'expert' opinion from outside the government on the 
viability of a unilateral American bombing campaign against Serbia itself. With 
. C--- trustration and desperation exerting an increasingly finn grip on a disjointed Clinton 
team, events in Bosnia were soon to force the President's hand. 106 
Pushed over the abyss 
On 6 th july 1995, Bosnian Serb forces overran the UN-guarded 'safe area' of 
Srebrenica. Over the next week or so, they massacred around 8,000 Muslim men and 
boys who had sought refuge there. It was Europe's biggest single massacre since the 
Second World War. 107 Amidst the international outrage, French President Jacques 
Chirac lambasted the 'congenital impotence' of the UN before turning his ire towards 
Clinton's continued dithering over the crisis: 'there is no leader of the Atlantic 
alliance', he carped; the 'position of the leader of the free world is vacant. ' Adamant 
that the West now had to use decisive military force against the Serbs, Chirac 
implored Clinton to re-take Srebrenica by force and pushed to protect Bosnia's 
remaining 6 safe areas 1, starting by fast-tracking 1,000 RRF troops to 
Gorazde, the 
next town the Serbs would likely target. 
108 
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On Capitol Hill, patience had also worn thin with a seemingly rudderless 
Clinton Bosnia policy. Hearing the White House continue to declare that it did not 
want to risk 'Americanizing the war' and putting US troops 'significantly at risk', 
both Democrat and Republican legislators decided that enough was enough. 109 
Arguing that if the West would not defend them, the Bosnian government should at 
least be allowed to defend itself, the Senate Republican leader Robert Dole and 
Connecticut Senator Joe Lieberman now pushed to sweep aside Clinton's prolonged 
refusal to formally end the UN arms embargo against the Sarajevo goverment. The 
Dole-Lieberman bill looked likely to have sufficient bipartisan support to over-ride 
Clinton's promised veto and the Senate voted to lift the an-ns embargo on 26 th jUly; 
the House did so six days later. ' 10 This was the very last thing that Clinton needed; if 
Congress was to vote to lift the embargo, France and Britain would likely make good 
on their UNPROFOR evacuation threats and that meant US troops going into Bosnia. 
President Clinton felt squeezed by the post-Srebrenica backlash. He privately 
supported lifting the arms embargo (indeed, he and his 'inner-circle' had willingly 
maintained the White House's 'don't ask, don't tell' stance, vis-a-vis the secret 
Iranian arms shipments) but he remained adamantly opposed to anything which might 
prompt the need for a US-led UNPROFOR withdrawal operation. "' Clinton also 
resented that it was the bullish President Chirac - now being referred to as the 
'Gaullist bulldozer' in some sections of the American media - who was now widely 
1995. The Balkan Institute. Accessed 8h July 2008 at: 
http: //www. publicintemationallaw. org/programs/balkans/archives/1995/BW227. DOC;. 
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seen to be leading the transatlantic response to Srebrenica. 112 Clinton complained that 
he was 'getting creamed' over Bosnia and he badgered his foreign policy team for 
options: 'Why aren't my people doing more for me? Why can't I have a new policy9' 
Clinton also vented his frustrations at the UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros- 
Ghali who, Clinton argued, was 'too weak' and 'won't stand up and take action' on 
Bosnia. 113 
For all his castigations, however, Clinton seemed blind to the role that his own 
weaknesses and indecisions were continuing to play in precluding decisive action 
over Bosnia. Since late 1994, US military commanders had been 'panic planning' in 
their uncertainty over what mission - UNPROFOR withdrawal, UNPROFOR 
reinforcement or a continuation of the current policy meander - the administration 
favoured and for all his resentment at Chirac's post-Srebrenica status, Clinton's 
thoughts on how to deal with the Bosnian Serb onslaught were positively timid when 
compared to those of his charismatic French counterpart. ' 14 Bill Morris's memoirs 
are telling; he recalls that in White House Bosnia meetings throughout this period, 
Clinton continued using the word can't as he rhymed off a litany of reasons as to why 
he could not push through his preferred strategies on the crisis. At one such meeting, 
Morris challenged the President: 'what do you mean can't? You're commander-in- 
chief; where does can't come from 
115 
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Inching towards an endgame strategy 
It was not just President Chirac's post-Srebrenica international standing which fed 
President Clinton's discomfort. Chirac's bold plan for protecting Bosnia's remaining 
'safe areas' placed Clinton under considerable pressure. The French premier's 
insistence that Gorazde be militarily reinforced by RRF troops - those troops 
transported and supported by US helicopters - publicly threw down the gauntlet to 
Clinton, who knew that an American refusal would give the impression of White 
House indifference in the face of the Srebrenica massacre. 
Despite the considerable imperative to act, however, Clinton officials were 
extremely sceptical about the French plan. They were especially concerned that it 
would put American helicopters at the vanguard of the challenge to the Bosnian Serb 
offensive. Furthermore, despite its designation as a 'beefed-up' military force, 
Clinton officials harboured doubts over the efficacy of the RRF once it was in theatre. 
It would, after all, still be operating within the existing weak UN framework. 
Unhappy at these prospects, President Clinton continued to focus upon a massive 
NATO air campaign as the most viable way of ending the Bosnian Serbs' 
stranglehold. After a series of meetings to discuss the Goradze reinforcement plan, 
his administration agreed that since the French plan was dependent upon the use of 
NATO airpower to disable Bosnian Serb positions which might threaten both the RRF 
troops and their transportation into theatre, it surely made more sense simply to use 
airpower in the first instance - in other words, to use NATO warplanes to actively 
head off Serb aggression rather than to employ them only once that aggression 
appeared to be underway. 
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Convinced that this was the surest (and most risk-free) strategy, the 
administration now stepped up the pressure on its key European partners to support it. 
Clinton officials embarked upon a series of diplomatic initiatives aimed at convincing 
the allies to support a policy which would see any Serb moves to threaten Gorazde 
trigger NATO retaliation - significantly, however, Clinton officials made it clear that 
this retaliation would not just be 'pinprick' air-strikes against the transgressing Serb 
units, as before; instead, the new Clinton plan proposed that NATO's retaliation 
would comprise a prolonged and massive NATO air offensive against Bosnian Serb 
positions and forces throughout Bosnia. Significantly, Clinton's new strategy was 
also predicated upon streamlining the 'dual-key' mechanism for sanctioning air- 
strikes by withholding the 'key' held by the UN civilian command - the White House 
viewed UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali as a considerable impediment to 
air-strikes and wanted him removed fTom the chain of command. 
' 16 
The American proposals were hotly debated two weeks after the Srebrenica 
massacre, at a conference called in London by the British Prime Minister, John Major. 
After a day of 'American arm-twisting', the British and French agreed in principle to 
the two key elements of the Clinton proposal: to commit to protecting Gorazde and 
extending what became known as the 'Gorazde rules' to Bosnia's other remaining 
'safe areas' (Tuzla, Bihac and Sarajevo); and to streamline air-strike decision-making 
by removing UN civilian authorities from the 'dual-key' decision-making process. 
' 17 
Despite the fact that agreement appeared to have been reached, however, 
Clinton's push to have Boutros-Ghali cede his decision-making 'key' quickly created 
problems. Whilst Clinton officials came away from the London conference with the 
impression that this issue had been settled and agreed upon - they had stipulated that, 
116 Daalder (2000), pp. 70-73 & 80; Chollet (2005), p. 33. 
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under certain conditions, the UN 'key' should be turned on automatically, with no 
need for approval from the UN civilian authorities - Boutros-Ghali (who had attended 
the meeting) subsequently insisted that he would not give up his 'key' since it violated 
the UN Security Council resolutions. In the face of Boutros-Ghali's resistance, the 
French and British then also appeared to backtrack from the tenets agreed in London. 
They now took the Secretary General's side, asserting that UN civilian authorisation 
should be necessary to any decision-making which might effectively spark a full-scale 
air war against the Bosnian Serbs. The threat that such a war would pose to their 
troops on the ground had, of course, been the principal Anglo-French concern since 
the beginning of UNPROFOR's involvement in Bosnia. 118 
It took a difficult thirteen-hour meeting of the North Atlantic Council, on 25 th 
July, to iron out these issues. Over the course of the meeting, the NAC agreed that 
NATO airpower should be used to protect Gorazde and the other 'safe areas' from the 
Bosnian Serbs (it was agreed that force should be used even if was only suspected that 
Bosnian Serb forces were about to mount an assault on these areas) and - most 
importantly - that the UN civilians would relinquish their 
decision-making 'key'. 
Anglo-French concerns over the vulnerability of their troops to Bosnian Serb 
retaliations - this issue had been the basis of their support for Boutros-Ghali's 
resistance to altering the existing 'dual-key' mechanism - were now fast diminishing 
since UNPROFOR troops were now being withdrawn from Bosnia's most vulnerable 
areas. 
This galvanising of transatlantic agreement subsequently persuaded Secretary 
General Boutros-Ghali to submit (albeit under considerable American diplomatic 
pressure) to the demand to relinquish his 'key' to the authority of the French General 
118 Chollet (2005), pp. 31-32. 
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Bernard Janvier, the overall commander of UNPROFOR inside Bosnia. Henceforth, 
as President Clinton wished, it would be the UN's militarY commander on the ground 
and not the UN civilians who would okay NATO air-strikes. 119 
New purpose 
Whilst the post-Srebrenica meetings had slowly moved the allies towards agreement 
over how to deal with the Bosnian Serbs, it was events in Bosnia itself which - once 
again - pushed the transatlantic Bosnia policy forward. In early August, Croatian 
forces decisively defeated the Bosnian Serbs in north-eastern Croatia, pushing them 
back into Bosnia itself 120 Clinton had personally been 'rooting for the Croatians', 
admitting - in a telling admission of his own powerlessness - that progress towards 
peace was now unlikely unless the Serbs 'sustained some serious losses on the 
ground' . 
12 1 Now that those losses had occurred, the allies hoped that the Bosnian 
Serb leadership would demonstrate a more conciliatory stance and be prepared to 
negotiate peace-terms before it lost any more territory. 122 
With the Bosnian Serbs appearing vulnerable for perhaps the first time, 
Clinton saw an opportunity to seize the initiative. He vetoed the Dole-Liebennan bill 
(for the lifting of the UN arms embargo against the Bosnian government) on 11 th 
August - only the second veto of his presidency - just hours before Congress broke 
for its summer recess. Publicly, administration officials expressed confidence that 
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they would convince enough legislators to change their embargo votes between now 
and Congress' reassembly after the September Labour Day. Privately, however, 
Clinton harboured doubts over this. He knew that the clock was now ticking for him 
either to change legislators' minds or appease their frustrations by showing that he 
had a decisive strategy which America's allies would support. 123 With Bosnia now 
dominating his presidency, with the world watching the White House in the afterrnath 
of Srebrenica, and with an election year looming, it was clear that any continuation of 
the transatlantic policy impasse was now out of the question. Notwithstanding the 
moral imperative to avoid any more Srebrenicas, Clinton was staring down the barrel 
of a costly defeat on Capitol Hill and, longer tenn, the likelihood of having to deploy 
US forces into war-torn Bosnia in the forthcoming election year. 'We need to bust 
our rear to get a settlement in the next couples of months', Clinton told his national 
security team; 'If we let this moment slip away, we are history. ' 
124 
The spur to decisive action was not long in coming. On 28 th August, Bosnian 
Serbs forces shelled a Sarajevo marketplace, killing 37 civilians and wounding a 
further 8 5.125 With Clinton already putting great pressure on the allies to take 
decisive action against Bosnian Serb forces at the next opportunity (NSA Anthony 
Lake had been dispatched to Europe with the message that the United States was now 
prepared to act unilaterally if necessary), this latest atrocity cemented transatlantic 
resolve. The attack persuaded UNPROFOR commanders to authorise the 
commencement of Operation Deliberate Force, the NATO air campaign whose 
planning and approval had been in progress since mid-1994.126 By the time the 
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American diplomatic delegation, headed by US Assistant Secretary of State Richard 
Holbrooke, arrived in Belgrade on the 3 Oth August for cease-fire negotiations with the 
Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic, the largest military action in NATO's history had 
been underway for 8 hours. 
127 
Operation Deliberate Force added considerable weight to the Holbrooke 
delegation's strenuous diplomatic efforts and on 14 th September, NATO's offensive 
operations were suspended for 72 hours as the warring parties finally agreed to a UN- 
brokered 'cessation of hostilities' accord. The UN and NATO announced a formal 
end to Deliberate Force on 20th September. A Bosnia-wide cease-fire was then 
announced by Clinton on 5 th October. If it held, it was agreed that the three warring 
sides would commence formal peace talks in the United States at the month's end. 128 
Having reached agreement with the NATO partners, Clinton then announced 
on 17 th October that a NATO-commanded Implementation Force (IFOR) of 60,000 
troops would oversee any agreed peace inside Bosnia. The big news for Americans 
was that this deployment would comprise 20,000 US troops. 
129 In response to media 
questions over how Congress would respond to this commitment, Clinton replied 
confidently: 'I believe, in the end, the Congress will support this operation. ' 
130 Given 
the considerable and prolonged legislative hostility to his Bosnia policy, Clinton may 
have been knowingly optimistic in this appraisal. However, over the coming weeks, 
there would be little to suggest that congressional support was particularly important 
to the President's Bosnia plans anyway. 
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Making the case for the IFOR deployment: Bosnia is not like Vietnam 
With the commencement of formal peace talks at the Wright-Patterson Air Force Base 
in Dayton, Ohio, on I" November, Washington's use-of-force debates moved back to 
a more 4 conventional' relationship between the White House and the Vietnam 
Syndrome; namely, with the White House seeking to publicly dispel the Syndrome in 
its efforts to win public-political support for the likely deployment of US troops. 
There was much to dispel. On Capitol Hill, critics decried the IFOR 
announcement, arguing that the deployment had 'all the makings of a very, very 
deadly quagmire' and that 'there is no compelling national interest to send young 
Americans to die in Bosnia'. 131 Some media commentary bordered on the 
sensational. Castigating any US troop deployment as a 'disastrous blunder', The 
Cincinnati Enquirer referred to '20,000 US troops marching into quicksand in 
Bosnia' against 'bloodthirsty Serbs', in a 'flammable pit of ethnic hatred, where death 
has been a fact of life since 1992'. The 'echoes of Vietnam', the editorial asserted, 
C are unmistakeable: Another war in which unsupported troops fight for unexplained 
goals in an ungTateful land. ' 132 
The Clinton administration clearly could not remain inactive in the face of 
such public accusations. The obvious difficulty facing the administration, however, 
was that Clinton officials themselves had been articulating similar sentiments for at 
least the previous two years. In recent months alone, Defence Secretary William 
Perry had publicly declared that Bosnia was not 'grave enough to risk the lives of 
thousands of our troops' (June), and that America should not become combatants in 
131 Jim Ranistad, 'No United States Troops to Bosnia'; Remarks in House of Representatives, 25 th 
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Bosnia because it was 'like Vietnam ... a civil war ... the most difficult of conflicts to 
manage' (August). With the administration now seeking to make the case for the 
possible introduction of IFOR troops into Bosnia, administration officials were now 
strenuously denying the Vietnamness of Bosnia, declaring on national television that 
Vietnam was 'a drastically different situation' to the current crisis. However, the 
emotive statements of the previous years were unlikely to be forgotten overnight. 
133 
Despite its new-found efforts to deny the applicability of the Vietnam analogy, 
there was much to suggest that the Vietnam Syndrome was infusing the deliberations 
of the Clinton foreign policy team itself, as it contemplated the possible role and 
scope of American IFOR troops in Bosnia. Whilst there was broad agreement that 
IFOR commanders should have 'unlimited authority' to take whatever actions they 
thought were appropriate, the traditional State-Pentagon schisms (which had been 
extremely evident during the Reagan administration's engagement with the Lebanese 
crisis in 1982-1983) quickly emerged over the policy specifics. With its customary 
caution, the Pentagon advocated a limited IFOR role whilst the 'civilians' at the State 
Department envisioned a more expansive role which would see, for example, IFOR 
troops deployed along Bosnia's border, supporting refugee returns and hunting down 
war criminals. Presidential preference ensured that the cautious Pentagon view 
prevailed. If anything, Clinton's deployment- aversions had actually increased since 
his announcement of the TOR commitment and he was deeply worried about the 
deployment, about incurring casualties and about the dangers of 'mission creep'. The 
Somalia experience continued to gnaw at him, and he repeated obsessively that 
133 Daalder (2000), pp. 68-69; William J. Perry, 'Using Military Force When Deterrence Fails'; 
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American IFOR troops 'would not be rummaging around in the mountains looking for 
war criminals. ' 
134 
The President's concerns were vividly evident as Chain-nan of the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff, General John Shalikashvili, rhymed off a list of things that US troops would 
not do in Bosnia, when he made the case for the deployment in the House and Senate. 
He emphasised that IFOR would not 'be responsible for the conduct of humanitarian 
operations .... be a police force ... conduct nation building ... have the mission of 
disarming', and would not 'move refugees. ' 135 However, despite being assured about 
the modest role US troops would play if deployed to Bosnia, Congress maintained its 
hostile stance towards Clinton's Bosnia policy and the House overwhelmingly passed 
(315 to 103; nearly half of the House Democrats voted for it) a non-binding resolution 
stating that no American troops should be deployed to Bosnia without congressional 
approva . 
136 
Clinton publicly downplayed the significance of the resolution, declaring that 
the peace process was his priority and that he fully expected 'to consult intensively' 
with congressional leaders on any significant developments. Stating that it was the 
American people themselves who had long demanded an end to Bosnia's 'mindless 
slaughter', he urged Congress to 'focus over the next few days on the peace 
negotiations' and reminded legislators that 'NATO is the one organisation with the 
track record and the strength to implement a settlement'. The United States 'is the 
source of NATO's military strength' and 'must participate' in enforcing any peace 
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135 Shalikashvili cited in Daalder (2000), p. 148. 
136 Chollet (2005), p. 132; 'Bosnia, a vote too far'; 'Read Our Lips': Congress Must Say No To Troops 
in Bosnia, Now', Decision Brief (No. 95-D 86) from the Center For Security Policy, I" November 
1995; Peter W. Rodman, 'Precarious Peace - US troops in Bosnia', National Review, 27 
th November, 
1995. Accessed I't May 2008 at the National Review's website: 
http: //article. nationalreview. com/? q--ODUxYzMINTJiNzgzZGFjMzcyNTcwMGZmYTQzMmQyMG 
E= 
271 
agreement, Clinton declared; 'there is no substitute for American leadership' on 
Bosnia. 137 
Engaging Congress 
Over the next few weeks, President Clinton repeated his commitment to congressional 
consultation and continued trying to eradicate the Vietnam Syndrome as critics 
offered gloomy predictions of the fate awaiting IFOR troops in Bosnia. On the 8 th 
November, Clinton met with congressional leaders. Mindful of Congress' prolonged 
derision for the stumbling UN mission in Bosnia, he emphasised two key points: 
firstly, that IFOR would only go into Bosnia to oversee a peace; secondly, that IFOR 
was under NATO - and not UN - command and that if it was deployed, IFOR would 
be 'militarily formidable'. There would, he promised, be no repeat of UNPROFOR's 
meekness in any NATO mission. 
The next day, Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott attempted to give an 
extensive clarification of the situation. In doing so, he appeared to offer some quite 
exaggerated reasons as to why a US military presence in Bosnia was now necessary. 
Talbott began by acknowledging that the administration 'has a tough job of 
persuasion here on the home front, up on the hill but beyond the beltway as well'. It 
was not, he admitted, 'self-evident to the American people why a conflict nearly 
5,000 miles away ... matters enough to 
justify a heavy investment of our treasure, 
prestige and military resources. ' In explaining why it did matter, Talbott proceeded to 
depict US leadership of IFOR as vital to almost every conceivable aspect of US 
137 , The President; Statement on Bosnia Negotiations'; The White House, 31" October 1995. 
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foreign policy. Without this leadership, he maintained, it was not just American 
leadership in Europe which was under threat but also 'relations between Russia and 
America' and 'the spread of post-Communist disorder'. Talbott also warned that 'the 
entire Muslim world' was watching to see 'whether their co-religionists in Bosnia will 
be accorded the same rights and protections as other Europeans. ' America's 
commitment to Bosnia, Talbott declared, thus also affected Turkey, Pakistan and Iran. 
'High stakes', he declared, 'justify - indeed require - bold action. ' This action, 
Talbott declared, could only be undertaken by NATO. Talbott also addressed the 
subject of Vietnam, notably the way in which congressional and media deployment- 
opponents were constantly trying to draw comparisons between Bosnia and Vietnam, 
in an effort to convince Americans that Bosnia was 'a permanent and hopeless 
quagmire I. Whilst these depictions were, Talbott declared, intended 'to have, in our 
ears, cautionary echoes of Vietnam', they were misleading. Reminding his audience 
that he himself had lived in Yugoslavia for two years, Talbott concluded that the 
'cliche about Bosina's "ancient hatreds"' is 'wrong-headed in the extreme'. 
138 
Five days later, Clinton sent a nine-page letter to House Speaker Newt 
Gingrich, reiterating that he would seek a 'congressional expression of support' for 
US participation in IFOR, before any deployment of US troops to Bosnia. There was, 
Clinton asserted, a 'timely opportunity for Congress to consider and act upon his 
request'. However, Clinton also stated that he 'must reserve his constitutional 
prerogatives in this area', thus making it clear that presidential preference on IFOR 
would continue to eclipse any legislative stipulations which did not meet with stated 
White House policy. Congress responded obstinately and continued to demand 
138 'US Leadership and the Balkan Challenge'; Remarks by Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott at 
the National Press Club, Washington DC, 9th November 1995. Accessed 10th July 2008 at the 
Department of State's US Policy in Bosnia site: 
http: //www. state. gov/www/regions/eur/bosnia/bostal2. html 
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formal consultation. Unhappy at the speed with which the President had committed 
the United States to the TOR deployment, the House responded by passing HR 2606, 
prohibiting the use of funds by the Defence Department for the deployment of US 
ground forces to Bosnia 'unless funds for any such deployment are appropriated' 
through fonnal channels. 139 'The last thing we need'. the bill's supporters argued, 'is 
to get tangled up in another Vietnam-like war and the loss of many American 
lives'. 140 
Agreement at Dayton - IFOR will deploy to Bosnia 
On 21" November 1995, after three weeks of poring over maps and haggling over 
land, the Presidents of Bosnia, Croatia and Serbia agreed the ten-ns of the Dayton 
Peace Agreement. The formal signing of the peace accord was scheduled to take 
place in Paris on 14 th December. 14 1 However, whilst transatlantic leaders now talked 
buoyantly of peace, congressional deployment-opponents continued to decry any 
possibility of seeing US soldiers on Bosnian soil under any circumstances. They 
reminded Americans that there had been 34 prior ceasefires in Bosnia and that not one 
of them had held; Dayton was, they insisted, simply the latest pseudo-peace which 
would surely fail like all the others. 142 With the stumbling UNPROFOR experience 
still fresh in many Americans' minds, and with senior legislators now talking on 
139 All comments cited in Grimmett, lt March, 2007, p. 36. 
140 Comments of Dave Weldon in House of Representatives, Prohibition On Funds For Bosnia 
Deployment', 17'h November 1995. 
141 Halberstam (200 1), p. 3 57. 
142 Richard Holbrooke in Chollet (2005), pp. iv & x. America's scepticism over whether peace would 
prevail was not entirely without foundation - as late as May of 1997, General George Joulwan, 
Commander-in-Chief of United States European Command (SACEUR), was stating that one of the 
mission goals for NATO SFOR (Stabilisation Force) troops in the region was 'preventing a spring th 
offensive' inside Bosnia. See 'Department of Defense News Briefmg', May 12,1997 . Accessed 
5 
May 2006 at: http: //www. defenselink. mil/transcripts/1997/tO5l397_tO5l2jou. html 
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national television about Bosnia's 'hateful, warring parties' and warning that with 
Bosnia's 'fon-nidable' weather and terrain, US forces were 'bound to have casualties', 
some commentators wondered whether the nation's support for Clinton's IFOR 
commitment would dwindle. 
143 
Aside from the possible perils of the IFOR mission, there were other reasons 
for legislative disgruntlement over the consequences of the Dayton agreement. 
Despite his promise to consult Congress on any formal authorisation for the 
deployment of US forces, Clinton delivered a national address on 27 th November 
which prompted many to conclude that the decision had in fact already been taken. In 
his speech, Clinton reminded America that he had long refused to send US troops to 
'fight a war' in Bosnia and that the forthcoming IFOR mission was not to fight but to 
oversee a peace. Having unambiguously confirmed that US troops were to be 
deployed (with no formal approval from Capitol Hill), Clinton's speech then carefully 
addressed the reasons why the deployment would not repeat the Vietnam failure. 
Rejecting any possibility of mission Open-endedness, he declared that the IFOR 
mission was 'clear, limited and achievable'. He then proceeded to address the issue 
of military casualties: 
But, my fellow Americans, no deployment of American troops is risk-free, and this 
one may well involve casualties. There may be accidents in the field, or incidents 
with people who have not given up their hatred. I will take every measure possible to 
minimize these risks, but we must be prepared for that possibility. As President my 
most difficult duty is to put the men and women who volunteer to serve our nation in 
143 Comments from a panel of guests on CNN Late Edition, 26 th November 1995; comments of Senator 
Daniel Coats (Rep. IN), Senator Charles Robb (Dem. VA) and Frank Sessno (host) - transcript 
available on the CNN Late Edition website (accessed 2 nd May 2008) at: 
http: //edition. cnn-com/WORLD/Bosnia/updates/nov95/11-26/transcript. html 
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hann's way when our interests and values demand it. I assume full responsibility for 
any harm that may come to them. 
144 
Clinton concluded by addressing the classic right-wing interpretation of what had 
gone wrong in Vietnam. Ruling out any possibility that American forces would be 
forced to go into Bosnia 'with one hand tied behind their backs', he assured 
Americans that: 
Anyone contemplating any action that would endanger our troops should know this: 
America protects its own. Anyone-anyone-who takes on our troops will suffer the 
consequences. We will fight fire with fire-and then some. 
145 
Seeking to address legislative concerns, Clinton also stated that if the final details of 
the IFOR deployment plan met his approval, he would 'immediately send it to 
Congress and request its support'. 146 Clinton's speech came under immediate 
criticism. Media critics argued that despite his stated commitment to congressional 
consultation, the IFOR announcement had clearly already been taken, thus upholding 
a convention which had reduced Congress to learning about Dayton's developments 
'in the newspapers'. 
147 
144 President's Statements on the Bosnian Peacekeeping Mission'; The White House, 27h November, 
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145 Ibid. 
146 Ibid. 
147 Peter W. Rodman, 'Precarious peace - US troops in Bosnia', National Review, 27thNovember, 
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On Capitol Hill, legislators also expressed anger. Americans' questions over 
Bosnia remained unanswered, Representative Toby Roth (Rep. WI) complained; 
'Every lesson we learned in Vietnam has either been forgotten or ignore '. 148 
Even those legislators who supported Clinton's IFOR commitment criticised 
the President for flouting the consultative process and for failing to dispel the 
Vietnam Syndrome before committing US troops. Whilst declaring his willingness to 
support the President, Senator Patrick Leahy (Dem. VT) warned Clinton that the 
IFOR mission was 'fraught with uncertainties and the undeniable likelihood that 
Americans will be injured or killed. ' Americans genuinely feared 'another costly, 
drawn out quagmire like Vietnam', Leahy argued; 'It is the President's job ... to 
ý 149 
convince the American people that Bosnia is not Vietnam . 
In a prepared statement to the House International Relations and National 
Security Committee, Defence Secretary Perry sought to dispel these concerns. Perry 
assured legislators that the forthcoming deployment was 'not a blind plunge into a 
conflict' and that, whilst the US contingent of 20,000 troops was criticised as 
excessive by some, 'if we err, I prefer to be on the side of sending in too many. ' 
Further seeking to convince the Committee over the measures taken to protect 
American troops, Perry asserted that 'The American force will be able to protect itself 
under any circumstances' and he stated on two further occasions that US troops would 
be 'well-armed', 'well-trained', and have 'robust rules of engagement'. Perry's 
message reiterated the message Clinton delivered just three days previously: unlike in 
148 Toby Roth, 'Is Bosnia Worth Dying For? '; Remarks in House of Representatives, 28 th November 
1995. 
149 Patrick Leahy, 'American Troops in Bosnia'; Remarks in the Senate, 28th November 1995. 
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Vietnam, the US military would not be forced to fight with one hand tied behind its 
back in Bosnia. 150 
Leaving Congress behind 
Amidst the wrangling and debating, Clinton's deployment plans continued 
unhindered. On 4 th December, William Perry announced that a 1,400-strong 
'enabling force' was to leave for the Balkans, the vanguard of the main contingent of 
IFOR troops scheduled to deploy after the official peace signing in Paris. After the 
signing, Perry clarified, about 20,000 US troops would deploy to Bosnia with IFOR 
and around 5,000 more to Croatia. Two days later President Clinton formally notified 
Congress of the deployment, declaring that his actions were 'consistent with the War 
Powers Resolution'. He added that he had also authorised the deployment of around 
300 US military personnel to Hungary, Italy and Croatia in a supporting role. The 
force deployment thus actually numbered nearly 30,000 troops, more than had 
initially been announced. 
151 
Congressional debate now reached boiling point, with allusion to the Vietnam 
experience rife as legislators debated the pros and cons of the deployment and its 
constitutionality. Indeed, at points, legislators appeared to be arguing as much about 
the appropriateness of the Vietnam analogy as about the imminent troop deployment 
itself Criticising President Clinton's deployment plans - an action he had taken 
'without coming to the Senate or the US House of Representatives for permission to 
do this' - Congressman Robert Doman (Rep. CA) saw glaring parallels: 
150 William J. Perry, 'The Deployment of US Troops to Bosnia'; Prepared statement to the House 
International Relations and National Security Council committees, 30 th November 1995. 
151 Clinton's statement cited in Grimmett, I s' March 2007, p. 37. 
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I remember when the Vietnam War went down the tubes and the fight transferred 
from the jungles and the fields and the central highlands of Vietnam to the Halls of 
this Congress. I remember when liberal Democrats were on this floor saying that 
Johnson, and then Nixon, did not have the constitutional power to absorb 300 and 400 
killed in action every week. 152 
However, other legislators disagreed with Mr Doman's prognosis. Sam Gibbons 
(Dem. FL) declared that: 
After long consideration, I ... support the mission and support the troops that are 
involved. I was here on the House floor and voted for the Gulf of Tonkin resolution. 
This is not a Gulf of Tonkin resolution. The Gulf of Tonkin resolution was a thinly 
disguised declaration of war against the Vietnamese forces. We go this time to keep 
peace, not to make war. There is a plan. There is a large support from the nations of 
the world to support this plan. There is acquiescence by the leaders of the combatants 
involved. Nothing that we do is without risk. We are going to have some casualties, 
for which we will all feel very sorry. But we cannot sit here or stand here idly and 
not do anything. Too much is at stake. 153 
As these debates continued, other legislators appeared to simply resign themselves to 
the inevitability of the imminent deployment - as a disgruntled Henry Hyde (Rep. IL) 
commented: 'the die is cast, we now have to fall in line. ' 154 However, others chose 
not to acquiesce without challenge and viewed the signing of the Peace Accords in 
Paris, on December 14 th , as a symbolic 
deadline for Congress to formally act upon its 
152 Robert Doman, 'United States Troop Deployments to BosMa'; Remarks in House of 
Representatives, 13 th December 1995. 
153 Sam Gibbons, 'United States Troop Deployments to Bosnia'; Remarks in House of Representatives, 
13th December 1995. 
154 Hyde cited in Hendrickson (1998), p. 252. 
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opposition to the President's actions. The 13 th saw a flurry of activity with legislators 
rejecting resolutions prohibiting the use of federal funding for the deployment. 
However, they also fonnally supported (by 287-141) Resolution 302 which opposed 
the deployment of US troops to Bosnia but which simultaneously expressed 'pride 
and admiration' for the US troops to be deployed. That same day, the Senate passed a 
resolution (S. J. Res. 44) articulating the same sentiment. 155 This somewhat bizarre 
vote -for the troops but not for the policy which deployed them - was an admission 
of defeat as much as a note of defiance from the legislature and demonstrated, once 
more, congressional unwillingness to seriously test the President's constitutional war 
powers. Also evident in this instance was the post-Vietnam legislative culture of not 
wanting to appear unpatriotic ahead of an imminent troop deployment. As Ryan 
Hendrickson notes, 'both chambers sought to wash their hands of the policy and 
remain patriotic at the same time. ' 
156 
Predictably perhaps, there was no effort by either the House or the Senate to 
reconcile the measures they had passed on the 13th. As Richard Grimmett observes, 
the IFOR deployment had been formally triggered by the Paris signing and the 
leadership of both parties apparently believed that nothing would be achieved by a 
conference on the measures passed. 
157 Over 29th and 3 oth December, 20,000 US 
troops started deploying to Bosnia. Despite the many legislators who had opposed the 
deployment, Congress had not managed to curtail any aspect of the deployment 
whatsoever. The one year time-limit that President Clinton subsequently placed on 
the troops' mission was purely discretionary and, critics speculated, was announced 
with the 1996 presidential elections in mind. Congress' inability to challenge White 
155 lbid, pp. 3 7-3 8; Halberstam (200 1), p. 3 59. 
156 Hendrickson (19 9 8), p. 2 54. 
157 Grimmett, I" March 2007, p. 38. 
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House deployment decisions thus appeared not to have changed, despite the much- 
touted vigour of the Republican revolution. 158 
Conclusion 
The White House's response to the war in Bosnia Herzegovina is an extremely 
significant event in the study of post-Vietnam presidential deployment decision- 
making. Whilst the events detailed in this chapter differ markedly from those of the 
previous two case studies in many respects, they also share some striking similarities. 
One of the most notable of these is the dominance of the Vietnam Syndrome in the 
criticisms and justifications espoused throughout the crisis by political and media 
deployment-opponents. The events detailed in this case study unmistakeably 
demonstrate that America certainly had not 'kicked' the Vietnam Syndrome by the 
mid-1990s, despite President Bush's declaration to that effect in the aftennath of the 
1991 Persian Gulf War. Once more, this study's focus upon public diplomacy is fully 
vindicated by the way in which it so vividly exposes the 'presence' of the Syndrome 
throughout Washington's Bosnia debates. 
If the Vietnam Syndrome was evident throughout these debates, it was also 
extremely evident in White House decision-making throughout this period. Despite 
optimistic predictions that his assumption of office would draw a line under 
America's Vietnam preoccupation, President Clinton's handling of the Bosnian crisis 
proved the ongoing influence of the Vietnam Syndrome upon presidential deployment 
decision-making. Clinton's lack of foreign policy experience may well have 
158 Daalder (2000), p. xix. 
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contributed to this since he found his feet on Bosnia under the advice of a Pentagon 
whose view of the crisis was 'haunted' by 'memories of America's last great "liberal" 
159 intervention, in Vietnam'. As an inexperienced and indecisive foreign policy 
practitioner, Clinton was understandably influenced by the concerns of towering 
figures such as Colin Powell and he was disinclined to challenge the expertise of an 
influential establishment whose favour he was keen to win. Consequently, as George 
C. Herring notes, the Pentagon's 'obsession' with mission security and the avoidance 
of casualties largely dictated the ten-ns under which the new President sought to 
proceed with a strategy for Bosnia. 160 
Given that the military chiefs seemed quite able to stifle Clinton's early 
deployment- advocacy, and given that he displayed little in the way of inspired 
leadership throughout most of the crisis, it might seem that Clinton's performance in 
stewarding America's Bosnia policy was largely absent the characteristics and feats 
we might associate with Schlesinger's 'Imperial President' depiction. However, 
there is little doubt that America's Bosnia policy proceeded largely at Clinton's own 
behest. He largely stuck fast to his own policy choices, despite the fact that these 
choices persistently displeased both sides of Washington's intervention- 
nonintervention debates: he refused to formally lift the arms embargo for the Bosnian 
government; he also refused to deploy US ground forces into Bosnia whilst hostilities 
persisted, despite coming under considerable pressure to respond forcefully to what 
Bosnian Serb forces were doing to Bosnia's civilians. Clinton also turned a blind eye 
to the covert weapons supply-line from Iran to Bosnia, a process which was a clear 
violation of the UN arms embargo. Clinton's quiet acquiescence on this issue (a 
stance which mirrored that of his predecessor) could easily be viewed as a justifiable 
159 McCrisken (2003), p. 163; Allin (2002), pp. 16 & 17 
160 George C. Herring, 'The Impact of the Vietnam War on the US Military', in Neu (2000), p. 80. 
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concession to a besieged Bosnian govenunent - however, critics would also argue 
(perhaps with some justification) that it was a glaring example of the kind of 
executive branch secrecy so associated with the Vietnam years and the censures 
associated with the 'Imperial Presidency'. 161 
Clinton's ultimate commitment to deploy US forces to Bosnia was also highly 
resonant of the presidential imperiousness depicted by Schlesinger. On the one hand, 
it is clear that the timing of the deployment was very much influenced by Clinton's 
concerns about domestic opinion - he made it clear that he did not want to leave 
himself in a position where he was forced to deploy US forces into war-torn Bosnia in 
an election year. He thus pushed to end the crisis and have US troops overseeing a 
peaceful Bosnia before the onset of 1996.162 By the same token, however, the 
decision to deploy US forces to Bosnia clearly contravened what the Pentagon had 
long advised and also what much of public-political America appeared to support. 
Indeed, whilst it was clear by the autumn of 1995 that keeping US forces out of 
Bosnia was not only increasingly unlikely but also increasingly indefensible as the 
atrocities escalated, it was also the case that congressional opposition was growing as 
Clinton pushed to bring the crisis to a finale. 
Notwithstanding the furore on Capitol Hill, it seemed that as the peace 
negotiations progressed and the IFOR mission became more and more a reality, the 
scepticism espoused by many political, military and elite commentators over the 
durability of Bosnia's peace may have had an impact upon the broader American 
public. Whilst opinion polls had persistently suggested significant domestic support 
for US involvement in multilateral ground operations inside Bosnia, national opinion 
polls taken in early January 1996 (less than a fortnight after US IFOR troops were 
161 See Chollet (2005), p. 36. 
162 Sobel (2001), p. 228. 
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deployed to Bosnia) suggested - quite incredibly - that less than 36% of those 
Americans polled now supported the deployment. 1 63 This apparently dramatic 
diminution perhaps says as much about the fickleness of 'public opinion' as it does 
about President Clinton's willingness to take tough political decisions which may be 
domestically unpopular, ahead of an election year. 
Clinton may thus not have always demonstrated the vigour and confidence 
that one might associate with an 'Imperial President'. However, when viewed 
broadly, it is clear that there was not a single aspect of America's Bosnia policy which 
did not transpire at his behest. Indeed, in the last few months of 1995, Clinton was 
arguably as imperious as his two predecessors as he pushed to initiate the NATO air 
offensive, the peace negotiations and the subsequent IFOR deployment. Clinton's 
performance throughout the whole period examined in this case study suggests that 
even where Presidents do not have the wherewithal to act decisively vis-a-vis a 
foreign crisis, and even when they are coming under intense domestic criticism, they 
have near-absolute authority to refuse actions demanded by other domestic and 
international public-Political actors. Any US military actions which do occur 
invariably do so only if the President seesfit to order them. 
Another glaring aspect of this episode is the way in which, for a long period, 
the Vietnam analogy was employed as much by the White House as it was by 
deployment-opponents in Congress and in the media. The prolonged White House 
'use' of the Vietnam analogy for much of this period was very significant indeed and 
may have had a considerable impact upon how America viewed the deployment of 
US troops to Bosnia. Initially convinced that he would take a stronger and more 
morally upstanding stance towards the crisis than President Bush had, there is every 
163 Poll cited by Richard Holbrooke, in Chollet (2005), p. xi. No source given. 
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reason to suspect that if he had chosen to do so, President Clinton could have rallied 
broad domestic support for deploying US troops into Bosnia. Such was the public 
anger at the atrocities being waged against Bosnia's civilian population, and such was 
the disillusionment levelled at the preceding Bush administration for its own inaction 
towards the crisis, it seems highly likely that Clinton could have emphasised the 
moral imperative for him to demonstrate 'American values' and act to halt the 
atrocities. Had he done so, he might well have managed to win round many of those 
- particularly on Capitol Hill - who appeared to oppose a US-led ground offensive 
into Bosnia. However, as this study amply demonstrates, Clinton's electioneering 
bravado quickly crumbled when he took office. After the allies rejected Clinton's 
preferred policy of 'lift-and-strike', the Clinton administration begin copying its 
predecessor in publicly drawing parallels between Bosnia and Vietnam; invoking the 
Vietnam analogy was seen as a way of both publicly justifying its inability to conjure 
up a forceful alternative strategy and of dampening calls for US military intervention. 
Even if President Clinton did genuinely see comparisons between Vietnam 
and Bosnia, it may have been unwise of him to publicly make such comparisons since 
- in the view of many senior advisors - the 
introduction of US troops into Bosnia at 
some point was inevitable. " Whether it was to oversee the withdrawal of a failing 
UNPROFOR mission, or in the event of a binding cease-fire, Clinton had decreed that 
US troops would go into Bosnia. Thus, whilst comparing Bosnia to Vietnam may 
have been effective in blunting domestic deployment-advocacy during its prolonged 
struggle with the crisis, the Clinton administration's 'endorsement' of the Vietnam 
analogy remained resonant when it changed its stance to one of assertive engagement 
with the crisis. It ensured that the Vietnam Syndrome continued to infuse much of 
164 Author interview with General George Joulwan (USA, retired), Arlington, Virginia, I lffi May 2006. 
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America's thinking on US involvement in Bosnia, even as the administration worked 
to generate support for the IFOR deployment. The critical congressional response to 
the TOR announcement in particular was dominated by reference to the Vietnam 
experience and the 'Vietnamness' of Bosnia. This is hardly surprising; Americans 
were highly unlikely to support the deployment of US troops to a region which the 
White House had been likening to Vietnam for nearly four years. 
The White House's prolonged willingness to see Vietnam dominating 
America's Bosnia debates was thus one of the most striking aspects of Washington's 
response to the Bosnian War. When it wanted Americans to support its policy of 
withholding US troops from Bosnia, the White House sought to convince them that 
Bosnia resembled Vietnam. When, under Clinton's stewardship, it wanted them to 
support its policy of deploying US troops into Bosnia, it sought to convince them that 
it did not. It would be hard to find a more glaring example of the politicisation of the 
Vietnam Syndrome than this. 
Similarly to the two previous case studies, there was little consensus within 
the Clinton administration over what conditions should be attached to the use of 
military force. Differences were once again evident in the views emanating from the 
State and Defence Departments. The administration's overall disjointedness did little 
to resolve these disputes and Clinton seemed in large part responsible for this. 
However, the administration's prolonged prevarications over what form the US 
Bosnia policy should take could also be read another way; not as a result of a 
conceptual poverty and lack of leadership on the part of the Commander-in-Chief, but 
as an example of a President simply digging in his heels and refusing to enact policy 
options he did not support, quite prepared to ride out the political stonn until events 
were more conducive to the policies he did want to enact. Having dismissed a ground 
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intervention into Bosnia, and with no other appealing options, Clinton's 'dithering' 
could thus equally be depicted as presidential preference prevailing, despite the 
domestic and international pressure to 'do something' about Bosnia. When he 
eventually did decide to sanction a ground intervention, it was Clinton's own 
preferences (namely, those which held the smallest risk to American troops) which 
settled the deployment disagreements between the Defence and State Departments. 
In his policy deliberations with the military, Clinton demonstrated some 
similarities with his predecessors. He was clearly mindful of the expertise provided 
by the military chiefs; he was probably more deferential to their views than were 
Reagan and Bush, especially in the early stages of his presidency. However, Robert 
DiPrizio speculates that Clinton's prolonged deployment reluctance was down to an 
array of other factors - domestic and international - and to his own preferences; not to 
military resistance. Indeed, the military's reluctance to see US troops in Bosnia 
certainly did not stop Clinton from considering a ground intervention on at least two 
occasions, something he ordered the Pentagon to explore. Nor did it stop him from 
deploying US troops in late December of 1995, when many US military figures were 
sceptical that Bosnia's fragile peace would hold. As had been the case when 
Presidents Bush and Reagan were deliberating their responses to the crises in Kuwait 
and Lebanon, the hierarchical nature of White House use-offorce decision-making 
was clearly evident; the military chiefs may have opposed deployment but they 
willingly provided the support to the President once he decided that this was his 
chosen course of action. 
165 
There is little doubt that Clinton shared the Pentagon's concerns, however, and 
this is vividly evident when one examines his use-of-force decisions throughout this 
165 DiPrizio (2002), p. 161. 
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episode. He consistently played the 'safe card' by adhering to a policy which relied 
upon air-power to halt the Bosnian Serb onslaught. He also resisted ground 
intervention until there was a formal cessation of hostilities. Only then did he deploy 
US troops into Bosnia with enough firepower, with sufficiently robust rules-of- 
engagement and with such a restricted mandate that IFOR did not lose one troop to 
hostile fire throughout its entire mission. 166 In dictating the terms of the IFOR 
deployment - and it was Clinton who ultimately decided what US troops would and 
would not do in Bosnia - Clinton's approach largely mirrored that of the Bush Persian 
Gulf deployment, in that casualty-avoidance was the over-riding concern. The 
'overwhelming force' approach, erring on the side of having too many troops, and a 
mandate whose studied caution minimised confrontation, greatly diminished the 
chances that US troops would find themselves in 'another Vietnam'. 
Clinton may have appeared more amenable than his predecessors to 
congressional involvement. He paid significant lip service to recognising the 
necessity for congressional partnership over Bosnia and, in PDD-25, he fonnally 
volunteered a greater legislative say in UN military-peacekeeping operations. 
167 
However, as was evidenced in the previous two case studies, presidential promise and 
presidential action do not always coincide where Congress is concerned and where it 
is the use of force which is the issue. Clinton did consult Congress over the 
developments in his Bosnia policy but he typically did so ex post facto. Like his 
predecessors, Clinton consistently reminded legislators of his powers as Commander- 
in-Chief and he was more than willing to risk congressional wrath in taking decisions 
that Congress disagreed with. Furthen-nore, in refusing to accede to congressional 
demands to lift the arms embargo (at least officially), Clinton openly subordinated 
166 Author interview with General George Joulwan (USA, retired), Arlington, Virginia, I Ith 
May 2006. 
167 Sewall (2002), p. 198. 
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Congress' wishes to those of the French and British governments. Once more, this 
shows that what Congress wants typically pales into insignificance if it is not what the 
President wants. It also shows that the wishes and demands of external, non- 
American, actors are often of greater significance to White House use-of-force 
deliberations than those of Congress. Indeed throughout the crisis, US policy over 
Bosnia was significantly influenced by the wishes of key UN and NATO partners, 
giving legislators justifiable reasons for asking where Congress really stands at such 
times. 
Nonetheless, there is little doubt that - as was evidenced in the two previous 
case studies - Congress often proves itself to be a willing deferent. Clinton's 'Bosnia 
policy' relied heavily upon retaliatory air-strikes throughout 1994 and 1995. 
However, despite the fact that he typically only notified Congress of bombing sorties 
after they had occurred, Ryan Hendrickson observes that 'there was virtually no 
congressional challenge to Clinton's legal authority to conduct the bombings. 
Constitutional questions on Clinton's authority to use force were simply not 
addressed'. The onset of the 104 th Congress did little to change this, despite the fact 
that it may have been the likeliest moment in recent decades at which a congressional 
challenge to White House use-of-force authority might have evidenced itself Facing 
a hostile Republican majority in both Houses, and a swathe of opposition in 
Republican circles to US participation in both UN peacekeeping and in Bosnia itself, 
Clinton's designs for Bosnia might conceivably have run aground. 
168 In fact, this did 
not happen. For all its bluster and dissent, Congress ultimately proved little obstacle 
to President Clinton's decisions on Bosnia, to his funding of Bosnia policy, or to his 
deployment of troops. 
168 Hendrickson (1998), pp. 241-242 & 248. 
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Clinton might be depicted as being similarly dismissive of the broader public 
mood during his handling of the Bosnian War. He remains known as a President who 
was influenced by public opinion; indeed, 'placement of polls over principle' became 
a 'frequent lament' of the Clinton presidency. 169 Despite this popular depiction, 
Clinton's constant interest in his public standing did not necessarily mean that public 
opinion actually steered his policy decisions. In fact, whilst his prolonged indecision 
over Bosnia can perhaps be attributed to his efforts to produce a decisive, effective 
Bosnia policy which had broad domestic approval (a preoccupation which is surely 
common to all policymakers operating in liberal democratic political systems), he 
ultimately did not shirk from taking tough decisions which flew in the face of what 
the American people appeared to want. Clinton's Bosnia policy may well have been 
hamstrung for so long because, as some commentators have contended, he was so 
obsessed with 'preserving his domestic capital' . 
170 However, there is little doubt that 
Clinton was fully aware of the considerable domestic resistance to his Bosnia 
deployment. For all that they had long appeared to support multilateral military 
action on the ground inside Bosnia, the Dayton Agreement was criticised by many 
political and elite commentators in the United States as being destined to fail. This 
elite response must have played no small part in dampening Americans' support for 
the agreement and the consequent military obligations it placed upon the United 
States. In fact, America's support for the Dayton Agreement and the subsequent 
IFOR deployment was by far the lowest support that President Clinton had on any 
issue at that point in time. 17 1 Against this critical domestic backdrop, and with the 
IFOR mission to oversee Bosnia's fragile peace scheduled to commence at the 
beginning of an election year, Clinton's decision to deploy US troops to Bosnia was 
169 Henriksen (1996), pp. 13 & 38. 
170 DiPrizio (2002), p. 160. 
171 Richard Holbrooke, in Chollet (2005), p. xi. 
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brave and very much contradicts the depiction of a President always likely to opt for 
the popular option. 
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Chapter 7 
Conclusion 
This study has explored the significance of the Vietnam Syndrome to presidential 
leadership on the deployment of US forces throughout the post-Vietnam years, 
between 1982 and 1995. It has sought to illuminate how the Vietnam Syndrome has 
evidenced itself as Presidents have responded to foreign conflicts, how it has 
influenced Presidents as they have deliberated the pros and cons of deploying US 
forces to these conflicts, and how far Presidents have been able to execute and 
publicly 'sell' their chosen deployment decisions, in the face of the obstacles which 
are popularly thought to be associated with the Vietnam Syndrome. 
In its search for answers, this study adopted a dual-focussed analytical 
approach which examined both the 'private' sphere of executive branch decision- 
making and the 'public' sphere of political commentary debate and diplomacy. This 
analysis showed that four characteristics have been both significant and recurring in 
post-Vietnam deployment decision-making in the United States: firstly, that any 
suggestion that the President will deploy US forces has generated significant public- 
political attention and debate in the United States; secondly, that at such times, the 
subject of America's Vietnam experience has quickly emerged to dominate 
Washington's deployment debates; thirdly, that Presidents' deployment decisions 
have often little reflected the prevailing mood espoused in these debates - Presidents 
have consistently taken such decisions based upon their own wishes, even if this has 
appeared to contravene the public-political mood; fourthly, that Presidents' 
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deployment decisions have consistently demonstrated many of the concerns so closely 
associated with the Vietnam Syndrome - deployments of US troops throughout the 
post-Vietnam era have consistently been planned in ways which have optimised the 
chances of avoiding bloody or protracted interventions. 
It seems clear from the events detailed in this study that the Vietnam 
Syndrome has indeed been very evident at times when the White House has 
responded to foreign conflicts during the post-Vietnam years. Its expression has 
perhaps been most discernible in the way in which - consistently throughout this 
period - key political, military and media actors have publicly invoked various 
aspects of America's Vietnam experience in order to define the conflict in question, 
how the President should respond to it and how the President is perfonning as he 
actually does respond to it. Furthennore, in drawing various parallels between the 
current crisis and the Vietnam experience, it seems that these actors were not simply 
attempting to draw instructive historical parallels; instead, these comparisons were 
typically critical in nature and were invariably invoked by deployment-opponents as a 
way of articulating their concerns over seeing US forces sent into combat and of how 
the President was handling the crisis in question. 
It seems clear that deployment-opponents in the United States think that if 
there is one argument which might rally public-political support against the 
deployment of US forces, it is by comparing the current situation to various aspects of 
America's Vietnam exPerience. Throughout the events detailed in the thirteen-year 
period examined in this study, deployment-opponents repeatedly pointed to the same 
factors - the nature of the conflict in question, the region of the world 
in which it was 
taking place, the White House's ignoring of Congress in taking deployment decisions, 
the speed with which the President was deploying troops, the President's refusal to 
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enact formal War Powers legislation - as 'evidence' that the White House was 
duplicating the mistakes of the Vietnam years and thus running the risk of miring the 
United States in 'another Vietnam'. The constancy of this deployment-opposition, 
and the subject which has so consistently been invoked to express it, appears to 
confirm a broad field of literary thought which depicts post-Vietnam America's 
responses to foreign conflicts as having been significantly influenced by the Vietnam 
Syndrome. 
The study's analysis of Washington's deployment debates proves equally 
effective in detailing how the White House has publicly responded to the public airing 
of a subject - Vietnam - which has the potential to sensitise Americans' deployment- 
aversions at the very time that Presidents may well want these aversions blunted. 
Whilst the task of rallying domestic support behind the deployment of US forces is 
doubtless one which American Presidents would have found challenging even if the 
United States had not been involved in a protracted, bloody and morally ambiguous 
war in Southeast Asia, it seems incontrovertible that the Vietnam experience has 
made this task even more difficult for American Presidents. The Reagan, Bush and 
Clinton administrations all necessarily sought to disavow the Vietnam analogies 
drawn by deployment-opponents as they sought to build a broad consensus of 
domestic support for their respective deployments. Each administration found this an 
extremely difficult task. 
Because each administration found itself facing very similar 'Vietnam 
accusations'. there was a considerable continuity in the public diplomacy of the White 
House across all three episodes, despite the fact that the first deployment examined in 
this study took place in 1982 at the height of the Cold War and the last one was in late 
1995, several years after the Cold War's end. In their efforts to reject the various 
294 
Vietnam analogies which threatened to undermine their desired national consensus of 
support, the Reagan, Bush and Clinton administrations all repeatedly espoused their 
commitment to consultation with Congress over the deployment, declared that the 
deployment in question had a clear mission goal, designated clear parameters for the 
mission and repeatedly assured Americans that the President was taking very 
seriously the risk of incurring casualties and miring the United States in 'another 
Vietnam'. 
However, it may be fair to say that there is something of a ritualistic element 
to these rhetorical interactions. For a start, deployment-opponents may be well aware 
that their challenges are highly unlikely to actually force the President to change his 
mind about deploying; even the most avid deployment-opponent will perhaps be 
aware that his or her opposition will not change the mind of a committed President. 
Despite this, it seems that deployment-opponents see a value in voicing and rallying 
domestic opposition anyway. This opposition - and the theme which is giving it such 
an emotive edge - might pressure the President to alter how he is handling the crisis in 
question (perhaps to consult more with Congress, for example); it might also prompt 
the President to reassess the scope of the deployment to come. At the very least, 
deployment-opponents' criticisms serve notice to both the Wbite House and the 
American public-political arena that the deployment in question is not roundly 
supported and that the President may face serious political consequences if his 
deployment should go awry. 
If there is a somewhat ritualistic element to these deployment debates, it may 
also be evident when one considers the White House's efforts to publicly 'sell' its 
deployment decisions. Indeed, critics might point to one key reason why these White 
House 'efforts' might be decried as not being genuine concessions to the 'democratic 
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ideal. ' Namely that, as the case studies make quite clear, for all the White House's 
public diplomatic efforts, the actual deployment of US forces is not dependent upon 
its success in swaying the American public-political arena behind the deployment in 
question. It seems perfectly clear that if the President decides to deploy US forces, 
his deployment plans - and the deployment itself - proceed apace, even in the face of 
considerable public-political opposition and even if the White House is unsuccessful 
in dispelling this opposition through its public communications. 
The events detailed thus appear to confirm two things of considerable interest 
to the focus of this study. Firstly, there is considerable evidence that a Vietnam 
Syndrome is 'at work' in the American public-political arena at times when the 
deployment of US forces is seen to be a possibility; secondly, that the label 'Imperial 
Presidency' is one which can still be justifiably applied to the President in the area of 
deployment decision-making, despite the oft-cited assertion that the Vietnam 
Syndrome has presented White House with a considerable array of obstacles in this 
area. The Vietnam Syndrome may well have made an already-difficult task - 
selling' force deployments to the American public-political arena - even harder for 
Presidents; however, the case studies also show that unsuccessful 'selling' has done 
nothing to arrest force deployments if President have decided that that is the 
appropriate course of action. 
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Congress: a junior role in the executive-legislative relationship 
This study not only confirms the President's status as the locus of authority on the 
issue of deploying US forces; it also exposes the implications that this status has for 
Congress' ability to assume its constitutionally mandated role in this area. The case 
studies demonstrate clearly that despite Congress' constitutional empowerments with 
respect to the use of US forces, and the formal galvanising of these powers with the 
enactment of the 1973 War Powers Act, Congress has remained very much a junior 
partner to the White House as the United States has responded to foreign conflicts 
throughout the post-Vietnam years. Presidents have consistently marginalised the 
legislature as they have taken use-of-force decisions during this period. When they 
have consulted Congess, this consultation has typically been ex post facto and has 
often been decried by critics as being merely ritualistic, with the issue under 
ý consultation' already having been decided upon by the President. 
There are several aspects to this marginalisation of Congress. One is the way 
in which the wishes and demands of external, non-American, actors frequently appear 
to be of greater significance to the President's use-of-force considerations than those 
of Congress, despite the fact that legislators are democratically elected representatives 
of the American people. Chapters 4-6 show that the Reagan, Bush and Clinton 
administrations dealt extensively with an array of foreign states and inter-state 
organisations as they sought to respond effectively to international conflicts. These 
'foreign partners' were not only frequently informed of developments or proposed 
White House policy details before the legislature was; these 'foreign partners' also 
had an influence on White House decision-making which the legislature did not 
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appear to enjoy at any time in the thirteen-year period examined in this study. For 
example, President Reagan effectively bypassed Congress when he gave his chief 
negotiator Philip Habib pennission to pledge US forces to oversee a PLO withdrawal 
from Beirut, during the latter's peace negotiations in June and July of 1982. President 
Bush eschewed congressional consultation in a similar manner as he marshalled the 
international response to Iraq's incursion into Kuwait. Bush sanctioned staged 
deployments of US troops to the Persian Gulf at his own discretion, typically only 
informing Congress after the fact. Throughout these deployments, President Bush 
was also in touch with an array of national govermnents in an effort to ensure that US 
troops would not be the only ones lining up to face the Iraqi Army. In arranging for 
contingents of US troops to be sent to 'defend' Saudi Arabia, for example, Bush 
liaised with Saudi government and military officials as Congress remained largely in 
the dark, awaiting clarification from the White House as to how events were 
developing. Chapter 6 showed that in trying to craft an effective transatlantic 
response to the Bosnian conflict, President Clinton tethered America's Bosnia policy 
for nearly two-and-a-half years to the wishes of America's key European allies, 
France and Britain. With Clinton determined to maintain the Anglo-French 
commitment to UNPROFOR, the wishes of Congress - for a lifting of the arms 
embargo, for a US policy pathway which deviated away from the UN pathway, and 
for a more vigorous air-strike policy at certain times during the conflict - were 
repeatedly disregarded by the President. Furthennore, whilst Congress repeatedly 
demands that the an-ns embargo be lifted against the Bosnian Muslims - something 
Clinton repeatedly told legislators he would not do; he also vetoed a House bill aimed 
at formally ordering such a lifting - it is clear that Congress' marginalisation over 
Bosnia went deeper than even the most cynical legislators might have imagined. In 
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fact, both the Bush and the Clinton White Houses had known that anns were being 
shipped from Iran, via Croatia, to the Bosnian Muslims, in clear contravention of 
United Nations' arms embargo and without the knowledge of legislators, for some 
considerable time. Whilst this supply programme has justifiably been seen as a 
necessary lifeline to Bosnian Muslim forces and a major factor in keeping 'the 
Sarajevo government alive at a time when its survival hung by a thread', it is a clear 
example of how the White House can enjoy the monopoly on information vis-a-vis 
Congress. 
If it is what the President wants which typically steers the deployment of US 
forces, is also clear that the wishes of key foreign actors can sometimes define what it 
is that the President 'wants' at any given point in his engagement with a foreign 
conflict. What the elected political body in the United States may want at such times 
can be, if it does not match the President's wants, almost an irrelevance. Congress' 
wishes, especially if they are not being met by the President, may well underpin the 
heated executive-legislative debates on the crisis in question and may also do much to 
influence the media's take on the crisis and how the President is dealing with it. 
Nonetheless, this is clearly not the same as influencing the actual policyrnaking 
process itself 
How far is Congress able to challenge this White House imperiousness? The 
case studies show that Congress has tried to do so repeatedly throughout the post- 
Vietnam years. Legislators have been particularly insistent on their right to decision- 
making involvement because of their empowerments articulated in the 1973 War 
Powers Act. However, it is clear that Presidents have consistently pointed to their 
own empowerments and their assumed dominance of the interpretation of crises, in 
1 Holbrooke (1999), pp. 50-52. 
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order to exclude congressional input. In doing so, they have frequently rendered the 
War Powers Act meaningless. The Act clearly does represent a significant notional 
hurdle to the President's ability to dominate use-of-force decision-making since it 
permits congressional oversight over any US mission which might see US troops 
involved in 'hostilities', or indeed any situation in which hostilities are deemed to be 
'imminent'. Because of these stringent - and apparently specific - designations for 
legislative involvement in crises which may not see US forces involved in actual war- 
fighting operations, the enactment of the War Powers Act was initially regarded as 
something which would bring executive-legislative equivalence to deployment 
decision-making. This clearly has not happened. 
Presidents Reagan, Bush and Clinton all repeatedly rejected congressional 
demands to enact War Powers authority for Congress as they sought to commandeer 
America's responses to the crises in Lebanon, Kuwait and Bosnia. President 
Reagan's eventual agreeing to the enactment of the War Powers resolutions for the 
Lebanon deployment might perhaps be viewed as an example of a disgruntled 
Congress placing pressure on the White House and forcing a say in a major US 
military operation. In fact, the eventual involvement of Congress through its War 
Powers does not detract from the fact that Congress was not consulted on the two 
occasions that President Reagan actually sent the Marines to Beirut (the initial MNF 
deployment and then the re-deployment of the MNF after the refugee camp 
massacres). Such a perspective would also overlook one very significant thing: that 
Reagan's agreeing to bring the Lebanon deployment under War Powers authority was 
done at his own volition. In fact, this concession to Congress worked out very well 
for Reagan: not only did the War Powers agreement prompt Congress to grant Reagan 
an extended mission-time of 18 months for the deployment if he felt he needed it (a 
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significant period of time; possibly even longer than Reagan himself had envisioned 
the Marines would be in Lebanon for); the agreement between the White House and 
Congress was also broadly read as a tacit congressional approval of the deployment, 
thus minimising the chances that Congress could now reasonably criticise it or the 
President. This was a considerable boon to President Reagan at this point as the 
mission was becoming increasingly perilous and domestic unrest over the US 
presence in Beirut was growing. Reagan's actions may be deemed devious, even 
cynical, but they were also both inspired and timely, and they vividly demonstrate a 
President exercising his authority over Congress in the most enterprising manner. 
Rather than being a unique example, such presidential enterprise seems to be a 
somewhat common reflection both of how Presidents view their position vis-a-vis 
Congress and how they often only 'collaborate' with Congress if it suits them to do 
so. Indeed, even where a new President has espoused a genuine commitment to try 
and establish a more fruitful executive-legislative foreign policy relationship, it seems 
that the emergence of a foreign crisis inevitably undermines this commitment and 
produces a near-reflexive shift towards executive branch 'unilateralism' and 
presidential imperiousness. For example, after the bitter executive-legislative 
wrangling which had dogged the Bush presidency, there was a feeling that Bill 
Clinton would seek to smooth executive-legislative relations once he took office. 
Some commentators predicted that in the field of international affairs in particular, 
Clinton's approach would be in keeping with a Democratic party that had, in the wake 
of the Vietnam War, 'striven to restrain presidential aggrandizement in foreign 
policy'. However, as the Bosnia case study showed, Clinton's good intentions for a 
more positive White House engagement with Capitol Hill quickly evaporated as he 
strove to lead American policy on the major foreign policy issue of his presidency. 
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Indeed, Clinton's foreign policyrnaking was decried by some critics as being 
4positively Nixonian in its breadth and audacity'; Gene Healy goes as far as to say 
that by the end of his second term, the 'Imperial Presidency' was 'as unconstrained 
and as menacing as it had been at any time since the Vietnam War'. 2 
Whilst these accusations may well have considerable veracity and may do 
much to sustain criticisms of presidential unaccountability on the issue of deployment 
decision-making, it could also be argued that Congress is very much implicated in its 
own marginalisation. Indeed, the events detailed in the case studies do much to 
confirm this. Whilst a complex mixture of bipartisanship, deference to the 
presidency, and a collective commitment to the 'national interest' often stop the 
legislature from challenging Presidents too far as they seek to steer a US response to 
foreign crises, even strongly partisan legislatures who are committed to bringing the 
President to task over his policy overstretch frequently fail to manage this. The 
actions of the Republican-dominated 104 th Congress - detailed in chapter 6- provide 
perhaps the best example of this seeming legislative inability to seriously challenge 
the White House over crisis foreign policymaking. However, there is little to 
, guarantee that, even 
if it wanted to, an earnest Congress could actually assume this 
role on the issue of deploying US forces. The most pessimistic conclusion that one 
might draw from the executive-legislative interactions detailed in this study is that the 
democracy-sustaining processes of canvassing, commentary, debate and opposition 
certainly do evidence themselves at times when the President is contemplating force 
deployments - but that they do so almost ritualistically, and at the margins of the 
decision-making process itself 
2 Gene Healy, 'Arrogance of Power Reborn: The Imperial Presidency and Foreign Policy in the Clinton 
Years', CATO Policy Analysis, No. 3 89,13thDecember, 2000, The CATO Institute. Accessed 14 th 
March 2008, available at: http: //www. cato. org/pubs/pas/pa-389es. html 
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A rhetorical presidency 
The case studies also find that in the face of congressional demands for consultation 
and involvement, Presidents have been able to demonstrate and maintain their use-of- 
force dominance as much by what they say as by what they do. Presidents Reagan, 
Bush and Clinton all used forceful and deflective rhetoric in order to prevent 
congressional intrusion where they did not want it. During all three crises, it was the 
President himself - with his greater access to information and his acknowledged 
authority on any given crisis - who first designated the nature of the crisis, its 
significance to the United States and - consequently - why he should or should not 
sanction a military response to it. 
Having examined the rhetorical jousting which typically unfolds between the 
White House and Capitol Hill at such times, it seems clear that the President's 
rhetoric is also sufficient to render Congress' War Powers authority effectively 
impotent. In seeking to avoid what they clearly view as the unwelcome concession of 
having to include Congress in deployment-planning, Presidents have simply denied 
any need to enact the War Powers resolutions. Presidents Reagan, Bush and Clinton 
repeatedly declared that their consultations with Congress came under the auspices of 
their constitutional empowerynents as Commander-in-Chief and not through any 
obligation pertaining to the War Powers resolutions. This simple interpretation (one 
which was given considerable validation in the light of the 1983 Chadha Supreme 
Court ruling, which decreed legislative vetoes unconstitutional) clearly has significant 
implications for Congress' chances of having a say; it also amply demonstrates the 
3 
President's ability to ostracise Congress with one simple sentence of denial . All 
3 Grimmett, 1" May, 2007, pp. 8-9. 
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three Presidents examined in this study explicitly articulated that this was the only 
justification they needed for taking the actions they did. The President's 
interpretation of events is, it seems, near-definitive in heralding the role he envisions 
for Congress on any given crisis. 
Of the three deployments, White House stubbornness in refusing to enact War 
Powers authority for Congress was unifon-n. In only one of the three cases did the 
President agree to submit a deployment to this oversight. In this instance, the White 
House's admission that US forces were involved in 'hostilities' (the very 'action' 
which is meant to formally trigger congressional oversight under the War Powers Act) 
was a very long time in coming and - as discussed above - was only announced 
because the President in question (Reagan) saw fit to make the concession. Indeed, as 
he warded off Congress' efforts to enact War Powers authority over the Lebanon 
deployment, Reagan's obduracy in denying that 'hostilities' were present in Beirut 
reached quite absurd levels - he continued to deny 'hostilities' even as US Marines 
were involved in skin-nishes and were coming under attack in Beirut. Reagan's 
repeated denials of any need to submit the Marines' mission to congressional 
oversight was a glaring example of the President's interpretive dominance at such 
times and of how this dominance can be crucial in justifying policy. For Reagan, the 
equation was quite simple: all he needed to do was declare that 'hostilities are not 
imminent' and then, as far as he was concerned, that was that - there were no grounds 
to enact the War Powers resolutions. 
The exposure of these dynamics is not only intriguing; it also thoroughly 
vindicates the decision to focus upon Washington's public-political deployment 
debates, especially the rhetorical haggling which occurs between the White House and 
Capitol Hill when such a recourse is being proposed. This focus upon the debates as 
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well as the policyinaking process which they surround, effectively exposes not just 
how the Vietnam Syndrome typically manifests itself as the President contemplates 
his response to a foreign conflict; it also shows that the President's use-of-force 
dominance arises from both his willingness and ability to take the vital decisions and 
from his ability to assume interpretive dominance of the decision-making process. 
This interpretive dominance allows the President both to justify his chosen policy 
stances and repel legislative demands that he alter them. It may appear trite to assert 
that 'what the President says, goes' at such times; however this interpretation seems to 
be a most appropriate summary of the dynamics which exist in Washington DC, at 
times when the President is considering his response to a foreign conflict. 
The definitiveness of the White House's 'take' on a crisis is exposed in a 
different, but no less intriguing, way in chapter 6. A significant characteristic of the 
White House's response to the conflict in Bosnia Herzegovina was the way in which 
Presidents Bush and Clinton both seemed to 'use' the Vietnam Syndrome in their 
efforts to convince Americans that US forces should not be sent to Bosnia. However, 
this willingness to publicly accentuate the 'Vietnamness' of Bosnia promptly ceased 
when President Clinton decided to deploy US troops as part of the IFOR mission in 
late 1995. At this point, now trying to 'sell' a completely different stance on the 
crisis, the Clinton foreign policy team performed a similarly dramatic volte-face in its 
public diplomacy, promptly adopting the 'standard' White House practice of publicly 
rejecting Vietnam analogies ahead of a forthcoming force deployment. 
Put simply, this episode showed that when the Clinton White House wanted 
Americans to support the withholding of US troops from Bosnia, it compared the 
conflict to Vietnam; when it wanted them to support the deployment of US troops to 
Bosnia, it rejected those comparisons. America's willingness to accept these 
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glaringly contradictory depictions was far from vigorous; having done much to 
foment the 'Vietnam frenzy' over Bosnia, the Clinton administration's efforts to 
suddenly deny the 'Vietnamness' of Bosnia appeared almost mendacious and 
deployment- critics - notably on Capitol Hill - simply refused to be swayed by the 
White House's new-found interpretation of the crisis. However, the raucous buzzing 
of 'Vietnam radars' in Washington did not stop President Clinton Erom sending US 
troops into Bosnia. He may have failed to take public opinion with him but this did 
not stop the troops from being deployed. 
This episode clearly demonstrates that 'what the President says, go& at such 
times. The White House was able to offer an emotive interpretation of the crisis at 
one point and then blatantly reject that interpretation a short time later. Regardless 
how the American public-political arena responded to these incongruous 
interpretations, the President's policy proceeded apace. Given their seemingly 
unassailable dominance of this policy area, it seems that Presidents' deployment 
decisions will be implemented, even if the reasons given for those decisions appear 
unsound, inconsistent or unpersuasive. 
It is thus fair to conclude that whilst the emergence of the Vietnam Syndrome 
has undoubtedly 'raised the bar' in tenns of what the White House has to do in its 
efforts to win domestic support for force deployments during the post-Vietnam years, 
there is no evidence that the Syndrome has wrested deployment authority away from 
the White House. Nor does this study find any evidence to support the notion that an 
ascendant post-Vietnam Congress has made 'spectacular inroads' into the making of 
US foreign policy - at least on the most serious policy 
decision of all; deploying US 
troops. 4 In fact, any notion of executive-legislative equivalence on this issue has been 
Foley & Owens (1996), p. 373. 
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unambiguously refuted. The study clearly demonstrates that it is not just in the 
conceptualising and taking of use-of-force decisions that Presidents have continued to 
dominate this policy area. Perhaps a less evident aspect of the 'Imperial Presidency' 
is the extent to which it is a 'rhetorical presidency', one which sees the President's 
use-of-force dominance evidence itself not just in his willingness and ability to take 
deployment decisions but also - inextricably linked - in the way in which his 
interpretive dominance is such a central element in the execution of these decisions. 
US Presidents, the Vietnam Syndrome and the steering of post-Vietnam US 
foreign policy 
Despite the President's continuing dominance of the processes which see US forces 
deployed to foreign conflicts, and despite the fact that the Vietnam Syndrome has not 
stopped willing Presidents from sanctioning this action throughout the post-Vietnam 
years, there is little doubt that post-Vietnam Presidents have been considerably 
influenced by the Syndrome. Not only has the Vietnam Syndrome been pivotal in 
shaping the visions that some Presidents have articulated for their presidencies; it has 
also been a concern for the White House as it has deliberated the ramifications of, and 
strategies for, using military force. 
It is clearly not just at times when they have deployed US forces that 
American Presidents have deemed it necessary to acknowledge and address the 
Vietnam Syndrome. The Cold War did much to place the Vietnam experience at the 
very heart of the presidential agenda. Presidents Reagan and Bush were both Cold 
War Presidents (although the Cold War was over by the time President Bush 
responded to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait) and the imperatives of the standoff against 
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Moscow were highly influential in making these men view the eradication of the 
Vietnam Syndrome as a key objective of their presidencies. Like many post-Vietnam 
conservatives, both Reagan and Bush viewed the Vietnam Syndrome as a debilitating 
national weakness at a time when a strong, confident United States was fundamental 
to defeating the threat of international Communism. For Bill Clinton, the first 
President to take office without the guiding parameters and imperatives of the Cold 
War, the dispelling of Vietnam's shadows seemed to be of less importance in defining 
a broad vision for his presidency. Nevertheless, like both his predecessors, the 
Vietnam experience did much to frame how he was viewed as a President, even 
before he won office. 
In some ways, the ending of the Cold War rendered much of the 'anti- 
Syndrome' forces' mission redundant. Absent the Soviet threat, there initially 
appeared to be no need to uphold Americans' tacit deployment-readiness. If 
Vietnam's shadows were still stifling Americans' willingness to support the use of US 
forces, then it seemed that these anxieties were now of less significance to the White 
House. Absent the threat from Moscow, and with the United States now the world's 
sole remaining superpower, it was hard to imagine what threats might induce 
Americans' Vietnam-fears in the 'new world order'. Even so, any possibility that the 
Vietnam Syndrome could now rest in peace was quickly dispelled by the passage of 
international events. President Bush quickly found that, to a substantial degree, 
nothing much had actually changed for the Commander-in-Chief, he still had to take 
difficult deployment decisions and there was still strident opposition to force 
deployments from within the American public-political arena. Indeed, the post-Cold 
War period was barely underway before Bush found himself publicly battling the 
Vietnam Syndrome as he responded to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. 
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Whilst Vietnam's shadows have underpinned domestic deployment-opposition 
throughout the post-Vietnam years, these shadows have also hung heavily over White 
House deployment decision-making throughout the same period. Indeed, White 
House deployment planning has consistently been dominated by two key emphases: 
mission brevity and casualty avoidance. Even Ronald Reagan, the champion of the 
'anti-Syndrome forces', had these imperatives etched all over his Lebanon 
deployment. Beginning with his acceding to the Pentagon's request to prematurely 
withdraw the first MNF contingent from Lebanon (even although they had been in the 
country for only half of their mandated 30-day mission), Reagan rejected, at several 
points, the opportunity to increase the US military presence on the ground inside 
Lebanon. His military 'escalations' came in the form that would come to be an 
increasingly preferred option for US military planners throughout the post-Vietnam 
years - bombardments from sea and air. 
The bloody finale to the US mission in Lebanon ensured that an even more 
cautious approach to force deployments would be evident in the White House's post- 
Lebanon deployment decisions. It is probably not overstating it to say that the 1983 
bombing of the Marine barracks at Beirut airport set in motion what can only be 
described as the entrenchment of the Vietnam Syndrome into executive branch use- 
of-force thinking throughout the 1980s and beyond. This disastrous ending to an ill- 
defined Lebanon mission enshrined in the collective mindset of the American foreign 
policy establishment that US military operations should be short, have clearly defined 
goals, a clear exit strategy and - whilst any mission was underway - employ massive 
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firepower in order to maximise the chances of eradicating proximal dangers to 
American troops. 5 
If there was a chance that Lebanon's 'lessons' would be lost due to the 
relatively quick turnover of 'civilian' administrations coming in and out of 
government every four years, career military figures in the Pentagon were determined 
that American troops should never be compromised again by what they viewed as the 
fickle concerns of the civilian leadership. Within the military hierarchy, the Lebanon 
experience came to represent a mini-Vietnam lesson' which, if the real Vietnam had 
not done so, should teach civilian policymakers, once and for all, what prudent use-of- 
force decision-making was all about. Whilst the imperatives and pressures of 
international politics have at times seemed to render these 'lessons' impractical or 
inappropriate to civilian policy practitioners, successive military chiefs have striven to 
ensure that they have not been forgotten. Indeed, the military has consistently seen 
itself, and acted, as a pillar of caution in deployment planning and it has ensured that 
both Vietnam's and Lebanon's shadows have continued to hang over the military 
planning table as civilian leaders have deliberated the pros and cons of deploying US 
forces. As this study has shown, General Colin Powell stands out as an example of a 
senior military practitioner who has sought to infuse White House use-of-force 
thinking with this caution throughout the post-Vietnam years. However, Powell's 
predecessors advocated just this caution as they advised President Reagan against 
involving US troops in the Lebanese conflict. 6 Presidents have thus not always 
listened to the military chiefs, even if they have been left in no doubt as to their 
deployment recommendations. 
5 Author interview with former State Department official, Dr William Schneider Jr. Washington DC, 
I Oh May, 2006. 
6 PBS Frontline interview with Colin Powell accessed 29/03/06) at: 
http: //www. pbs. org/wgbh/pages/frontline/gulf/oral/powell/l. html 
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The Lebanon experience undoubtedly nourished the Vietnam Syndrome and it 
underpinned the obsession with mission-brevity and casualty avoidance which 
governed subsequent US force deployments. Furthermore, this 'obsession' has had a 
significant influence on the types of conflict that the post-Lebanon White House has 
been willing to send US forces to. Whilst the amenability of the terrain and the 
mediocrity of the Iraqi army doubtless dispelled some of President Bush's fears over 
sending US forces to the Persian Gulf, the nature of the military offensive he ordered 
clearly reflected the various concerns associated with the Vietnam Syndrome. Bush's 
clear willingness to engage Iraq militarily was castigated by domestic critics as a 
reincarnation of the hubris which led the United States into Vietnam in the first place; 
however, the plan he sanctioned for US military operations in the Gulf was dominated 
by his desire that there would be no repeat of America's military experience in that 
country. Operation Desert Storm was crafted with a laser-like focus on casualty- 
limitation, modest mission parameters, a clear attainable exit strategy and on attaining 
intemational legitimacy for the use of force. The conceptualising of Operation Desert 
Storm also demonstrated other factors which maximised the chances of quick, 
publicly supportable success. Ensuring that there were sufficient accompanying 
allies, but in modest numbers and in relatively peripheral roles, meant that the White 
House could effectively dictate the ten-ns of the offensive but still justify domestically 
its use of force by pointing to the legitimising presence of a supportive international 
coalition. 
Whilst there were supportive allies and legitimacy, many of the other key 
ingredients were absent as the West sought to make a telling intervention in Bosnia's 
war. If Iraq's invasion of Kuwait allowed the White House and the Pentagon to plan 
and execute 'the perfect war against the perfect enemy' in the flat expanses of the 
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Persian Gulf, Bosnia's conflict was viewed very differently from the White House 
and it set Vietnam radars buzzing in the Oval Office itself. 7 Not only did it initially 
appear to be devoid of any obvious US national interests; its complexity, its ferocity 
and the terrain on which the fighting was taking place meant that attaining the 
prerequisite quick, decisive victory looked extremely difficult. Firstly, it would likely 
require a significant commitment of ground troops. Secondly, with three warring 
sides, it was unclear which of these sides would be the main 'target' in any offensive 
military intervention. Thirdly, even if a decisive victory could be attained, it would 
not necessarily eradicate all hostilities. US planners might then be faced with the 
'410 cl. ice of either having to stay in the region to fight a frustrating, possibly 
damaging, 
low-intensity guerrilla war, or withdraw, unable to claim 'decisive victory' because 
the hostilities were clearly still ongoing, albeit at a lower level. 
In short, the ominous ambiguities of the Bosnian War simply could not 
overcome the Vietnam Syndrome sensitivities in the White House and the Pentagon. 
Consequently, President Clinton's deliberations over how to engage with the crisis 
centred around one key question: what strategy, short of deploying USforces, stands 
the best chance of halting the hostilities? Indeed, despite the fact that the Clinton 
administration toYed with the idea of ordering a ground intervention at several points, 
intervention-advocacy in the Clinton White House was never anything more than 
tentative. Clinton's prefeffed option was always to play the 'safe card', emphasising 
a policy reliant upon air-power to halt the Serbian onslaught and ruling out ground 
intervention until there was a formal cessation of hostilities. Only then did he send 
US troops into Bosnia, with enough firepower, with sufficiently robust rule-of- 
engagement, and with such a restricted mandate, that they had an optimal chance of 
7 Sobel (200 1), p. 154; Roper (2000), p. 173. 
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avoiding trouble. 8 This cautious stance from Clinton, in the face of Europe's 
bloodiest conflict since the Second World War, may well have 'shattered the world's 
confidence in American leadership and power' - however, it also ensured that US 
troops did not find themselves in 'another Vietnam' and it kept Clinton's 1996 
election hopes alive. 9 Such are the choices that Presidents must make and such are 
the imperatives which steer Presidents' use-of-force decisions. 
The White House's engagement with the Bosnian War was also significant for 
another reason - the Bush and Clinton administrations' public 'use' of the Vietnam 
Syndrome in order to justify the prolonged policy of withholding US troops. It was 
President Bush himself who first did this and his public allusion to the Vietnam 
experience was not just a significant volte-face from his declaration about the 
Syndrome's demise in the aftermath of Operation Desert Storm in January 1991 - it 
also marked a watershed moment in post-Vietnam American foreign policymaking in 
that it was thefirst time that a President had wielded the very 'weapon' that had been 
wielded against Presidents throughout the post-Vietnam years. 
The White House's willingness to publicly play on Americans' Vietnam 
sensitivities during the Bosnian War shows that whilst political and media 
commentary has often given the impression that the Vietnam Syndrome is an 
affliction which many Americans involuntarily succumb to at times when US forces 
are to be deployed, the 'status' of the Syndrome is in fact as dynamic, nuanced and 
exploitable as the political process it infuses. Political actors in the United States - 
including Presidents themselves - are vividly aware that America's Vietnam 
experience remains an emotive 'conceptual weapon', one which has the potential to 
darken Americans' views of a foreign conflict and America's obligation to it. 
8 Interview with General George Joulwan (USA, retired), Arlington, Virginia, II 
th May 2006. 
9 Chollet (2005), p. 1. 
313 
Presidents Bush and Clinton, their administrations, and the military chiefs clearly 
recognised this and proved themselves all too willing to 'use' the Vietnam Syndrome 
in their efforts to justify staying at the periphery of Bosnia's hostilities. Because of 
this, by December 1995, the Vietnam Syndrome was as conspicuous as it had been at 
the height of the Carter presidency. 
A continuing Vietnam Syndrome? 
Whilst it is perhaps unwise to try to draw definitive conclusions from just three case 
studies, it is possible to draw upon the events examined in order to make some 
infon-ned judgements as to what they portend for the foreseeable future of deployment 
decision-making in Washington DC. It is safe to make four assumptions. Firstly, the 
White House will continue to be presented with opportunities to deploy US forces to 
foreign conflicts. Secondly, the White House will continue to dictate whether and 
how these deployments happen. Thirdly, crises which have a clear interest for the 
presiding administration and which look least likely to contravene the parameters 
steered by the Vietnam Syndrome (namely, operations which allow US forces to 
operate unilaterally, with an 'overwhelming force' approach and towards a 
realistically achievable goal) are most likely to invite a US military response. 
Fourthly, and significantly, the Vietnam experience will continue to loom large over 
these processes. 
Much has been made of the 'lessons' which might be drawn from the Vietnam 
War; indeed, it is usually Vietnam's ostensible lessons that Americans politicians, 
journalists and other elite actors are voicing as they articulate their stance on US force 
deployments. However, given the broad - and perhaps natural - assumption that 
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America should have learned something from Vietnam, this study suggests that 
whatever Vietnam's 'lessons' may be, many of the key elements associated with the 
Vietnam failure are still very much in place. Because of this, the characteristics and 
controversies of America's force deployments exposed in this study will likely 
continue into the foreseeable future. 
The steering of America's Vietnam policy, and the secrecy of much of that 
policy, appeared to diminish America's acceptance of the power bestowed upon the 
President. As Brian Balogh notes, it also soured America's trust in the 'experts' and 
'elites' who surrounded and advised him, and who were broadly implicated in the 
conceptualisation and execution of the Vietnam endeavour. However, if one key 
'lesson' of the Vietnam experience was that America's foreign policyinaking had to 
be more democratically accountable, it seems clear that this has not happened. The 
legislature's efforts to rein in the President's authority in this area have been almost 
wholly unsuccessful. Similarly, the 'experts' and elites so heavily implicated in the 
Vietnam failure have, since Vietnam, actually become more firmly entrenched in 
executive branch foreign policy making. As this study has shown, they work closely 
with the President and they enjoy a decision-making influence that elected legislators 
simply do not. 10 
If these 'experts' consistently oversaw successful use-of-force initiatives, then 
it is conceivable that public concerns over US forces deployments would perhaps 
dissipate somewhat. However, whilst the rising culture of 'civilian militarism' in 
executive branch foreign policymaking in the United States has consistently been 
rationalised as a way to 'render policymaking more scientific and less political', 
White House deployment decision-making has in fact consistently shown a dearth of 
10 Balogh (2000), p. 39; Stone (2002), pp. 7& 376. 
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such precision. " The events detailed in this study overwhelmingly suggest that 
deployment decision-making remains an extemporized undertaking, carried out by 
men and women whose apparent 'expertise' frequently struggles in the face of the 
complexities and pressures thrown up by trying to plan - and publicly 'sell' - 
effective military initiatives in a liberal democracy. Indeed, the 'performances' of the 
foreign policy teams examined in this study are a vivid reminder that statecraft is a 
human activity and subject to very human characteristics and fai ings. 12 
Thus, whilst Yuen Foong Khong is perhaps correct in observing that the 
Vietnam experience has forced presidential administrations to ask themselves 
'tougher questions' about the use of military force, the fact remains that those asking 
the questions have continued to operate in the same policyrnaking bubble they did 
during the Vietnam years. 13 The figure leading them - the President - continues to 
command the same discretionary authority over the use of US forces and a near- 
unassailable interpretive dominance of the events and implications of any crisis that 
the White House might see fit to respond to. And, as the Beirut and Mogadishu 
setbacks demonstrate, the presidential 'inner-circle' has remained just as vulnerable to 
ordering ill-fated military strategies. 
14 Whilst there is undoubtedly a more intrusive 
media culture nowadays (ostensibly offering greater scrutiny of these processes and of 
the men and women steering them), it seems that the use-of-force decision-making 
pathways which were so heavily implicated in the Vietnam fiasco are still largely in 
place. The 'checks and balances' which did not stop Presidents Johnson or Nixon 
have not, it seems, checked their successors when they have seen fit to use force. 
" Stone (2002), pp. 7 &376. 
12 Robert Jackson (2000), The Global Covenant. Human Conduct in a World ofStates. Oxford 
University Press, pp. 30-3 1. 
13 Yuen Foong Khong (1992), Analogies at War. Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu and the Vietnam 
Decisions of 1965. Princeton University Press, p. 26 1. 
14 This is not to suggest, of course, that the Beirut and Mogadishu setbacks were on a par with the 
setback the United States experienced in Vietnam. 
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Indeed, sceptics might question if any-thing significant has actually changed since 
Vietnam. 
But could it be any other way? Could the use of US military forces be made 
4 more democratic'9 Could deployment decision-making authority be spread more 
evenly between the executive and the legislature? Realistically, the answer is 
probably 'no'. The consensus within both military and political circles remains that 
effective deployment decision-making is best managed by an informed and 
empowered few, despite the fact that this clearly contravenes the norms which are 
typically idealised in most liberal democratic societies. Indeed, this study has shown 
that this acceptance may even be evident in the collective mindset of legislators on 
Capitol Hill. Even at times when Congress has appeared to be vigorous in wanting to 
challenge presidential use-of-force decisions, legislators have consistently 
demonstrated an unwillingness to undermine either the White House or America's 
credibility, and have consequently pushed the President only so far. Even when 
legislators appeared to be at their most adversarial in the thirteen-year period 
examined in this study, there always seemed to be a line beyond which they would not 
cross in challenging the President. 
Thus whilst it does, to a large degree, appear to contravene the deeply- 
ingrained liberal democratic expectations within the United States (expectations 
which appeared to be greatly reinvigorated by the Vietnam experience), the 
convention of White House dominance of US force deployments is highly unlikely to 
change. ' 5 Since it is executive branch unilateralism which seems to prompt much of 
15 One of the ironies of the criticisms that Presidents persistently face for the single-mindedness of their 
deployment decisions is that if a President were to announce an imminent force deployment and then 
backtrack from that position due to a lack of domestic support for the deployment in question or 
because of high levels of domestic criticism, he would likely be broadly lambasted by various political, 
media and public figures within the United States. Critics would doubtless criticise him not only 
for 
demonstrating weakness in such an important policy area but also for compromising the integrity of his 
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the domestic criticism of, and opposition to, US force deployments, it is certain that 
these events will continue to be contested; not just because war and military 
intervention are inherently dangerous and unpredictable, but also because the decision 
to deploy US troops will continue to be taken by an executive elite centred in the 
White House. 
If the controversy which accompanies force deployments is certain to 
continue, it is also overwhelmingly likely that the Vietnam experience will continue 
to provide the thematic platform for this controversy. There is every reason to suspect 
that the Vietnam experience will continue to be invoked by political, media and elite 
actors in the United States at times when the President is proposing to deploy US 
forces. As long as these actors view the invoking of America's Vietnam experience 
as either a genuinely pertinent example as to why US forces should not be deployed, 
or as an emotive 'conceptual weapon' which has the capacity to sway opinion and 
undermine the President when he is taking deployment decisions, the Vietnam 
experience will continue to be the subject of choice for America's domestic 
deployment-opponents. Combined, these factors suggest not just the likely longevity 
of the Vietnam Syndrome itself, they also make it overwhelmingly likely that the 
perspectives, arguments, decisions and criticisms exposed in this study will continue 
to evidence themselves as the White House responds to conflicts in the future. 
office and - in ordering a deployment and then changing his mind - treating the armed 
forces with a 
worrying lack of respect. Such a u-tum would undoubtedly raise serious questions about that 
President's capabilities and about his policy conviction. 
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